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ABSTRACT 
This thesis describes and analyses the progress and development of 
ironmaking a t Consett between 1840-1940. The main body of the thesis i s 
the 
however devoted to period 1864-1914. and examines the hypothesis that there was 
a f a i l u r e i n entrepreneurial a b i l i t y i n the l a t e V i c t o r i a n economy. 
Chapter I provides the background to the foundation of large scale 
iron-making a t Consett, and also i l l u s t r a t e s the r i s k s involved i n creating 
large enterprises i n an age of unlimited l i a b i l i t y . Chapter I I deals with 
the c a p i t a l i s a t i o n of the Consett Iron Company, Limited,between 1864-1914* 
The f i n a n c i a l performance of the Company can then be examined with regard to 
the structure of ownership and the extent of the Company's c a p i t a l i s a t i o n . 
As Consett was an integrated concern from the outset, i t s development has been 
treated through the examination of inputs, culminating i n the f i n a l output of 
iron and s t e e l . 
Chapter I I I therefore describes the Company's search for iron ore supplies 
through the period, examining the reasons for s h i f t s i n location from which ore 
was supplied, and also highlighting the comparative f a i l u r e of the Company' 3 
management to secure a new source during the Edwardian decade. 
Chapters IV and V deal with the firm's coal-mining a c t i v i t i e s . The former 
traces the growth of demand and the Company's foresight i n acquiring large 
new coal t r a c t s . Chapter V then examines the problems on the supply side 
created by the c o n f l i c t between the industry's naturally diminishing returns 
and the quality of management and labour e f f o r t . 
Chapter VI, V I I and V I I I look at the iron and s t e e l producing a c t i v i t i e s . 
The f i r s t simply traces the changing technology, from a qualitative viewpoint. 
The impact of t h i s Chapter i s heightened by the quantitative evidence on 
the changing r e a l costs of iron and s t e e l manufacture, which are presented i n 
Appendix G . l . Chapter V I I examines the demand for the Company's iron 
and s t e e l products, and the methods for marketing them. Chapter V I I I 
concludes the main body of the thesis by enquiring into the Company1s labour 
re l a t i o n s , and also the structure, training and personalities of the 
management. 
F i n a l l y Chapter DC examines the fortunes of the Company during the 
Great War and the d i f f i c u l t inter-war years. This exercise helps to 
emphasise the decline i n managerial vigour which took place during the 
Edwardian era. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For many decades, economists and historians have been fascinated 
by the causes of the retardation of i n d u s t r i a l growth i n the l a t e 
V ictorian and Edwardian periods. This debate has centred upon the 
entrepreneur for sometime, for i t i s he who originates and directs the v i t a l 
input of i n d u s t r i a l growth, e n t e r p r i s e / 1 ^ This input, we "are led to 
believe, was uncommonly scarce i n B r i t a i n a f t e r the 1870*s, i n contrast 
(2) 
to i t s r e l a t i v e abundance i n Germany and the United States. 
I n the l a t e 19th Century and i n B r i t a i n h e r s e l f at an e a r l i e r period 
the s c a r c i t y of enterprise dampened the propensity to innovate, and so 
the rate of technical progress slowed down, and the r e a l costs of production 
began to l e v e l o f f . The climacteric for the growth of productivity has been 
established either i n the 1870's or the l 8 9 0 * s ; ^ both may be correct. 
D.J. Coppock shows that a period of sustained productivity growth preceded the 
(4) 
1870's, whereupon productivity growth i n B r i t a i n began to slow down. 
However, h i s evidence does not contradict that of Phelps Brown and 
Handfield-Jones who observed a further break i n the 1890*3, when productivity 
(5) 
growth and r e a l income per capita stagnated. 
Can t h i s decline i n the rate at which productivity was growing be 
necessarily traced back to the men i n command, the entrepreneurs? I n the 
(1) D.H. Aldcroft, "The Entrepreneur and the B r i t i s h Economy, 1870-1914," 
Economic History Review. 2nd Ser. XVII (1964-65), pp. 113-134. 
(2) Ibid.,pp. 9134-35. 
(3) D.J. Coppock, "The Climacteric of the 1890*3 A C r i t i c a l Note," 
The Manchester School. XXIV (1956) pp. 1-29; E.H. Phelps Brown 
and S.J. Handfield-Jones, "The Climacteric of the 1890's : A Study i n 
the expanding Economy," Oxford Economic Papers, New Series IV (1952), 
pp. 266-307. 
(4) D.J. Coppock, op.cit.,p.7. 
(5) E.H. Phelps Brown and S.J. Handfield-Jones, op.cit.,p.27l. 
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case of the iron and s t e e l industry some writers c l e a r l y think so. 
Professor Duncan Burn claims that: 
"The B r i t i s h makers were l e s s well equipped than t h e i r r i v a l s to 
judge the commercial prospects of innovations while they were i n 
an experimental stage, or to forecast the trend of technical 
change and therefore to be prepared f or i t . " ^ ^ 
Burnham and Hoskins; have been much more e x p l i c i t i n thei r c r i t i c i s m 
of entrepreneurship: 
" I f a business deteriorates i t i s of no use blaming anyone except 
those at the top, and i f an industry declines r e l a t i v e l y f a s t e r 
than unfavourable external and uncontrollable factors lead one to 
expect, the weakness can only be attributable to those who are 
(7) 
i n control of i t s a c t i v i t i e s . " ' 
However, t h i s c r i t i c a l view of the entrepreneur i n iron and s t e e l has 
of l a t e been under attack. D.N. McCloskey concludes h is examination into 
the entrepreneurial performance of the Victorians thus: 
"Late Vi c t o r i a n entrepreneurs i n iron and s t e e l did not f a i l . By 
any cogent measure of performance, i n f a c t they did very well 
i n d e e d . " ^ 
In a s i m i l a r vein, though not absolving the entrepreneur from 
'stup i d i t i e s or f a i l i n g , ' Peter Temin a s s e r t s , "there i s l i t t l e reason to 
give prominence to the inadequacies of B r i t i s h industry or i n d u s t r i a l i s t s i n 
(6) D. Burn, The Economic History of Steelmaking, (Cambridge, 1961) p.297. 
(.3) T.H. Burnham and G.O. Hoskins, Iron and Ste e l i n B r i t a i n . 1870-1930. 
(London, 1943) p.271. 
(8) D.N. McCloskey, Economic Maturity and Entrepreneurial Decline : 
B r i t i s h Iron and Steel 1870-1913. (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis 
University of Chicago, 1970) p.142. 
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(9) an explanation of the fortunes of the B r i t i s h s t e e l industry. ' 
the of Temin argues that ^ demise suffered by B r i t a i n was a consequencejslowly 
growing markets, compared with Germany and the U.S.A. 
Thus on the one hand there i s a school arguing that the r e l a t i v e 
decline i n the B r i t i s h s t e e l industry was induced by the inadequacies of the 
management, whilst the r i v a l school maintains that e x t e r n a l i t i e s imposed 
such limitations upon the growth of the industry that the scope for 
innovation was severely c u r t a i l e d . The opinions of the former have been 
l i b e r a l l y absorbed as an example of entrepreneurial degeneracy i n the 
documentation of the evidence against the Victorian businessman.^"^ 
Interpretations of the coal industry's performance i n the same 
period are equally diverse. The years a f t e r the middle of the 1880's saw a 
steady decline i n labour productivity i n B r i t i s h coal-mining. I n an 
extractive industry diminishing returns are only to be expected at some 
stage. However, Professor A.J. Taylor has argued that the extent of the 
decline cannot be explained by unfavourable geological conditions alone. 
Coal-mining too suffered from the malaise of conservatism amongst i t s 
leadership, and an o v e r a l l lack of v i s i o n : 
"Failure to take f u l l advantage of the economies of scale both at 
the entrepreneurial and operational l e v e l reduced the industry's 
o v e r a l l e f f i c i e n c y and i n so doing also r e s t r i c t e d i t s competitive 
(9) P. Temin, "The Relative Decline of the B r i t i s h Steel Industry, 1880-
1913," i n I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n i n Two Systems, Edited by H. Rosovsky 
(New York, 1966) p.155- " 
(10) I b i d . p.141. 
(11) D.S. Landes, "Technological Change and Development i n Western Europe, 
1750-1914," The Cambridge Economic History. VI (Cambridge, 1965) 
p. 563; D.J. Coppoek, op.cit. p*27. 
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capacity i n r e l a t i o n to a German r i v a l who not only saw the advantages of 
( 1 2 ) 
integration but was quick to make use of them". 
Once more D.N. McCloskey has provided a counter-blow, since the 
differences i n resource endowment between the U.S.A. and B r i t a i n could 
e a s i l y explain the difference i n labour productivity. He concludes that: 
"The case f o r a f a i l u r e of masters and men i n B r i t i s h coal-mining 
before 1913, i n short, i s vulnerable to a most damaging c r i t i c i s m ; 
there was c l e a r l y no f a i l u r e of p r o d u c t i v i t y . " ( ^ ) 
This contest i n the interpretation of h i s t o r i c a l data remains 
unresolved. Against the entrepreneur there i s an extensive qu a l i t a t i v e 
l i t e r a t u r e , both contemporary and h i s t o r i c a l , ^ ^ w hilst i n h i s support 
there are both the quantitative and qualitative studies i n the s t y l e of 
McCloskey and Charles Wilson. ' 
The present study w i l l attempt to bring together a qualitative 
description of management, and the decisions i t made, with a measurement of 
the performance of the Company as a r e s u l t of these decisions. The object 
(12) A.J.Taylor, "The Coal Industry," i n The Development of B r i t i s h 
Industry and Foreign Competition 1375-1914, Edited by D.H. Aldcroft 
(London, 1968) pp. 67-68, 
(13) D.N. McCloskey, "International differences i n productivity? Coal 
and Steel i n America and B r i t a i n before World War I , " i n Essays on a 
Mature Economy; B r i t a i n a f t e r 1840, Edited by D.N. McCloskey (London, 
1971) P.295. 
(14) A. Shadwell, I n d u s t r i a l E f f i c i e n c y : A Comparative Study of I n d u s t r i a l 
L i f e i n England, Germany and America, (London, 1909)? A.L. Levine, 
I n d u s t r i a l Retardation i n B r i t a i n , 1880-1914, (London, 1967). 
(15) C. Wilson, "Economy and Society i n Late Vi c t o r i a n England," Economic 
History Review. 2nd Ser. X V I I I (1965). 
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of study i s the Consett Iron Company, an integrated coal, coke, iron 
and s t e e l producer. The Company rose out of the ruins 
of the Northumberland and Durham D i s t r i c t Bank, and the Derwent Iron Company, 
i n 1864. The following years were of unbroken prosperity for the 
owners of the concern. 
"In the f i r s t half century of i t s history, the company always 
made a p r o f i t and never paid a dividend below 7^ per cent, and then 
only i n the early years 1867-69; dividends of 33i» 40, 50 or even 60 
per cent were not uncommon, while the average dividend over the 
period 1864 to 1914 was about 23^ per c e n t . " ^ ^ 
The ownership was from the outset broad, and although certain families 
provided a succession of Directors, the Company could never be described 
as family controlled. 
Though p r o f i t a b i l i t y i s of paramount importance to the shareholder, 
i t does not neces s a r i l y provide a good indicator of i n d u s t r i a l and economic 
ef f i c i e n c y i n the u t i l i z a t i o n of resources. I t has therefore been necessary 
to adopt some other, measuring rods of performance. For coal-mining, the 
average product of labour between 1896-1914 has been used i n conjunction 
with information on geological conditions i n the p i t s , and the rates pa i d 
to the miners. I n l i g h t of th i s the rate of adoption of new techniques i s 
examined. On the iron and s t e e l side, a measure of the r e a l costs of 
production i s used to see how these changed over time. This i s supported 
by a descriptive account of the developments i n the iron and s t e e l works. 
(16) H.W. Richardson and J.M. Bass, "The P r o f i t a b i l i t y of the Consett Iron 
Company Before 1914," Business History, V I I , (1965) p.72. 
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However cer t a i n factors defy quantification, p a r t i c u l a r l y the 
relationship of management with suppliers, employees and customers. The 
company owed much of i t s success to the a b i l i t y shown by i t s managers i n 
negotiating supplies and i n adopting and maintaining a sound sales policy. 
As a further t e s t of a firm's success, i t i s important to remember 
that a possible source of the exceptional p r o f i t a b i l i t y was may be 
monopoly power. The Market i n which Consett operated w i l l be examined 
to ascertain whether the Company had either monopoly or monopsony power. 
I f such power existed i t would have contributed to p r o f i t a b i l i t y , whilst 
detering innovation and technical improvement. 
The study follows the Company through by way of inputs, that i s f i r s t 
looking at the sources and nature of c a p i t a l i s a t i o n , the supply of iron ore, 
coal, coke &c, and culminating i n the examination of iron and s t e e l production, 
markets and labour. 
Though one cannot extend any conclusions drawn i n a single firm 
study to an industry as a whole, ce r t a i n limited generalizations might 
safe l y be made. F i r s t l y , i t i s possible to rank productive operations at Consett 
amongst the best-practice techniques available, a t l e a s t up to 1900. Thus 
the entrepreneurial vigour of the Company's management kept the firm 
at the forefront during the expansionary years of the open-hearth process. 
As Consett was the largest producer of s t e e l for the shipbuilding 
industry, t h i s weights i t s contribution of entrepreneurial talent to t h i s 
sector of the s t e e l industry, quite heavily. Secondly, some of the problems 
encountered by Consett were common to a l l s t e e l producers, p a r t i c u l a r l y labour 
relati o n s and the supply of iron ore. Therefore, as i n many instances the 
producers acted i n concert Consett s success or f a i l u r e i n tackling such 
problems, probably f a i r l y r e f l e c t s the success and f a i l u r e of other interested 
s t e e l producers. 
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However, there were p a r t i c u l a r problems, possibly unique to Consett, 
such as the question of location and space for expansion. This i s the simplest 
case of the past heritage constraining the options open to a company at any 
moment of time i n the future. The study of the development of other iron and 
s t e e l companies might well show that they too suffered s i m i l a r problems. 
I n the f i n a l Chapter IX there i s a c e r t a i n amount of i m p l i c i t comparison, 
i n so f a r as the development up to 1914 can be seen i n a clearer perspective. 
Though the interwar years proved most d i f f i c u l t for the Company, they induced 
a new approach to business. The shrinkage of t r a d i t i o n a l markets meant the 
Company had to adopt a more positive approach to the disposal of i t s products. 
P r i o r to 1914 marketing had remained a low i n t e n s i t y operation, geared primarily 
to the smooth functioning of e x i s t i n g markets, rather than to the creation of 
new ones. 
I n surveying the o v e r a l l performance i n a l l these ways, i t i s c l e a r that the 
Consett Iron Company exhibited evidence of a climacteric i n i t s own development 
i n the l a t e 1890's, though i t i s not possible to say much about the 1870's. 
However, i t i s u n l i k e l y that there was much growth i n productivity i n the twenty 
years preceding 1870 because of the uncertainty with which the^ronworks 
operated during that period. ! 
I t i s hoped that t h i s study w i l l i l l u s t r a t e that the Victorian entrepreneur 
was not n e c e s s a r i l y the i l l - q u a l i f i e d amateur that he has been painted; and that 
contemporary and retrospective c r i t i c i s m have done a grave disservice to the 
endeavour and a b i l i t y of these businessmen. The decline i n the rates of r e a l 
growth i n a l l i n d u s t r i a l nations a f t e r 1900 probably supports Temin 1s hypothesis 
that the development and growth of the market determines the quality of 
entrepreneurship, and also Habakkuk's observation: "Great generals are not 
V I I I -
made i n time of peace; great entrepreneurs are not made i n non-expanding 
(17) 
i n d u s t r i e s . " 
(17) P. Temin, op.cit.,p.155; H.J. Habukkuk, American and B r i t i s h Technology 
i n the 19th Century, (Cambridge, 1962) p.212. 
CHAPTER 1 
THE ORIGIN OF THE CONSETT IRON COMPANY 1840 - 1864 
Introduction 
During the period between 1830 - 1870, the ironmasters of 
Great B r i t a i n were able to exploit rapidly developing markets, both 
at home and abroad, i n the refreshing atmosphere of free-trade. 
Production of pig iron i n B r i t a i n rose from j u s t under one m i l l i o n 
tons (per annum) to s l i g h t l y over f i v e m i l l i o n . ^ The growth of 
these years followed c l o s e l y the demand created by the booms i n 
railway construction throughout the world. However, i t was not a period 
without i t s own sp e c i a l problems: there were marked depressions i n each 
(2) 
decade, usually caused by the over optimism of the ironmasters. ' 
Entrepreneurs had to cope with the increase i n the scale of operations 
caused by expanding output and the advances of technology. 
The l a t t e r . d i f f i c u l t y of organising the larger scale of enterprises 
was not limited to the ironmasters; the railways, the source from 
which so much of t h e i r business originated, also faced the problem 
of r a i s i n g large amounts of c a p i t a l f o r the construction of railway 
networks. The railway companies were instrumental i n the founding 
of Joint Stock companies i n the 1830's and 1840*s and were to some 
extent followed by the Welsh ironmasters i n the 1 8 4 0 ' s . ^ However, 
despite t h i s trend i n .South Wales, the partnership remained the 
(1) A. Birch, The Economic History of the B r i t i s h Iron and S t e e l 
Industry. 1784 - 1879 (London. 1967) Appendix I . 
(2) I b i d . , pp. 220 - 222; J.R.T. Hughes, Fluctuations i n Trade. 
Industry and Finance (Oxford, 1960) pp. 154 - 171. 
(3) A. Birch, op.cit.,pp. 201 - 204. 
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preferred form of organisation i n the iron-trade because i t avoided 
some of the hazards of remote ownership, which s t i l l existed before the adoption 
of limited l i a b i l i t y i n 1856. 
At the beginning of the 1840's the North-East region was an 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t producer of pig iron, but during the ensuing decade the 
ironstone resources of Cleveland were opened out and by 1865 the region 
accounted for 21$ of the nation's annual production of pig i r o n . ^ 
Though the main development took place on Tees-side, one of the 
e a r l i e s t ventures was undertaken i n North-West Durham, at Consett. The 
early history of modern iron-making a t Consett i l l u s t r a t e s some of the 
enthusiasm of the early Victorian entrepreneurs, and also the dangers 
which could b e f a l l the over-ambitious. 
The entrepreneur was naturally anxious to expand his operations to 
exploit the r i s i n g tide of demand, but th i s confronted him with the 
dilemma of how best to r a i s e the necessary c a p i t a l f o r investment i n 
b l a s t furnaces, puddling furnaces and m i l l s : he had i n e f f e c t three 
choices. He could plough back current p r o f i t s , but t h i s was more 
suited to long term growth and was not geared to very rapid expansion. 
Secondly a partnership could be formed, extended or even converted to 
the Joint Stock p r i n c i p l e ; t h i s necessitated either the absorption of 
a few very wealthy persons, or the acceptance of the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
attending remote ownership i n an age of unlimited l i a b i l i t y . F i n a l l y 
the entrepreneur could borrow the necessary funds, the main problem 
i n t h i s case being' that i n t e r e s t payments would constitute a cost on 
the fini s h e d product. The founders of the ironworks a t Consett chose 
* 1 
WW.. 
SS;-V -
(4) J.R.T. Hughes, op.cit.,p.155* I n 1847 the region produced % of 
a national output of 2 m i l l i o n tons of pig iron; i n I865 t h i s 
had r i s e n to 21$ of 5»819,000 tons. 
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the l a t t e r , and this chapter i s devoted largely to an examination of 
the calamity wrought upon both borrowers and lenders. 
I n I84O Consett was no more than a couple of isolated houses on 
the wild moorland of North-West Durham. I n that year, however, 
a partnership was formed to exploit the minerals of the d i s t r i c t for 
iron-making. The following year, 1841, the partnership styled i t s e l f 
the Derwent Iron Company and within f i v e years grew into the second 
lar g e s t iron-making concern i n the kingdom, being surpassed only by 
Dowlais. The Derwent Iron Company however became "famous only for i t s 
s i z e (with eighteen blas t furnaces the largest ironworks i n England) 
(5) 
and for i t s i n a b i l i t y to make a prof i t . !'r ' 
2. The Derwent Iron Company, 1841-1857 
The i n d u s t r i a l and commercial a c t i v i t y of the North-East was much 
influenced by the l o c a l Quaker community, and the foundation of an 
ironworks at Consett was no exception. This was appropriate, for 
near by Shotley Bridge had been one of the e a r l i e s t strongholds of 
Quaker a c t i v i t y i n the North, and i t i s believed that the f i r s t Quaker 
Meeting House i n England was b u i l t t h e r e . ^ Even though the members 
of the Society of Friends were dispersed more widely throughout the 
County by the raid-nineteenth century, much of the property i n the 
v i c i n i t y of Shotley Bridge was s t i l l owned by them. One family that 
had remained prominent i n the l o c a l i t y was the Richardsons. Jonathan. 
(5) H.W. Richardson and J.M. Bass, "The P r o f i t a b i l i t y of theConsett 
Iron Company before 1914» " Business H i s t o r y ? V I I T ( l 9 6 5 ) . 
(6) W. Fordyce, The History and Antiquities of the County Palatine of 
DjirhajB (Newcastle, 1857, 2 v o l s . ) I I , p.700. 
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(7) Richardson had developed Shotley Bridge as a Spa,N " and later 
played a central role i n the emergence of the Derwent Iron Company. 
I t was the existence of a Spa which brought William Richardson 
of Sunderland to the area, for reasons of his health, i n the autumn 
of 1839 .^ During his v i s i t he became friendly with a local cartwright, 
John Nicholson, who was also an amateur mineralogist '. Nicholson 
of (9) showed some samples ironstone, found "on the blue heaps at Consett , , v' /, 
to William Richardson. At this point there i s some confusion about which of 
the Richardsons Nicholson approached. The writer of the Victoria County 
History opted for Jonathan Richardson, but only upon hearsay evidence. 
More probable seems to be the account presented i n the Durham Chronicle 
i n 1858.^*^ In that account i t was William Richardson who received the 
samples from Nicholson, and carried out preliminary examinations i n 
the area. He then called upon Robert Wilson of Newcastle to undertake 
a further inspection of the mineral deposits. On the strength of their 
findings i t was decided to make more exhaustive tests on the deposits, i n 
order to ascertain whether they would be viable as the basis for an 
industrial concern. Test shafts were sunk and samples of ore analysed, 
probably by the Quaker ironmasters i n Sunderland. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) Durham Chronicler. 2 July, I858. 
(9) The Victoria History of the Counties of England; A History of Durham 
(London, 19Q7, 2 vols.) I I , p.291. Hereafter cited as V.C.H. 
(10) Durham Chronicle. 2 July 1858. 
- 5 -
The analysis proved satisfactory, for shortly after four gentlemen, 
including three Quakers of whom no more is r e c o r d e d f o r m e d a 
partnership to smelt the ironstone at Consett. The i n i t i a l capital 
was £10,000. Once again an element of confusion is introduced by 
Lowthian Bell's account of the formation of the company. He claimed 
that the owners of the Redesdale Ironworks, Messrs. Bigge, Cargill and 
Johnson, had their attention diverted to the resources at Shotley 
(12) 
Bridge. ' However, i t is unlikely that this t r i o were responsible 
for the i n i t i a l investment, though they did merge their interests with 
(13) 
the Consett partners i n 1841 to form the Derwent Iron Company. ' 
The four original partners seem to have quickly appreciated that 
the location was not ideal for the production of pig iron alone. 
A greater advantage was possible by the addition of forges and mills. 
The reason for this was that coal was the relatively cheap input, and 
thus, the further the metal was refined, the greater would be the 
possible p r o f i t , since the products' value would be increased without 
any substantial addition to cost. 
The extension of the plant to include puddling and finishing mills 
required a considerable infusion of new capital, more than the original 
partners could afford. I t was this which induced the merger of 
interest between Consett and Redesdale; the amalgamation became known 
as the Derwent Iron Company. At about the same time the new company 
(11) Win. Backhouse and Edward Richardson were probably two of the 
Quakers. Counterpart lease of Ridsdale Iron Works by the Derwent 
Iron Company, 11 November I846 (DCRO: D/CO/59(vi)). 
(12) The Briti s h Association, A History of the Trades and Manufactures 
of the Tyne,Wear and Tees (London, 1863) p.57. 
(13) Durham Chronicle. 2 July I858. 
(14) Ibid. 
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bought the Bishopwearmouth Ironworks from Messrs. White, Kirk^Panton 
and Company. The manager of the Bishopwearmouth concern later moved 
to Consett to become the general manager. (15) 
The purchase of the Bishopwearmouth works provided the Derwent 
Iron Company with a readily b u i l t puddling plant and r o l l i n g m i l l s , 
but i t hardly seems a suitable integration. I f the Consett works were 
to send their pig iron to Bishopwearmouth for finishing then the f u l l 
advantage of cheap fuel would not be secured. I t is d i f f i c u l t to 
appreciate the business logic behind this purchase, unless i t was to 
infuse some expertise i n the puddling and r o l l i n g mills which were soon 
b u i l t at Consett. 
After the two mergers the newly constituted Derwent Iron Company 
expanded at a very rapid r a t e . ^ " ^ By 1846, i t was described as the 
leading iron-making firm i n the North, with a to t a l of fourteen blast 
furnaces; the expansion was made possible not so much by the extension of 
the partnership i n l841 f as by the large advances and loans made by the 
(17) 
Northumberland and Durham Dis t r i c t Bank. " Despite i t s size, the 
history of the company up to I864 was not one of success and prosperity. 
I t i s worthwhile examining the conditions that encouraged the establishment 
of such a large concern, and whether they i n anyway contributed to the 
absence of success. 
(15) Ibid. 
(16) The British Assdciation, op.cit.sp.57» 
(17) Lord Aberconway, The Basic Industries of Great Britain (London, 
1927) p. 183. 
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Fi r s t of a l l how ideal a location was the Consett area for the 
foundation of a large ironworks? The early partners were obviously 
satisfied with i t s s u i t a b i l i t y , i n view of the rapidity with which they b u i l t 
the works up into a gigantic concern; later observers were more sceptical, 
but they had the advantage of hindsight. ' 
The iron ore reserves at Consett were the chief basis for establishing 
the works. The ore was found i n a working section or seam, about seven 
feet high, with the ore actually occuring i n six or seven bands, each 
about twelve inches thick; four and a half fathoms below this f i r s t seam 
occured another containing a six inch band of iron ore. At the outset the 
ore could be worked for between seven and eight shillings per ton. The 
original estimates of the extensiveness of the reserves, made by Cargill, 
put the potential output at 5i324 tons of ore per acre. However,, sometime 
later the company's own mineral agent, Edward Boyd found that Cargill 
had over-estimated. In addition the ore was of a very poor quality, 
(19) 
containing only 26 per cent of iron. ' The local reserves remained 
economical only as long as the cost of working them did not rise above the 
alternative cost of importing ores from another source, or constitute such 
a proportion of f i n a l costs as to make Consett1s products uncompetitive with 
ironworks elsewhere. The leanness of the ores and the uncertainty of their 
extent were not a sound basis for such a large concern. By the late 1840's 
the local ore was becoming very costly to mine. In the lg60's Lowthian 
(18) The Brit i s h Association, op.cit.,p.49» 
(19) I b i d . 
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Bell observed that "Until 1850 the furnaces went on devouring the 
minerals found i n the neighbourhood at an alarming pace, having 
i n the meantime made extensive t r i a l s of those from the lead veins of 
Weardale"/ 2 0) 
The search i n Weardale proved f r u i t l e s s , but the realisation of 
the extent of the Cleveland ironstones i n the early 1850's proved to be 
Consett's salvation. By 1852 the Derwent Iron Company had ceased to 
use i t s own local iron ore, which was by that time costing about ten 
shillings per torn to mine, whilst the Cleveland ironstone, mined by the 
open-cast methods, could be delivered at Consett for about seven shillings 
(21) 
per ton. N ' The Company leased mines at Upleatham, and these were later 
taken over by J. and J.W. Pease, the powerful and influential Darlington 
Quaker family. This family became closely involved i n the affairs of the 
Derwent Iron Company, through their ironstone interests and their 
association with the Stockton and Darlington Railway. As major creditors 
they were at the forefront of those attempting to keep the company 
operational after 1857. In 1856 the search for ore spread even further 
afield, and hematite ore was brought to Consett from the West Coast ore 
mines. 
Though the discovery of the iron ore was apparently the major factor 
i n the formation of the ironworks, Consett's redeeming asset was to be 
throughout the nineteenth'century i t s abundance of cheaply won top 
(20) The Bri t i s h Association, The Industrial Resources of the Tyne, 
Wear and Teesf (London & Newcastle, 1864) p.86. 
(20) Durham Chronicle. 2 July 1858. 
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quality coking coal. One of the reasons the coal was so cheaply 
worked was that the royalties were low. This derived from ConsettAs 
position as a monopsonist, and also from the over exploitation of the coal 
resources along the Stanhope and Tyne Railway during the 1830's. 
There were no other large industrial concerns i n the area and the 
coal could not "be exported competitively to the coast, because of the 
saturation of the market. The cheap coal was an enormous advantage, 
and i t was often asserted that the t o t a l cost of coal at Consett was 
only as much as some other coal companies paid i n royalty: though this 
was probably an exaggeration i t does indicate the extent of the 
advantage, enjoyed by Consett i n the supply of fue l . Through most 
of the period I84O - I864 the mines at Consett were producing coal for 
(22) 
between two shillings and sixpence and three shillings. ' An i l l u s t r a t i o n 
of the disadvantage endured by unintegrated iron works is provided by 
J. Carr and Company of Wallsend, who bought coking coal from John Bowes 
(23) 
and Partners at Marley H i l l for six shillings and ninepence per ton. x 
I t i s hardly surprising that Carr's went bankrupt, and that during the 
I85O's most of the new Tees-side iron-makers followed Consett1s 
example i n securing their own pit s . 
By I858 Consett was the leasor of 3»300 acres of coal royalties. 
Its requirements were mined from four pits on their estate; the Saint 
Pit (so called because i t was f i r s t worked by Mormons, The Latter Day 
Saints), Weston, Bradley and Crookhall. Any additional requirements 
were purchased from another p i t which worked the Derwent royalties. 
(22) W. Fordyce, History of Coal and Iron (London, l860) sp.l49-
(23) C.E. Mountford, History of John Bowes and Partners up to 1914 
(Durham M.A. Thesis, 1967), p.91. ' 
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The. coal was found i n four workable seams, of which the Busty 
Seam was the most productive: this seam varied between four feet six 
inches and seven feet i n height, with one other seam above and two 
below. The coal was ideal for coking i n beehive ovens, being highly 
bituminous and giving a yield of 68 per cent, at a very low c o s t . ^ ^ 
The ironworks were consuming nearly 600,000 tons of coal, 440,000 
tons of ironstone and 110,000 tons of limestone by 1858. The slag 
heaps created by the waste of the pits and blastfurnaces towered above 
(25) 
the old Crookhall Mansion, threatening to engulf i t . ' 
The main royalties leased by the Company were those at Hownes 
G i l l , Belves and most important of a l l , the Old Consett Estate. The 
lat t e r was leased from Jonathan Richardson giving him a vested interest 
i n the size of the Iron Company. This was significant because Richardson 
had i n 1836 become the Managing Director of the Northumberland and 
Durham Distr i c t Bank, which made very large loans to the Derwent Iron 
Company. Jonathan Richardson's commitment and involvement is made 
even more clear by the proceedings of I84O. In that year he was approached 
by the partners i n the prospective ironworks, not to jo i n them, 
but to purchase the then available Consett Estate, and lease the 
(26) 
mineral rights to the partners * ' Therefore, although Richardson 
was never a f u l l partner In the Derwent Iron Company, he did make a 
considerable investment which depended for i t s success upon the working 
of the ironwork*. Furthermore the larger the ironworks, the faster 
(24) Durham Chronicle, 9 July I858. 
(25) Ibid. 
(26) Jonathan Richardson to the Shareholders i n the Northumberland and 
Durham Di s t r i c t Bank, 26 January I858. (DCR0 : D/H0/PII9). 
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the return on the investment. The agreement made between Richardson 
and the Derwent Iron Company stipulated that the ironworks should work 
the minerals under the Consett Estate, paying a royalty on a l l that 
they took out, and alsp compensation on any land that they rendered 
(27) 
unuseable by the dumping of slag. " 
The third main material input, i n the manufacture of pig iron, 
i s limestone. This was obtained from the nearby quarries at Stanhope, 
where the Company purchased some quarries i n 1842 when i t acquired 
a section of the old Stanhope and Tyne railway. 
From the outset the Derwent Iron Company achieved a high degree of 
vertical integration, relying heavily upon local mineral resources. 
However, despite the proximity of the raw materials i t was s t i l l 
necessary to have a good communications network, for distributing the 
output of the Company, and then i n the 1850's for the assembly of raw 
materials. The most important element i n communications at this 
juncture was the development of the railways. (See Map 1.1.) 
In 1840 the d i s t r i c t ' s only through railway line was the Stanhope 
and Tyne which had been b u i l t i n the early 1830's. The line had 
not f u l f i l l e d the expectations held for i t , and fallen into financial 
d i f f i c u l t i e s by I84O. The ownership of the line was re-organised by 
an Act of 23 May 1842, and i t became the Pontop and South Shields 
(29) 
Railway.x " The Derwent Iron Company bought the stretch of line between 
(27) Durham Chronicle. 2 July 1858. 
(28) C.J. Allen, The North Eastern Railway (London, 1964)>p.75« 
(29) Ibid. 
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Consett (Carr House) and Stanhope, * ' and the new t r a f f i c generated 
by the ironworks helped to put the railway back on to i t s commercial 
feet. However, one line with links to Tyneside and the Wear was not 
sufficient and efforts v/ere made to improve the network, particularly i n 
the direction of South Durham and North Yorkshire. To this end i t was 
proposed that a line be constructed between Waskerley Park on the 
Stanhope-Tyne line and Crook, where i t would li n k up with the 
Stockton and Darlington system. As a further inducement to the Stockton 
and Darlington Company, the Derwent Iron Company offered to se l l its . 
section of the old Stanhope-Tyne Railway thus guaranteeing them the 
receipts of limestone t r a f f i c between Stanhope and Consett. The scheme 
was agreed to by the Stockton and Darlington and the new line was 
completed i n 1844• The r a i l s were supplied by the Consett ironworks, 
and the whole project cost £125,433* The completion of the Wear and 
Derwent Junction Railway i n 1845 paved the way for close co-operation 
between the Stockton and Darlington Company and the ironworks. The 
purchase of the Stanhope-Carr House section from the Derwent Iron 
Company was the f i r s t step i n a scheme of amalgamation undertaken by 
the Stockton andDarlington i n the middle of the 1840's. This gathered 
momentum during 1846, u n t i l by 1847 the Stockton and Darlington Railway 
had significantly increased i t s network i n West Durham. The investment 
undertaken during these two years by the railway company almost brought 
about financial ruin, and a severe crisis was only averted by the 
(30) I b i d . , p.101. 
(31) G. Whittle, The Railways of Consett.and North-West Durham 
(Newton Abbott, 1971), p. 53. 
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opening out of the Cleveland ironstone deposits. The Stockton and 
Darlington leased a line b u i l t by the Middlesbrough and Redcar 
Railway, and began carrying ironstone from Upleatham, near 
Saltburn^to Consett. The f i f t y - f o u r mile haul between North 
Yorkshire and Consett became a most important source of revenue for 
the railway. After 1851 the Stockton and Darlington became particularly 
dependent upon the continuation of the Derwent Iron Company; this was 
(32) 
to prove an important factor i n later years. 
The exploitation of the Cleveland ores after 1850 also 
stimulated the interest of the North Eastern Railway i n getting a 
direct link between Cleveland and Consett. I t already had a 
substantial ore carrying l i n e , the North Yorkshire and Cleveland 
Railway, but had no connecting line through County Durham. The 
Company eventually got Parliamentary sanction to extend a line from 
Durham i n 1857* but at that time there were serious doubts as to the 
future of iron-making at Consett. Consequently the construction of the 
Relly M i l l Junction, from the Durham end of the Bishop Auckland - Durham line 
to Blackhill, was not completed u n t i l 1863. The Lanchester Valley 
Branch, as i t became known, was important for carrying Cleveland ore 
to Consett, and later for the importation of Spanish ore through 
Sunderland. I t also served as an outlet for iron and steel to 
Wearside and Tees-side, and for coke from Langley Park bound for the 
(33) 
Cleveland and South Durham ironworks. 7 
(32) C.J. Allen, op.cit.,p.ll3. 
(33) G. Whittle, op.cit.,p.73. 
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The f i n a l important railway link with Consett was a connecting 
line down the Derwent Valley to j o i n the Newcastle and Carlisle 
Railway. In I856 the Derwent Iron Company had begun to use 
Cumbrian hematite ore, which had to be brought by a very circuitous 
route, over the Newcastle and Carlisle Railway past Gateshead to 
Washington, where i t joined the Pontop and South Shields Railway. 
The t r a f f i c had then to double back to Consett. In 1856 i t was 
proposed that the Newcastle and Carlisle Railway should link up with the 
Stockton and Darlington system at Cold Rowley, near Consett, creating a . 
line which would pass the ironworks. The S.tocksfield - Cold Rowley 
Branch was started i n 18571 but was soon terminated because of the 
financial d i f f i c u l t i e s suffered by the Derwent Iron Company. 
The Newcastle and Carlisle Railway's scheme was eventually superceded i n 1862 
when the North Eastern Railway had a B i l l enacted to construct a line 
between Blaydon and Consett. Work was delayed u n t i l 1864 because of the 
continued uncertainty which surrounded the future of the ironworks, and 
of other large investment projects being undertaken by the North Eastern 
Railway. The line was eventually opened at the end of I867 providing 
Consett with a valuable outlet for coke to the West Coast, and hematite 
ore on the return journey. 
The last input affected by location was labour. In I84O the area 
was only thinly populated, Shotley Bridge being the only settlement 
of any size; by I858 there were estimated to be about 20,000 people 
i n the vincinity of Consett, most of whom were dependent either directly 
or indirectly upon the operation of the i r o n w o r k s . T h e development 
(34) Ibid., p .60. 
(35) Ibid., p .99. 
(36) Durham Chronicle.9 July I858. 
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of the ironworks had necessitated a considerable immigration of 
labour. The immigrants seem to have divided into two groups. 
On the one hand there were the predominantly Protestant English, 
and oh the other the I r i s h , of whom the majority were Roman Catholic. 
This religious division sadly produced a series of open and 
violent confrontations during the 1840's which were recorded both 
by contemporary observers and the local press. The most serious 
disturbance took place at Blackhill i n November 1847 when some of 
the English workmen at the Derwent Iron Company threatened to attack 
(37) 
the Roman Catholic Chapel. ' Disturbances caused by drink and 
religious antagonism were not uncommon during the formative years of 
the new community at Consett, as the following passage i l l u s t r a t e s . 
"In the early history of Consett Iron Works a feeling of 
h o s t i l i t y unhappily existed between English and I r i s h workmen, and 
many a pugilistic encounter resulted i n consequence. These fights 
generally took place at the end of the week, and their effect on the 
combatants may be inferred from the following description:- 'In the 
lower rooms of the public house there was not a table or chair but 
had i t s legs broken o f f , and these a number of mad drunken fellows 
were wielding to some purpose on each others heads. The landlord, 
Mr. Moore was i n his shirt sleeves, and his arms from his hands to 
his elbows were just as though they had been dipped i n a blood k i t i " . 
(37) Durham County Advertiser, 26 November 1847. 
(38) G. Neasham, A History and Biography of West Durham (Durham, 1882) 
P-72. 
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With so much h o s t i l i t y existing between factions of the labour 
force, i t is a wonder that any iron was ever produced at Consett, and 
many years later when the Company was managed by the very able William 
Jenkins he often voiced his reluctance to employ too many strangers, 
especially when the Company opened a new Angle M i l l i n 1893. The 
early unrest at Consett, and later labour problems at Chopwell, would 
seem to j u s t i f y Jenkins' reservations about "strange" workmen. 
However, the Derwent Iron Company does appear to have coped reasonably well 
with i t s wayward labour force. In his "Report on the Mining Districts 
i n 1854"1 H.S. Tremenheere stated: 
" The just, firm and judicious principles of management 
adopted from the beginning by the Company ^have overcome^ 
most of the d i f f i c u l t i e s generally incident to the 
(39) 
sudden collection of large bodies of men". " 
This may have been due to the Quaker influence, for they were more 
aware of the advantages of providing at least some of the trappings 
of c i v i l i s a t i o n , particularly schools. Edward Trow, the General 
Secretary of the Associated Iron and Steel Workers, spent part of his 
early l i f e at Consett, and later recalled his part i n organising a 
strike at Consett i n 1852 because of the poor wage rates paid there, 
compared with some other works i n the North East. The Company's 
failure cannot therefore be attributed to uncompetitive labour costs. 
One more important aspect i n the formation of a new company 
remains to be investigated, and that i s the source of capital. I t has 
already been noted that the original partners put up £10,000, and 
(39) W. Pordyce, History of Durham p.702. footnote. 
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that i n 1841 MessrB. Blgge, Cargill and Johnson were admitted to 
give an infusion of capital to enable the expansion to be carried out.^*^ 
The new partners however do not seem to have been able to furnish 
a l l the necessary capital personally, but they do seem to have had 
established connections with the Northumberland and Durham Di s t r i c t 
Bank, for during the five years I84I - I846 the Derwent Iron Company 
borrowed heavily from the Bank.^"^ So from a very early stage the 
Bank had a substantial stake i n the development of the iron company. 
In contrast to the Continental banking system, B r i t i s h Commercial banks 
were not normally associated with any financial involvement i n 
industrial concerns, except i n the provision of working capital. 
There were numerous connections between iron firms and banks, however, 
such as that between the Weardale Iron, Coal and Coke Company and 
Barings. On the whole, the association was limited to the provision of 
(42) 
extensive working capital. ' However, the Di s t r i c t Bank became involved 
with apparently l i t t l e regard for i t s own l i q u i d i t y . The extent of the 
loans to the Derwent Iron Company seems far too great to be merely the 
provision of working capital. I n the enquiry into the financial crisis of 
1857 the investments of the Di s t r i c t Bank were plainly regarded as of an 
"unsuitable nature" for a Commercial bank.^^ That the Bank chose to 
invest i n industrial assets should not i n i t s e l f have been grounds for 
criticism; what was at fault was the extent and manner i n which the financing 
was conducted. 
(40) See page 5* 
(41) Lord Aberconway, op.cit. p.183. 
(42) A. Birch, op.cit.,pp.209-210. 
(43) P.P 1857 - 58 (381) V, QQ. 3468 - 3470. 
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The financial mismanagement of both concerns seems to be the 
clue to the collapse of the Bank i n 1857» and to the persistent 
unprofitability of the iron company. In this respect the relationship 
between the D i s t r i c t Bank and the Derwent Iron Company was markedly 
different from any Continental counter-parts, since German banks kept 
a close watch on their industrial investments, and i n some instances 
even participated i n the actual financial management of the dependent 
concern. How then did this situation of gross mismanagement occur? 
I t was not unusual that a bank should make advances to a new company 
which had prospects of making good pr o f i t s , and was backed by 
respectable local businessmen. However the debt owing to the Bank soon 
outgrew the size which was commensurate with good banking practice. 
The personalities common to the Bank and the Derwent Iron Company 
are d i f f i c u l t to discern. In the l i s t of shareholders i n the Northumberland 
and Durham Dis t r i c t Bank, only Charles I'anson, a Shotley Bridge ironmaster 
(44) 
and an agent of the Derwent Iron Company provides any direct l i n k . 
A second avenue of influence was probably through the Bigge family. 
The Bigges had been partners i n Matthew Ridley'3 Old Bank i n Newcastle 
which was taken over by the D i s t r i c t Bank i n 1839 .^"^ Purthermbre the 
Bank l e n t heavily to the Redesdale Ironworks, of which a Bigge was a 
partner. In view of this i t does not seem unlikely that this 
continued to be a channel along which finance flowed when the merger of 
Redesdale and Consett took place i n I84I. 
(44) Durham Chronicle. 13 February I852. 
(45) Maberley Philips, A History of Banks, Bankers and Banking (London, 
1894) P. 1 7 4 . 
(46) W. Fordyce, The History of Coal and Iron.p.151. 
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However, undoubtedly the leading figure i n this financial scandal 
was the Shotley Bridge Quaker, Jonathan Richardson who had a large 
stake i n the success of the iron company and was also the Managing 
Director of the Di s t r i c t Bank. Some ambiguity exists as to when exactly 
Richardson took up that post i n 1836 when the D i s t r i c t Bank opened. 
He had up to then managed Backhouse and Company's branch i n Newcastle, 
(47) 
but the business of that bank was transferred to the District Bank. ' 
In his own account Richardson claimed he did not become Managing Director 
u n t i l 1845.^^ I f the f i r s t account i s correct then i t would be 
reasonable to assume that Richardson played an important role i n 
securing loans and credit for the iron company; i f , however, i t i s 
not correct, i t must be assumed that the partners i n the Derwent 
Company were of very good credit standing, and that Bigge played an 
influ e n t i a l part i n securing funds, for by 1845 the debt amounted to 
£500, OOo/ 4 9 ^  
When he later tried to j u s t i f y his position, i n face of mounting 
criticism, Jonathan Richardson stated:-
" I t was f u l l y believed, by the then Bank Directors, that 
this undertaking was of a sound and legitimate character, 
and that i t afforded every prospect of success. I freely 
admit, however, that the large property and respectability 
of the partners i n the company rendered the Directors not 
sufficiently upon their guard against their banking account 
(47) Maberley Philips, op.cit.^p.14-7. 
(48) Durham Chronicle. 29 January I858. 
(49) I b i d . 
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being allowed, not by specific advances of large suras, 
but by degrees, and by heavy accumulations of interest, to 
assume objectionable proportions." 
Richardson may have been attempting to abdicate responsibility 
by claiming he did not take control u n t i l 1845• What is clear i s 
that the Bank's management exercised too l i t t l e control over the flow 
of credit to the Consett Works. Of the £750,000 debt owed on the 
accounts of the Bank, on the 30th September 1857» by the Derwent 
Iron Company, only £350,000 was secured i n any form, and the 
(51} 
security was of a very tenuous nature. w ' The Bank held £250,000 
i n Derwent Iron Company "debentures", which, since the Company was only 
a partnership, were really no more than promissory notes issued by 
(52) 
the partners; the other £100,000 was secured by a mortgage on the 
plant and estates. In addition to the £750*000 owed to the Bank the 
iron company owed £197*000 to other creditors, and this was secured 
by b i l l s which had been endorsed by the Bank. 
This then was how the Derwent Iron Company secured the means to 
carry out i t s expansion during the f i r s t five years of i t s existence; 
at i t s peak the works comprised eighteen blastfurnaces, 543 coke ovens, 
and sixty-nine kilns for calcining ironstone. I t employed 2635 horse 
power i n driving blast engines, r o l l i n g mills, locomotives and other 
(50) Jonathan Richardson to the Shareholders i n the Northumberland and 
Durham Dis t r i c t Bank, 26 January I858 (DCR0:D/HO/P119). 
(51) P.P. 1857 - 58 (38l)V, Q.3457 and Q.3459. 
(52) I t was not uncommon i n Northumberland for a company to style 
i t s e l f Joint Stock, whether i t was a Joint Stock Company 
or a Partnership. 
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(53) miscellaneous machines. As has already been suggested, the size 
of the concern may i n some respects, have been i t s disadvantage, but 
there may also have been operating inefficiencies which would have 
been f e l t during the depression years when the price of iron f e l l 
seriously. 
Using the best techniques available i n the production of pig iron 
during the l840's,not an unreasonable assumption, since the plant had 
only just been constructed, the material cost of a ton of pig iron 
(54) 
at Consett should have been i n the region of 35 to 40 shillings. •rT' 
By 1851-52 the use of the richer Cleveland ores would have sli g h t l y 
reduced the cost, to just below 35/- per ton for material inputs. 
(55) 
Cost of minerals per ton of pig iron v ' 
3& tons of ironstone (30 per cent Pe.) @ 7/- per ton = 23/4 
4- tone of coal @ 2/9 per ton = l l / - • 
34/4 
I f there had been any operating inefficiencies they would have 
affected the Company most adversely during the f i r s t half of the 1840*s, 
when the price of pig iron was depressed. When trade picked up i n the 
mid 1850's there was a series of boiler explosions at the works resulting 
i n f a t a l i t i e s and considerable damage to plant. Operations were thus 
(56) 
part i a l l y disrupted i n the prosperous years of 1853 > 1854 and 1855. 
(53) Durham Chronicle, 9 July 1858. 
(54) Using local iron ore (26 per cent Fe) at seven shillings per ton, 
and local coal at 2/9 per ton (about 80 cwts. would have been necessary) 
(55) V. Pordyce, History of Coal and Iron.p.151. 
(56) John Latimer, Local Records of Northumberland and Durham, 1832-1857 
(Newcastle, 1857) pp. 231, 332, 342 and 371. 
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Thus although the 1850's were better years for the ironmasters, 
with the price of pig iron never f a l l i n g below 39/9 per ton between 
1850 - 1863> Consett was unable to make any p r o f i t either through 
inefficiency, or the crippling debt. 
(57) 
Table 1.2. The Price of Pig Iron per t o n w , / 
Year Price Year Price Year Price Year Price Year Price 
1850 44/2 1853 62/3 1856 72/6 1859 51/9 1862 56/-
1851 39/9 1854 79/8 1857 69/2 1860 53/6 1863 55/9 
1852 45/1 1855 70/9 1858 54/4. 1861 49/3 
Oven during this period of the f u l l employment of the plants capacity, 
during the Crimean War, i t was s t i l l said of the Derwent Iron Company. 
"that i t has never made any profits at a l l , even i n the 
very finest years for the ironmasters, and i t has gone 
('58') 
on absorbing the money of the bank unchecked."v ' 
However, the operating inefficiencies could not have been too gross, 
for when taken over by the Consett Iron Company i n 1864 the works 
produced a p r o f i t of £21,062 for I863-64, inspite of seven yearB of 
neglect; the boiler explosions were i l l - l u c k . 
Another possible source of weakness may have l a i n i n the proud 
(59) 
boast of one of the Company's selling agents "We make everything". ' 
Such wide diversification may have denied the Derwent Iron Company the 
(57) A. Sauerbeck, Prices of Commodities and Precious Metals (London, 1886). 
(58) P.P. 1857-58 (38l) v., Q.3458. 
(59) Durham Chronicle. 9 July I858. 
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advantages gained by specialisation i n a limited number of goods. 
However, there i s evidence to suggest that the Company was progressive 
i n marketing iron for new uses. In 1852, the f i r s t iron vessel launched on 
the Wear was b u i l t by George Forster, the manager of the Derwent 
Ironworks. 
However, the failure does not seem to have been on the production 
or selling side of the business, but i n the financial structure. 
The collapse of the Northumberland and Durham Di s t r i c t Bank i n 1857 
brought to l i g h t the mismanagement which had been, r i f e i n two of the 
North east's most important concerns. The ambition of the Derwent Iron 
Company's partners and the slackness of the Bank's Directors had eventually 
trapped both i n a vicious circle, where the one could only survive as 
long as the other continued to exist. The Iron Company, unable to 
redeem the debt, required a steady infusion of capital, whilst the Bank 
could hot write off the loan, because i t s very size would have destroyed 
confidence. I t could only continue through the support and endorsement 
of the Bank of England. In J.S. Jeans'view the iron company 
"experienced the fate that proverbially attends vaulting ambition -
c» (62) 
the/ o'er leaped themselves and f e l l on t'other side . For the 
next seven years, the fate of North-West Durham remained i n the balance, 
as various factions vied with one another over what should happen to the 
ironworks. 
(60) Durham Chronicle. 27 February 1852. 
(61) P.P. 1857-58 (381) V, QQ. 3468-3470; 3472; 3481-3489. 
(62) J.S. Jeans, Pioneers of the Cleveland Iron Trade (Middlesbrough 
1877) p.202. 
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Crisis and Transition, 1857-1864 
This period formed a watershed i n the development Of the ironworks 
at Consett. Since the fortunes of the Northumberland and Durham Distr i c t 
Bank and the Derwent Iron Company had been very closely interwoven, the 
failure of one imperilled the existence of the other. The evidence up 
to 1857 seems to suggest that both concerns were equally badly 
managed. As has already been pointed out the securities of the Dist r i c t 
Bank were regarded by o f f i c i a l s of the Bank of England to be of a most 
unsuitable n a t u r e . T h e B:irik only survived the 1847 crisis because of the 
timely intervention of Mr. Grote, the Bank of England's agent i n 
Newcastle. By the way of a concession to that l i q u i d i t y c r i s i s , the 
Directors of the Di s t r i c t Bank did increase the capital of the Bank, 
nominally by £1,200,000 of which £600,000 was paid up. I t was hoped that 
the issue would cover the Bank's increased business and the diverse nature' 
of that business. 
After the closure of the Bank i n 1857, the Bank of England 
investigator, Mr. Hodgson, discovered that the Bank's books were only 
balanced q u a r t e r l y . T h e Bank1 s financial control system was almost 
non-existent. I t was also Hodgson's opinion that the Bank had 
survived as long as i t did only through the Bank of England's 
endorsement stamp. By late autumn of 1857 a continual withdrawal of 
deposits through the summer months had drained the Bank of i t s l i q u i d 
reserves, and on the 26th November, 1857 i t was eventually forced to close 
i t s doors when i t s l i q u i d assets were exhaused. 
(63) P.P. 1857-58 (38l) V, QQ.3457 and 3459. 
(64) I b i d . , Q.3456. 
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The Bank had invested badly i n assets of a dubious nature for a 
commercial banking business. The Derwent Iron Company was i t s largest 
single debtor. Even after the completion of most of the Iron Company's 
plant i t was unable to reduce the size of the debt. This was probably 
because the expansion occurred so rapidly, and also during a period of 
depressed trade. The Company probably had to resort to further borrowing 
to service the interest of the debt, and by the time there was a period of 
f u l l employment for the capacity of the plant i n the 1850's, the 
debt was so large that interest payments alone were l i k e l y to absorb 
normal annual pr o f i t s . The extent of the Iron Company's borrowing had 
therefore outstripped the p r o f i t potentiality of the concern. The 
financial structure and policy of heavy borrowing was.probably the 
fundamental reason for the lack of success of the Derwent Iron Company. 
The original partners had over-estimated the buoyancy of the iron trade 
and might have expanded their interest more judiciously during the 
1840's, when trade vacillated between wild optimism and serious over 
capacity. 
To return to the plight of the Bank i n 1857» i t was soon clear that 
i t was wholly insolvent, since its capital was exhausted and i t s 
securities were not readily convertible. The Bank of England refused 
any further support, despite emotional applications, which foresaw 
"the fear.of disturbances and breach of the peace which might ensue 
i f they were to f a i l , they being so largely connected with collieries 
(65) 
and ironworks." The Bank Directors appreciated the hardship that 
(65) P.P. 1857-58 (381) V, p . x v i i i . 
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their mismanagement was about to bring upon the d i s t r i c t . Fortunately 
so did the Bank of England and they made alternative arrangements for 
the payments of wages. 
The failure of the D i s t r i c t Bank put the Derwent Iron Company i n 
a most uncertain position, for i t was largely at the mercy of the 
Bank's creditors. Under a compulsory liquidation, which would be more 
li k e l y to secure a speedy remuneration of creditors, the works might have 
been broken up and sold much below their true value. Alternatively, 
the works could be carried on, and any resulting profits could be used 
to re-imburse the Bank's creditors. The Iron Company's past record and 
Hodgson's view that the works had been mismanaged and unprofitable, even 
i n the finest years for the ironmasters, provided the creditors with 
l i t t l e encouragement to continue operating the works. There was no evidence 
that the works could be profitable and remunerative to the creditors. 
Two factions developed: on the one hand the London Banks, which were 
creditors of the Bank because of their endorsement of i t s b i l l s , those 
included Glyns, Barclay, Overend and Company, and Alexander, and i n the 
interests of their own l i q u i d i t y they desired a quick settlement. On the 
other side there were the Di s t r i c t Banks shareholders, the Iron Company and 
i t s trade creditors, a l l of whom stood to lose by the closure of the 
works. Such a premature ending to iron-making at Consett would have 
brought severe unemployment i n North-West Durham, and probably serious 
financial d i f f i c u l t i e s for the Stockton and Darlington Railway which 
depended so heavily for revenue on the Cleveland-Consett ironstone trade. 
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Thus, through 1858, a battle developed over the manner i n which 
the Bank's assets would best be realised, simultaneously with a struggle 
for the control of the Derwent Iron Company and having an important 
bearing upon that struggle. The continuation of the works was only 
feasible i f they were run at a p r o f i t , and this could only be achieved 
by some capital reconstruction of the Iron Company. 
The works of the Derwent Iron Company went through three distinct 
phases of control and ownership between 1857 and the end of 1864* In 
general terms these could be classified as, f i r s t of a l l , an attempt by 
parties already concerned with the Derwent Iron Company to keep the 
concern afloat; then an attempted purchase by some of the shareholders 
i n the D i s t r i c t Bank; and f i n a l l y the successful formation of Bank 
creditors and the general public into a limited company to buy the 
ironv/orks. 
Jonathan Richardson was the chief figure behind the f i r s t scheme, 
by which he proposed to guarantee the Derwent Iron Company's overdraft, 
i n company with some other p a r t n e r s . R i c h a r d s o n and Bigge both 
resigned their Directorships i n the Bank to concentrate their efforts 
upon the salvation of the Iron Company. However, Bigge and the other 
proposed guarantors soon dropped out, leaving Richardson to guarantee 
the debt on his own. The Scheme was to operate on a sliding scale 
principle, that is the annual repayments were to be dependent upon the 
price of pig iron, the minimum repayment being £10,000 per annum: this 
(67) 
was over and above the annual interest payments. 
(66) W. Backhouse to John Pease, 26 November 1857 (DCR0:D/Ho/F119)• 
(67) Joseph Pease to John Pease, 9 December 1857 (DCRO: D/H0/PII9). 
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Early i n I858 new pressure began to build up for a compulsory 
(68) winding up order for the Distr i c t Bank amongst the London creditors. ' 
This was counter-balanced by a resolution from the Bank's shareholders 
to apply for registration under the Joint Stock Banking Companies Act, 1857t 
and then to voluntarily wind up the Bank's a f f a i r s . T h e former 
course would probably ensure a swift settlement but i t would probably have 
and 
proved disastrous to both the Bank's shareholders /the Derwent Iron 
Company and i t s creditors. The Vice-Ghancellor, i n the Court of 
Chancery, eventually accepted the voluntary winding-up proposed by the 
shareholders,, i n February 1858;^°^ the liquidators and accountants were 
then appointed. By May, Mr. Coleman had produced the Accountants' Report 
(71) 
on the Bank's af f a i r s . ' A Court was set up i n Newcastle by the 
Vice-Chancellor to settle the l i s t of shareholders and how much would 
have to be called up on each share to clear the Bank's debts. 
These two events together settled the fate of Jonathan Richardson's 
scheme, for the report made by Coleman severely criticised the management 
(73) 
of the Derwent Iron Company. ' Since Richardson had long been implicated 
with the affairs of the Iron Company i t was inconceivable that he could be 
(68) Durham County Advertiser. 1 January I858. 
(69) I b i d . 
(70) Jonathan Priestman to John Pease, 7 February I858 (DCR0:D/HO/F119). 
(71) Durham Chronicle. 23 April I858. 
(72) Durham Chronicle. 14 May I858. 
(73) Durham Chronicle. 23 April I858. 
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allowed to continue to participate i n i t s a f f a i r s , even under the 
guidance of inspectors, imposed upon Richardson by the Company's trade 
c r e d i t o r s / ' ^ The Bank's shareholders were also unlikely to accept 
the situation, where they would have a crippling outlay to their 
creditors whilst their own debtors remained largely unaffected. 
There were other potent reasons why the Richardson scheme should 
f a i l ; f i r s t and foremost i t did nothing to remove the enormous debt and 
interest payments which had over-burdened i t s earlier operations. 
Secondly there were serious doubts about Richardson's a b i l i t y to make 
(75) 
good his guarantee, ' and also about the way i n which he was 
('76) 
securing working capital and running the concern.* ' Richardson's 
scheme was i n effect no more viable as a long term proposition than the 
Derwent Iron Company had been up to November 1857• 
The alternative solution was f i r s t proposed at a meeting of shareholders 
i n the Bank on the 29 May 1858, when the following resolutions were 
adopted 
"1. That the only means of averting ruin which appears to be 
impending over the shareholders i s to be found i n the raising of a 
fund to relieve the bank from the heavy debt due from the Derwent 
Iron Company; and vesting i n the contributors to that fund the 
property and effects of the said establishments. 
"2. That a committee consisting of Mr. C. Allhuson, Mr. W. Benington 
and Mr. J. Friestman Jnr., be and is hereby appointed, for the 
purpose of procuring subscriptions from the shareholders and 
others with instructions that respective amounts proposed to be 
(74) Jonathan Priestman to John Pease, 11 January 1858, and Jonathan 
Richardson to John Pease, 20 January I858 (DCR0:D/Ho/F119). 
(75) P.P. 1857-58 (38l)v, Q.3459-
(76) Durham Chrpniplp, 30 April 1858; W.Backhouse to John Pease, 29 
December 1857 (DCR0:D/Ho/F119). 
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paid by shareholders be considered s t r i c t l y confidential. 
"The information which has been obtained regarding the 
value and future prospects of the Derwent Iron Company's 
works j u s t i f i e s the belief that a handsome annual return may 
be secured under good ..management - a circumstance which has 
induced-many shareholders i n the bank to attempt to compromise 
with the liquidators, which shall at once embrace a release 
from further l i a b i l i t y and afford the chanoe of ultimate recovery 
of the amount contributed. 
" I t i s intended, i n persuance of this view, to form a company 
with limited l i a b i l i t y , upon equitable principles for carrying 
(77) 
on the said works." ' 
In effect, the capital structure of the Iron Company was to be 
changed, along with the ownership, and this would free i t from the 
burden of fixed annual interest payments.. The plan was enthusiastically 
received by many of the Bank's shareholders, and i n l i t t l e over a week 
(78) 
£190,000 was contributed towards the purchase.v' ' However, i n some 
quarters this new scheme was regarded with reservations, the feeling 
being that the works should be carefully valued and offered for sale 
on the open market. Significantly, these reservations were held by 
parties more intimately connected to the iron trade who appreciated that 
the Derwent Iron Company's debt was a gross over-estimation of the plants 
real worth. Any new concern burdened with a capital valuation such as the 
new Derwent and Consett Iron Company, Ltd., would have experienced 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n producing good financial results. One suggestion made 
was that, should the Bank's shareholders wish to keep an interest i n the 
Company then they should put up about 25 per cent of the capital and they 
would then be followed by outside investors; a l l this should only be done 
(77) Durham. Chronicle,, 4 June I858. (78) Durham C h r o n i ^ n June I858. 
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(79) 
after a careful evaluaqtion. ' 
) 
Vice-Chancellor Kindersley, however, agreed to the shareholders 
scheme, with the provision that those taking part were to he discharged 
of further l i a b i l i t y to the Bank's Creditors on completion of the 
(80) 
purchase. ' 
The I858 project was revised downward on 1st December 1859 to 
£825,000; the shareholders had paid £250,000 to procure release from 
a l l future l i a b i l i t i e s of the Northumberland and Durham Dis t r i c t Bank. 
Of the remaining £575,000, £150,000 was paid out of share .subscriptions; 
the new company being capitalised at £150,000. The remaining £425,000 
(8l) 
had therefore to be paid from profits by December 1864* 
The scale of the purchase, the time schedule for i t s completion 
and the conditions of trade after I858 made the scheme unrealistic. 
(79) Durham Chronicle. 25 June 1858. 
(80) Durham Chronicle, 6 August I858. 
"Telegraphic messages were received on Monday, by the o f f i c i a l 
liquidators of the D i s t r i c t Bank and by the shareholders' 
committee informing them that the Vice-Chancellor's Court 
had approved the arrangement whereby the Derwent Iron Company 
pass into the hands of some of the shareholders of the D i s t r i c t 
Bank. The particulars of the arrangement may be described as 
follows 
"Pify-four shareholders purchase the works, collieries and 
houses for the workmen, for £930,000. The payments w i l l thus 
be raade:-
£175»000 i n cash £ 41,000 30 months 
£85,000 6 months £129,000 36 months 
£96,500 12 months £ 14,000 42 months 
£103,500 .18 months £ 47,500 48 months 
£191,500 24 months £ 45,500 60 months 
Add £36,831.00.06d already made by the same parties i n respect 
of the £5 c a l l prior to Mr. Coleman's Report, making a t o t a l 
of £966,831.00.06d. 
"The above artttngeraent, i t may ultimately turn out, w i l l enable 
the liquidators, we believe, to declare a dividend of 5shillings 
i n the pound on the 1st October next, as also to compound i n f u l l 
with creditors under £100, at the rate of 15 shillings, should they 
be disposed to entertain that offer." 
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In an effort to cut costs the owners tr i e d to reduce wages. In the 
trough of depression i n 1861 the Company's puddlers went out on strike 
when the practice of providing free rent and coal was withdrawn; this had 
been customary at the works since they were b u i l t . The men had received 
3d. to 6d. per ton below the national norm i n li e u of the free rent and 
coal. The men demanded 6/- per fortnight as compensation for the 
withdrawal of the privilege, when 4/6 would have brought them to the 
country average. The employers held out for 4/- per fortnight, and 
(82) 
eventually forced the men back without any compensation at a l l . ' 
Labour relations continued to deteriorate, and the pressure from the 
Dis t r i c t Bank's creditors increased i n intensity. By mid-August, Vice-
Chancellor Kindersley ruled that the Company must make i t s outstanding 
payments or be wound-up and disposed of. This was inspite of applications 
ors,' 
(84) 
(83) 
for postponement by both the Bank's liquidators, ' and the creditors 
of the Iron Company, principally the Peases. 
The failure of the Sunderland shipbuilders, Oswald's, an 
important customer of the Iron Company, and the outbreak ofa • another 
strike against a proposed 10 per cent reduction further aggravated the 
problems of continuing the works. By September 1861 the works were 
gradually closed down - Bishopwearmouth altogether, then Crookhall 
•85) 
blastfurnaces and Delves p i t . ' 
(81) W. Pordyce, History of Coal and Iron.PP. 149-150. 
(82) The Colliery Guardian. 27 Apr i l 1861. 
(83) Relations between the liquidators and creditors of the D i s t r i c t 
Bank were becoming strained by this time. 
(84) The Colliery Guardian. 24 August 1861. 
(85) The Colliery Guardian. 14 September 1861. 
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Despite constant rumours no "buyers came forward with a firm offer. 
The strike dragged on and an aura of pessimism settled over the 
d i s t r i c t - except for one optimistic observer, the leader writer of the 
"Consett Guardian" who could not envisage the closure of the greatest 
works i n England. There was some basis for such optimism, however, for 
the Consett works had solicited the approval of the Admiralty for 
its iron. Whilst the ownership of the works remained uncertain, the 
(86) 
order books were at least f i l l i n g up. ' 
The leader writer of the "Consett Guardian" had the foresight, or at 
least the optimism, a valuable state of mind i n such depressing times, to 
forecast:-
"Consett, we w i l l venture to t e l l the good people of Newcastle 
whether friends or foe, so far from sinking into ruin and decay, 
has yet bright and prosperous days before i t - perhaps brighter 
and more prosperous than i t has ever yet enjoyed." ' 
However, whilst trade remained depressed, the Vice Chancellor 
with-held permission for a further sale, u n t i l an advantageous deal could 
(88) 
be made. ' He came under increasing pressure from the Bank's creditors, 
who were becoming impatient at the absence of urgency i n clearing off the 
debts owing to them.^"^ 
During 1863 the iron trade began to improve and with i t , the 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y of the Consett ironworks; this induced the Vice-Chancellor 
(86) I b i d . ; and The Colliery Guardian. 23 November 1861. 
(87) The Colliery Guardian. 19 October 1861. Quoted from the Consett Guardian. 
(88) Durham Chronicle, 5 June 1863. 
(89) Durham Chronicle. 22 May and 5 June 1863. 
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to agree to a sale, but not before a r e a l i s t i c assessment was made of the 
works. By October 1863, rumours became so r i f e of an impending sale, 
announced 
that the Durham Chronicle that "the extensive ironworks at Consett 
^ A. 
w i l l shortly be offered for sale " 
A group of the Bank's creditors organised themselves for the 
purchase of the works, i n conjunction with the trade creditors, and 
the plant never was offered for sale on the open market. In March 
I864 this group was constituted as the Consett Iron Company Ltd., and 
began the purchase of the ironworks. The remaining unsettled creditors 
of the Bank were offered shares i n the new company to the extent of 5/-
i n the £ of their debts. 
There were ho immediate changes i n the management of the Company, 
except at directorial level. However i t proved to be at this level that 
the fortunes of the Consett Iron Company rested. The financial debacle 
of the I85O's was avoided by the shrewd management of David Dale and there 
could have been no greater contrast than that between the financial 
results prior to 1857 and those after 1864. 
(90) Shipperdson MSS. 1729. 
(University of Durham, Department of Paleography and Diplomatic.) 
CHAPTER I I 
THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE AMD FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
OF THE CONSETT IRON COMPANY 
A company's potential to make p r o f i t s may be undermined by a number 
of considerations, one of which i s f i n a n c i a l mismanagement. F i n a n c i a l 
obligations may outstrip the earning c a p a b i l i t i e s of a firm i f i t s 
management are too optimistic and reckless i n the i r approach to the control 
of i t s c a p i t a l structure. Such a fate overtook the Derwent Iron Company. 
I n this chapter the f i n a n c i a l management and performance of the 
Consett Iron Company w i l l be examined. The Company's origi n had a 
profound a f f e c t upon the nature and extent of i t s ownership. The 
Directors did not become detached from the body of shareholders generally, 
and t h e i r management of the concern was directed primarily to s a t i s f y , 
the expectations of those shareholders. 
C a l l s f o r additional c a p i t a l were avoided by using current 
earnings for plant construction, with intermittent c a p i t a l i s a t i o n of 
such expenditures. Alternatively payment on c a l l s for share c a p i t a l 
was synchronised with dividend payments. E f f o r t s were made to keep -
borrowing within reasonable l i m i t s , and i t never threatened to engulf 
the p r o f i t earning capacity of the Company* 
The p r o f i t s earned by Consett were handsome, and the dividends 
paid generous. Every attempt was made to equalize dividends by varying 
the l e v e l of p r o f i t s distributed, and by contemporary standards, e s p e c i a l l y 
for a C o l l i e r y Company, th i s was a most conservative policy. 
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The carefu l f i n a n c i a l management of the Company was probably the 
single most important factor i n the improved performance of the Consett 
Ironworks. However, probable under-capitalisation concealed a 
deterioration i n the e f f i c i e n c y i n the iron and steelworks a f t e r 1900. 
For t h i s reason p r o f i t a b i l i t y i s a dangerous indicator to choose for 
assessing the performance of an i n d u s t r i a l concern. 
1 . The Nature of the Company's Ownership 
I t has been seen that one of the main weaknesses of the Derwent 
Iron Company had been t h e i r unsound c a p i t a l structure; t h i s was a defect 
which t h e i r successor the Consett Iron Company avoided su c c e s s f u l l y . 
The interregnum of I858-I864, when the Derwent and Consett Iron Company 
attempted to purchase the works and repay the debt to the Bank 
i l l u s t r a t e d the unr e a l i t y and i m p r a c t i c a b i l i t y of such a great burden 
of debt. The Consett Iron Company eventually purchased the works i n 1864 
for £295,318.08s .OOd. by the issue of 40,000 shares of £ 1 0 . denomination, 
of which £ 7 . 1 0 s . was c a l l e d up to f a c i l i t a t e the purchase. 
Consett was thus among the pioneers of the New Acts which had 
introduced the concept of limited l i a b i l i t y to the structure of company 
ownership i n B r i t a i n . For these pioneers, a t t r a c t i n g investors was one 
of the primary problems, and t h i s i s r e f l e c t e d i n contemporary l i t e r a t u r e 
dealing with the new opportunities created by the 1862 A c t . ^ Not 
only was a t t r a c t i n g investors important, but also a t t r a c t i n g ones of the 
( l ) J.B. J e f f r e y s , "The Denomination and Character of Shares, 1855-85" 
Economic History Review XVI, (1946) , 
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r i g h t quality; many early limited companies maintained a narrow 
base of ownership, almost akin to partnership, so that they might 
preserve the confidence of t h e i r trade creditors. Consett's 
case i s somewhat different since almost h a l f the shares were offered 
to and taken ..up by creditors of the Northumberland and Durham D i s t r i c t 
Bank i n l i e u of money s t i l l outstanding to them. The Company from 
the outset had a broad ownership, with 3 8 5 shareholders i n 1 8 6 4 * 
Another unusual feature of Consett's c a p i t a l i s a t i o n was the r e l a t i v e l y 
low denomination of the shares, because coal, iron and engineering 
companies floated i n the same period generally opted to issue shares of 
(2) 
large denominations, £ 1 , 0 0 0 being not unknown. A possible explanation 
of the low denomination i s that since many of the early shareholders were the 
small creditors and depositors whose claims on the D i s t r i c t Bank had yet 
to be s e t t l e d , large shares would have been impracticable i n carrying out 
the e x e r c i s e . ^ 
I n respect to the low denomination and large ownership Consett was 
t r u l y a pioneer for t h i s did not become the norm u n t i l well into the 1 8 7 0 ' s . 
Most companies floated a t t h i s time were attempting to achieve 
r e s p e c t a b i l i t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the eyes of t h e i r creditors, and so they 
had a few respected shareholders, high share denomination and most 
(A) 
important, a high proportion of uncalled c a p i t a l . ' Consett had no 
problem i n persuading creditors, since some of the leading creditors 
(2) I b i d . 
( 3 ) Register of Shareholders i n the Consett Iron Company, Ltd.. Vol 1 . 
(DCRO: D/Co /3 . ) 
( 4 ) J.B. J e f f r e y s , op.cit. The high proportion of uncalled c a p i t a l 
became a weakness since i t encouraged adventurism and i n e f f e c t 
offered no r e a l security- to the creditor. 
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•became, owners i n the concern, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Pease family of 
Darlington. Furthermore Consett had become such an important 
constituent of County Durham's economy, that many creditors were 
dependent upon the continuation of the concern, no matter who the 
owners were: t h i s was e s p e c i a l l y true of the railway companies which 
derived a substantial revenue from carrying f r e i g h t to and from Consett. 
The practice of having a large reserve of uncalled c a p i t a l was 
also prevalent during the 1860*8? t h i s served several ends. F i r s t - V 
and foremost i t was a sop to trade creditors who formed the main 
source of short and medium term loans; secondly i t was sometimes necessary 
during the early years of experiment, because of the imperfections i n 
forecasting c a p i t a l requirements; and f i n a l l y i t was sometimes due to 
over-valuation of nominal c a p i t a l , as i n the cases of Bolckow Vaughan, 
Palmers and Ebbw Vale. ' Once more Consett did not follow the normal 
pattern since £7*10s. was paid up, a r e l a t i v e l y high proportion by the 
standards of the time. However., despite such an enlightened s t a r t Consett 
was not to remain amongst the front runners i n the progression towards the 
more t y p i c a l £1. share of the twentieth century; t h i s was not introduced 
u n t i l the c a p i t a l reconstruction of 1913; 
During the f i f t y years up to 1914» the Company carried out seven 
al t e r a t i o n s i n the s i z e of i t s share c a p i t a l of which only one 
was a c a p i t a l reduction, and that involving a very small amount. 
( 5 ) I b i d . 
(6) Directors' Minute, 8 October 1881, P»9 (DCRO:D/Co/33). 
Some members of the Company had voluntarily paid up t h e i r share 
c a p i t a l to i t s f u l l extent (3342 shares i n a l l ) . I t was found that 
the owners of these shares were at a disadvantage when they t r i e d to 
s e l l them. I t was therefore resolved to repay the £2.10s. on each of 
the f u l l y paid shares so that they might be equally marketable as a l l 
other Consett shares. 
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The other a l t e r a t i o n s merit an explanation since they give an insight 
into the f i n a n c i a l policy adopted by the Company, and also the 
dominant ro l e played by David Dale i n formulating that policy. 
The f i r s t a l t e r a t i o n took place i n 1866 when 6,000 additional 
shares were created to enable the Consett Iron Company to take 
over the nearby Shotley Bridge Iron Company. This take over was a 
straight purchase of the works of the Shotley Bridge Company, and 
(7) 
did not involve any exchange of shares. v ' The e f f e c t of t h i s was 
that there was no s i g n i f i c a n t d i l u t i o n of the Consett ownership. 
The year was also marked by a sharp decrease i n the trading i n Consett's 
shares, probably due to the depression of 1866 and the completion of sales 
of shares by ex-Bank creditors anxious to r e a l i s e a quick cash benefit. 
The second a l t e r a t i o n followed during the boom years of 1872-73 
when the Company c a p i t a l i s e d £92,000 out of p r o f i t s , by is s u i n g 9»200 
shares. Since there was no provision for paying bonuses out of reserves, 
the new share issue was used 3 * a substitute; i n e f f e c t i t was a bonus of 
£1.10s. upon every e x i s t i n g share. However, t h i s issue did occur 
during a period of b l a s t furn ace reconstruction, and much of the 
undivided p r o f i t was being applied to finance the reconstruction. I t 
was therefore more desirable that i t should appear as new share c a p i t a l 
rather than as a reserve fund, which i n principle would be d i v i s i b l e among 
the shareholders. 
(7) Directors' Minute. 13 September 1866. p.104. ( D C R 0 : D / C O/29). 
(8) General Meeting Minutes. 2 8 September 1872. (DCRO:D/Co/44). 
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The next occasion on which the share c a p i t a l was increased was 
during 1880 when the Directors suggested an a l t e r a t i o n and also made 
provision for tonuses to he paid from the Reserve Fund, with the 
(9) 
sanction of a General Meeting of the Company. ' A bonus share 
issue was then made, i n the r a t i o of one new share to every three 
e x i s t i n g shares, and th i s increased the Compnay's c a p i t a l by £ 1 8 4 , 0 0 0 . 
The f i n a l increase of the Ordinary share c a p i t a l was under-taken 
between I886-I89O, during which time the number of shares issued was 
brought up to 100,000, with paid up c a p i t a l of £ 7 5 0 , 0 0 0 . The issue was 
necessary to finance the extensive alterations which attended the 
change over from iron to s t e e l production. 
After 1890 there was only one further increase i n the Company's 
share c a p i t a l before 1913, and i t was of a different kind, for i t 
involved the issue of 100,000 8 per cent Preference Shares of £5» 
denomination. Since these shares car r i e d a fixed i n t e r e s t payment, 
they had f i r s t c a l l upon any p r o f i t s that the Company made. I n t h i s 
respect they were a compromise between debenture stock and ordinary 
shares, since they avoid an annual payment that i s a cost, whilst they 
offer the investor greater s e c u r i t y . The issue was made with a dual 
purpose; overtly to finance the construction of a New Angle M i l l and 
open out some extensive coal t r a c t s acquired by the Company north of the 
River Derwent. However, behind t h i s was a scheme to reduce the extent 
of Consett's indebtedness. The Company estimated that the extensions 
would cost £ 3 3 9 , 0 0 0 , whilst they had £ 2 0 7 , 0 0 0 on loan. Bymaking an 
(9) A r t i c l e s of Association, The Consett Iron Company Limited. 1864 
A r t i c l e 109A. ( D C R 0 : D/Co/125). 
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issue of £500,000 of Preference Shares, f u l l y paid up, and s e l l i n g 
1867 Ordinary Shares at t h e i r market value of £29, the firm would be able 
to c l e a r the indebtedness at an early date.^"^ 
The desire to pay off the loan c a p i t a l was understandable since 
i t was a l l i n the nature of short term borrowing, that i s i t was 
repayable on s i x months notice from either side. This was not a 
sound basis upon which to finance fixed a s s e t s . Therefore the rationale 
behind the Preference Share issue was that the f i r s t c a l l s would be used 
to c l e a r off the £207,000 indebtedness, and the l a t e r c a l l s could coincide 
with dividend payments to remove any burden of payment from the shareholders. 
The extension of the plant was i n f a c t planned to be financed out of 
current p r o f i t s . The Preference Share issue f a c i l i t a t e d the whole 
operation and an attempt was made to protect the value of the ordinary.. 
shares by introducing a cumulative dividend upon the Preference Shares, 
so that i n t e r e s t payments started at 6f# i n I892 r i s i n g to 8$ i n 1895. 
The alterations of 1886-1890 and 1891-94 were both planned by 
David Dale, the Company's Chairman, and they give an insight to h i s 
astute f i n a n c i a l control of the concern, despite the f a c t that h i s time 
was s p l i t between several business a c t i v i t i e s . His aim was as f a r as 
possible, to finance the expansion out of current p r o f i t s , c a p i t a l i s i n g 
(12) 
them as they went along v and also to keep the Company's borrowing within 
(10) "The Chairman's Proposals, for providing additional Ca p i t a l , " 
Directors' Minute. 28 October I89O, pp. 213-219. (DCRO:D/Co/34). 
(11) I b i d . , p.218. 
"A. I t may be better to make the dividend on the suggested Preference 
Shares 'cumulative' because t h i s would increase the i r market value 
without correspondingly decreasing the market value of the ordinary 
shares." 
(12) Newcastle Daily Chronicle. 5 August 1886. 
- 42 -
r e a l i s t i c l i m i t s * ' and so avoid the rock upon which the Lerwent Iron 
Company had run aground. 
F i n a l l y a further overhaul of the Company's c a p i t a l structure 
took place i n 1913 when both the Ordinary and Preference Shares.were 
subdivided into £1 u n i t s . Shortly a f t e r the Ordinary Shares were also 
(14) 
f u l l y paid up by a bonus payment. ' 
What was the significance of these various share c a p i t a l a l t e r a t i o n s ? 
The Consett shareholders were not divorced from control, since the 
Board of Directors was non-executive, being made up of the more 
substantial shareholders. The Company therefore adopted a policy i n 
the i n t e r e s t s of the owners, and i n t h i s respect Consett probably 
approximated to the notion of p r o f i t maximisation, a goal not n e c e s s a r i l y 
compatible with the organisational structure of the modern business . 
enterprise. 
. However, Consett was not t y p i c a l of companies i n the iron and 
coal trades during the 1860's and 1870's because of i t s broad base of 
ownership, which would have been more t y p i c a l of the twentieth century 
than the second h a l f of the nineteenth. (See Diagram NoTLl). The 
Board of Directors existed as an e f f e c t i v e l i n k between the owners and the 
managers, and out of t h i s structure emerged a p r o f i t conscious company. 
(13) "The Chairman's Proposals for providing Additional C a p i t a l , " 
Directors' Minute 28 October 1890. pp.213-219 (DCRO:D/Co/34); 
and "The Chairman's Suggestions for Increased Capital," 
Directors' Minute 6 A p r i l 1886. pp.247-252. (DCRO:D/Co/33). 
(14) A r t i c l e s of Association. Consett Iron Company Ltd.. 1900 Revised 
1913, ( D C R O : D / C O/125 J . 
DIAGRAM T I 4 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF SHARES AMONGST SHAREHOLDERS IN 1864 
Proportion holding 
/ between 1-50 Shares \ 
I 
0) 
Source: The Register of Shareholders 
Vols. 1-iV (DCRO: D/Co/3-6). 
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Prom the outset the f i n a n c i a l policy adopted was more r e a l i s t i c than 
that followed by the o r i g i n a l Derwent Iron Company. New plant was paid 
for either by new share issues or out of accumulated reserves, rather 
than by borrowing. At the outset the Directors had authorisation 
only to borrow up to £60,000, although t h i s c e i l i n g was gradually 
increased. This sound f i n a n c i a l policy limited the burden of 
fix e d i n t e r e s t payments. 
As has already been noticed, the Company issued 40,000 shares 
for the purchase of the plant and equipment a t Consett, Bradley, 
Crookhall and Bishopwearmouth. Of these shares f r a c t i o n a l l y under 
h a l f were allocated to the creditors of the former D i s t r i c t Bank, who 
were also able to submit offers for the remaining unallocated shares. 
The issue was taken up e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y i n the North East: geographically 
most of the shareholders were from Durham and Tyneside, w h i l s t t h e i r 
occupations broke down into the following categories 
(15) Directors' Minute. 14 May 1864, p.14 (DCRO:D/Co/29). The 
Company a l i o t e d 19,895 shares to the Bank creditors and the 
remaining 20,105 shares to the general public, including any 
Bank creditors who wished to take up shares i n excess of t h e i r 
quotas. 
TABLE i i . 2 
OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF CONSETT SHAREHOLDERS 
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of Shareholders Per. Cent, of Shares Held 
Professional 34# 
Private 33$ 
I n d u s t r i a l 24% 
Merchants 9f* 
Included i n each category were the following occupations. 
( 1 ) Professional - lawyers, accountants, bankers, clergymen, 
doctors of medicine. 
(2) Private - small businessmen, farmers, spi n s t e r s , widows, 
gentlemen, gentry. 
(3) I n d u s t r i a l - owners of i n d u s t r i a l concerns, and employees of 
such business. 
(4) Merchants - anyone described i n the Register as a Merchant. 
Source: Register of Shareholders, Vols. 1 - IV. (DCRO: D / C O/3-6). 
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The wide range of occupational groups covered i n the ownership of the Company-
i s a r e f l e c t i o n of i t s origins amongst those people who had business with a 
bank, but i t was not a t y p i c a l cross-section business investors i n the early 
days of limited l i a b i l i t y . 
Noticeable by i t s absence from the l i s t of shareholders i s the 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l investor; not u n t i l the l890's did t h i s group figure a t a l l i n 
Consett share transactions. P r i o r to that Consett's only involvement with 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l investment was that with theFriends Provident Society, who lent 
£7,000 to Consett during the l870's, and t h i s probably only existed because 
of the Quaker influence exerted i n the Company by the Pease and David Dale. 
Unfortunately no records e x i s t of the dealings i n Consett Preference 
Shares, and so a true picture of the influence of i n s t i t u t i o n a l investors 
i s d i f f i c u l t to assess. I t was th i s category of shares that V i c t o r i a n 
I n s t i t u t i o n a l investors would most probably have been interested i n , 
because of t h e i r r e l a t i v e s e c u r i t y , and i n Consett's case t h e i r very 
a t t r a c t i v e rate of i n t e r e s t . One would not expect i n s t i t u t i o n a l investors to 
be heavy traders i n the more speculative ordinary shares, e s p e c i a l l y i n the 
l a t e nineteenth century, when investment i n i n d u s t r i a l concerns was only 
j u s t beginning to gain a c c e p t a b i l i t y . 
There were, however, two prominent dealers i n Consett shares, 
from the 1890's onwards, and these were both northern banking firms, 
the North - Eastern Banking Company, Ltd. and the York Ci t y and County 
Banking Company, Ltd. Their frequent dealings i n small quantities of 
shares i s probably an indication of a speculative motive, other 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l investors included t r u s t companies such as Northern Trust Ltd. 
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and the Tyne Shipping and General Investment Trust, Ltd., and also 
the Union Property Association, Ltd. Even amongst the i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
investors there existed a high degree of regionalism. Unlike the banks, 
the l a s t mentioned investors tended not to trade i n the shares but to hold 
them over longer periods of time. 
Not u n t i l 1913• when the National S e c u r i t i e s Trust Company, Ltd. 
invested i n the Ordinary shares of the Company, was any attention paid 
to i n s t i t u t i o n a l investors by the Board of Directors. The absence of any 
e a r l i e r comment may be indicative of an absence of such investors, for i t 
i s l i k e l y that once a company does become a t t r a c t i v e to the i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
investor i t i s accepted as a good r i s k , therefore becoming more a t t r a c t i v e 
to the small independent investor. This i n turn would probably lead to 
more frequent dealings i n the shares and consequently greater marketability. 
As t h i s would benefit a l l shareholders i t i s something that a Board of 
Directors i s l i k e l y to take note of. 
Returning to the Preference shares, there are one or two indicators, 
which,in the absence of any concrete data, might give some lead as to the 
extent to which these shares were taken up by i n s t i t u t i o n a l investors. 
The f i r s t i s the a v a i l a b i l i t y of these shares on the market, and since i t 
was a pro ra t a i s s u e , those shares not taken up by ex i s t i n g Consett 
shareholders would have been sold a t a premium on the open market, to equal! 
the 8 per cent rate with the r u l i n g market r a t e . Thus any i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
investors would only get a y i e l d approximating to the r u l i n g market rate 
of i n t e r e s t a t the time they bought the shares. Therefore i n any normal 
One Preference Share a l l o t e d per Ordinary Share. 
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trading a f t e r the o r i g i n a l issue there would he no f i n a n c i a l advantage i n 
purchasing the 8 per cent Consett Preference Shares; the only advantage 
would be with regard to such features as security and r i s k . 
The main features of ownership i n the period under consideration 
are the comparatively large number of shareholders, t h e i r regional 
nature and apparent absence of any s i g n i f i c a n t i n s t i t u t i o n a l investment. 
However, despite the large number of shareholders and the small denomination 
of shares there was a tendency towards the concentration of shares i n the 
hands of a few f a m i l i e s . Most prominent, through t h e i r continuous 
representation upon the Board were the Bainbridges, Hendersons and the 
Sales, but other important holders were the Pease$, the Spencers, the 
Newburn Steel Manufacturers, and the Fenwicks. The management of the 
firm did continue to respect the i n t e r e s t s of the smallersshareholders 
i n t h e i r policy of d i s t r i b u t i n g p r o f i t s . I f .they took the s i z e of the 
dividend as the c r i t e r i o n of success, then there was no ground for 
complaintv For the fulfilment of general s a t i s f a c t i o n for the ordinary 
shareholder, Consett had a structure of management which at l e a s t 
approached the i d e a l , for the Directors, though non-executive, were 
usually successful l o c a l businessmen with knowledge of management and i t s 
problems. They adopted a policy of a sensible balance between d i s t r i b u t i o n 
and retention of p r o f i t s , and t h i s was often noted by contemporary observers 
as. one of the main factors i n the ov e r a l l strength of the Company. 
The retention of prof i t s i n Reserve Funds can, however, create a 
misleading picture to the r e l a t i v e l y uninformed shareholder, f o r they are 
(16) Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 5 August 1886. 
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l e g a l l y distributable amongst the owners. Reserve Funds are r a r e l y kept i n 
the form of l i q u i d a s s e t s , and are more normally used to carry out plant ex-
tensions, maintenance etc., thus e f f e c t i v e l y being c a p i t a l i s e d . Once 
the reserves are embodied i n plant i t becomes expedient to c a p i t a l i s e them as 
share c a p i t a l , and they are then no longer l e g a l l y available f o r normal 
di s t r i b u t i o n . Throughout the period the Consett Board tended to follow such 
a policy, and much of the increase i n the nominal c a p i t a l from £400,000 to 
£1,500,000 was achieved by bonus i s s u e s . 
What are the advantages of bonus payments and issues? Above a l l 
else they are a r e f l e c t i o n of the Board's confidence i n the continuation 
of p r o f i t a b i l i t y , for they dispatch to the realms of share c a p i t a l , 
reserves which could otherwise be distributed as a dividend. Thus the 
c a p i t a l i s a t i o n of reserves i s an indication that the Directors expect 
pr o f i t s to remain at l e a s t a t t h e i r current l e v e l , under normal trading 
conditions, and that they have continuing f a i t h i n the l i n e of business 
they are i n . A further implication might be that the l e v e l of the 
dividend w i l l be maintained and t h i s could lead to an appreciation i n 
the value of the share, and so a possible c a p i t a l gain to the shareholder. 
F i n a l l y an increase i n the number of shares a Company has issued, w i l l 
lead to greater marketability of the shares. The r e a l i t y of t h i s 
advantage i s demonstrated by Consett*s application i n 1881 for a quotation 
on the London Stock Exchange: t h i s would create a potential national 
market for the Consett shares, and deriving from that, greater marketability. 
A s i m i l a r e f f e c t was generated i n 1913 by the subdivision of e x i s t i n g shares, 
creating a larger number of lower denomination with the tendency for them 
TABLE I I > 3 . 
NDMBER OF TRANSFERS OF CONSETT IRON COMPANY LTD. 
ORDINARY SHARES BETWEEN 1865-1913 
YEAR TRANSFERS . YEAR TRANSFERS YEAR TRANSFERS 
1865 98 1882 389 1899 638 
66 65 83. . 344 1900 606 
67 101 84 313 01 570 
68 80 85 220 02 464 
69 140 86 633 03 373 
1870 78. 87 379 04 435 
71 52 88 491 05 529 
72 92 89 560 06 443 
73 190 1890 666 07 462 
74 356 • 91 : 540 08 405 
75 342 92 555 09 490 
76 216 93. 446 1910 352 
77 202 94 314 11 400 
78 178 95 473 12 423 
79 250 96 458 13 610 
1880 568 97 519 
81 762 98 548 
Source: Register of Share Transfers. (DGRO:D/CO/6-28) 
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to become more widely held and more frequently dealt i n . Some evidence of 
th i s tendency toward greater marketability can be seen from Table I I . 3 
(17) 
which records yearly transactions i n Consett's Ordinary shares. 
The table shows a general upward trend through the whole period, 
with peaks i n 1874, 1880-81, 1886 and 1913 coinciding with the new 
issues. 
The adjustments to the c a p i t a l structure between 1886-1894 
produced a better gearing between loan and share c a p i t a l . When David 
Dale drew up his f i r s t c a p i t a l reconstruction plan i n 1886, loan 
(18) 
c a p i t a l was about 30 per cent of t o t a l c a p i t a l , ' wh i l s t a f t e r 1894 i t 
was only between 13-20 per cent. The Company then had a moderately low 
(19) 
geared c a p i t a l structure. ' This was a most desirable policy f o r a 
Company operating i n an industry, more susceptible than most to v i o l e n t 
fluctuations i n p r o f i t s . The gearing between Preference shares and 
Ordinary shares also indicated a sound f i n a n c i a l policy f o r a f i r m i n the 
i r o n and steel industry; i n years of low p r o f i t the dividend on the Preference 
shares could s t i l l be paid, w h i l s t p r o f i t s did not have to be abnormally 
high before a dividend could also be paid on the Ordinary shares. 
This arrangement contributed towards the maintenance of a f a i r l y stable 
value f o r Ordinary shares. The decision to issue Preference shares 
(17) Another factor which influenced marketability was the dividend 
paid, though t h i s would not account f o r continuous upward trend 
i n the number of transactions. 
(18) "The Chairman's Suggestions f o r Increased Capital", Directors' Minute 
6 A p r i l 1886. pp. 247-252. (DCRO: D/Co/33). ~~ 
(19) The influence of the borrowed ca p i t a l was f u r t h e r reduced by the 
i n f l a t i o n a f t e r 1896, which reduced the burden i n r e a l terms. 
(20) F.W. Paish, Business Finance (London, I965) pp.25-27. 
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was due to a f e e l i n g amongst the Directors that i t would be desirable f o r 
the investor to have an assured income from his stake i n the Company. 
This would enable shareholders with commitments to make plans of 
expenditure i n advance with reasonable certainty as to the income from 
t h e i r investment. 
• Loan Capital and Financial Policy 
The Directors of the Consett Iron Company were authorised at the 
f i r s t Annual General Meeting of shareholders, i n September 1864* to 
borrow up to £60,000. The money was hot to be raised by a specific 
debenture issue, but merely by the acceptance of loans at 5 per cent with 
either s i x or twelve months notice of repayment necessary by either 
party. This money was used f o r working c a p i t a l and f o r the provision 
of small items of plant. 
For example, i n 1867 the Company s t i l l had £ 1 5 , 6 8 0 of unexercised borrow-
ing power, and t h i s , plus c a l l s on shares due and working surpluses, 
amounted to £ 4 7 , 8 4 1 - a f t e r deductions the f i r m had a cash balance of 
£26,044 and the Board of Directors urged David Dale to watch f o r 
(21) 
suitable opportunities to apply t h i s sum to Co l l i e r y extensions. ' Thus 
some loan c a p i t a l was applied to plant improvements, but not on a large 
scale,' and also to a sphere of business a c t i v i t y where the Company expected 
(22) 
a s w i f t return on outlay. v ' 
(21) Directors' Minute. 2? A p r i l I 8 6 7 , p. 1 4 1 . (DCR0: D/Co/29). 
(22) "The Report of Messrs. Boyd and Armstrong on C o l l i e r y Operations," 
Directors' Minute. 29 January 1867. (DCR0:D/Co/29). 
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By 1871, however, the Directors were eager to repay certain loans, 
or at least get a reduction i n the rate of i n t e r e s t . The Friends* 
Provident Society which had le n t £ 7 , 0 0 0 to the Consett Iron Company was 
given notice that i t s loan would he repaid unless they accepted a 
reduction i n i n t e r e s t from 5 per cent to 4 per cent. The two parties 
however eventually negotiated a compromise of Ah Per cent. 
The boom conditions of the early 1870's i n the coal and i r o n 
industries placed Consett i n a very strong l i q u i d i t y position, and by 
1875 the cash balances were so large, and the rate of i n t e r e s t paid on 
current Banking Accounts so low, that the Directors resolved to repay a l l 
(23) 
debenture holders, or further reduce the rate of i n t e r e s t to 4 per cent. 
However, the downturn i n trade i n I876 altered the Company's l i q u i d i t y 
p o sition, and the programme of expenditure exceeded expected revenue, 
f o r c i n g the Directors to extend t h e i r borrowing powers to £ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 rather 
than carry out t h e i r proposed reduction.- ' By March 1877 loans 
amounted to £ 8 4 , 4 6 2 a l l of which, except f o r £440 was borrowed at 4z> per cent. 
Trade remained depressed f o r the rest of the decade, and one would 
not have expected the l i q u i d i t y position of the Company to ease i n such 
conditions. However i t did at Gonsett, f o r i n 1879» one of the worst 
trading years i n the second ha l f of the century, the Company had 
(23) Directors' Minute. 6 A p r i l 1875. p.l01.(DCR0:D/Co/3l). 
(24) Directors' Minute 11 July I 8 7 6 , pp. 212-213. (DCR0:D/Co/31). 
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accumulated such a large cash balance as to be able to repay the loans 
from the Friends' Provident Society, and the National L i f e Assurance 
(25) 
Society, v J i and also to deposit between £20,000 and £25,000 i n a 
special account with J. and J.W. Pease, one of the firm's bankers. 
As depression faded and buoyant trade returned the loan c a p i t a l 
was f u r t h e r reduced; £25,190 being repaid on 31st December 1881. 
Furthermore the majority of outstanding loans were then held at 4$ 
( £ 9 5 , 8 9 9 ) as opposed to only 4^ 9& £ l 3 , 3 8 l ) . However, th i s reduction of 
loan c a p i t a l was short-lived f o r i n 1883 the Directors had to seek f u r t h e r 
(26) 
borrowing powers, to the extent of an additional £100,000. ' At t h i s 
juncture loan c a p i t a l amounted to 30$ of t o t a l c a p i t a l , and the f i n a n c i a l 
policy from t h i s time onwards consciously attempted to reduce the proportion 
of loan c a p i t a l . I n 1886 David Dale put forward a plan to raise share 
ca p i t a l and reduce loan c a p i t a l , w h i l s t at the same time extending 
steelmaking capacity. The Bcheme had much to recommend i t ; by 1891 i t 
was proposed that borrowed c a p i t a l would be reduced to £20,000. Such a 
r e a l i s a t i o n was not feasible, f o r no account was taken of the proposed 
c o l l i e r y extension. However the essence of the scheme was to constrain 
the absolute size of loan c a p i t a l , w hilst i t would f a l l as a proportion 
(27) 
of t o t a l c a p i t a l , because of the new share issues. ' The 8 per cent 
(25) Directors' Minute, 2 December 1879, PP. 177-178.(DCR0:D/C0/32). 
(26) Directors' Minute. 31 July 1883* p.l01,(DCR0:D/C0/33). 
(27) ,?*The Chairman's Suggestion f o r Increased Capital, 1 1 Directors' Minute 
6 A p r i l 1886, pp. 247-252. (DCR0:/D/C0/33). 
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Preference share issue between I89I-84 was directed to the same end, 
the Preference shares o f f e r i n g a compromise between debentures and ordinary-
shares . 
The depressed nature of trade i n the mid-1890's hindered the 
completion of the loan c a p i t a l reduction scheme, and i n I898 Consett 
s t i l l held loans of over £100,000. However, as trade picked up the 
Company gave notice of the repayment of £104,775» though at f i r s t they 
put i n an option f o r the renewal of 50 per cent of the loans. This 
(2Q) 
privilege was also withdrawn two months l a t e r . 
The boom of l899-19°0 gave the Consett Iron Company a substantial 
reserve of l i q u i d i t y . As a reserve fund was established to conserve 
funds f o r the proposed reconstruction of the blast furnace plant, money 
was invested i n Government sec u r i t i e s . I n a l l £150,000 was invested 
by Consett, i n 1900, i n Consols, War Loans and Exchequer Bonds, a t a 
(29) 
rate of 2i$. ' The Directors also transferred t h e i r pay account to 
Messrs. Lambton and Company, since the business contemplated by the I864 
banking agreement had not materialised. By that agreement a l l the Ir o n 
Company's discount business was to be handled by Lambton's Bank, wh i l s t 
J. and J.W. Pease handled a l l the general banking business. The pay 
account was to be provided f o r by the Iron Company re m i t t i n g d i r e c t 
to Lambton's l o c a l and other cheques. This concession to Lambton's was 
probably secured by Mark Penwick, a Director of both concerns. 
(28) Directors' Minute. 19 July I898.p.39.(DCR0:D/C0/38) 
(29) Directors' Minute. 23 January 1900, p.l69; I b i d . , 28 A p r i l 1900. 
p.195; I b i d . , 6 November 1900, p.236. (DCROsD/CO/38). 
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I n 1902 the ironworks at Consett were involved i n the second 
f a i l u r e of a l o c a l bank; on t h i s occasion, however, the circumstances 
f o r the Iron Company were not so traumatic or damaging as i n 1857• 
The bank was that of J. and J.W. Pease of Darlington, with whom Consett 
was a large c r e d i t o r . The c r i s i s had been caused by a succession of 
d i f f i c u l t i e s culminating i n an unsuccessful law s u i t by J. and J.W. Pease. 
The large creditors agreed upon a plan to assign the property of the bank 
and i t s Partners to W.B. Peat, the l i q u i d a t o r . The assets would then be 
realised by Peat, under the supervision of a Committee of Inspection, 
upon which Consett 1s s o l i c i t o r , Mr. Cooper served. However, despite 
donations and guarantees from friends of the defunct bank to the extent 
of £140,OOo/3°) $he Consett Iron Company had to write o f f £50,000 
f o r the year ending June 1903, as bad and doubtful debts. As part of 
the Pease settlement Consett received £6,450 worth of shares i n Henry 
Pease and Co., Ltd. i n 1906. 
When J. and J.W. Pease f a i l e d i n 1902 t h e i r 'current banking business' 
(31) 
was taken over by Barclay and Co., Ltd., who continued as the bankers 
f o r the Consett Iron Company. Between t h i s period and the outbreak of the 
F i r s t World War, the Directors continued to pursue the policy of placing 
cash reserves to either Government bonds or special deposits with Barclays, 
the former normally paying 2f$6, the l a t t e r 3 - 3|$. 
The f i n a n c i a l policy of the Company shows a keen awareness of the 
dangers that can b e f a l l a concern short of cash reserves, and overburdened 
(30) Directors' Minute. 23 December 1902 p.150.(DCR0:D/C0/39). 
(31) P.W. Matthews and A.W. Tuke..< History of Barclays Bank Limited 
(London, 1926) p.209. 
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with loan c a p i t a l . The b i t t e r lesson of 1857 appeared to have been well 
appreciated by the Directors, and David Dale i n p a r t i c u l a r . He steered the 
Company along a path of l i q u i d i t y strengthened through short-term borrowing 
and retained p r o f i t s , whilst preventing the loan c a p i t a l from becoming 
too large a proportion of t o t a l c a p i t a l . The policy, both with regard 
to share c a p i t a l and loan c a p i t a l , r e f l e c t s the influence of a Board of 
Directors, made up of substantial shareholders, with an extensive range 
of business i n t e r e s t s ; but more than anything else i t r e f l e c t s the almost 
continuous presence of David Dale. 
3. FINANCIAL RESULTS AND THE COMPOSITION 
OF THE COMPANY'S PROFITS 
The main c r i t e r i o n f o r the success of a company, i n the eyes of 
the shareholders, i s inevitably i t s p r o f i t a b i l i t y . I t was t h i s feature 
of consistently good p r o f i t s which marked Consett out from many of i t s 
contemporary i r o n and steel makers. However the use of p r o f i t s and 
dividends as a measure of a firm's success contains hidden p i t f a l l s 
f o r large p r o f i t s do not necessarily indicate operating e f f i c i e n c y . The 
f i r s t p i t f a l l may be that a company i s under-capitalised, an indictment 
that might well have been l a i d against the Consett Iron Company i n the 
l860*s, and a f t e r 1900. From an o r i g i n a l c a p i t a l i s a t i o n (or valuation) 
of about £lmillion i n 1858, the works were eventually sold i n 1864 
f o r £295,318.08s., and the nominal c a p i t a l i s a t i o n was £400,000 of which 
£300,000 was paid up. Bolckow Vaughan, which converted to a l i m i t e d 
company i n 1864 also, and had a productive capacity i n the same range >as 
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Consett had a nominal c a p i t a l of £2^ m i l l i o n of which £813,737 was 
paid up by 1867. Even /though Bolckow's reduced t h e i r c a p i t a l i s a t i o n to 
(32) 
£l£ m i l l i o n i n I867, i t was s t i l l considerably greater than Consett 1s. 
Their p r o f i t s and dividends were therefore not l i k e l y to be as s t r i k i n g 
as those of Consett. 
However u n t i l I87O the p r o f i t s made by Consett were themselves 
unspectacular, f o r much of the blast furnace plant was obsolete, and 
i t was only when the new furnaces came int o commission that p r o f i t s 
improved. I t was necessary to have a considerable outlay on replacement 
before the company was able to compete i n terms of operating e f f i c i e n c y with 
B e l l Brothers and Bolckow Vaughan on Tees-side. A f t e r 1870 i t has been 
shown i n the l a s t section that much plant renewal and expansion was carried 
on from accumulated p r o f i t s w i t h periodic share issues to increase the 
ca p i t a l value of the plant. The spectacular appearance of Consett's 
p r o f i t s and dividend payments seems therefore to suggest that the plant 
was r e l a t i v e l y under-capitalised. 
The second p i t f a l l that might be concealed by high p r o f i t s was 
possible operating i n e f f i c i e n c y induced by a monopoly position. This 
i 
i s not the place f o r a detailed discussion on Consett's market position, 
but suffice i t to say that Consett did have l i m i t e d monopoly powers i n 
providing materials f o r shipbuilding, especially on Tyneside. However 
during the l a s t 15 to 20 years of the period coal and coke products 
accounted f o r an increasing contribution to the ove r a l l p r o f i t a b i l i t y of 
arvL 
the concern, with these products the company was competing with numerous 
s e l l e r s . 
(32) A. Birch, The Economic History of the B r i t i s h Iron andSteel Industry 
1784-1879. (London. 1967) PP. 207-208. 
TABLE I I . 4 
CONSETT IRON CO. LTD. - PROFITS 1864 - 1914 
Year 
P r o f i t per year 
( a f t e r tax & 
int e r e s t ) 
CD 
Per Cent 
of P r o f i t 
Distributed (A) 
( I I ) 
Ordinary 
Dividend 
Rate % p.a. 
( I l l ) 
P r o f i t on Ca 
Employed 
per cent (B) 
(IV) 
1864 £ 21,062 66.0 94 9.2 
5 39,096 76.7 10 12.0 
6 35, 872 66.8 10 10.9 
7 31,605 74.2 74 8.9 
8 38,413 67.2 74 10.4 
9 39,786 65.0 74 10.8 
1870 101,791 58.4 17 24.5 
1 101,208 45.5 134 23.5 
2 160,194 39.5 184 31.7 
3 302,505 73.0 534 49.2 
4 304,128 81.7 60 47.1 
5 215,102 77.0 40 33.7 
6 86,257 72.0 15 13.9 
7 83,289 74.6 15 12.9 
8 57,996 89.2 124 9.3 
9 55,995 73.9 10 8.9 
1880 104,497 79.2 20 15.6 
1 195,071 75.5 26f 27.1 
2 128,495 85.9 20 18.9 
3 130,219 77.7 184 18.5 
4 85,631 86.0 134 11.8 
5 60,123 91.8 10 8.6 
6 72,502 76.1 10 9,9 
7 95,752 69.2 n4 11.9 
8 117,746 70.2 134 13.5 
9 220,389 59.7 20 24.8_ 
1890 366,410 63.2 334 38.6 
1 275,689 86.8 31|- 26.4 
2 157,623 93.3 I 6 f 14.3 
3 110,971 96.9 10 8.8 
4 124,786 91.8 10 9.5 
5 114,973 93.5 9 8.6 
6 182,383 76.8 134 13.2 
7 246,771 77.0 20 17.4 
8 272,885 69.6 20 18.5 
TABLE I I . 4 . CONTINUED 
Year I I I I I I 17 
1899 433,900 65.8 3 3 i 29.0 
1900 672,585 61.7 50 38.7 
1 575,088 72.2 50 30.5 
2 299,996 88.3 30 15.8 
3 231,324 98.4 25 12.4 
4 250,067 91.0 25 13.5 
5 244,825 92.9 25 13.6 
6 303,181 81.2 2 7 i 17.0 
7 498,468 68.2 40 27.5 
8 374,019 77.5 3 3 i 20.8 
9 243,579 78.0 20 13.6 
1910 221,326 94.3 22* 12.4 
1 338,501 85.7 3 3 i 18.6 
2 427,007 88 .4 45 24.O 
3 581,998 84.2 60 3 2 . 1 
4 408,014 77.0 30 22.6 
(A) P r o f i t d i s t r i b u t e d a f t e r 1894 includes £ 4 0 , 0 0 0 per annum as 
dividends on £ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 of 8 per cent preference shares (during the 
period 1891-94 when the shares were i n the process of being 
paid up smaller sums were distributed.) 
(B) This compares p r o f i t earned (including i n t e r e s t payable) with 
t o t a l capital, employed (the t o t a l of share c a p i t a l , reserves, 
long-term loans, and undistributed p r o f i t . ) 
Source : H.W. Richardson and J.M. Bass, "The P r o f i t a b i l i t y of the 
Consett Iron Company up to 1914", Business History (1965) 
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Having illuminated two of the possible explanations of Consett's 
high p r o f i t a b i l i t y , what then were the p r o f i t s and dividends made and 
paid during the f i f t y years up to 1914? Table I I . 4 gives a summary of 
p r o f i t s , amount d i s t r i b u t e d , dividends and the rate of return on c a p i t a l 
employed. 
Prom the Table i t can be seen that the dividend paid to shareholders 
was never below 7& per cent, and i n 33 of the 51 years recorded i t was 
15 per cent or above. The only other i n d u s t r i a l concern i n the heavy 
sector, i n the North-east, that could compete with Consett's performance 
during the p a r t i c u l a r l y bleak years of the mid-1890»s was the engineering 
f i r m of Armstrong, M i t c h e l l and Company of Tyneside, who paid dividends of 
10J per cent, l l f per cent and 16§ per cent i n 1894 - 95 - 96 respectively. 
For the same years Bolckow Vaughan were only able to pay 2^, 2-jjr and 3 
per cent, and Palmers Shipbuilding and Iron Company had sunk i n t o deep 
f i n a n c i a l trouble, through over-valuation and managerial i n e f f i c i e n c y . 
The performance of the Consett Iron Company was even more spectacular a f t e r 
1900 when the dividend never f e l l below 20 per cent. 
The dividends were s t a b i l i s e d as much as possible, by the Company's 
policy of r e t a i n i n g p r o f i t s during the exceptional boom years, allowing 
expansion and replacement to be financed by p r o f i t to a considerable 
degree. I n depressed years almost a l l the p r o f i t s would be d i s t r i b u t e d 
to keep up the dividend and so secure the price of Consett's Ordinary 
shares. The Board were following a policy which brought the greatest 
benefit to the shareholders. 
(33) Newcastle Daily Chronicle. 17 November 1893. 
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I t would be wrong to create the impression that Consett did not 
suffer from exigencies of depressed trade; on the contrary, Consett was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y susceptible to recession because of i t s concentration on 
providing f o r the shipbuilding industry, a t least u n t i l the l a t e 1890's 
The absolute l e v e l of p r o f i t s show vi o l e n t f l u c t u a t i o n s , t y p i c a l of firms 
engaged i n the heavy i n d u s t r i a l and cap i t a l goods sectors. The p r o f i t s f o r 
the year ending June 1878 were only 19*1 per cent of those f o r 1873-74* 
and those f o r the year ending June 1893- only 30.3 per cent of the p r o f i t s 
f o r the year ending June I89O. 
The impressiveness of Consett's record i s i n a large part due to 
the f i n a n c i a l s k i l l of the management, and also to the ef f e c t of v e r t i c a l 
integration which enabled the f i r m to keep going through depression by 
charging coal to the ironworks at cost, and thus being able to reduce 
i t s . t o t a l manufacturing costs as price f e l l . Table 11.5 i l l u s t r a t e s 
how as trade worsened i n the 1870's the proportion of gross p r o f i t s accruing 
to finished metals (plates and p i g iron) increased as the proportion 
a t t r i b u t a b l e to coal and coke used a t the works f e l l . By transfering -
the p r o f i t earning potential from the intermediate inputs to the finished 
product the Company were able to compete f i e r c e l y i n any price c u t t i n g 
during depression, thus keeping t h e i r plant as f u l l y occupied as possible. 
Consett's success rather dispells the o f t quoted opinion that integrated 
firms benefit during the booms from cheap raw materials but suffer during 
recessions, as they are not able to s p e c u l a t e . T h i s theory of 
speculative buying i s also inappropriate to the market f o r coal and coke, 
since both these materials deteriorate quite rapidly when stocked. 
(34) H.W. Richardson and J.M. Bass, op.cit.,p.8l. 
TABLE I I . 5 
THE CONTRIBUTION TO PROFITS OF THE COMPANY'S 
VARIOUS EARNING FUNCTIONS. 1873-1893 
Year 
Ending 
June 
Finished Iron 
& Steel Products 
Pig 
Iron 
Coal 
& Coke 
Sold 
Coal & 
Coke used 
at Works 
House Rent 
Royalties 
Share 
Transfers &c. 
1873 49.22$ 8.07% 4.33% 35.96% 2.39% 
74 71.27 3.34 23.05 - X 2.32 
75 65.61 3.04 26.78 - * 4.54 
76 31.14 2.73 21.0 27.a 11.13 
77 38.39 11.90 24.1 14.6 11.03 
78 36.71 15.55 24.4- 7.9 15.40 
79 50.59 8.74 21.2 4.1 * 15.35 
1880 36.12 32.23 21.83 * 9.10 
81 54.06 24.13 16.54 5.25 
82 52.33 25.54 16.29 5.82 
83 53.59 22.52 16.86 7.00 
84 52.18 21.95 15.23 10.62 
85 44.42 26.35 14.15 15.05 
86 57.67 + 18.40 9.21 13.54 
87 64.56 15.11 10.72 9-58 
88 75.71 6.45 9.14 8.68 
89 86.82 2.81 5.33 5.01 
1890 71.19 8.47 17.65 2.67 
91 75.72 4.87 15.05* 4.32 
92 81.44 4.41 5.73 8.33 
93 77.24 0.28 12.49 11.62 
Included i n Finished Iron and Steel Products, as i t was not accounted 
separately. 
A loss of £1185 was made on the sale of coke from the new Langley 
Park C o l l i e r y . 
A loss of £217 sustained on coal used i n the ironworks. 
P r o f i t s from steel exceeed those from f i n i s h e d i r o n f o r the f i r s t time. 
F i r s t sales of coal from North of River Derwent. 
* 
Source : P r o f i t and Loss Accounts. 1873 - 1893 (DCR0:D/C0/89). 
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Prom the beginning of the 1890 's Consett began to d i v e r s i f y the 
range of products i t offered, though i t had the e f f e c t of f u r t h e r t y i n g 
the Company to shipbuilding. An angle and sectional steel m i l l with 
coke from north of the Derwent started i n I89O. The addition of the angle 
m i l l , however, absorbed the extra blastfurnace capacity, and sales 
of p i g i r o n became negligible a f t e r 1893. The angle m i l l d id help 
to improve the marketability of stee l plates, since Consett was able to 
provide a l l the steel requirements of shipbuilders. The extension of 
coal and coke sales was very large, and appears to have proved wise. 
During the depression of the 1920's Consett's Chairman, Clarence D. Smith 
recalled that: 
" I n a composite company l i k e ours i t had frequently happened 
i n the past that when the coal trade was depressed we were able to 
make substantial p r o f i t s i n our i r o n and steel departments, and, 
conversely, when i r o n and steel were depressed we were able to 
(35) 
make up f o r i t i n our coal and coke departments. 
A test of the Company's dependence on the shipbuilding industry may 
be ascertained from the relationship i n the f l u c t u a t i o n of p r o f i t s to the 
(36) 
f l u c t u a t i o n of a c t i v i t y i n the shipbuilding industry. v 
additional ingot capacity began operating i n 1893, and sales of coal and 
OC+ 04S 4P 
s ( H r > 
or APt = oc+ftA S ( t - i ) 
where P «= P r o f i t , S = Shipping tonnage launched. 
(35) Evening Chronicle. 25 June 1925. 
(36) The S t a t i s t i c s on tonnage of Shipping launched i n the U.K. taken 
from:- P.P. 1889 (5862) LXXX11.1; P.P. 1899 (9182) CV.365; 
P.P. (4805) C.l; P.P. 1914-1916 (7636) LXXV1.1. 
- 59 -
Allowing f o r a six month lag i n p r o f i t s behind tonnage launched 
produces the r e s u l t : 
= 9.8481 + 0.4876 ^ s ( t _ £ ) 
(0 .2206) 
R 2 o 0.1225 P - Value = 4 . 8 8 6 , P ( l , 3 5 ) > 4.13 at % 
f o r the period 1877-1913. Thus over the whole period fluctuations i n 
shipbuilding a c t i v i t y appear to account f o r only 12^$ of the fluctuations 
i n the Company's p r o f i t s . More surprising i s the r e s u l t f o r the sub-
period 1897-1914. 
AP t -* 8.8227 
R2 = 0.2564 
This apparently indicates that fluctuations i n p r o f i t s became 
more susceptible to fluctuations i n shipbuilding a c t i v i t y a f t e r the mid-1890's 
when the Company had adopted a broader base of saleable goods by 
manufacturing sectional steel and s e l l i n g more coal. 
One explanation may be that during the period more dependence 
rested on business from shipbuilding because the sale of pi g i r o n had 
ceased, and was diverted to the manufacture of steel angles which was 
dependent upon the l e v e l of a c t i v i t y i n shipbuilding. A second explanation 
was that during the period 1877-1897 movements i n prices and costs over-
rode the influence of changes i n the l e v e l of a c t i v i t y i n shipbuilding 
w h i l s t between I897- I914 the e f f e c t i v e collusion of steel-plate manufacturers 
from 1904 onwards accentuated the r e l a t i o n between p r o f i t s and output 
of shipping tonnage. This occured because the price of ship-plates 
+ 0.5289 A S ( H r ) 
(0.2325) 
P - Value = 5.173, P(l,15)> 4.54 at % 
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was held longer than under free competition, and so revenue would decline 
with sales to shipbuilders as opposed to the alternative where i t may 
decline through the reduction of price, although sales were maintained. 
I t can be inferred from t h i s that i f the l e v e l of a c t i v i t y i n 
shipbuilding was a r e l a t i v e l y minor cause of the f l u c t u a t i o n i n 
p r o f i t s , then the change i n price r e l a t i v e to that of costs must have 
been s i g n i f i c a n t , and also that t h i s factor does not correlate well 
with a c t i v i t y i n shipbuilding. That i s , i n a normal competitive s i t u a t i o n „ 
a downturn i n price w i l l probably lead the downturn i n deliveries to buyers, 
and i n reductions i n costs. Therefore before there i s any appreciable 
change i n output of shipping there w i l l be a downturn i n p r o f i t s . 
P r o f i " t s w i l l stablise then begin to r i s e when price^ stabilises and costs 
begin to f a l l . This i s .to some extent substantiated by allowing 
f l u c t u a t i o n i n p r o f i t s to lead by six months the f l u c t u a t i o n i n ship 
launchings. 
A P t = o c + / 6 A S ( l H i ) 
For the period 1876-97 when the market was r e l a t i v e l y free from collusive 
a c t i v i t y , the following regression i s found. 
APt = 4.1017 + 0.916 A S ^ ) 
Co.3768) 
R 2 = 0.2579 F - Value = 5-909, F(l , 1 7 ) > 4 . 4 5 a t 9& 
The implications of these results are that the inter-play 
between costs and price, as much as the l e v e l of a c t i v i t y i n the chief 
customers' industry, were c r u c i a l to Consett's p r o f i t a b i l i t y . That the 
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Company made respectable p r o f i t s even i n the worst trading years i s a credit 
to the managements responsiveness to changing conditions w i t h i n 
several markets. However the number of markets i n which the Company 
had to buy and s e l l was minimised by the extent of v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n . 
CHAPTER H I 
IRON ORE : THE SEARCH FOR SUPPLIES. 
For the ironmaster the acquisition and supply of i r o n ore was 
fundamental. The o r i g i n a l Derwent Iron Company had been located a t 
Consett upon the expectation of r i c h ore deposits, but these were 
rapidly devoured by the large concern, and w i t h i n a decade i t had 
become apparent that the ore only occured i n dispersed 'pockets' which 
could only be mined at a proh i b i t i v e cost. The owners of the Derwent 
Iro n Company turned t h e i r a t t e n t i o n elsewhere, t r y i n g ore from 
Northumberland and Weardale, but both of these f a i l e d to provide an 
economic a l t e r n a t i v e . The Derwent partners were not alone i n t h e i r 
search f o r more satisfactory i r o n ore supplies. John Vaughan, a partner 
i n Bolckow Vaughan, who b u i l t blastfurnaces at Wiitton Park i n 1845» 
was also seeking to obtain a regular and cheap supply of ironstone. 
His search bore f r u i t i n I85O when he discovered the main seam at Eston. 
Vaughan's discovery opened the floodgates of exploitation of the 
Cleveland ironstone. I n the following year the Derwent Ir o n Company 
opened out mines at Upleatham, on land leased from the Earl of Zetland. 
However, the most important development did not take place u n t i l 1853 when 
Joseph Pease and J.W. Pease began opening out the mines at Hutton Lowcross 
near "Giiisborough Messrs. J.W. Pease and Company l a t e r took over the 
Upleatham and Skinningrove mines, and became the largest workers of 
(2) 
ironstone i n Cleveland. ' 
(1) J.S. Jeans, Pioneers of the Cleveland I r o n Trade (Middlesbrough, 
1875) P.139. 
(2) I b i d . , p.140. 
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Simultaneously, across the Pennines, the West Coast hematite 
ores were being exploited around Whitehaven (where there were 19 mines i n 1858) 
and Ulverstone i n Purness. I n the l a t t e r d i s t r i c t the main progress was 
made by Messrs. Harrison, A i n s l i e and Co. and Messrs .Schneider, Hannay 
and Co. who owned eight of the twenty-three mines between them.^^ 
The importation of t h i s hematite ore to Consett was not feasible on a 
large scale u n t i l a more d i r e c t r a i l connection was constructed between 
the Newcastle and Carlisle Railway and Consett ironworks - such a l i n k 
was not opened u n t i l 1867. Cumbrian ores were used at Consett from I856, 
ins p i t e of the circuitous route. This was necessary because the high 
phosphoric content of the Cleveland ironstones made them unsuitable f o r 
use alone i n the manufacture of i r o n ship-plates; they, therefore, had to 
be mixed with the non-phosphoric West Coast i r o n ore "to produce a suitable 
pi g i r o n f o r the manufacture of plates. 
I n 1855 Jonathan Richardson had leased ironstone and i r o n ore r i g h t s 
on Alston Moor and C a r r i g i l l from the Commissioners of Greenwich Hospital, 
f o r 28 years. The royalty rent was 5d« per ton and he was obliged to work 
or pay roy a l t y on at least 2,800 tons annually. This lease was 
surrendered i n 1864 when the ironworks were transferred to the Cbnsett 
Iron Company.^ Iron ore from t h i s r oyalty was never s i g n i f i c a n t i n 
supplying ore f o r Consett, and was probably j u s t another burden which 
Jonathan Richardson took upon himself. 
Another source of i r o n ore which Consett explored but did not e x p l o i t , 
was the r i c h magnetic ore at Rosedale i n Cleveland. I n 1860 William 
(3) W. Pordyce, History of Coal and Iron (London, 1860) p.152. 
(4) Agreement with the Commissioners, of Greenwich Hospital f o r Ironstone 
at Alston. (DCRO:D/CO/59 ( v i i i ) ) . 
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Fordyce "believed that the Derwent and Consett Iron Company were going 
to take 175,000 tons annually, at 6s.l0d. ' However there i s no 
furth e r mention or indication as to whether t h i s contract ever 
materialised, and i t c e r t a i n l y was not f u l f i l l e d . 
Thus when the Consett Iron Company took the works over i n 1864 
the. main sources of i r o n ore were Cleveland, Ulverstone and Whitehaven. 
The Company wets, a t a grave locational disadvantage compared with i t s 
competitors on the West Coast and Tees-side, with regard to the i r o n ore 
input. However the ben e f i c i a l association between the Company and 
Pease and Partners, through the persons of David Dale and J.W. Pease, 
ensured a t least the continuity of ironstone supplies on favourable terms. 
. Types of Iron O r e ^ 
Since i r o n i s r a r e l y found i n nature i n a pure form, because of i t s 
a f f i n i t y with oxygen, i t i s necessary to process the ore by removing the 
oxygen. Iron ore i t s e l f i s not homogenous, f o r beside oxygen i t may 
contain traces of numerous other elements such as phosphorous, s i l i c a , sulphur, 
manganese etc. Nor does the ore necessarily occur as an oxide of i r o n ; 
the Cleveland ironstones were carbonates of i r o n , and before they could 
be used i n the blastfurnace they had to be reduced to an oxide by 
calcining ( r o a s t i n g ) . This process removed carbon dioxide. The 
Cleveland ores also contained phosphorous i n a quantity s u f f i c i e n t to make 
them unsuitable f o r use i n the manufacture of steel by the acid process 
( i . e . i n furnaces l i n e d with s i l i c a ) . I n terms of i r o n content the 
Cleveland ironstones produced about 30 tons of i r o n per 100 tons of 
(5) V/. Fordyce, op.cit.,p,150. 
(6) This section has been based upon information from: W. Fordyce, 
History of Coal and I r o n , p.115; M.W. Fl i n n , B r i t i s h Overseas 
Investment i n Iron Ore Mining 1870-1914 (M.A. Thesis, University of 
Manchester, 1952) pp. 57-62. 
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ironstone, and t h i s was regarded as a r e l a t i v e l y lean ore. 
The Cumbrian and Ulverstone ores however were both richer and free 
from phosphorous, making them suitable f o r the manufacture of s t e e l . 
The Red Hematite or specular ores used at Consett contained on 
average about 60$ of i r o n . 
I n the 1870's Consett began to draw upon Spain f o r i t s ore requirements, 
and several types of non-phosphoric ores were imported. Most popular, 
and so most rap i d l y exhausted, was the red hematite or •campanil' which 
contained about 50$ of i r o n and was very easily mined. Richer i n i r o n 
content (52-56$) but not as pure because of a 4-5$ s i l i c o n presence was 
1rubio' or brown ore; t h i s was extensively used by Consett a f t e r 1880. 
Much less common, but highly valued f o r i t s high metallic content and the 
presence of manganese was 'vena dulce 1 or purple ore. Manganese was a 
necessary input i n the manufacture of Bessemer s t e e l , i n order to remove 
(7) 
oxygen and replace some carbon. ' At Consett manganese was used m the 
production of mild steel f o r ship-plates. By the mid - l890's the rubio 
deposits of the ''•Bilbao d i s t r i c t were nearing exhaustion, and the mining 
companies began to work out the s i d e r i t e or spathic ores, which l i k e the 
Cleveland ironstones were carbonates of i r o n . These ores had to be 
calcined, a process which was carried out at the mines, reducing the ores 
to quite a r i c h concentrate, which was more economical to ship. 
2. The Changing Sources of Ore: Cleveland, Cumberland and Spain 
The source, from which an i r o n company drew i t s i r o n ore supply 
was dependent upon two factors. F i r s t and foremost i t depended upon the 
(7) /\t Birch, Th& bconomic History of the Bnfci'sh Iron an(i 
Sfcee) Whirry , 1784-187^ ( London, 116 7 ) . p. 326. 
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use the p i g i r o n was to be put t o , the clearest example being the 
u n s u i t a b i l i t y of phosphoric pigs f o r making steel p r i o r to 1879» 
but t h i s did extend even to the use of d i f f e r e n t types of p i g i r o n f o r 
manufacturing d i f f e r e n t finished products. I n Consett's own case the Company 
needed hematite ores, even before i t began to manufacture s t e e l , because the 
unadulterated Cleveland p i g i r o n was not suitable f o r producing ship-plates. 
The second factor was the changing r e l a t i v e prices of i r o n ores from 
d i f f e r e n t sources. 
The f i r s t f a ctor was c r u c i a l i n the su b s t i t u t i o n of hematite i r o n 
ore f o r Cleveland ironstone during the 1880's when Consett turned over 
gradually to the production of s t e e l . The second operated i n the l870's 
as the price of West Coast ore rose phenomenally due to the pressure of 
demand upon a l i m i t e d supply. This opened the way f o r the ex p l o i t a t i o n 
of overseas deposits, by f a r the most important of these being i n Spain. 
As mineral deposits are f i n i t e , they reach., the point where they 
became either too costly to work, or a*e simply exhausted. This became 
a potent force from the 1890's onwards as the deposits i n North Spain became 
more d i f f i c u l t to mine. Consett i n company with other steel producers 
was forced to search f o r alternative sources. 
I n the early 1870's there was a marked boom i n i r o n prices during 
1872-73* and an increasing production of steel by the Bessemer process 
f o r the manufacture of r a i l s . The only domestic source of suitable ore 
was the West Coast, but although there was a substantial increase i n output 
between 1868-1873, the r i s e i n price suggests that there was a large 
excess demand. 
TABLE I I I . l 
PRODUCTION AND PRICE (PER TON) 
OF WEST COAST HEMATITE IRON ORE. 
Year Output 
('000 tons) 
Price 
( f . o . t . ) 
1868 1694 13s.8d 
1869 1832 14s.5d 
1870 2093 14s.Od 
1871 1969 19s.9d 
1872 1767 28s.6d 
1873 2156 33s.6d 
Source : M.W. F l i n n , B r i t i s h Overseas Investment i n Iron Ore Mining 
1870-1914 pp. 18-19. 
William Jenkins had purchased some samples of Spanish pre f o r • 
blastfurnace tests as early as 1870, an idea he probably brought from 
Dowlais, since the Welsh ironmasters had been importing Spanish ore from 
(8) 
the early 1860*s although only on a small scale. ' At the beginning of 
1871 he contracted with Henry Clapham to supply 20,000 tons of Bilbao 
ore at l8s.0d. per ton ex ship i n the Tyne. I f the ore was freighted to 
Consett at §d per ton mile then the cost from Tyne Dock (22 miles from Conse 
would have been ls.7d. Spanish ore could thus be delivered at the Consett 
blastfurnace tops f o r between 19s.6d. - 20s.Od. per ton, which compared 
(8) M.W. Fli n n , op.cit.,p.74. 
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favourably w i t h the price of West Coast Red ore, which cost about 
(9) 
20s.6d. per ton at Consett even i n 1869-
The Spanish ore proved satisfactory, f o r the Board instructed 
Jenkins to make further enquiries about the f e a s i b i l i t y of importing 
Spanish ore on a permanent basis. The rapid increase i n the price of 
West Coast ore during 1871 added urgency to Jenkins 1 enquiries. 
Between December I869 and September 1871 the price of Hodbarrow hematite 
i n trucks at the mines rose from 13s.Od per ton to 27s.Od.^^ 
The rush to secure Spanish supplies caused a bottleneck i n the 
inadequate shipping f a c i l i t i e s at Bilbao. Consett attempted to ease i t s . 
d i f f i c u l t i e s p a r t i a l l y by chartering a steamer at 22s.Od. per ton gross 
re g i s t e r , to transport ore between Spain and the north east coast. I t 
also sent two of i t s . agents, Messrs. Greenwell and Sick to Spain to 
make a survey of the extent of the ore resources i n both the north and 
south. Whilst i n Spain they made orders f o r 5f000 tons of ore from 
Garrucha i n the South (8s.Od per ton f.o.b.) and also f o r 10,000 tons from 
Messrs. Ybarra, and 20,000 tons from Sgnr. Chavarri (6s.Od per ton f.o.b.), 
to be shipped from Bilbao, I t was also t h e i r opinion that Bilbao was the 
most feasible source of supply since the ore was cheaply worked, close to 
the coast and the port was one of the nearest shipping points to Great 
B r i t a i n . O n the basis of Greenwell and Dickfs Report the Cohsett 
Board resolved to approach the Directors of Bolckow Vaughan with a view 
(9) Directors' Minute. 3 A p r i l 1869. (DCR0:D/C0/29). 
(10) Directors' Minute, 4 December I869. P«44»; Directors' Minute. 2 
September 1871 p.128. (DCR0:D/C0/30). 
(11) Directors' Minute. 22 July 1871. pp.121-122. (DCR0: I b i d . ) . 
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of undertaking a j o i n t project f o r acquiring and working mines i n 
(12) 
Spain. Though nothing came of the Bolckow Vaughan scheme, Consett 1s 
i n t e n t was clear. The next proposed project was less soundly based. 
The Company contemplated a long term contract with a shipping f i r m , 
Holloway Brothers, f o r the supply of 25,000 tons of ore i n 187?, and 
50,000 tons annually f o r six years thereafter. On the completion of 
the f i r s t year's deliveries, Consett was to pay £ 5 0 , 0 0 0 ( f o r the. second 
year's supply @ 20s.Od. per ton i n trucks at Sunderland or the Tyne) 
and t h i s sum would be used by Holloway's f o r the purchase of purpose 
b u i l t ore carrying v e s s e l s . ^ ^ The main drawbacks i n t h i s scheme were 
that there was no sound guarantee of the ore being delivered, and that 
Holloways would be dependent upon docking f a c i l i t i e s at Bilbao, over which 
they or Consett could have l i t t l e c o n t r o l . I n one respect Consett's 
proposed involvement with Holloway*s was not dis s i m i l a r from the Marbella 
Iron Ore Company's unfortunate association with the shipping f i r m of 
Malcolm*s,^^ f o r both shippers went bankrupt. Fortunately Holloway's 
bankruptcy occurred before Consett had entered i n t o any contracts. 
However, j u s t as i t became apparent that Holloway's were u n l i k e l y 
to be able to f u l f i l l any commitments, Consett was approached by the 
Welsh i r o n company of Dowlais. to enter a partnership with them and a 
(12) I b i d . , p.122. 
(13) Directors' Minute. 28 October 1871. p.123. (DCR0: I b i d ) . 
(14) M.W. F l i n n , o p . c i t . , p . l l l . 
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Spanish i n t e r e s t , Messrs. Ybarra. The proposal was to work the mining 
concession of the Ybarras' near Bilbao, and to b u i l d a railway-
to the r i v e r below Bilbao, and there erect the partnership's own 
(15) 
shipping f a c i l i t i e s . ' William Jenkins 1 past connection w i t h Dowlais 
was probably an important factor i n bringing Consett and Dowlais 
together i n t h i s partnership. As f o r Messrs. Ybarra, they not only 
owned i r o n ore concessions, but were also the proprietors of the most 
important ironworks i n Spain, and so a portion of the mines' output would 
be destined f o r t h e i r own works. Shortly a f t e r , Ybarras' decided to 
admit Krupp of Essen to the partnership, thus s p l i t t i n g the c a p i t a l four 
ways. 
The mines belonging to Don Juan Maria de Ybarra, Don Gabriel Maria de 
Ybarra and Don Cosme de Zabiria were leased to the Orconera Iron Ore 
(16) 
Company Ltd. f o r 99 years from 1st July 1872/ ' The Orconera I r o n Ore 
Company had a nominal c a p i t a l of £200,000 i n twenty £10,000 shares 
divided equally between the partners. Consett, however, ran i n t o some 
legal d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s i n g out of . i t s own A r t i c l e s of Association 
which did not cover investment i n overseas operations. For t h i s reason 
a holding company was fl o a t e d , the Consett Spanish Ore Company, Ltd. f o r 
the purpose of holding shares i n the Orconera Company. The c a p i t a l of t h i s 
new holding concern was £55,200 i n f u l l y paid £1. shares, and these 
were offered to the shareholders of the Consett Iron Company. At 
the f i r s t General Meeting the Directors of the Consett Spanish Ore Company 
(15) Directors' Minute. 9 A p r i l 1872. p.169 (DCR0: I b i d . ) . 
(16) An Agreement between the Orconera Iron Ore Company Ltd., and the 
Consett Iron Company Ltd. 15 August 187^. (DCR0;D/C0/59 ( x i v ) ) . 
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underlined the relationship "between t h e i r Company and the Iron 
Company: 
" I t must at the same time not be forgotten that the Shareholders of 
t h i s Company, so f a r as they remain i d e n t i c a l with those of the Consett 
Ir o n Company w i l l i t i s hoped derive the important c o l l a t e r a l 
advantages which r e a l l y led to the Establishment of t h i s Company." (17) 
I n t h i s respect, the Spanish Ore Company was not d i r e c t l y controlled 
by Consett, and t h e o r e t i c a l l y could have passed out of Consett's 
control through dealings i n i t s shares. I n r e a l i t y , however, the 
Directors of the Spanish Ore Company were always Directors of Consett, 
i n e f f e c t making i t a subsidiary concern. 
The partners i n the Orconera Company were to be a l l o t t e d ore at 
cost plus ls.7d> p r o f i t ; Krupp and Dowlais were to take up to 200,000 
tons each annually, Consett and Altos Homos (Ybarras') 100*000 tons each. 
Any ore produced i n excess of the 'o r i g i n a l contract 1 could be purchased 
at the going market price. As M.W. Fl i n n points out the contract terms 
gave the participants a very r e a l cost advantage i n producing pig i r o n 
from hematite. 
Though the Orconera I r o n Ore Company was registered i n July 1873, 
i t began to export ore only i n I876 because of the interference of the 
C a r l i s t War (1872-76) i n Spain, and delays connected with the construction 
of haulage and shipping f a c i l i t i e s . During t h i s interim period, Consett 
took i t s ore requirements from Ybarras' at 17s.6d. per ton delivered i n 
(17) Consett Spanish Ore Company Ltd.: Minutes of the General Meetings. 
6 September 1873. pp.4-5.(DCRO:D/CO/179). 
(18) M.W. Fl i n n , op.cit.,p.l24. 
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the Tyne or Wear. This was a remarkably low price i n 1873; and was 
probably the r e s u l t of the ore being shipped i n two steamers belonging 
(19) 
to Thomas Morton, a Director of the Iron Company. ' Between 1873-1879 
Spain replaced the West Coast as the source of hematite ores used by 
Consett. 
TABLE I I I 2. 
PRICE AND QUANTITY OF HEMATITE IRON ORE BOUGHT 
BY THE CONSETT IRON COMPANY. HALF YEARLY 
BETWEEN 1873 - 1879 
Six Months Spanish Ore Cumberland Ore 
Ending Quantity Price per ton Quantity Price per ton 
June 1872 7,589 25s. Od 14,161 27s. 5d 
Dec. 1872 10,039 27s. 7d 17,270 29s.10d 
June 1873 10,749 29s. 6d 12,598 30s. 3d 
Dec. 1873 16,439 30s. 9d 8,379 31s. 4d 
June 1874 20,007 29s. 6d 5,617 34s.lOd 
Dec. 1874 22,188 21s. 8d 9,627 25s. 6d 
June 1875 15,380 24s. 9d 9,194 26s. Od 
Dec. 1875 10,884 22s. I d 10,115 24s. 5d 
June I876 12,973 24s. 4d 8,937 25s. Od 
Dec. 1876 17/538 22s. 5d 135 22s. Od 
June 1877 19,221 21s. Od 642 20s. Od 
Dec. 1877 29,492 21s. 7d 143 22s. Od 
June 1878 17,738 20s.lid 782 20s. Od 
Dec. 1878 22,847 18s. 9d 383 . I 8 s . l l d 
Source: Private Cost Book. 1868-1905. (DCRO: D/CO/97). 
(19) Directors' Minute. 3 December 1872, pp.207-208.(DCR0:D/C0/30). 
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The opening of the Orconera's railway i n 1877, and the increased 
output from the mines ended Consett's trade with the West Coast, 
even though they were by then able to compete more evenly i n price. 
However, the future ore supply lay i n Spain, f o r a guaranteed flow of 
ore was imperative. The shipments of ore by the Orconera i n 1877 
produced the p r o f i t s out of which the Consett Spanish Ore Company 
began to pay i t s dividends; t h i s pseudo-Bubsidiary of Consett was to 
have even more s t a r t l i n g f i n a n c i a l results than the parent Company. 
TABLE I I I 3 
ANNUAL DIVIDEND PAID BY THE CONSETT SPANISH ORE CO., LTD. 
Year Dividend Year Dividend Year Dividend 
1873 1887 .40% 1901 86£% 
74 r 5%' | 88 02 70% 
7 5
 < 
3 f % \ 89 374% 03 70% 
7 6 
24% 1890 04 75% 
77 \ , o , 91 50% 05 674% 
78 74% 92 474% 06 633% 
79 7% 93 424% 07 67^% 
1880 94 45% 08 674% 
81 10$ 95 524% 09 50% 
82 5% 96 50% 1910 50% 
83 15% 97 50% 11 474% 
84 324% 98 50% 12 624% 
85 36*% 99 50% 13 574% 
86 1900 5l£% 14 474% 
* During these years there were no dividends paid by the Orconera 
Ir o n Ore Company; the Consett Spanish Ore Company's dividends were paid 
out of i n t e r e s t accruing to them on the ca p i t a l which was deposited with 
the Consett I r o n Company Ltd. 
Source: The General Meeting Minutes of the Consett Spanish Ore Co. Ltd.. 
(DCRO : D/CO/179). 
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The inadequacy of domestic supply had driven Consett abroad i n 
search of a suitable source of supply. The next major a l t e r a t i o n 
i n the o r i g i n of i r o n ore was the replacement of Cleveland ironstone 
by Spanish ore; a change which was necessitated by the Company's 
decision to produce steel i n 1880. 
Consett drew i t s Cleveland ironstone from J. and J..W. Pease, through 
a contract that had originated with the Company's predecessors, i n 
1 8 5 9 . ^ ^ I n I867 a revised agreement was drawn up between the two 
parties with Consett guaranteeing t o take 50*000 tons, and Pease to supply 
up to 200,000 tons per annum. The ore was to be delivered i n t o trucks 
(21) 
at 2s.l0d per ton at Upleatham,v ' and transported by. the North Eastern 
Railway f o r 4a.Od per ton. . By 1873 i t had become evident that Peases 
were unable to supply Consett's ironstone requirements i n f u l l . The 
Company entertained two alternatives: the f i r s t was to import Northampton 
ore, which they did during the boom of 1872-1873, though t h i s was 
uneconomic i n normal conditions; the second choice was to acquire an 
ironstone concern i n Cleveland. I n September 1873 negotiations went on 
over the acquisition of the Liverton Iron Ore Company but by the year's 
end the Board had resolved that the time was not r i g h t f o r the purchase 
(22) 
of f u r t h e r ironstone mines. ' 
On David Dale's i n i t i a t i v e Pease and Company approached Consett 
to f u r t h e r revise the contract, i n a downward d i r e c t i o n . They were 
(20) Directors' Minute. 29 September 1866 p.106. (DCRO:D/CO/29) 
(21) Agreement between the Consett Iron Company and Joseph Whitwell 
Pease and Gurney Pease. 1867. (DCRO:D/CO/59 (X) ). 
(22) Directors' M^H+.P T 2 December 1873 p.9- (DCR0:D/C0/3l). 
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only able to deliver 2,200 tons per week against the 3,846 tons of the I867 
Agreement. As an alt e r n a t i v e , Consett began to buy ironstone from Messrs. 
Stevenson, Jacques and Company, a t considerably more than i t had to pay 
Pease and Company. I n I874 i t bought 26,000 tons a t 4s .9d per ton a t the 
(23) 
mines, and the following year 60,000 tons at a similar price. 
A f t e r 1883 the quantities of Cleveland ironstone taken by Consett 
dropped rapidly as Bessemer pig replaced Hematite and Cleveland p i g i r o n , 
as the production of steel was quickly expanded. 
TABLE I I I . 4 . 
PERCENTAGE OF HEMATITE AND CLEVELAND. AND BESSEMER 
PIG IRON IN TOTAL OUTPUT. 1880 - 1885 
Year Hematite & Cleveland. Bessemer 
1880 40£ \ % 
1881 42$ 22$ 
1882 42$ 30# 
1883 36$ 36$ 
1884 18# 48$ 
1885 2f0 45# 
and Cleveland ironstone mixed 
•purple ore.' 
Source: Private Cost Book. 1868-1905. (DCRO:D/CO/97). 
Hematite and Cleveland: hematite ore 
mixed i n 1:3 r a t i o , aoproximately. 
Bessemer : Spanish hematite and some 
(23) Directors' Minute. 6 October, 1874s p.68; Directors' Minute. 
2 February, 1875» P>90. (DCR0:D/C0/3l). 
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Only i n 1882 had Pease and Partners drawn up a new contract with 
Consett, "by which the price of ironstone was f i x e d to a s l i d i n g scale 
of p i g i r o n prices. Tinder the new agreement Messrs. Pease were to provide 
between 1,500 - 3,000 tons a week, from any of t h e i r mines, though 
the price varied from one mine to another. 
However, when t h i s expired i n 1885 i t was allowed to lapse f o r two 
years, and though a new contract was arranged i n 1888 i t was f i n a l l y 
cancelled i n 1889 on the payment of £ 2 , 7 5 0 compensation by the Consett 
I r o n Company to Pease and P a r t n e r s . ^ ^ 
This brought an end to the association between the Darlington f i r m 
and Consett which had had i t s origins back i n the l850's and had been 
considerably strengthened i n 1858 when Joseph Pease appointed David Dale 
as an Inspector of the Derwent Iron Company's a f f a i r s . Dale was 
simultaneously involved with both concerns, and i n 1872 resigned from 
active management at Consett to become Managing Director of Pease and 
Partners; t h i s association probably enabled Consett to secure such a 
favourable contract, and eventually such a painless withdrawal. 
Thus by 1890 Consett was f i r m l y committed to Spain f o r its. i r o n ore, 
but even by that r e l a t i v e l y early date there had been pessimistic forecasts 
(25) 
regarding the impending exhaustion of the ores i n the Bilbao d i s t r i c t . 
The Orconera Company's railway had been completed i n 1877 and the staithei 
were able to handle 6,000 tons of ore a day by 1882. The f u l l range of 
northern Spanish hematite ores were mined i n the Orconera ro y a l t y , 
(24) Directors' Minute. 14 December, 1889 p.l43«(DCRO:D/CO/34). 
(25) M.W. F l i n n , op.cit.,pp ,176-177. 
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although the 'purple ore 1 only occured in small deposits and was 
(26) 
shipped only when mixed i n with other ores. ' Consett's imports of 
Spanish ore reached a peak i n 1883, coinciding with the trade revival 
i n the early 1880's and the adoption of steel. However, i n the following 
year they f e l l and stabilised at the lower level u n t i l 1888, when 
trade began to improve once again, and the Company's new steelwork 
extension came into operation. 
The trade improvement encouraged the speculators who had 
acquired concessions i n Spain, and had been holding them undeveloped 
during the depressed years. The Bilbao d i s t r i c t was f u l l y exploited 
and the centre of speculative a c t i v i t y moved to the southern provinces. 
The moment was particularly opportune for the speculators, for not 
only was there a sound improvement i n the iron and steel industry, 
but there were also signs that the 'rubio' ore of the Bilbao d i s t r i c t 
was rapidly nearing exhaustion, and some companies had turned to the 
less attractive spathic ores which required calcining. Between 
1893-1914* 92$ of investment i n new mining companies i n Spain was 
i n 
allocated to those operating the south, an almost complete reversal 
(27) 
of the 1871 - 1891 position. " The Bri t i s h steel companies looking 
for alternative supplies turned their attention not only to the South 
of Spain, but also inland, and as the 1890's drew to a close the search 
for other ore deposits had extended far beyond Spain. 
Consett's extensions to capacity by the addition of the new 
Angle M i l l i n 1893 accentuated the Company's need to find further ore 
supplies. On a medium term basis Wm. Jenkins approached the San 
(27) M.W. Flinn, op.cit., p.183. 
(26) Wra. G i l l , "The Iron Ore District of Bilbao," Journal of the Iron and 
Steel Insti t u t e . J(l882), p.64. 
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Antonio Mining Company to ascertain whether they would be able to 
(28) 
supply 150,000 tons per annum for ten to f i f t e e n years. ; However, 
this did not provide the certainty of supply that the steel company 
was looking for, and so Consett "both independently and through 
the agency of the Orconera Company sought to acquire new mining 
interests, at f i r s t i n Spain, but after 1900 elsewhere. 
In the acquisition of property i n Spain the Orconera Iron Ore 
Company was more successful than Consett. In 1893 the liquidators 
of the Parocha Iron Ore Company offered, for £175,000 the mines 
adjacent to Orconera containing ore resources of 3,000,000 tons of 
ore; however, the offer was regarded as unattractive. More important 
was the purchase i n I896 of Joseph McLennan's Obregon Mine, near 
Santander. This was bought for £100,000, and the Orconera borrowed 
the money i n equal shares, from each of i t s shareholders. The mines 
were 9 kms. from shipping staithes at Astillero, and the ore, which had 
to be washed to remove the clay, was treated at Solia, about mid-way 
between the mines and the staithes. There were f a c i l i t i e s to 
ship 2,000 tons of ore per day at Astillero, but i n 1895 McLennan 
was handling only 65,000 tons of ore a year at Solia; however, by 
1899 204,450 tons were exported from the Obregon Mine, by the Orconera 
(29) 
Company. ' 
The Orconera Company also extended i t s range of operations by 
constructing calcining kilns i n 1894; the two kilns had a daily 
capacity of 156 tons between them, but this was increased i n I896 
by the addition of a 120 ton k i l n . Whether Consett was ever a large 
(28) Directors' Minute. 13 September 1890 p.204 (DCRO:D/CO/34). 
(29) M.W. Plinn, op.cit., p.129: Wm. G i l l , "Iron Ore Industries of Biscay 
and Santander," Journal of the Iron and Steel Insitute.(l896)ll.-p.86. 
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consumer of the calcined spathic ores i s d i f f i c u l t to ascertain. 
However, i n 1895, tests were carried out on these ores and they were 
found to be usable for about 10$ of each burden i n the blast. 
This suggests that Consett continueato rely mainly upon 'rubio' ores 
which were easier to handle and had a lower s i l i c a content. 
Consettfs own attempts at acquiring alternative ore supplies 
appear to have started i n 1888 - 1889 when offers of properties 
i n the Santander and Sevilla d i s t r i c t s were made to Jenkins. The mines 
near Sevilla aroused the interest of the Company. They were offered 
by Wra. Thomas, and preliminary samples seemed to indicate that the ore 
was satisfactory. Consett, however, was not w i l l i n g to act alone, 
and sought the co-operation of D o w l a i s . I n March 1890, Mr. 
Halmer was sent to Spain to inspect the Pedroso mines on behalf of 
Consett and Dowlais. His report could not have been favourable for 
neither Consett nor Dowlais participated i n the Iberian Iron Ore Company, 
(32) 
which took over Thomas's mines. ' 
Jenkins estimated that Consett required 350»000 tons of ore per 
annum, i n addition to the Orconera contract, and on the grounds that 
Dowlais would require a dmilar amount, a jo i n t venture seemed to him 
(33) 
"to be the most feasible mode of proceeding." w ' 
(30) Directors' Minute. 5 February, 1895 p.53.(DCR0:D/C0/36). 
(31) Wra. Jenkins to Wm. Thomas, 26 November,1889. (DCR0:D/C0/70). 
(32) Wm. Jenkins to E.P. Martin, 25 June Pl891, (DCR0:D/C0/76). 
(33) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 5 March, 1891. (DCR0:D/C0/75). 
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The offers i n the north at Santander, Corunna and i n the Bilbao 
d i s t r i c t were not encouraging - i n Jenkins1 view there was not "much 
i n the way of advantageous outlet for investment i n Bilbao minerals," 
and preliminary analysis of Corunna ores was disappointing: The two 
companies thus concentrated their attention i n the south., upon 
the mines at Pedroso, and also i n mines at Lucainena i n Almeria. The 
l a t t e r were offered i n I89I by Mr. H. Borner, a London merchant 
dealing primarily i n the iron ore trade. William G i l l the Orconera's 
General Manager, was also of the opinion that the Lucainena mines were 
more suited to Consett and Dowlais' requirements. The negotiations 
between Consett and Dowlais on the one hand and Borner on the other 
reached a tentative agreement, by which £35,000 would be paid to Borner 
to relieve him of the concession, and £6,800 certain rent, and lOd per 
ton to the superior Lessor. An expedition to Spain reported on the ore 
and the f a c i l i t i e s for shipping, and the content was unfavourable 
because the estimated reserves did not warrant the proposed expenditure 
on shipping f a c i l i t i e s . The venture was dropped, and £4,000 compensation 
(35) 
paid to Borner for keeping the option open. However, a v i s i t made 
to some mines at Pedroso on behalf of Son Jose de Ybarra proved 
more encouraging, and Consett and Dowlais began to show an interest 
(36) 
i n joining Messrs. Ybarra i n a Pedroso scheme. ' Tests proved the 
ore from Pedroso to be rich and pure, and although i t would cost 
Consett 4d to IsOd per ton more than Bilbao ore because of the extra 
distance, i t was about 14$ richer i n iron content. Ybarras were 
(34) Wm. Jenkins to D.Dale, 8 August 1891. (DCRO:D/CO/77). 
(35) Directors' Minute. 1 September 1891. pp. 270-271.(DCR0:D/C0/34). 
(36) Directors' Minute. 3 November 1891. pp.4-5. (DCR0:D/C0/35.). 
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authorised by the two Brit i s h firms to bid up to 2,500,000 pesetas 
for the mines, which would then be vested i n an English limited company 
much the same as the Orconera Company. The capital was to be taken 
out i n the following proportions:-
Messrs Ybarra ^ 
Dowlais ^ 
Consett .|-| 
The scheme did not reach maturity because the Trustees of the 
Pedroso estate asked a much higher price than the three partners were 
(37) 
prepared to pay.v ' The Pedroso mines were eventually opened out i n 1895 
( 3 8 ) 
by Bairds of Glasgow, and were successfully worked. ' After this Consett was 
involved i n a number of other fruitless negotiations, particularly for 
mines at Cerain i n Guipuzcoa during 1892-93, and then later i n protracted 
negotiations for the Cala mines i n Huelva i n 1898, but a l l its enquiries 
came to nothing. 
Between 1888-1914 no fewer than 258 mining properties i n Spain were 
offered by speculators anxious to make quick profits on unproven ore 
reserves, but Wm. Jenkins and George Ainsworth, his successor, were 
too astute to be caught by such unscrupulous operators. One such 
devious dealer appears to have been a Mr. V i t t o r i a , but Jenkins was 
forewarned of his activities by Wm. ^ i l l : 
(37) Directors Minute. 1 December, 1891. pp.11-15 (DCR0: Ibid)* 
(38) M.W. Plinn, op.cit. p.l85» 
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" I am thinking that there i s at the root of this that not 
very acceptable man V i t t o r i a , of whom Mr. G i l l has given us 
i 
such a graphic account, and there-is the usual extreme declaration 
as to the 30,000,000 tons which are alleged to be i n the mines. 
I t requires a good deal of patience to l i s t e n to these high 
(39) 
f l y i n g accounts from time to time." x " 
Consett'8 failure to fi n d a suitable alternative source of supply 
to the Orconera Company, was probably due to the high standards they 
set themselves. The Orconera. venture had been an unqualified success 
but the experience gained therein was not a suitable frame of reference 
for ore exploration and acquisition after 1890, for the competition 
for good properties was fiercer. The case of the Pedroso mines probably 
highlights this more than any other; the price the Consett-Dowlais-Ybarra 
consortium was prepared to pay appears to have been ill-conceived, since 
the Scottish firm, Bairds were able to exploit the royalty profitably. 
The search for further foreign ore sources 1900-1914 
As the opportunities for further exploitation i n Spain dwindled 
i n the closing years of the 1890*s, Consett began to look elsewhere 
for its future iron supplies. Though there.were s t i l l mines to be 
bought i n the Iberian Peninsula, the chance of getting a bargain 
had vanished in the speculative booms of the 1870's and l890's. In 
an effort to emulate the success of the Orconera venture Consett 
turned its attention to other undeveloped areas where the risks 
might be higher, but so too would the returns. Unfortunately the 
ventures which Consett opted to enter into illustrated only too well 
(39) Wm. Jenkin's to D. Dale, 26 September, I892. (DCR0:D/G0/82). 
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the risk and frustration encountered i n mineral prospecting and 
exploitation* 
The two areas i n which Consett directed . i t s energies were 
Algeria and Norway. The former had been a source of limited ore 
imports from as early as the 1870's, mainly because the ore was rich 
and could be imported cheaply, to South Wales especially, as a 
return cargo for the coal e x p o r t e r s . H o w e v e r , despite this the 
ore fields were s t i l l undeveloped. 
Consett1s interest i n Algeria was aroused i n 1901 when Mr. E. Carbonel, 
of Paris, approached the Company with a report on the ore reserves 
of the Ouenza d i s t r i c t . A syndicate originally made up of Consett, 
Guest, Keen and Co. (formerly Dowlais) and Krupp of Essen formed the 
Societe d'Etudes (authorised capital 300,000 f r s . ) to investigate 
the reserves and the f e a s i b i l i t y of working them. The fact that i t 
(41) 
was purely an exploratory concern explains the modest capitalisation. 
Having visited the mines and the port of Bone and substantiated the 
claims of Mr. Carbonel, the partners i n the investigation syndicate 
resolved to take up the option granted by the Government of Algeria, 
(42) 
and develop the area. ' 
Even at this stage d i f f i c u l t y was encountered i n gaining the 
necessary concessions, but by September 1905 Mr. Carbonel f e l t that 
a l l had been overcome, a l l that remained being the passage of the 
(40) M.W. Plinn, op.cit. p.209. 
(41) Ibid? Directors' Minute. 5 May 1903. p.169 (DCR0:D/C0/39). 
(42) Directors' Minute. 3 November 1903 p.200. (DCR0: l o c . c i t . 
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Act by the French Chamber. Plans were made for the provision of 
capital to float two companies, one to work the ore, the other 
to operate the railway and harbour f a c i l i t i e s . There were nine 
companies now involved as prospective partners i n the scheme from 
(43) 
Britain, France, Germany and Belgium.v ' 
However, Carbonel's optimism was ill-founded. The approval of 
the French legislature did not prove to be the foregone conclusion he 
had anticipated. The problem revolved around the precise authority 
to make the concessions; the Chamber of Deputies could not, or 
would not pass a B i l l granting concessions for open cast mining at 
Ouenza, for the Ouenza-Bone railway or for a site for f a c i l i t i e s i n 
the port of Bone. They asserted that the f i r s t and last concessions 
must be approved by a decree of the President after approbation by 
the Council of State. However, the Council of State decided on the 
contrary that the concession of a site i n Bone could not merely be 
approved by decree but required to be enacted by the legislature. 
Furthermore the Council of State demanded an enquiry into the advisability 
of foreigners participating i n the exploitation of the ores at Ouenza. 
These problems seemed to have been surmounted by the energies of 
Monsieur Jonnart, the Governor General of Algeria, who had formulated 
and acceptable programme to grant the concessions, when a characteristic 
Ministerial c r i s i s upset the apple-cart. 
(43) Directors' Minute, 5 September 1905 pp.84-85. (DCRO: loc.cit.) 
(44) "A Report by Monsieur Carbonel," Directors' Minute. 6 November 
1906, pp.190-191.(DCRO:D/CO/40). 
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Although not e x p l i c i t l y stated, some of the trouble was 
probably caused by another interest, the Societe Concessionaire des 
Mines de L1Ouenza, which was controlled by the Dutch mineral merchants, 
W.H. Muller. Prom Carbonel's statement i n 1906, i t i s clear that the 
Societe d1Etudes was only seeking an open-cast mining concession, 
as the deep mining concession was held by Muller's. Also later 
evidence suggests that the greater part of the ore would be extracted 
by open-cast m e t h o d s . T h e clash of interests between the Societe 
d'Etudes and Muller's probably provided the opposition lobby of 
the French legislature with a rallying point. The situation was 
aggravated by the volatile and transient nature of French Governments 
during this period. 
In an effort to placate the nationalists opposing the scheme, the 
capital of the Union Siderurgique (the consortium of iron and steel 
companies) was increased from 4,000,000 to 4*600,000 f r s ; the 6,000 
new shares were to be offered principally to French subscribers. 
Three new Directors were to be appointed, a l l French, and 10% or up 
to 120,000 tons of the concerns output was to be sold to unassociated 
French works . 
However, the Societe d'Etudes claim was not as strong as they 
(47) 
had at f i r s t thought, and Muller's became a very serious threat. 
The wrangle continued through 1907 and into 1908, before the two factions 
f i n a l l y reached an agreement. The outcome was that the Union 
Siderurgique was to be enlarged from an authorised capital of 4»000,000 
(45) Directors' Minute. 7 A p r i l , 1908, pp.83-86. (DCR0:D/C0/4l). 
(46) Directors Minute. 8 January, 1907, p.215. (DCR0:D/C0/40). 
(47) Directors' Minute. 9 A p r i l , 1907, p.239.(DCR0:D/C0/40). 
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to 5,000,000 f r s . , with Muller's taking a 30$ holding. In return 
Muller's were to hand over their lease to the Ouenza syndicate, free 
of royalty and a l l other payments; this would then run concurrently 
\ (48) with the syndicate's own lease on the Minieres d'Ouenza. ' The 
President of the Republic then signed the decree granting the lease 
of the Minieres d'Ouenza to the Societe d'Etudes, but the Act for the 
railway concession was deferred. 
The matter continued on u n t i l 1912 when a new Ministry was-formed 
containing Messrs. Briand and Millerand, both favourable to the 
Ouenza scheme i n the past. Once more, Carbonel grew optimistic and 
he declared, "no Ministry has ever had more power on Parliament 
to bring the Ouenza af f a i r to a f i n i s h , either by a vote on the B i l l 
already deposited .or by a modification of the Algerian 
l e g i s l a t u r e . " ^ 
The Briand Ministry neither solved the problem, nor lasted long; 
by Spring 1913 i t had fallen from power. The situation for the 
Societe d'Etudes was now c r i t i c a l , for i t was threatened with the 
termination of its - concession unless i t . began to mine the ore. 
This was impossible as the B i l l to construct the railway was opposed 
both by the Bone-Guelma Railway Company and the legislature. Muller's 
y- s 
were also actively trying to disrupt the Societe d'Etudes' concession, 
and when i t was f i n a l l y revoked, i t was Muller's who dominated a new 
limited company formed to work the concession. Although. Consett was 
(48) "A let t e r of agreement between the Societe d'Etudes de L'Ouenza 
and the Muller syndicate, sent to the Reporter of the Conseil 
d'Etat," 6 March 1908 i n Directors' Minute 7 A p r i l , 1908 pp.83-86. 
(DCR0:D/C0/4l). 
(49) Directors' Minute. 5 March, 1912 p.2l6.(DCR0: D/CO/42). 
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were granted the option to subscribe to the new company, i t declined 
since there were to be no preferential ore contracts. 
The New Societe de L'Ouenza paid indemnity to the Societe d'Etudes 
for the forfeiture of the concession, and out of this 26,000 f r s . 
was repaid to Consett, corresponding to its advances and share 
capital. Therefore although the Company suffered no financial loss, 
the loss of the concession was very costly, i n the foregone benefits 
i t would have bestowed. In a mood of frustration and indignation 
George Ainsworth wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, 
i n 1914 attempting to s o l i c i t his aid. The opinions expressed i n 
this l e t t e r deserve citation i n f u l l : 
"The plan we have always worked on i s to secure ourselves 
a certain proportion of the ore produced by any mine i n which 
we have an interest at a figure below the market price. In the 
case of the Ouenza, the arrangement was that we should receive 
120,000 tons of ore per annum at 1 franc per ton f.o.b. above 
the cost price, and this i t was estimated would be about 5 
francs per ton below the average price. Since 1901 the value of 
Hematite has been enhanced. You w i l l therefore see what a serious 
thing i t i s for the Consett Iron Company to be deprived of t h i s . 
"We think that the French Government, i n view of the fact 
that we are prepared to and i n fact did take up this scheme 
years ago before the value of these deposits was f u l l y recognised, , 
should see that our share of the ore i s reserved for us on 
favourable terms. I t has not been our f a u l t that the Railway 
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has not been b u i l t . The Government of Algeria reported very-
much i n our favour, and the Commission appointed by the French 
i 
Governments also reported to the same effect - the delay has 
been caused by the French Parliament i t s e l f ."^®) 
At the prices prevailing i n 1913 the Consett Board estimated that 
the loss of preference would cost them £25,000 per annum on 100,000 
(51) 
tons of iron ore from Algeria. ' This case amply illustrated the 
vulnerability of overseas investment, especially i n an atmosphere of 
international tension. A major French objection to the scheme had been 
the participation of German armament firms, notably Krupp. The 
French, for their part, particularly the Barti-Socialists had been more 
alert to the removal of natural wealth from France. As economic 
nationalism and armaments were growing in Europe, Consett was a sufferer. 
I f the Algerian venture illustrated the vulnerability of overseas 
investment to nationalism, then the Norwegian enterprise revealed 
some of the technological p i t f a l l s inherent i n mineral exploitation. 
Scandinavia had long been an area of ore prospecting and exploitation 
on an international scale, especially since the early 1870's. Activity, 
however, had been concentrated i n Sweden, and though British capital 
was important at the outset, the Swedish ores proved disappointing to 
Br i t i s h steel producers because of their phosphoric content. As 
Br i t i s h interest and capital declined i n Sweden around 1890, attention 
switched to Norway where there were more deposits of non-phosphoric 
(50) "Geo. Ainsworth to Sir Edward Grey, Bart," Directors' Minute. 16 
January, 19H. p.112. (DCR0:D/C0/43). 
(51) Directors' Minute. 4 November 1913 p.92. (DCRO: loc.cit.) 
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ores. In 1890 the Norwegian Geological Survey published a report on 
the iron ore deposits i n the Dunderland Valley 200 miles north of 
Trondheim. 
Consett had shown interest i n Norway from about 1893 onwards, 
and i n 1898 Professor Louis, the Company's geological adviser and 
Professor at the University of Durham, had visited some mines i n 
Axendal. 
In 1900 a group of British businessmen had acquired the European 
licence for the American 'beneficiation' process. Invented by Edisonf 
the process involved the crushing of the ore, and the separation 
of the metallic content by magnetism. The ores i n the Dunderland 
Valley were not r i c h , and required some form of concentrating to 
make exportation feasible, and so the associates of the Edison 
Ore Milling Syndicate, Ltd. "Suggested that persons or Companies interested 
i n Pig Iron or Steel production should take a.- pecuniary interest 
either i n the Syndicate properties as a whole or in an independent 
Company acquiring from the Syndicate the Dunderland property and the 
(52) 
right to use the Edison patents i n connection therewith." 
Consett was. , interested, and on a v i s i t to the U.S.A. i n 1901, 
George Ainsworth arranged for some Dunderland pre samples to be 
treated by the Edison process. As a result of the tests Ainsworth 
was satisfied that the process could be f r u i t f u l l y applied at the 
(53) 
Norwegian mines. ' In January 1902 the Consett Directors agreed 
(52) Directors' Minute. 5 March, 1901. pp.13-14.(DCRO:D/CO/39). 
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to subscribe £50,000 to the capital of the Dunderland Iron Ore 
Company, which was to buy the Norwegian interests and patent rights, 
vested i n the Edison Syndicate. As was customary Consett was to be 
entitled to a share of the production at preferential rates. 
The t o t a l share capital of the DunderlandjPompany was £2.million, 
half of which was used i n buying out the Edison interest, the rest for 
the costly construction of railway, harbour, process and bricquetting 
plant, power station and a township.^^ I t was planned that the 
capacity of the plant would be 750,000 tons of ore bricquettes 
annually, and that production would begin i n 1905. However, by 1907 
only 35,735 tons had been exported, even though the Company had 600 
(55) 
men employed. ' The problem was that the Edison process was unable 
to cope with the dust and low magnetism of the Dunderland ore, and 
i n an effort to avert to t a l loss the process was abandoned and replaced 
(56) 
by the Ullrich wet separator. ' 
On top of the technological d i f f i c u l t i e s the Company ran into 
financial d i f f i c u l t i e s , because of i t s large Debenture issues 
between 1904-1907. The Ullrich^rocess offered some hope of saivation 
since Krupp agreed to invest a further £400,000 i f the bricquettes 
produced were suitable for use at Essen. They were not, and the 
withdrawal of German support led f i r s t to financial reorganisation, 
by which the capital was reduced to £450,000 and eventually to 
(54) M.W. Flinn, op.cit., p.249. 
(55) Consular Report. No. 3997. Norway 1907. 
(56) P. Nicou, "Etudes sur leg Minerals de Per Scandinaves,11 
Annales des Mines. 10th Her., XIX (l91l),p.32l. 
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liquidation. Although the New Dunderland Iron Ore Company took 
over the capital of the old firm, Consett withdrew i t s support; 
George Ainsworth declined an offer to serve on the new Board. The 
failure of the Norwegian scheme and the frustration i n Algeria i l l u s t r a t e 
only too viv i d l y the high risk nature of mineral development, and they 
stand i n contrast to the rich returns of the Orconera Iron Ore Company. 
Despite the attempts to break away from Spanish dependency, Consett 
was s t i l l i n 1914 importing most of i t s ore from Spanish mines. 
However, i n 1910 i t had reached an agreement with the Rouina Iron 
Ore Company i n Algeria to supply, over several years, 400,000 tons of 
ore from Braira; to f a c i l i t a t e this deal Consett advanced £40,000 
against a mortgage on the mines. This sum was to be repaid to Consett 
by a reduction of 2s.3d per ton, on 360,000 tons of ore. Later i n 
the same year Consett negotiated a sliding scale contract with the 
merchants, W.H. Muller and Co. for 150/200,000 tons of Zacar Iron Ore 
at 19s0d per ton ex ship at Tyne Dock or South Dock, Sunderland. The 
sliding scale was to be governed by iron content, s i l i c a content 
and the price of East Coast Hematite pig. A similar type of contract 
was offered by the Sydvaranger interests, with a loan similar to 
that to the Rounia Company part of the scheme. However, the Consett 
Iron Company was not sufficiently satisfied with the prospects at 
Sydvaranger at the Northern t i p of Norway. This was possibly the 
most serious miscalculation on the part of Consett, for Sydvaranger 
was the most important ore deposit i n Norway, and f e l l largely under 
the control of Krupp. 
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The last date for which there are records of Consett's ore 
demands from Orconera was 1909. The Company took 100,000 tons on 
contract, and 108,333 outside the contract, mainly from the Obregon 
mine. The balance came from the San Salvador Iron Ore Co. i n which 
Consett was a Debenture holder, and also had a representative on the 
Board. Further ore was supplied by the Tafna Iron Ore Co. and the 
Mines Parocha. Thus u n t i l 1910 the hold of Spain remained unbroken. 
In 1910, however, the Consett Iron Company's interests i n 
possible ore deposits actively extended beyond Europe. Some capital 
was subscribed to an exploration syndicate investigating the Itabira 
region i n Brazil, and then i n 1912 another £2,000 was subscribed 
to the Glasgow based Olga Exploration Company, Ltd. By 1914 Consett 
had received offers of ore deposits from every corner of the globe, 
Canada, Brazil, South Africa and even Australia, but i n such cases 
the distances acted as an effective barrier. 
The Cost of Iron Ore 
The main components i n the price of ore at Consett were mining 
costs and freight. Since the beginning of the 1850's, when the firm 
had to start importing ironstone from Cleveland freight charges had 
been a major consideration, and the subject of continuous negotiations 
between Consett and the railway companies. 
From the outset the Company sought to reduce the rates charged 
by the North Eastern Railway. The cost of transporting pre over 56 
miles from Cleveland to the blastfurnaces at Consett was 4s0d 
per ton. The rate from Ulverston at the beginning of the 1870's was 
8s.6d per ton for a 117 mile journey. The North Eastern Railway was 
notorious for the high rates i t charged, and this led to resentment 
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amongst "both ironmasters and coal-owners - who even threatened to 
build an alternative line i n North Yorkshire and South Durham. 
In 1877 Wm. Jenkins complained that the rates for conveying ore 
from Cumberland and Lancashire to the North-East were the same 
as those to South Wales. The policy of the Railway Company was both 
(57) 
prejudicing the ironmasters and restricting t r a f f i c . Despite 
its . representations, the Consett Iron Company was no more able, 
than the body of Tees-side ironmasters, to modify the freight policy 
of the N.E.R. . Small token concessions were made i n 1876 and 1878-79 
during the sharp depressions i n iron-making, but they were only of a 
temporary nature. The high cost of carrying West Coast Hematite ores 
to Consett probably accounted for the rapid decline of this trade i n 
the second half of the 1870's. 
There were, of course, more fundamental causes for the shifting 
source of ore supply than the cost of ore freights, but there are enough 
indications to support the views of Burn and Plinn that the cost of 
freighting ore to Brit i s h ironworks was sufficient to create a competitive 
disadvantage for British ironmakers. This was firmly borne out by 
Consett's unhappy experiences i n importing Spanish ore through Tyne 
Dock, i n particular, but also through other north-east docks. 
As Spanish ore imports began to reach their peak at the end of 
the 1880's, and the trade boom at the turn of the decade stretched 
resources, the inadequacy of ore importing f a c i l i t i e s on the Tyne 
(57) "Steel Report by Messrs. Wm. Jenkins and Edw. Williams," 
Directors' Minute. 6 March, I 8 7 7 . p,12.(DCRO:D/CO/32). 
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became apparent. In 1891 Jenkins complained of the position to 
David Dale: 
" I must, later on, explain to you my fears as regards the capacity 
of the North Eastern Railway Co. to deal with large quantities of 
ore coming i n . Not only are the docks at both places /~Tyne and 
Sunderland_7 unequal to their work without causing considerable 
irratation with the steamer owners - and inevitably certain 
w i l l accrue i n the matter of scant dock accomodation, but i n 
addition to this there is repeated admission on the part of the North 
Eastern Railway Co. that they have hot sufficient trucks to keep 
this ore t r a f f i c going. In time to come this w i l l certainly be 
aggravated."v3 ' 
The Tyne Dock had never been constructed to cope with such an 
inflow, for by I89O approximately 300,000 tons of ore were imported 
annually. I t was anticipated that this would rise to 450,000 tons 
(59) 
when the new Angle M i l l was completed at Consett. ' However, the 
North Eastern Railway were s t i l l unwilling to make r a i l freight 
concessions to Consett, and switch some of the t r a f f i c to the Albert 
Edward Dock on the north bank of the Tyne. 
In view of the growing d i f f i c u l t i e s , Consett began to explore other 
possibilities, and decided to expand i t s recently acquired shipping 
f a c i l i t i e s at Derwenthaugh. An extensive scheme for exporting coal 
and finished metal, and importing ore was expected to save £39*375 
(58) Wm.Jenklns to D. Dale, 26 December I89I. (DCR0:D/C0/79).. My 
brackets. David Dale was i n addition to being Chairman of 
Oonsett a Director of the North Eastern Railway. 
(59) "Report on the D«0wenthaugh Shipping Places," Directors' Minute. 
25 February 1890. pp.165-166. (DCR0:D/C0/34). 
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annually, and the Company computed a saving of ls.Od per ton on 
imported ore. 
TABLE I I I . 5 . 
ESTIMATED SAYING ON IMPORTED IRON ORE. 
( l ) Ore imported via Tyne Dock arid the Lanchester Valley Branch. 
(a) Cost of discharging ore (N.E.R.'s charge) 0s.7^d per ton 
(b) Railway Rates, Tyne Dock to Consett 2s. Id per ton 
(c) Railway Co's. wharfage charge Os. 4d per ton 
(d) Charge for vessels clearing at Tyne Dock Os. 2d per ton 
Total Cost 3s.2^d per ton 
(2) Ore imported via Derwenthaugh and the Blaydon - Consett Branch 
(a) Cost of discharging ore Os. 6d per ton 
(b) Railway rate on the new route I s . 6d per ton 
(c) Newcastle Swing Bridge Dues 0s.2£d per ton 
Total Cost 2s2^d per ton 
Estimated Saving per ton ( l ) - (2) 
3s.2^d - 2s.2^d = Is.Od. per ton. 
Source : "Report on the Derwenthaugh Shipping Places," Directors' Minute, 
25 February 1890 pp.172-173. (DCRO:D/CO/34). 
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The scheme could not be undertaken immediately because the 
Company had to buy some more land at Derwenthaugh, but the project 
was agreed i n principle. The Company was convinced that a great 
economy could be made by handling i t s own ore imports as was done 
by Linthorpe and Jarrow. 
However, despite i t s conviction about the wisdom of such a 
scheme, i t never came to f r u i t a t i o n . The staithes remained i n 
use solely for exporting the output of Chopwell, Garesfield and WMttonstall 
Collieries. The size of "these exports grew very rapidly after the 
opening of Chopwell i n 1897. In 1908, 71,000 tons of coal and coke 
were exported during July alone, and in 1910 permission was granted 
by the Tyne Improvement Commission for a further extension of coal 
shipping f a c i l i t i e s . T h e expansion of the coal exporting f a c i l i t i e s 
l e f t no room for the implementation of the rest of the scheme. I n 
1914 Consett's ore was s t i l l being shipped i n via Tyne Lock or South 
Bock. 
The reluctance of the Railway Company to improve their dock 
f a c i l i t i e s , probably had repercussions upon the willingness of ship-
owners to invest i n specialist ore carriers. I f the docks were unable 
to unload quickly then the vessels would be of l i t t l e advantage. 
In Spain, on the other hand, the f a c i l i t i e s b u i l t by the Orconera 
Company were very good. By 1882 6000 tons of ore could be loaded 
i n a twelve hour day, and between 1881-1895 the size of ore carriers 
(60) Proceedings of the Tyne Improvement Commissioners, 1909-1910 
(Newcastle, 1910) pp.813-814. ' 
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which could be accomodated at the staithes, rose from 1,690 tons to 
5,380 tons.^ 1^ However, although cargoes of over 5,000 tons could 
be despatched from Bilbao i n the 1890's, Tyne Dock was unable i n 1890 
to take cargoes as large as 3,200 tons because the water was too 
(62) 
shallow.v ' Despite the vagaries of trade and the increasing 
inconvenience of Tyne Dock, Consett was lucky, as were a l l Spanish 
ore importers, i n that the cost of mining ore remained stable between 
1882-1896.^^^ This worked i n Consett's favour especially with the 
preferential contract, as the price was governed by a mark-up on 
cost, and not by an rebate on the market price. 
Prom the outset the provision of adequate iron ore reserves 
was a high p r i o r i t y , not only on a short-term working basis, but 
also over the long-term. This was necessary so that investment 
decisions could be made, with a high degree of certainty that the 
Company's ore supplies would remain economical, or that there was a 
readily available alternative. 
The Consett Iron Company never gave serious consideration to the 
East Midlands ores before 1914• This was primarily because they were 
phosphoric, but also because they were too lean to be economically 
transported to Consett, whilst the strong local influence i n the 
Company's ownership made a relocation of operations outside the region 
unthinkable. 
(61) Wm. G i l l , "Iron Ore District of Bilbao," Journal of the Iron & Steel 
Institute. 1882.1. p.85; M.W. Flinn, op.cit., p.142. . 
(62) Wm. Jenkins to J.H. Hicks (N.E.R's representative at Tyne Dock), 
9 October, 1890. (DCRO:D/CO/74). 
(63) Wm. G i l l , "Iron Ore Industries of Biscay and Santander," Journal 
of the Iron & Steel Institute, 1896. I I . p.43. 
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The solid association between Consett and the Peases was followed 
by the b r i l l i a n t participation i n the Orconera venture. However, the 
failure after 1900 to find another major new source of ore l e f t 
Consett i n an uncertain, although not a c r i t i c a l position at the 
outbreak of the Great 7/ar. The dilemma the Company faced was crystallised 
in the protestations to Sir Edward Grey: 
"We shall be much obliged i f you can see your way to 
give us some assistance i n Paris i n the matter of the deposits 
of Hematite Iron Ore situated at Ouenza i n Algeria 
" We fear that the situation i s now getting beyond our 
control and that unless some pressure can be brought to bear 
i n the most influential quarters i n Paris, this valuable deposit 
w i l l be lost to the Brit i s h Steel Trade 
" We mention this (details of Orconera, Dunderland and 
Braira ventures) to show what efforts have been necessary i n 
the past to keep ourselves supplied with ore, and what a 
serious thing i t w i l l be to be deprived of our share of these 
deposits at Ouenza."^^ 
Although Consett was not the only firm which failed to recreate the 
Spanish bonanza i n other ore fields,, the catalogue or failures after 
1900 was an indicator that some of the drive had l e f t the Company. 
Carbonel the representative of the Societe d1Etudes, does not seem to 
have been adequate to the d i f f i c u l t diplomatic task he had at hand. 
Nor dossthe Company seem to have been very effective itself as a 
(64) "A le t t e r from Geo. Ainsworth to Sir Edward Grey, Bart." 
Directors' Minute. 16 January 1914 p.112. (DCR0:D/CO/43.) 
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lobbyists. In the Norwegian venture the tests carried out i n 
the United States on Dunderland ores v/ere surely insufficient when 
such a large investment was to be made to acquire the European 
licence for the Edison process. These were the tell - t a l e s of declining 
dynamism in the Company. 
CHAPTER IV 
COAL-MINING AND COKE MANUFACTURE : THE BASIS 
OF CONSETT'S STRENGTH 
From a very early date Consett operated as an integrated concern with 
substantial interests i n coal-winning and coke production. The change of 
ownership and reorganisation of the ironworks during the period 1857-1864 ^-e<^ 
to an even more active pursuit of the opportunities which were presented 
by the coal-trade. Throughout the period 1864-1914 coal production grew 
substantially, putting Consett amongst the largest producers i n the North east. 
The growth was not attributable to the increasing demands of the ironworks 
but to the diversification i n the sales policy, which established Consett 
as a considerable force i n the markets for the sale of coke and coal. Like 
many other aspects of the Company's development this trend reflects the 
^influence of both David Dale and William Jenkins. Dale, as well as 
being a Director, and later Chairman of Consett, was also the Managing 
Director of Pease and Partners* collieries, and was thus intimately connected 
with the coal-trade. William Jenkins, prior to his appointment at Consett, 
had been employed at Dowlais, and this other great iron-making concern had 
seized the opportunity to enter the steam coal-trade i n the 1860's.^ 
This probably had some effect i n convincing Jenkins of the wisdom of such 
diversification. 
In this chapter the growth of the Company's production of coal and coke and 
the techniques employed by Consett i n marketing i t s coal products w i l l be 
examined. The expansion of output could not be achieved without an increase 
i n the coal tracts held by the Consett Iron Company. The acquisition of 
royalties served a dual purpose; f i r s t l y i t was necessary to f a c i l i t a t e the 
(1) J.H. Morris and L.J. Williams, The South Wales Coal Industry. 1841-1875 
(Cardiff, 1958) pp. 88-89. 
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increase i n output; and second for a successful sales drive the company-
needed to acquire coal tracts closer to the market. I t w i l l be shown that 
i n its. negotiations for the coal tracts i n the proximity of the 
ironworks i t enjoyed the position of a monopsonist. In their efforts 
to increase its coal royalties i n the direction of the. market, the 
Company was naturally confronted by s t i f f e r competition for the acquisition 
of new tracts. However, in one out of the two major extensions the 
Company gradually asserted i-ts power as a monopsonist; this was 
the acquisition of the royalties north of the River Derwent. Only i n 
the case of Langley Park was Consett i n f l i c t e d with royalty payments 
significantly above the County average*; 
The advantage of coal at a low price was pa r t i a l l y derived from 
the monopsony power which conferred upon Consett low royalty charges. 
Cheap coal was fundamental to the success of the ironworks, and so 
negotiations for coal royalties were crucial, and took up a large 
amount of the Directors' time. 
The f i r s t problem w i l l be to discuss the growth of output and i t s 
distribution between the ironworks and sales, and the forces which 
induced Consett to enter the ranks of the sale collieries. 
The Growth of Output of Coal and Cokef and i t s Distribution. 
In 1865» one year after the Consett Iron Company had taken over 
control of the ironworks and collieries, the concern raised 354499 tons 
(2) 
of coal, and produced 132,158 tons of coke, ' which was almost 
(2) Profit and LOBS Accounts. 187V1893. (DCRO.:D/CO/89). 
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exclusively devoted to consumption within the ironworks themselves. 
Within ten years coal output had doubled, and coke production had almost 
doubled. 
Though this dramatic increase could be partially attributed to 
increased demand from the Company's own iron-making departments, i t 
was due also the Directors'decision to s e l l coal and coke from some of 
their more advantageously located collieries. 
The following Table shows the pattern of the growth of output from 
1871 to 1914. The rapid growth which began i n the late 1860's was 
sustained through u n t i l the early 1880's. There was then a decade 
of relative stagnation and this was followed by a very rapid growth i n 
the late l890's which was sustained through the f i r s t decade of the 
twentieth century. 
TABLE IV.1 
The five year average of coal production, 
and the change from one period to the next. 
v » _ , , % Change over the Year Average Output ' . „. B * previous five years 
1871-75 629,263 
1876-80 774,497 23.08% 
1881-85 968,484 25.04/0 
1886-90 882,452 8.88% 
1891-95 1,026,561 16.33% 
1896-1900 1,424,017 38.71% 
1901-05 1,568,017 10.11% 
1906-10 2,180,398 39.05% 
1911-14 2,218,610 1.75% 
Source: Annual Statistical Returns of the Durham Coalowners' Association. 
(DCR0 : Nation Coal Board Deposit.) 
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The progress of coke production was more interrupted, as can be 
seen from the next Table. The main period of growth was the decade 
I876-I885, although there was another significant upsurge between 
1896-1900. However coke production was much more susceptible to the 
business cycle, and i t s fortunes fluctuated closely with those of the 
ironmasters. Furthermore the stagnation after 1900 was attributable to 
the trend of amalgamation which reduced the number of pig iron producers 
dependent on the open market for their coke supplies. 
TABLE IV.2 
The five year average output of coke, and the 
percentage change from one period to the next 
Year Average Output 
1868-70 186,609 
1871-75 216,712 
1876-80 328,259 
1881-85 466,928 
1886-90 418,044 
1891-95 401,604 
1896-1900 522,141 
1901-05 491,814 
1906-10 541,928 
1911-14 514,331 
$ Change over the 
previous five years 
16.13$ 
51.47* 
42.24$ 
-10.46$ 
-3.93$ 
30.01$ 
-5.80$ 
10.18$ 
-5.09$ 
Source: Private Cost Book. 1868-1905: Private Cost Book. 1892-1909; 
Private Cost Book. 1910-1926. (DCR0:D/CO/97,100&. 101) 
The f i r s t phase of expansion up to I885 was f a c i l i t a t e d by the 
acquisition of new royalties, and the opening of two sale collieries 
at Westwood and Langley Park, which u t i l i z e d the improved railway 
communications to Consett, which were opened during the 1860's. The 
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second phase after the mid-18901s was caused by the purchase of the coal 
tracts north of the River Derwent and the exploitation of these, and to 
a lesser extent by the opening out of the non-coking coals at Langley Park. 
In 1864 the collieries of the Consett Iron Company probably served 
only the ironworks, with their few sales being local landsale. There i s 
no reference to coal sales i n the Prospectus for the Consett Iron Company, Ltd., 
and had they been significant then one would have expected some reference 
to be made in this source. The principal reason for the absence of sales 
was the poor location of Consett's collieries, especially i n the early 
1860's before the important Lanchester Valley and the Blaydon-Consett 
Branch lines were opened. Furthermore Consett was at a competitive 
disadvantage with the collieries scattered along the Pontop-Shields 
Railway line, i t s most direct outlet to the open market. 
However, the construction of additional railway communications 
did strengthen Consett's a b i l i t y to compete. The Consett-Blaydon Branch 
gave Consett a slight edge over other Durham coal and coke producers i n 
the trade to Cumberland. The Lanchester Valley line opened an 
alternative route to the Tees-side market. 
The f i r s t indication that the Board were preparing to take advantage 
of the new railways was shown i n 1866 when the installation of screens 
was approved for Medomsley P i t , so that the quality of coke might be 
improved for s a l e . ^ Early i n the following year the Board's intentions f 
were crystallised i n their approval of Messrs. Armstrong and Boyd's Report 
on the means by which coal output could be expanded to f a c i l i t a t e sales. 
The output from the existing Derwent and Medomsley Pits, and from a new 
colliery near Ebchester (Westwood) was to be devoted to sales, because of 
0) Director's Minute. 29 September 1866. (DCRO: D/CO/29). 
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their proximity to the Blaydon-Consett Branch line. ' In 1868 the 
Consett Iron Company sold 74»129 tons of coke, out of a to t a l production 
179.362 tons. 
This rapid development of coke sales was intimately bound up with 
the opening of the Branch line i n 1867, and the rapid growth i n the 
output of hematite pig iron, which was stimulated by the development 
of the Bessemer steel process. Output of pig iron increased five fold 
i n Lancashire between 1862-70, and three fold i n Cumberland because of 
the exploitation of the non-phosphoric iron ores. Consett was well sited 
for access to .both these markets ; to Barrow via the South Durham and 
Lancashire Union Railway and to Cumberland via the Newcastle and Carlisle 
Railway. When Westwood was opened i n 1872 i t became the Company's main 
supplier to. these markets. w / 
Even by the early 1870's Consett was unable to take advantage 
of the equally impressive growth of pig iron production i n South Durham, 
and on Tees-side. This was due to the distance and discriminatory railway 
rates which favoured the Auckland Di s t r i c t collieries. In order to tap 
this market Consett entered negotiations with the Earl of Durham for his 
Langley Royalty i n 1871, and the acquisition of this Royalty i n 1873 
opened the way for competition between Consett and the Auckland collieries. 
Although Langley Park Colliery was not opened u n t i l 1877» Consett 
began to s e l l coke to Tees-side firms i n 1874, at the tail-end of the 
"Coal-famine." The Company was thus able to establish connections with 
U) Directors' Minute, 29 January 1867, (DCR0;D/C0/29). 
(5; In 1886, of 80,420 tons of coal and coke from Westwood which went on the 
North Eastern Railway's system, 72,504 tons went via Blaydon to Carlisle 
G. Whittle, Railways of Consett and North West Durham (Newton Abbot -1971), 
p.110. 
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some reputable Tees-side iron-makers, such as Gjers, Mills and Company, 
(6) 
and Hopkins, Gilkes and Company. ' 
By 1873-74 the increased output which resulted from the Armstrdng-Boyd 
Report began to outrun demand, and stocks started to accumulate (see Table 
IV.4) . Since coal deteriorates, stocking was an unprofitable procedure 
and the Board instructed the Chief Viewer, Mr. Hedley, to cut back output. 
This was implemented by the closure of Delves P i t , which had been the highest 
(7) 
cost colliery i n the Consett group.x ' 
Prom 1874 u n t i l the end of the decade there was a persistent 
downward d r i f t i n prices, reaching i t s nadir i n October 1879» when the 
average price of Durham coals was 4s.3d per ton. ' I t was during this 
depression that the Company's sale collieries became more clearly 
separated from their 'home' collieries. Sales from Derwent and Medomsley 
began to f a l l off as these two were the least well located of the sale, 
collieries, and the Company's selling operations were concentrated upon 
the pits at Westwood and Langley Park. Furthermore the l a t t e r two 
were able to make significant cost reductions during the d i f f i c u l t years 
I878-I88O, and so maintain their a b i l i t y to compete. 
1879 was not only depressing from the point of view of insufficient 
demand but also because the trade conditions sent some iron-makers to 
the wall; three local firms which suffered such a fate were the Rosedale 
and Ferryhill Iron Company, Hopkins, Gilkes and Company, Ltd., and Lloyd 
and Company. A l l three had outstanding accounts with Consett. In face 
(6) Directors' Minutes. 3 November I874, and 15 May 1874. (DCR0:D/C0/3l). 
(7) Directors' Minute. 11 April I874, p.29 . (DCR0:D/C0/3l). 
(8) Ascertained net selling price of a l l types of Durham coal, as given on the 
Accountant's Certificates of the Durham Coal Owners' Association and the 
Durham Miners Association. C.E. Mountford, The History of John Bowes and 
Partners up to 1914 (Durham, M.A. Thesis, 1967) Appendix D. 
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of such trade i n s t a b i l i t y Consett wisely adopted a p r i c i n g and marketing 
policy which r e s t r i c t e d c r e d i t to buyers and demanded more general 
(9) 
monthly settlement of coke purchase accounts. ' 
At the end of 1879 "the production of pig iron began to show signs of 
picking up. Sales of coke began to increase once again, whilst the 
ascertained price of coal turned up reaching 5s*0d per ton i n the l a s t 
quarter of 1883. Between 1878-79 and 1880-81 p r o f i t s made from the sale 
of coke rose from £6,712 to £30,979 through a combination of s l i g h t l y 
reduced costs, r i s i n g prices, but most s i g n i f i c a n t l y because of a 33 per cent 
increase i n s a l e s . These days of p r o f i t a b i l i t y lasted u n t i l 1884-85 
when dropping sales and diminishing p r o f i t margins pushed the p r o f i t s 
earned down to £7»875» and there was l i t t l e further improvement u n t i l 
1889-1890. 
The 1880's proved to be a period i n which the delineation between the 
Home and Sale c o l l i e r i e s became complete. Coke sale s from the Consett group 
(Home) f e l l from 84,023 ton i n l879i to only 1,232 ton i n I889. The 
Directors had resolved i n I885 that t h e i r coke sales policy should be . 
to s e l l f r e e l y from Westwood and Langley Park, whilst reserving Consett's 
output for the Company's own use, except where i t might be expedient to 
u- -4- ( 1 1 ) ship i t . ' 
Throughout the period from 1864 to the end of the^eighties the sale of 
coal remained f a i r l y constant, fluctuating between 15,000 and 20,000 
tons a year. Small quantities of coal were sold during the l a t e 1860's 
(9) Directors' Minute 7 January 1879. p.ll6.(DCRO:D/CO/32). 
(10) P r o f i t and Loss Accounts. 1873-1893. (DCR0:D/C0/89). 
(11) Directors' Minute. 10 February I885 p.l90.(DCRO:D/CO/33). 
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for export from the Tyne, and gas-making at Tow-Law, but the main market 
was for local consumption. Why the quantities sold should have remained 
so insignificant is puzzling, since the p r o f i t on coal sales never f e l l 
(12} 
below ls.6d. per ton. ' The most plausible explanation is that the Company 
was supplying the local household market, where the Company accrued 
some of the benefits of a monopoly position, or at least a partial monopoly 
because of the protection bestowed by distance. However the very factors 
that protected Consett's local market excluded i t from the larger domestic 
markets which were open to the East Durham collieries* 
In 1887 V/estwood Colliery began to raise coal for sale, as well 
as conversion into coke, but the most important development was 
the acquisition of the Garesfield Colliery i n I89O. By 1899 sales of coal 
had risen to 298,802 tons, and of the Sale Collieries only Westwbod 
sold more coke than coal. Whilst the demand for coke had remained f a i r l y 
stable there was a dramatic surge i n the coal market. Consett's growth 
rate for coal sales over the twenty years from I89O to 1910 was more typical 
of a colliery company located i n the newer East Midlands and South Wales 
Coalfields than i n the old slow growing Durham Coalfield. This development 
was mainly achieved i n the royalties acquired north of the Derwent and at 
Langley Park, where the Company began to exploit the non-coking coal seams 
i n I898 on a large scale. 
During the l880's the stagnating demand for coal manifested 
i t s e l f i n very tight margins between costs and price. In the Autumn of 
I885 when the price at the Langley Park ovens f e l l to between 7 s . 9 ^ per 
ton, and 8s.4^d per ton, the average costs varied between 8s.3d.and 7s.l0d 
(12) Profit and LOBS Accounts, 1873-1893. (DCR0:D/C0/8?). 
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(1"0 
over the last half of 1885 and the f i r s t half of 1886/ J / This was the 
f i r s t indication of the growing cost inefficiency of the beehive coke ovens 
when prices were forced down i n depression. Although the Company made £6,433 
p r o f i t on coke sales i n the year ending June 1886, the 911263 tons of 
coke sold from Langley Park yielded only £57.11s.7d. p r o f i t . 
The balance was probably made by sales from Westwood and Cohsett to 
the West Coast for prices at the oven for delivery to the West were 
( 1 5 ) 
normally higher by about 6d or 9d per ton, ' and the average cost of 
producing coke at Consett was lower than at Langley Park i n 1885-86. 
The p r o f i t a b i l i t y of coke sales improved sli g h t l y i n the next two years 
mainly because the cost of coal was held down to about 4s.Od per ton. Then 
there was a dramatic upturn i n coke prices i n 1889-1890 caused by the 
renewed activity i n the pig iron trade. Profits leapt from £11,217 i n June 
1889 to £64,166 i n June 1890., and though they s l i d back to £37f3l7 
(16) 
the following year prices continued to boom, 1 but ominously costs 
had risen by 2sld per ton at Langley Park, mainly because of ris i n g labour 
costs i n the p i t . The cost of coal at Langley Park and Westwood rose to 
(17) 
5s.5<i. and 5s.4d. per ton respectively i n 1891. 
The boom collapsed early i n 1891 when contracts came up for renewal. 
Customers began to hold out for lower prices. In a l e t t e r to David Dale, 
Jenkins compalined that 
"Linthorpe declines to proceed further with their 300 tons per 
week, so that we are on the verge of serious curtailment of 
(13) Directors' Minute. 6 October I885 p.217 (DCR0:D/C0/33); Private 
Cost Book, 1868-1905; Langley Park Coke, (DCRO:D/CO/97). 
(14) Profit and Loss Accounts. 1873-1893. For the year ending 3rd July 
1886 (DCR0:D/C0/89). 
(15) Wm. Jenkins to D.Dale,25 March l891.(DCR0:D/C0/75). 
Profit and Loss Accounts, 1873-1893. (DCR0:D/C0/89). 
(17) Private Cost Book. 1868-1905. (DCR0:D/C0/97). 
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output at Langley unless we sel l quickly." 
He was more sanguine about Westwood's prospects because 
"for the West Coast locality we pretty nearly always get 
(18) 
about 6d to 9d better oven price than we do for Cleveland.11 v
By mid Ap r i l , deliveries from Langley Park had fallen to 3,200/^500 
tons per week, compared to the normal capacity of about 2,000 tons. 
(1Q) 
A decision had to be made as to the ovens which should be closed down. 
Jenkins was growing more concerned about the rising cost of coal winning at 
Consett's Collieries, and f e l t that attempts should be made to win some 
re l i e f -
"The important point is I think that we should endeavour to find 
out calmly whether r e l i e f can be brought about i n some way i n 
the costs of the pits that have been so high in the expense of 
getting coal, especially i n those where wages alone form 4s.Od per ton." 
The situation was reaching c r i t i c a l dimensions, for though the 
Company continued to reduce the price i t was unable to stimulate fresh 
demand. Finally i n May, when the price of coke had been reduced to 10s.6d 
per ton at Langley Park and l l s . 6 d at Westwood enquiries began to flow 
forth again, but i n the case of Langley the current cost of producing coke 
(21) 
was 10s.lOd. per ton. '. 
By September orders were more p l e n t i f u l , but the price remained low, 
between 12s.9d and 13s.Od. per ton at Middlesbrough and 12s.7^d per ton 
(18) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 25 March 1891.(DCRO:D/CO/75). 
(19) Wm. Jenkins to D.Dale, 23 April 1891. (DCR0 : D/CO/75)0 
(201 Wm. Jenkins to D.Dale, 21 April I 8 9 I . (DCR0 : D/CO/75)c 
(21) Wm. Jenkins to D.Dale, 16 May 1891. (DCR0: D/CO/76). 
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at Stockton, and there was no sign of an abatement i n the high costs of 
(22) 
production. ' The increasing price of the chief factor input, coal, 
was having an adverse effect not only on the Company's coke sales but also 
(23) 
on the advantage Consett held as an iron and steel producer. 
The natural course of action adopted by the coal producer was to seek 
r e l i e f i n the labour cost component of mining. However the miners were 
not surprisingly resolute against any wage reduction. The alternative 
was to improve the u t i l i z a t i o n and productivity of the relatively expensive 
coal input. This could be done by reorganising the production of coke i n 
by-product ovens instead of the traditional and wasteful beehive ovens. 
Early i n 1892 William Logan examined the advantages of establishing a 
(24) 
Central Coking Plant, with Simon-Carves ovens installed. This plan 
was rejected i n favour of W.H. Hedley's suggestion that instead of a new 
coking plant, additional beehive ovens could be b u i l t at the p i t s , and 
(25) 
their waste gas used for raising steam for p i t engines. This only 
became a feasible alternative because the miners"' resistance to a wage 
reduction had been broken during the strike/lockout during the Spring of 
I892. Coal costs began to decline, restoring some semblance of p r o f i t a b i l i t y 
to coking operations. 
Through the rest of 1892-1893 there was l i t t l e improvement i n price 
although demand rose and costs f e l l . In February 1893 David Dale was of 
made 
the opinion that i f sales could not be at 12s9d. per ton delivered on Tees-side 
then the trade should be foregone. The price level remained unaltered 
(22) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 12 September l891.(DCRO:D/CO/77). 
(23) Win. Jenkins to D. Dale, 21 April l891.(DCRO:D/CO/75). 
(24) Directors' Minute. 26 March 1892. p.35. (DCRO/CO/35). 
(25) Directors' Minute. 5 July 1892 p.49. (DCRO: D/C0/35). 
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through the year when 
"The Tees Bridge Coy. offer us 12s.3d. per ton for Stockton for 
1,000 tons of coke in continuation of an existing contract, 
but I consider this price rather bare, and inasmuch as we are 
rather oversold at Langley I think we might l e t i t slide 
for a few weeks, and i n the meantime we might have an opportunity 
of disposing of the coke at somewhat better prices for the Midlands." 
(26) 
(There was a Miners' Strike i n the Midlands D i s t r i c t . ) v ' 
Although there are no price details for 1894 i t appears to have been 
a better year for coke sales, as sales rose whilst costs f e l l . Thereafter 
there was a sustained, even i f unimpressive growth of coke sales to a peak 
of 336,344 tons i n 1900. A new boom had begun i n 1898-1899. and the 
Company brought 244 new ovens into operation at Chopwell Colliery and 
Bradley. In addition coal sales also expanded rapidly after a period of 
stagnation between 1895-1897» during which time the price of coal never 
exceeded 5s.5d. per ton. However i n I898 price began to move rapidly 
upward reaching a peak of l l s . 4 d . per ton i n the third quarter of 1900. 
This trade improvement was fortuitous for Consett, whose new Chopwell Colliery 
became operational i n 1897* The Company also responded by exploiting the 
deeper non-coking seams at Langley Park from 1898. 
In 1901 coke sales slumped, mainly because of the f a l l i n overseas 
demand for pig iron. The effect on Consett was such that i t had to close 
(27) 
the Westwood Colliery. ' This decision was taken on the grounds 
that short-time working would raise costs, and thus i t was more desirable to 
close one p i t and keep the others on full-time working. Westwood was chosen 
since i t s principal markets on the Tyne and West Coast had been taken over 
by Chopweli and Garesfield. I t was also the smallest sale colliery, and 
thus i t s closure would not seriously damage the Company's capacity to f i l l 
See page 114 for footnotes. (26j„ and (27). 
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remaining demand. 
The recession of 1901 f i n a l l y persuaded Consett to adopt by-product 
ovens, but not at Langley Park where the pressure of high coal costs had 
f i r s t manifested i t s e l f . In the mid-1890's there had been only a small 
reduction i n the cost of coal at Consett, and the trade upturn at the turn 
of the century renewed the upward spiral. This was tolerable"while the iron 
and steel trades were booming, but when collapse eventually came in 1902 
the cost of coke became an intolerable burden. I t was a l l the more serious 
since the Company was contemplating extensive replacement of its 
blastfurnace plant. I f such a plan were carried out the Company had 
to be assured of a reasonably priced coke supply over a long term period. 
Eventually i n 1904 the Board decided to erect 50 Otto Hilgenstock by-product 
(2ft) 
ovens to provide for the requirements of the Consett blastfurnaces. 
On the sales side of the colliery operations, coke sales slumped 
to their lowest level for seven years i n 1902 but thereafter rose 
gradually, with only a slight interruption i n 1904» to an a l l time peak 
of 359>714 tons i n 1908. Coal sales continued to grow uninterrupted 
passing the 1 million ton mark i n 1909. I t was probably this period which 
Clarence D. Smith had in mind when he talked of the counter-cyclical 
nature of coal and steel pr o f i t s , for 1907-1908 was a peak for coal prices 
whilst i t proved a sharp recession i n steel prices. The demands upon 
the Home collieries were so small between the winter of 1908 and early 
1909 that the Board, rather than lay i n the pits, began to se l l the. coal 
(26) Richard Evans to D. Dale, 17 November 1893.(DCRO:D/C0/88). 
(27) Directors' Minute. 5 March 1901. p.11. (DCRO:D/CO/39). 
(28) Directors' Minute. 19 January 1904 p.208.(DCRO:D/CO/39)• 
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and coke. Despite this attempt to keep the Home Collieries operational, 
working was irregular, and a certain amount of resentment developed 
between the pitmen of the Home collieries and those at the more prosperous 
(29) 
Sale collieries. ' 
Information on the uses of coal from Consett's pits is very sparse. 
However, precise indication i s given for 1892 i n a return to the 
Durham Coal Owner's Association. 
TABLE IV.3 
Colliery 
Company Coke Gas Household Manufacture Steam Total 
Lambton 110,001 379720 461,392 501,057 322,299 1,774,469 
Bolckow Vaughan 921,476 38252 218,317 382,034 141,292 1,701,371 
Bowes & Partners 390,413 820703 48,176 171,487 42,484 1,658,274 
Pease & Partners 1.10U28 mm 40,261 21,640*] 62,859 J - _ 1,225,888 Consett Iron Co. 659,258 - 26,579 235,748 80,893 1,002,478 
Bell Brothers 453,746 - 7,145 165,319 - 647,385 
* Exported. 
Source: National Coal Board Statistical Return No.321. (D.C.R.O.:N.C.B. Deposits.) 
As coal sales up to the end of the 1880?.s only amounted to between 15,000 
to 20,000 tons i t i s l i k e l y that they were for local household purpose. 
In 1892 Consett sold approximately 80,000 to 90,000 tons of coal, the 
(29) Directors' Minute. 2 March 1909 p.179.(DCR0:D/C0/4l). 
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balance probably being steam coal from the newly acquired Garesfield Colliery. 
This is l i k e l y since steam i n the ironworks was raised mainly by the 
u t i l i z a t i o n of waste heat and gas from coke ovens and blastfurnaces. 
However the development after 1892 added coal for gas making. 
After 1892 i t is not possible to differentiate between the types of coal 
mined by the Consett Iron Company. Coal for gas-making was certainly mined 
at Langley Park and sold to some local corporations. By 1925 Consett 
advertised coal for gas, bunker, coking and smithy purposes from the 
Sale C o l l i e r i e s / 3 0 ^ 
2. Marketing and Pricing Policy. 
Coal is not an homogenous commodity since i t s chemical and physical 
properties vary. Different uses require different qualities of the coal. 
Similarly coke quality is variable, depending upon the properties and 
mixture of coals used i n i t s production. From this basis the rudiments 
of a marketing policy were derived. At the same time the differentiation 
of product does not take the place of price competition, and so the Company 
also had to develop a pricing policy. However, given the price, the Company 
then tr i e d to increase the attractiveness of i t s product by adopting 
some f a i r l y simple marketing techniques. 
The most fundamental of these techniques was the use of the communications 
media for advertising. With products such as coal and coke intensive 
advertising was unlikely to yield r e a l i s t i c returns, thus Consett adopted 
(30) Consett Iron Company, Ltd. 1925 (Leeds, 1925) p.12. 
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the normal practice of trade advertising, which was more of an 
informative than a persuasive nature. Customarily the advertisements 
informed potential customers of the range of goods sold, and sometimes 
(31) 
the Company's capacity to produce them. ' 
However, i n a basic product industry, oneethe information had been 
conveyed to the potential consumers, the retention and extension of 
of sal e s to these customers depended increasingly on both the 
maintenance of quality, delivery and goodwill i n the trade. The 
importance of the continuity of goodwill was i l l u s t r a t e d when Consett 
took over Lord Bute's Garesfield C o l l i e r y . Though William Jenkins 
decided to drop the name 'Bute' on the ' c e r t i f i c a t e of origin', he did 
c a l l i t 'original Garesfield C o l l i e r y 1 emphasising that there was a 
(32) 
continuity of q u a l i t y . w ' When i n l897 f the Company opened the Chopwell 
C o l l i e r y i n the same area as Garesfield "the Secretary urged the 
d e s i r a b i l i t y of maintaining i f possible the name 'Garesfie3d% to which 
a considerable market value was attached. The matter was discussed 
and various suggestions made, a f i n a l decision being deferred. I n the 
•meantime the coals disposed of might be described as 'Garesfield' by 
arrangement with the Railway Company, which the Secretary was instructed to 
carry o u t . " ^ ^ 
The value attached to the name was dependent upon the maintenance of 
quality over a number of years. This proved a constant source of worry 
( 3 1 ) The Consett Iron Company regularly advertised i n the Iron and Coal 
Trades Review. 
(32) V/m. Jenkins to R.W. Cooper, 27 January 1890. (DCRO:D/C0/7l)• 
(33) Directors' Minute. 26 January 1897, PP. 137-138.(DCRO:D/CO/37). 
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to the management. Langley Park was from the outset a troublesome 
colliery with regard to q u a l i t y . A l t e r n a t i v e methods of working the 
coal were tried, and the viewer, William Logan, was instructed to ensure 
more care i n the cleaning and preparation of the coal for the coke 
ovens. Ten years later i n 1887 Jenkins warned Hedley that inferior 
coke was endangering the continuation of contracts with Spain and 
(35) 
restricting profits. The problem was not limited to Langley and 
the gravity with which complaints were treated by William Jenkins can be 
ascertained from his frequent communications with the colliery viewers: 
" I have received from Westwood a couple of lumps of coke 
which appear to me to be from a very inferior class of coal 
and certainly i f there i s much of this quality sent to the 
west coast our trade is not l i k e l y to be continued there. 
"....What between bad quality and high costs you may take 
my word for i t that we are coming to a very serious state of 
things. 
Such was just one of Jenkins1 remonstrances. There were three 
main problems encountered i n maintaining the quality of coke: 
carelessness i n mixing the coals for the ovens, poorly cleaned coal, 
and the presence of sulphur and ash. A l l resulted from human negligence 
and could be put to rights by closer supervision. To this end Jenkins 
urged closer co-operation between the Colliery viewers and Mr. Keenleyside, 
the Coke Oven Manager. '' 
(34) Directors' Minute. 24 February 1877, p.265.(DCR0:D/C0/3l). 
35) Wm. Jenkins to W.H. Hedley, 17 January 1887, (DCRO:D/CO/68). 
36) Wm. Jenkins to J.J. Hedley, 27 July, 1891.(DCRO:D/CO/77). 
(37) " I think i t would be worth your while to meet Mr. Keenleyside 
occasionally at the Westwood ovens, and l e t him have the opportunity 
of describing to you what the d i f f i c u l t i e s are." Ibid. 
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The maintenance of quality helped retain current customers, but 
as the coke trade began to stagnate after I89O, the Company turned to 
coal sales, and this meant improvements had to be made i n the quality 
of coal. A rapidly expanding demand for coal was i n the provision of 
bunker coal, ^o exploit this opportunity W.H. Hedley was encouraged 
to persevere i n his efforts to get a process of better mingling so that 
splint coal could be sold to the shipowners as bunker coal. ' Pour years 
later in 1891 when the firm's coal sales had grown considerably, Jenkins 
attempted to market bunker coal "as a kind of reciprocity i n the freight 
(39) 
business we are doing..."v ' This was not a particularly novel approach 
since the Company had been working a reciprocal freight trade with Spain 
since the l880's, coke outward and iron ore on the re t u r n . ^ 0 ) 
In Durham only the Stella Coal Company and Priestman's were larger 
exporters of coke than the Consett Iron Company. 
The relationship between Consett and the shippers was such 
however, that the Company reacted tardily to a scheme for regulating 
coal prices: 
"Assuming that such a scheme (price regulation) would be brought 
about i t might adversely affect us i n the matter of freights much 
more than any benefit we might receive i n the sales of our coals and 
coke. When arranging thefreights this year much was made by the 
shipowners of the high cost of bunker coals I fear that the Consett 
Co.'s cost of Bilbao iron ore would be seriously affected by the increased 
freights on i t s 300,000 to 400,000 tons of imported ore every years. 
(38) Wm. Jenkins to W.H. Hedley, 8 June I887. (DCR0:D/C0/69)o 
(39) Wm. Jenkins to W. Dickinson & Co., 12 December l891.(DCR0:D/C0/79)• 
(40) Wm. Jenkins to W.H. Hedley, 17 January I887. (DCR0:D/C0/68). 
(41) Quantity of Coal and Coke Exported, excluding coals put into ship's 
bunkers, during lqoO.Kfati^i r r t a i TW,~* Q4.„-n n t i r i 1 £ r + 1 i r n 1 T o igg 
(DCR0: N.C.B. Deposits.). 
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However the fears of Consett's executive management were over-ridden 
(43) 
by the Directors and the Company did participate i n the scheme. 
Presumably, the Directors who had other interests i n Durham Coal companies 
could not permit Consett to renege because of the effect this would have 
upon the Association and their other interests. 
In the early stages of the evolution of management structure i t 
was common for the sales of a concern to be handled by agents. 
In some branches of industry their control was complete, and firms 
could not s e l l directly to consumers. William Jenkins resented the 
interference of these speculative and non-productive commission agents. 
When i n I89I Mr. Swan approached Consett offering a sale contract with 
Millom and Askam Company on the payment of Id per ton commission -
William Jenkins by-passed Swan and.made a direct offer to Millom and 
Askam/44) 
Direct contact gave Consett more freedom both i n dealing with 
complaints and also spreading the total sales over a number of customers 
I t was one of Jenkins' principal objectives to avoid dependence upon one 
or two large customers - this was more d i f f i c u l t when operating through 
merchants. Such a policy minimised the risk of acute depression due to 
the cessation of any one large contract. When Sir Bernhard Samuelson's 
enquired for a sample of Consett coke, Jenkins congratualated F.W. Hodges, 
the Company's Newcastle sales agent: 
(42) 
(43) 
(44) 
R. Evans to D.Dale, 9 February I894. (DCRO:D/C0/88). 
Directors' Minute. 4 September I894. p.240.(DCR0:D/C0/35). 
Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 6 April l891.(DCRO:D/CO/75). 
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"This may lead to business and i t may place us ultimately 
in a l i t t l e more independent position with other p a r t i e s . " ^ ^ 
For efficient operation i t was important that the Company's 
plant was f u l l y u t i l i z e d , and so to f a c i l i t a t e this Consett occasionally 
oversold; sometimes i t was caught out by i t s own precautions. 
" I regret that the Normanby Iron Works Co. should feel aggrieved 
i n any way Like most Coke owners we oversell a l i t t l e i n order 
to meet contingencies of stoppage by the Railway Co., accidents at 
Furnaces &c. - so as to keep the ovens regularly supplied. During the 
early part of the contract the Normanby firm sometimes ordered less 
than their contract quantity and the overselling was partly to meet 
such contingencies as these and what they claimed for themselves we 
presume they would not refuse to us n(46) 
Although he was anxious to broaden the Company's customer base, 
Jenkins was not prepared to go to any lengths. When Stephens of Bilbao 
inserted stipulations about quality and delivery dates i n a coke enquiry, 
Jenkins replied that such stipulations were neither customary nor l i k e l y 
(47) 
to be granted by any northern coke manufacturer. ' Jenkins was 
similarly unenthusiastic about enquiries from the Moss Bay Hematite 
Iron and Steel Co. who had an unfortunate record of late settlement 
on c o n t r a c t s . T h e i r r e l i a b i l i t y and cr e d i b i l i t y were rightly 
suspect, and Jenkins was loath to deal with them even when trade was slack. 
(45) Wm. Jenkins to F.W. Hodges, 29 June I887 . (DCRO:D/CO/69). 
(46) R. Evans to D. Dale, 17 November 1893. (DCR0:D/C0/88). 
(47) Wm. Jenkins to R. Stephens, 29 April I887 . (DCRO:D/CO/69). 
(48) Wm. Jenkins to Jos. Ledger (Moss Bay Co.), 14 February 1887, 
(DCR0:D/C0/68). 
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"Mr Hodges might have sold to Moss Bay Co. 500 tons, but for 
such a weak customer (he) did not think i t wise to exhibit our 
glut of coke on hand, nor did I think i t well to quote any low 
(49) 
figure i n the way of temptation to such a consumer." 
The credit-worthiness of customers was of great interest to Jenkins, 
for a wise choice could save loss through bad debts, or at least the 
administrative inconvenience of securing repayment from bankrupt firms. 
During depression the Company rejected the principle of extending 
long credit to customers, insisting that accounts should be settled 
monthly by cash.^^ 
Not a l l the Company's sales were by contract, for during periods of 
low ac t i v i t y ad hoc orders were taken to draw i n the slack i n the 
capacity of the plant. Sales for early delivery were not uncommon 
in the grey areas between boom and recession. Such a period was late 
autumn of 1893 when the Company was prepared to s e l l for early 
delivery to the Altos Hornos Company, 1,000 tons of coke at 14s.6d per 
ton f.o.b. at Tyne Dock, less 2%fi for cash. This was intact the Spanish 
iron company belonging to the Ybarra Brothers, who were Consett's partners 
(51) 
i n the Orconera Iron Ore Company. ' Hand to mouth selling was more 
characteristic of the coal trade during recession, since i t avoided the 
(52) 
costly and wasteful practice of stocking coal, ' and so prevented 
the i l l u s i o n taking hold amongst the miners that the Company was 
prepared to put any amount of coal to stock, i n order to avoid closing 
(49) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 22 February 18900(DCRO: D/CO/72). 
(50) Directors' Minute. 7 January, 1879. p.ll6»(DCR0 : D/CO/32). 
R. Evans to D.Dale, 27 November 1893. (DCR0:D/C0/88). 
(5 1) R. Evans to D.Dale 27 November l893.(DCR0:D/C0/88).. 
(52) Wm. Jenkins to W.H. Hedley, 18 January l890.(DCR0:D/C0/7l). 
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(53) the p i t s . ' I t was only found prudent to stock coal at the Home 
Collieries for use i n the iron and steel works i n the event of any 
(54) 
stoppages i n the pi t s . ' 
TABLE IV.4 
Corrected Coal Stocks on 31st December, 1870-1914. 
Year Consett Langley 
1870 4,607 
1871 573 
1872 1,270 
1873 28,500 
1874 18,519 
1875 16,559 
1876 12,433 
1877 10,887 
1878 8,545 388 
1879 6,411 392 
1880 11,880 240 
1881 18,006 3576 
1882 24,403 -
1883 32,338 63 
I884 28,183 1284 
I885 32,541 25 
1886 3P,643 560 
1887 29,001 390 
1888 26,937 1100 
1889 24,627 150 
1890 19,095 90 
Garesfield Chopwell Westwood 
97 
(53) Wm. Jenkins to W.H. Hedley, 27 October l892o(DCR0:D/C0/83). 
(54) Directors' Minute, 22 July I87L p.l20.(DGRO:D/CO/30). 
Mr. Boyd recommended the wisdom of keeping a coal stock of about 
10,000 tons. See Table IV . 4 . for the significant difference 
i n stocking policy between the Home and Sale Collieries. 
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TABLE IV.4. Continued 
Year Consett Langley Park Garesfield Chopwell Westwood 
1891 38,291 300 1,053 
1892 8,582 225 1,458 
1893 9,020 825 356 . 
1894 21,505 150 1,612 
1895 35,579 225 818 
1896 34,985 525 319 
1897 20,918 300 74 
I898 21,330 748 448 974 
1899 10,579 217 318 20 
1900 10,975 1,610 856 756 2,697 
1901 20,188 1,255 376 1061 1,025 
1902 22,677 572 1,129 1359 423 
1903 26,878 1,017 876 867 370 
1904 29,904 448 1,856 4168 402 
1905 31,917 772 1,657 1781 289 
1906 21,421 1,257 2,021 3018 1,085 
1907 19,766 422 564 1342 151 
1908 27,585 1,372 1,077 1532 999 
1909 38,167 1,009 1,976 4195 38 
1910 31,388 602 600 536 350 
1911 32,112 263 390 649 -
1912 27,000 422 600 578 . 145 
1913 33,669 1,240 765 875 625 
1914 61,287 659 250 440 165 
Source: Production and Stock Books. (DCRO:D/CO/107-109)p 
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As the operations of the ironworks expanded the amount of coal 
stocked at Consett, i n case of emergency also increased to between 
20,000 - 30,000 tons. 
With respect to p r i c i n g policy the Company was bound more or less 
by a market price, and there i s no indication that i t was a price 
leader. As mentioned e a r l i e r , there was a price d i f f e r e n t i a l of 
between 6d and 9d per ton, at the Company's ovens, between Cleveland 
(55) 
and West Coast buyers. Inevitably price competition was s t i f f e s t 
during the slumps, as manufacturers strove to keep t h e i r t o t a l capacity 
employed, i n an e f f o r t to minimize t h e i r overheads. I n some instances 
Consett had to <:.damp down i t s ovens since the price of coke became 
unremunera t i v e . 
"Teesbridge have refused 13s.Od d/d and have bought elsewhere, 
Langley w i l l not deliver more than 1,200 / 1,500. tons t h i s week 
i t would seem that we are coming to a stage i n which we must consider 
the policy of extinguishing some of our ovens and s e l l i n g our coal i f 
t h i s i s thought a prudent thing to do.11 
Such was William Jenkins impression of the state of trade i n 1891; 
on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r occasion Consett was forced to reduce . i t s oven 
price f o r coke at Langley Park to 10s.6d before i t was able to 
induce buyers. The deterioration of price was so bad that i t had f a l l e n 
below the average cost - i n such a s i t u a t i o n some ovens had to be(damped 
(55) See footnote (15). 
(56) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 15 May 1891, (DCRO:D/CO/76) 
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down/-^ Though Jenkins always t r i e d to hold out f o r the price he 
regarded as acceptable, the trend inevitably drove prices down to those 
prevailing i n the market generally. 
Consett was not powerless i n face of the force of the market 
were 
f o r though the. p r o f i t margins nipped i t performed creditably i n 
maintaining the l e v e l of j i t s ' - sales. This was due i n a large part, 
to the astuteness of Wm. Jenkins and the extensive knowledge of the trade 
which David Dale possessed. As Managing Director of Pease and Partners, 
Dale was confronted by the very same problems as Jenkins, and thus the 
two men were able to counsel one another. Dale was also f o r sometime 
a Director of the Barrow Hematite Steel Company, thus strengthening the 
position of Consett on the West Coast. When trade began to slacken 
at the ta i l - e n d of 1890, Jenkins wrote to Dale i n his capacity as a Barrow 
Director, o f f e r i n g "to entertain an application from the Barrow 
Steel Co. f o r say 500 tons per week of Langley Park coke, commencing 
say the second week of 1891." 
During the period 1864-1914 Consett evolved a sales policy based 
upon the production of r e l i a b l e product, sold to a f a i r l y wide range of 
customers, of good c r e d i t standing. Lt;:-" - extended normal trade c r e d i t 
when times were good, but required regular cash payments during slumps. 
Wherever possible i t s coal and coke sales were complementary to the 
importation of Spanish i r o n ore. However, i t i s apparent that the markets 
i n Cleveland and on the West Coast, were i n themselves, quite sharply 
(57) Wm. Jenkins to David 'Dale, 16 May 1891. (DCRO:D/CO/76). 
(58) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 3 February 1893. (DCR0:D/C0/83). 
(59) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale ( c / ° Barrow H.S.Co. ) , 31 October I89O. 
(DCR0:D/C0/74). 
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competitive, and so the p r o f i t s earned i n t h i s branch of Consett's 
a c t i v i t i e s were not derived from any position of monopoly. 
. The Acquisition of Coal Royalties* 
I n the previous two sections the expansion and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of 
output was examined, and Consett's market position analysed. Expansion 
necessitated the acquisition of additional coal r o y a l t i e s , w h ilst the study 
of marketing involves a p a r a l l e l a n a l y t i c a l approach, as to whether 
Consett was a monopsonist i n the a c q u i s i t i o n of coal leases. I n t h i s 
section the process of royalty acquisition w i l l be traced and the 
presence of monopsonist power assessed. 
Negotiations with royalty owners were often protracted, sometimes 
going on over a number of years, and often involved a number of mineral 
owners. This was peculiar to B r i t a i n and the U.S.A.:. F i r s t l y , i n 
the north eastern c o a l f i e l d , the c o l l i e r y company had to establish a 
•certain* rent which i t would pay whether coal was extracted or not. 
Secondly, a 'tentale 1 rent was f i x e d f o r each 'ten' of coal above some 
fi x e d quantity allowed i n consideration of the 'certain* rent. A 'ten* 
was normally 50 tons during t h i s period. Should the c o l l i e r y company 
extract less than the allowed quantity i n a pa r t i c u l a r year, i t was usually 
allowed to make up such 'short workings' or 'shorts' i n subsequent 
years without the payment of 'tentale 1 rent on them. Besides these basic 
rents, negotiations had to be undertaken with neighbouring royalty owners 
* See the map of Coal Royalties. 
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f o r privileges incidental to the main working. I f another royalty was 
penetrated underground, whether f o r working coals ;or f o r carrying 
them, an 'outstroke* rent had to he negotiated, and a 'shaft* rent was 
payable f o r the p r i v i l e g e of r a i s i n g coals up a shaft i n a neighbouring 
ro y a l t y . I f the coals were carried across the land of a landed 
proprietor other than the immediate owner of a c o l l i e r y ' s r o y a l t y , he 
was e n t i t l e d to wayleave rents. 
The fragmentation of the coalfields between landlords i n t h i s way 
was judged by the Sankey Commission of 1919 and the Samuels Commission 
of 1925, to be a major cause f o r the prevalence of second-best 
locational decisions and p i t s of sub-optimal size i n the B r i t i s h coal 
industry. I n the history of Consett, the costs of long drawn-out 
bargaining, and of co-ordinating and timing the acquisition of variously 
owned pieces of adjoining land, must be considered as a consequence 
of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l context of the day. But the Company's location 
provided a certain degree of b u i l t - i n monopsonist power, enabling i t 
to squeeze out advantageous terms from the l o c a l mineral owners, 
and the location had i t s origins rooted i n the p r i n c i p a l a c t i v i t y of the 
Company, manufacturing i r o n . • 
Since coal was a v i t a l raw material to an i r o n and steel company, 
the long term provision of s u f f i c i e n t coal was an important item on the 
Directors' Agenda. The Board was kept informed as to the long term 
outlook by occasional reports on estimated coal resources, which were 
produced by the Chief Viewer or mineral agent. I n I867 Mr. Boyd estimated 
that the Company's reserves were 30,893,000 tons i n easily worked seams, 
(60) G.C. Greenwell, A Glossary of Terms used i n the Coal Trade of 
Northumberland and Durham (London, 1888). 
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and 26,663,600 tons i n more d i f f i c u l t s e a m s . W h e n i n I889 
the f i r m was completing i t s negotiations f o r the r o y a l t i e s north 
of the Derwent, the reserves i n that d i s t r i c t were estimated at 
13f850,000 tons of coal i n ro y a l t i e s already held by the Company, 
and 13,370,000 tons i n adjacent royalties which could be worked i n 
(62) 
conjunction/ ' Five years l a t e r William Hedley, the Chief Viewer 
of the •Consett Home Co l l i e r i e s * reported that the resources f o r 
consumption by the ironworks were 20,000,000 tons of coking coal and 
15,000,000 tons of m i l l i n g coal, or f o r t y and f i f t y - e i g h t years 
supply respectively. 
I n B r i t a i n the law r e l a t i n g to the ownership of minerals made the 
process of negotiating f o r land i n which to sink a c o l l i e r y , complex and 
even exasperating. Even where a large estate was being purchased or 
leased as i n the case of Langley Park and Chopwell, there were invariably 
smaller adjacent t r a c t s that had to be acquired to make the holding 
complete. While the Board were proposing to take the Earl of Durham's 
Langley Royalty of 1470 acres i n 1871, they had concurrently to bargain 
f o r J. Darling's royalty of 8 l acres which was adjacent. The completion 
of the Darling negotiations was not reached u n t i l 1883 ten 
years a f t e r the Earl had leased the Langley Royalty to the Consett Iron 
Company. 
Negotiations were bound to be d i f f i c u l t given the i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
structure, f o r once the royalty owner became aware of the plans of the 
(61) Directors' Minute 
(62) Directors 1 Minute 
(63) Directors' Minute 
(64) Directors 1 Minute 
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Company his bargaining hand was inev i t a b l y strengthened. This could 
lead to the paradoxical s i t u a t i o n where coal i n a t r a c t furthest from 
the shaft was subject to the highest royalty payments solely because 
of the bargaining power of the royalty owner. Such a s i t u a t i o n was 
i l l u s t r a t e d i n 1890 by William Hedley's evidence to the Royal Commission 
on Mining Royalties. The example he drew upon, though unnamed, was 
probably one of the p i t s w i t h i n the 'Consett Col l i e r i e s * group, of 
which he was the Chief V i e w e r . H e d l e y emphasised the d i f f i c u l t y 
of securing a reduction on royalty rent as compensation f o r increased 
(66) 
easement charges, such as underground wayleave and 'instroke* rent. 
He maintained that the prospective leasee pressed hard f o r consideration 
of easement charges i n the negotiations of royalty rent - however, more 
often than not only p a r t i a l allowance was granted since the mineral 
owners, and t h e i r agents, expected to receive the average royalty f o r 
(67) 
the d i s t r i c t , irrespective of the easement charges. 
Even when the coal was brought to the surface the coal company was 
often confronted with payments of surface wayleave i f i t traversed 
adjoining land by a private railway. This commonyamounted to between 
(68) 
3d to 6d per ton. ' Consett had to pay such amounts on coal taken 
from the: Chopwell and Garesfield C o l l i e r i e s to Derwenthaugh. 
The position of the Consett Iron Company was not as c r i t i c a l as 
that faced by some coal companies, f o r i t s location i n North-West 
(6$) R.C. on Mining Royalties, p.p. I89O / c.6l95_7 1« 700-701. 
(66) 'Instroke 1 rent i s payable where the coal from one leasor's property 
i s drawn to the surface on the land of another leasor - i t was 
paid to the f i r s t party i n compensation f o r foregone 'shaft* rent. 
(67) R.C. on Mining Royalties. p.p. I89O/"c.6l95_7 XXXVI. 1. Q.712. 
(68) I b i d . , Q.718. 
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Durham gave the Directors the strength of a monopsonist i n t h e i r 
dealings with r o y a l t y owners i n the immediate v i c i n i t y of Consett. Most 
of the leases a f f e c t i n g the 'Consett C o l l i e r i e s ' had been negotiated 
by the end of the 1860's, before there was a railway l i n k to the Tyne 
at Blaydon. This meant the coal mined i n and about Consett had to be 
exported by the North Eastern Railway's Pontop branch and was thus at 
a serious disadvantage when set beside the Tanfield Moor.collieries 
i n the matter of shipping coal to the Tyne f o r export. The s i t u a t i o n 
as f a r as Consett was concerned was aggravated by the North Eastern 
Railway's p r i c i n g policy, which favoured the Crook-Bishop Auckland 
c o l l i e r i e s . Coke could be transported t h i r t y - s i x miles to Cleveland 
from these c o l l i e r i e s 8d. per ton cheaper.: thari'.-Consett could put 
i t s coke f.o.b. i n the Tyne, a distance of only twenty-two miles 
This view of the uncompetitiveness of Consett's 'Home Co l l i e r i e s ' was 
substantiated by Edward Williams who concluded that the Company's 
mining properties were not we l l si t e d f o r sales on the open market. 
This remained the case throughout the f i f t y years u n t i l 1914* 
The Consett Iron Company were therefore the only sizeable 
market f o r coal i n the l o c a l i t y , and so when bargaining with royalty 
owners began they had the option of accepting Consett's o f f e r or 
continuing farming the land, or a t the most to operate small p i t s 
(71) 
supplying l o c a l domestic needs. However the ro y a l t y owners were 
often f i r m i n t h e i r dealings and occasionally extravagant with t h e i r 
(69) Directors' Minute. 8 May I869. (DCRO:D/CO/29). 
(70) Edward Williams, "Report on Iron-making at Consett, 1 1 Directors' 
Minute 13 March I869. (DCRO:D/CO/29). 
(71) Mr.-Coupland, from whom Consett purchased two leases at Sherburn 
and Westwood f o r £5,500 appears to have been such a small coalmining 
operator. Since the payment included plant and Stock his operations 
could not have been very large. Directors' Minute, 3 February and 
10 March 1866, (DCRO:D/CO/29) 
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demands. I n one instance the owners of some freehold and copyhold 
land in.Iveston asked £9000 f o r thirty-two acres i n 1867, hut the 
Company did not entertain such a proposal, and held back u n t i l the owners 
accepted £4,500 i n l 8 7 l / 7 2 ^ 
The proposal to b u i l d a railway between Blaydon and Consett also 
had an adverse e f f e c t on the Company's negotiating position, f o r i t 
encouraged royalty owners i n the b e l i e f that they could extort better-
terms. Negotiations f o r the Hamsterley estate were suspended when 
Elizabeth Surtees wrote: 
" I have come to the conclusion not to entertain any application 
f o r the Coal mines at present. 
" I t w i l l not be long before ray son can judge f o r himself and 
the Consett Railway may i n some degree improve our property and 
the D i s t r i c t m a t e r i a l l y . " ^ 7 3 ^ 
Fortunately most of the Iron Company's coal leases, which affected 
the supply to the ironworks, had been renegotiated before the 
interference of the new railway, and the even more disturbing boom 
i n coal prices i n 1872-73. Advantageous leases were held.by the 
Company.from S i r Frederick Bathurst on the Lanchester Common; the Tin 
M i l l C o l l i e r y acquired with the Shotley Bridge Ironworks was subject to 
tentale rent of 15s.6d per ten (50 tons) u n t i l 1870, whereupon i t became 
18s.6d u n t i l the expiry of the lease i n I884. 
(72) Directors' Minute. 7 March 1871, p.l02.(DCR0:D/C0/30). 
(73) Elizabeth Surtees to the Directors of the Consett Iron Company 
Directors' Minute 12 November I864. p.27«(DCR0:D/C0/29). 
(74) Directors' Minute 16 August 1866. (DCRO:D/CO/29). 
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The main new acquisitions of leaseholds i n the l a t e 1860's were 
i n the area east of the Derwent, around EbChester. This scheme 
was related to the construction of the Consett^Blaydon l i n e , and i t 
(75) was proposed to sink a shaft on the Sherburn t r a c t adjoining the l i n e . ' 
The Westwood scheme was completed i n 1867 by the acquisition of Okey 
and Graham's holdings i n the Westwood estate, and a lease with the 
Trustees of Sherburn Hospital. This formed the basis of Consett coke 
sales plans embodied i n Armstrong and Boyd's Reports. 
At the beginning of the l870's the Company diverted i t s a t t e n t i o n 
from those ro y a l t i e s i n i t s immediate v i c i n i t y , and began to explore 
the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of acquiring the Earl of Durham's Langley Royalty. 
I n 1871 - i t offered the Earl a certain rent £1,250 on his 1,470 acre 
royalty with a tentale rent of 25s.Od r i s i n g i n fourteen years to 30s.0d. 
(76) 
per ten. ' The Earl held out u n t i l the peak of the boom i n I873 when 
he proposed a counter-offer to Consett of one s h i l l i n g per ton royalty 
rent. This was unheard of f o r an unproven coal t r a c t and the Board 
(77) 
i n i t i a l l y rejected i t . ' Subsequently, however, the Consett Directors 
gave way and accepted the terms, which meant the payment of a royalty 
rent nearly double that of the average f o r the Company's other c o l l i e r i e s . 
By the time exploratory borings had been made and the p i t sunk, four years 
had elapsed. The ascertained price of coal had f a l l e n from a peak of 
15s.lOd i n January of 1873 to 5s.8d i n I876 and f i n a l l y to the lowest price 
of 4s.3d per ton i n October of 1879• The dramatic deterioration of the 
coal market induced the Directors to apply to Lord Durham f o r a reduction 
(75) Directors' Minute. 7 A p r i l 1866.(DCR0:D/C0/29). 
(76) Directors' Minute. 6 November 1871. pp. 135-137.(DCR0:D/CO/30). 
(77) Directors' Minute. 4 March I873. pp. 218-219.(DCRO : D/CO/30). 
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i n the royalty rent. The persistence of low prices eventually 
persuaded his Lordship to grant a temporary 10 per cent reduction 
(78) 
during 1884 and I885. I n 1887 another reduction i n rent and royalty 
was obtained on the lat e Joseph Laycock's Whittonstall Royalty. I n 
t h i s case i t was a permanent reduction of certain rent from £500 to £300, 
(79) 
and tonnage rent from 7d. to 5d. 
However, pleas f o r reductions and threats of lease termination were 
an unsatisfactory way i n which to conduct business a f f a i r s . While 
the r o y a l t y owners persisted i n t r y i n g to extract onerous royalty 
payments even during depression, they often inadvertently harmed 
themselves, and invariably imperilled the coal companies. I n t r y i n g to 
maximise the price they received they often forced the coal companies 
to c u r t a i l or l i m i t t h e i r operations, and thus they f a i l e d to maximise 
t h e i r revenue. S l i d i n g scales r e l a t i n g elements of cost to 
ascertained prices were very much i n vogue during the 1870*s and i t i s 
therefore only natural that t h i s p r i n c i p l e should have been extended to 
negotiation of mineral leases. Royalty payments related to the price 
of coal were customary i n Scotland but. s t i l l exceptional i n the North of 
England. The Consett Iron Company negotiated i t s f i r s t s l i d i n g scale on 
a mineral lease i n 1875» when i t bought Mr. Carr's Milkwellburn 
Royalty f o r £29,500. Carr held the royalty on lease from the Duke 
of Northumberland and when Consett arranged a new forty-two years lease 
( 8 l ) 
i n 1875 i t embodied the pri n c i p l e of a s l i d i n g scale. ' From t h i s 
(78) Directors' Minute, 21 October 1884. p.171. (DCR0;D/C0/33). 
(79) Directors' Minute. 2 May 1887 p.8. (DCR0 : D/CO/34). 
(80) Royal Commission on Mining Royalties, P.P. 1890 / c.6l95_/ XXXVI.1. 
ft- 739. 
(81) Directors' Minute. 5 October l8759p.129. (DCR0:D/C0/3l). 
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time on the Company attempted to have the p r i n c i p l e inserted i n a l l 
its new leases. 
The 1880's were a period of consolidation, and the renewal of 
several important twenty-one years leases made during the 1860's. 
The most important lease was on S i r . P.H.H. Bathurst's land and 1884 t h i s 
reverted to a di r e c t lease of minerals by the I r o n Company from the 
Ecclesiastical Commissioners who were the o r i g i n a l royalty owners. 
This continued a lease between the Bishop of Durham and S i r F.H.H. 
(82) 
Bathurst made i n 1850 and renewed i n 1868. ' Consett renewed the 
lease with S i r . F.H.H. Bathurst i n 1869. Under the new 1884 lease 
the tentale rent was 22s.Od per ten between 1884-1900, and then 24s.Od. 
per ten u n t i l the lease expired i n 1926.^^^ Another important renewal 
was on the Allgood* s Medomsley coal f o r a furt h e r twenty-one years 
on the same terms; the only a l t e r a t i o n to the conditions of t h i s lease 
(Qc) 
was the addition of a s l i d i n g scale to govern the tonnage rent. 
I n securing new leases the 1880's were probably most important f o r 
the consolidation of workings north of the Derwent. Expansion there 
had taken i t s f i r s t crude shape almost by chance i n the mid 1870's 
when John Carr had offered a royalty and some coke ovens at Westwood to 
the Consett Iron Company. Though Carr apparently saw his o f f e r as a 
supplement to the Westwood development, the Consett Directors did not f i n d 
i t a t t r a c t i v e i n that context. However, they did perceive that i f Carr's 
from the Duke of Northumberland could be renewed and the adjacent r o y a l t i e s 
of the Marquis of Bute and Elizabeth Surtees obtained, then a new 
(82) Lease of Coalmines &c. i n the Parish of Lanchester, the Bishop of 
Durham to S i r . F.H.H. Bathurst, I85O. (Church Sommissioners MSS. 
(83) 
 
209/ am to S i r .  Bathurst, I85 . (Church 125771; University of Durham). Directors' Minute. 2 November I869. (DCR0:D/C0/29) 
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development worthy of consideration would emerge. After eight 
months negotiations the Company secured Carr's lease, but more 
important renewed the lease with the Duke of Northumberland. The 
terms were £500. certain rent f o r the f i r s t three years and then £1,000 
per annum f o r the remaining t h i r t y - n i n e years; the royalty rent was set at 
(Ql) 
a basic 9d per ton, but was governed by a s l i d i n g scale. ' 
I n I878 the Company began to negotiate i n earnest f o r the 
Marquis of Bute's estates i n Durham. At f i r s t i t concentrated i t s 
attention on the Ravenside Royalty, but i n July I878 Armstrong 
advised the Board that before committing themselves to the Ravenside 
Royalty alone, they should consider "the a d v i s a b i l i t y of t r e a t i n g f o r 
the Garesfield C o l l i e r y and the adjoining Royalties of the Marquis..." 
The Directors agreed with Armstrongs reasoning but were "somewhat averse to 
engage with a C o l l i e r y so f a r removed from t h e i r other operations as 
Garesfield.. . " ^ ^ William Hedley's investigation i n t o the q u a l i t y 
and the price fetched by Garesfield coal proved unfavourable, 
allowing the Directors to r e j e c t Armstrong's advice, and continue 
bargaining f o r Ravenside alone. 
(84) Reversionary lease of Coal, Ironstone and Fireclay underlands at 
Lanchester i n the County of Durham. Ecclesiastical Commissioners of 
England to the Consett Iron Company, I884. (Church Commissioners 
MSS 261/214265: University of Durham.) 
(85) Directors' Minute, 14 June l869,p.l0. (DCR0:D/C0/29). 
(86) Directors' Minute. 2 February 1875, P«91. (DCR0:D/C0/3l). 
(87) Directors' Minute, 5 October l875,p,129. (DCR0:D/C0/3l). 
(88) Directors' Minute. 2 July l878,p.88. (DCR0:D/C0/32). 
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Talks between Lord Bute's representatives and Consett dragged on 
u n t i l 1881, largely because of a disagreement over who was responsible 
f o r the construction of a railway l i n e to Stocksfield; the Marquis 
refused to make any contribution. F i n a l l y i n June 1881 the royalty 
was offered f o r sale and Consett's b i d of £10,000 was i n s u f f i c i e n t . ^ ^ 
The next move of significance occurred i n I884 when' Mr. Green, Lord 
Bute's agent, offered Ravenside and West Chopwell f o r sale at £50,000 
but t h i s proved i n excess of the valuation placed on the property by 
W.H. Hedley. However, from I885 i t became apparent that Lord Bute 
wished to s e l l his property o u t r i g h t , rather than lease i t , f o r he would 
not entertain an o f f e r of leasing terms put forward by Consett. 
The year I885 may be taken as the c r i t i c a l turning point i n these 
negotiations, f o r besides Lord Bute's apparent anxiety to s e l l his 
Durham property, Mrs. Surtees also became w i l l i n g to l e t the Woodhead 
Royalty. Optimistic that the outstanding roy a l t i e s of Woodhead 
and Ravenside would be ultimately secured, the Directors drew up t h e i r 
f i r s t comprehensive plans f o r the development of the royalties north of the 
(91) 
Derwent i n 1886. ' Such plans could only be ten t a t i v e , f o r much depended 
upon land and concessions secured from Lord Bute. 
A f i n a l settlement was eventually reached i n 1889; once again Consett 
proposed to take out a lease but Mr. Geddes, who was now representing 
Lord Bute, declined the o f f e r . He did however make counter-offer of a 
sale f o r £120,000 and on t h i s occasion the sale price f e l l below William 
(92) 
Hedley's valuation of the property. v 7 ' The o f f e r included Ghopwell Estate, 
Directors' Minute 
Directors 1 Minute 
Directors' Minute 
Directors 1 Minute 
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Garesfield. C o l l i e r y and the Ravenside Royalty. The agreement reached i n 
July 1889 included property at Derwenthaugh on the Tyne; the wayleave 
belonging to the Winlaton Partnership Estate; Garesfield wayleave 
subject to lease; the Thornley Estate wayleave; and a l l moveable plant 
and stock belonging to the Garesfield C o l l i e r y . These extras cost Consett 
(93) 
a fu r t h e r £20,000. ' The completion of t h i s scheme of royalty acquisition 
established the basis f o r the dramatic growth of Consett's coal output 
i n the years leading up to 1914. I n t h i s respect i t was probably one of 
the Directors' most farsighted and remunerative p o l i c i e s . 
Prom 1890 onwards the physical structure of royalties held by the 
Consett I r o n Company was altered l i t t l e by the acquisition of new 
leases. Throughout the l890's much of the Company's negotiating was 
concentrated upon Laycock's Whittonstall Royalty which formed an i n t e g r a l 
part of the Chopwell scheme i n i t s physical location, but could only be 
worked from a new sinking. I n 1892 the 1887 agreement which had secured 
a reduction i n r o y a l t y and rent came up f o r renewal. Laycock was not 
prepared to acquiesce to Consett's proposals and i n 1893 the Company 
gave notice that i t would terminate the lease on the 13 May 1895• Consett 
was matching Laycock's stubbornness with i t s bargaining strength. I n 
I896 i t was intimated to i t that the Mickley Coal Company, the only 
(94) 
l i k e l y competitors f o r the Whittonstall Royalty, were not interested. ' 
With his bargaining position thus weakened, Laycock submitted to a reduced 
royalty of 5d. per ton, and the Board decided to retake the Royalty on 
terms to be decided. However, a l l did not go smoothly, f o r Consett insiste d 
upon the r i g h t to work 10,000 tons of 'shorts' which had accrued to i t 
under the previous lease, while f o r his part, Laycock stubbornly refused. 
(93) Directors' Minute, 2 July I889 pp.107-109. (DCR0:D/C0/34). 
(94) Directors' Minute. 9 June 1896 p.63. DCR0:D/C0/36). 
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The Impasse was not overcome u n t i l 1906, when along with the renewal 
of the Duke of Northumberland's Chopwell lease, the Company drew up 
a very favourable lease with Laycock, paying only 4§d per ton ro y a l t y 
on a l l coals. 
The only other s i g n i f i c a n t acquisition occured i n 1901 when the 
Ecclesiastical Commissioners f o r England took over and renewed a lease 
formerly held under the Dean and Chapter of Durham. The new lease included 
120 acres of land adjoining Lord Durham's Langley Royalty. An i n t e r e s t i n g 
feature i s the divergence i n royalty paid to the Church as compared 
(95) 
to that paid to the Earl; the new lease set a royalty of only 6d. per ton, ' 
whilst the renewal of the Langley Royalty i n 1910 was a t lOd per ton on 
Busty and Hutton seams, and 4d. to 6d. on a l l o t h e r s . I n 1904 a further 
sixty-seven acres were added to Langley Park by an additional lease 
from Lord Durham. 
Besides these r e l a t i v e l y minor additions to the overall size of the 
Consett Iron Company's mineral holdings, the last years leading up to 
the F i r s t World War were devoted to the important task of renewing 
certain c r u c i a l leases. The most urgent renewal was on Langley Royalty, 
the lease of which ran out i n 1915? i t was successfully extended f o r 
forty-two years on terms i n effec t not substantially d i f f e r e n t from 
the o r i g i n a l lease. The main difference was a higher certain rent, 
and a v a r i a t i o n i n royalty depending upon whether the coal was f o r coking 
(97) 
and also on the ease with which the seam could be worked. 
(95) Directors' Minute. 9 February 1901, p.23.(DCRO:D/CO/39). 
(96) Directors' Minute. 6 December 1910 p. 108.(DCRO:D/CO/42). 
(97) I b i d . 
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Equally important but l e s s urgent was the renewal of the 
extensive E c c l e s i a s t i c a l Commissioners' lands which were the basis 
of the 'Home C o l l i e r i e s 1 . Though t h i s was not due u n t i l 1926 
the Company wa^s contemplating extensive c a p i t a l investments, both on 
a new c o l l i e r y at Crookhall and on plant for the blastfurnaces. Before 
undertaking the expenditure of £600,000 the Directors wanted to be 
assured of a new long l e a s e . T h e lease was renewed without hi t c h 
for forty-two years i n 1 9 1 3 o n terms only s l i g h t l y more demanding than 
(99) 
previously. ' The management was overjoyed a t the terms, forecasting 
"that i n 13 years time, coal w i l l probably be of a greater value than 
i t i s now, and we would hot be able to get such terms as are now 
offered to us " (Mr. Kirkup) ^ 1 0 0 ^ 
The Cost of Royalties. 
The preceding section has traced the acquisition of coal r o y a l t i e s 
by the Consett Iron Company, and to some extent that has thrown some 
l i g h t upon the extent of the Company's monopsonist. power. 
(98) Directors' Minute. 1 November 1910, pp. 97-98.(DCR0:D/C0/42). 
(99) Directors' Minute 3 June 1913,pp.59-61.(DCR0:D/C0/43). 
(100) I b i d . 
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TABLE IV.5 
Tonnage rents paid i n Northumberland and Durham c. 1890 
Type of Rent Maximum Minimum Average 
Royalty 10d 2^d 5d 
Underground . 
Wayleave 0 . 6 2 d 0.26d 0.39d 
Shaft Rent 0.62d 0.26d 0.39d 
Surface 
Wayleave 0.62d 0.26d 0 .39d 
Source: R.C. on Mining Royalties,P.P. I89O /~c .6 l95_7 XXXVI.1. 
Appendix B. p.203. 
I n t h i s section Consett v / i l l be compared with B e l l Brothers who 
owned c o l l i e r i e s i n the Wear Valley not too f a r from Langley Park, i n 
coke 
the heart of the area supplying.0. to Tees-side. Over the period 1885-
89 Consett's'Home C o l l i e r i e s ' paid an average royalty of 5»02d per ton, 
w h i l s t B e l l Brothers paid 9»54d per ton at th e i r South Brancepeth C o l l i e r y . 
Since t h i s cost i s equivalent to the price which had to be paid to the 
royalty owner for the ri g h t to mine minerals, i t gives some indication 
of the different conditions prevailing i n the market for mineral rights 
i n these two d i s t r i c t s . That competition for the purchase or acquisition 
of leaseholding i n the Browney and Wear Valleys was more keen than that 
i n the l o c a l i t y of Consett i s further borne out by the royalty paid a t 
Langley Park which averaged 7.87d per ton over the period 1885-89. 
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TABLE IV.6 
Royalty paid per ton of coal, at f i v e yearly i n t e r v a l s 
1870-1914 
CONSETT IRON COMPANY B e l l 
Brothers 
Year Home C o l l i e r i e s ' Langley Park a a Garesfield S. Brancepeth 
1870 3.38d 
1875 4.15d 8.0d 
1880 3.79d 8.06d^ 9-5d 
1885 4.92d 9.25d 9-5d 
1890 5.58d 13.68d 12.58d 8.6d 
1895 5.51d 8.19d 6.05d 9.2d 
1900 5.90d 13.96d 6.2ld 8.7d 
1905 6.l6d 6.62d 6.3Qd 8.8d 
1910 6.66d 7.09d 6.26d 8.7d 
1914 7.00d 8.04d 5.39d 8.4d (1913) 
a. Average during the f i r s t s i x months of each year. 
b. The E a r l of Durham adopted a s l i d i n g s c a l e . 
Source: Private Cost Book3 1868-1905: 1892-1909: 1910-1926 
(DCR0 : D/CO/97, 100 and 101); B e l l Brothers, Cost 
Accounts 1873-1916. (North Riding Record Office: Dorman Long MSS.). 
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Whilst the royalty payments at Gonsett tended to move upwards 
throughout the whole period to 1914» being then more than double what 
they had been i n 1870, B e l l Brothers cost were maintained more or l e s s 
constant, between 8d - 9^d P©* ton. During the f i r s t h a l f of the 1880*s 
Langley Park's royalty payments were comparable with those of B e l l 
Brothers, but then fluctuated widely during the 1890's, probably 
because of the adoption of the s l i d i n g s c a l e . After 1902 the average 
Langley royalty f e l l to j u s t over 6d. because of the revised terras for 
working non-coking coals. The constancy of Garesfield and Chopwell 
r o y a l t i e s i s probably because the Company computed a charge, payable 
to i t s e l f , since i t owned most of the r o y a l t i e s from v/hich coal 
was taken by those c o l l i e r i e s . 
I t i s l i k e l y that B e l l Brothers paid so much because they were 
operating i n the prime coke producing area for Cleveland, and the 
Purness d i s t r i c t of Lancashire. Other large coke producers i n the area 
included Bolckow;Vaughan, Pease and Partners, S i r Bemhard Samuelson, and 
the Carlton Iron Company. Since most of the development occured i n the 
1860*s competition drove up the l e v e l to be paid i n r o y a l t i e s . Consett 
on the other hand was generally badly s i t e d f o r coke export, the other 
chief producers i n the area, the S t e l l a Coal Company, Priestmaris and 
John Bowes and Partners being situated closer to the Tyne for shipment. 
Assuming that B e l l Brothers had a normal twenty-one year lease on 
t h e i r coal t r a c t s , renewal would have been due i n the depressed 1880's 
and then again a f t e r the turn of the century when the market for coke 
had stagnated. Under such circumstances they would have been i n a 
favourable position for renegotiation. The Consett C o l l i e r i e s on the other 
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hand were the l i f e blood of the ironworks, and thus the lessors were 
to some extent i n a more favourable position at the time of renev/al. 
However, they were by no means able to wring large concessions from the 
Iron Company, and the r i s e i n royalty payments barely compensated 
for the decline i n the value of money a f t e r 1900. 
Since both Consett and B e l l Brothers were working coal of a s i m i l a r 
quality ie.<t. for coking purposes, the royalty d i f f e r e n t i a l cannot be 
attributed to a v a r i a t i o n i n quality. Nor can the difference be put down 
to superior bargaining techniques of the Consett management, for when 
Consett leased land i n the Browney v a l l e y i t had to pay a s i m i l a r 
royalty to that paid by B e l l ' s a t South Brancepeth. On the basis of the 
available evidence i t seems legitimate to conclude that Consett did 
enjoy a certain amount of monopsonist power which depressed its cost 
curve below the l e v e l that would be expected under competitive conditions, 
such as those i n the South-West Durham d i s t r i c t . 
However, one other factor bears consideration, and that i s the 
marginal product of the coal seams; i f labour productivity at Consett 
were s i g n i f i c a n t l y lower ..than that at South Brancepeth then labour costs, 
assuming a constant price for labour, would be higher at Consett. 
Given that price was determined by a competitive market, then r i s i n g labour 
costs would reduce the re s i d u a l ; i f other costs and p r o f i t expectations 
remained constant, then r o y a l t i e s would decrease as labour productivity 
f e l l , signifying that as the f a c i l i t y with which the seams were worked 
decreased so would the rent. This gives r o y a l t i e s the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
o£ pure rent, but since coal seams are exhaustible they are also a price 
paid for the removal of a mineral. Overall, however, there was not a 
s i g n i f i c a n t difference between labour productivity of Consett's c o l l i e r i e s 
compared to South Brancepeth. 
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F i n a l l y Table IV.7 shows the t o t a l cost of r o y a l t i e s paid by Consett 
annually to the l e s s o r s . Between 1868 and 1914 i t increased almost 
tenfoldd, w h i l s t output increased by about s i x times.. The difference i s 
accounted for by the r i s i n g average cost of royalty e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r 
1895. This can be largely explained i n terras of price related s l i d i n g 
scales as the price of coal on balance rose during the Edwardian period. 
I n many respects the acquisition of coal r o y a l t i e s was a long term 
policy decision, requiring a mixture of i n t u i t i o n and experience to 
forecast demand and requirements ten or even twenty years ahead. 
Consett probably was lucky to achieve the growth that i t did, but 
the luck was well harnessed by the s k i l l and foresight of i t s Directors, 
several of whom brought t h e i r coal trade experience to the aid of the Company. 
The most notable was undoubtedly David Dale, who had a part i n negotiating 
many of the Company's leases; he v/as also the Managing Director of Pease 
and Partners, Ltd. the largest coal company i n Durham. There were others 
such as John arid C.V/.C. Henderson, and William and Frank S t o b a r t / 1 0 1 ^ 
who either chaired the Board meetings or served on the Coal Committee, 
a useful adjunct to the Board which u t i l i z e d the experience and i n t e r e s t s 
of the Directors. By th e i r a c t i v i t y they were able to shade a map of 
north west Durham i n Consett's colours by the outbreak of the Great War. 
( l O l ) Frank Stobart was elected to the Board i n 1905, on the retirement 
of William Stobart, was the intermediary who acted on behalf of the 
E a r l of Durham and the E c c l e s i a s t i c a l Commissioners i n thei r 
negotiations with Consett regarding r o y a l t i e s . 
CHAPTER V. 
COSTS AND PRODUCTIVITY 
Since Consett was unable to control the demand side of i t s coal 
business, i t remains to be seen whether i t was able to manage the supply 
side to its advantage. I n the previous section i t has been shown that 
the Company enjoyed a certain amount of success i n applying monopsonist powers 
to the business of acquiring coal r o y a l t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Consett 
v i c i n i t y i t s e l f . 
More can be added to this examination by comparing the costs of 
r a i s i n g coal incurred by the Consett Iron Company, and the Middlesbrough 
pig iron manufacturers, B e l l Brothers. The l a t t e r firm was established 
at Port Clarence on Tees-side i n 1854 to exploit the deposits of ironstone 
found during the l840*s. Having acquired a sound base of ro y a l t i e s for 
mining ironstone, the Company then turned i t s attention to securing coal 
r o y a l t i e s . These were situated i n the triangular area bounded by Bishop 
Auckland, Spennymoor and Langley Moor. 
The f i r s t half of the chapter w i l l deal with the relationship between 
productivity and costs, and thei r impact upon the rate of technical 
innovation. Prom the comparative data with B e l l ' s i t w i l l be shown that 
Consett 1s c l e a r cut cost advantage was eroded by the mid-1890's, and was 
not regained before 1914- I t w i l l also be seen that Consett was slower 
in adopting by-product ovens i n the early 1900's than i t s competitors, 
despite i t s record of adverse cost conditions. 
I n the second half of the chapter the supply of labour and i t s 
r e l a t i o n with management w i l l be examined. I n this area of supply Consett 
did not have any s i g n i f i c a n t monopsonist power mainly because of the large 
demand for miners from the mid-1890's onward, and of the influence of the 
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Durham Miners' Association. I t w i l l also be seen that the se t t l e d labour 
re l a t i o n s at Consett became increasingly disturbed during the Edwardian era, 
es p e c i a l l y a f t e r the death of David Dale i n 1906. 
Clearly Consett had no l a s t i n g monopsony powers i n the supply of labour, 
and once productivity began to f a i l i n the late l890's, so too did the 
comparative cost advantage. 
The following Table i l l u s t r a t e s the trend i n the average t o t a l costs 
of mining coal. This shows the steady upward trend i n the cost of 
winning coal at Consett's Home C o l l i e r i e s , ' compared with f a i r l y constant 
costs at Langley Park u n t i l 1905» and declining costs a t South Brancepeth 
C o l l i e r y , belonging to B e l l Brothers'until the turn of the century. The 
costs at the two other 'Sale C o l l i e r i e s , ' Garesfield and Chopwell, were 
consistently higher than those a t Langley Park. 
TABLE V . l . 
Variable. 
Average Cost of Coal Production per ton at the 
C o l l i e r i e s of the Consett Iron Compaqy and B e l l Brothers 
CONSETT 
Year 
1870 
1875 
1880 
1885 
1890 
1895 1900 
1905 
1910 
1913 
IRON COMPANY .,-„•/*>, 
Consett 
3s. 3d 
4 s . l i d 
3s. 9d 
4s. I d , 
5s. Od 
5s. Od 
6s. Id 
6s. 6d 
7s. 9d 
7s. Id 
Langley 
Park 
3s.9^d 
4s. 4d 
4s.l0d 
4s. 8d 
4s. 7d 
4s.l0d 
6s. 5 ^ 
6s.9|d 
a. To the near Jsd per ton. 
Garesfield Chopwell 
B e l l 
Brothers 
South 
Brancepeth 
6s. Oid 
4s. 9d 
5s. 3d 
5 s . l l ^ d 5s. Od 
5s. l i d 4s. 6d 
5s.10 d 6s. 5d 5s. 9d 
6s. 2^d 6s.o|d 5s. 2d 
7s. 9 d 7s. l i d 7s. 4d 
8s. 7 d 8s. 3d 8s. 5d 
Source.: Private Cost Books 1868-1905; 
1892-1909; 1910-1926. (DCRO : D/CO/97, 100 and 101). 
B e l l Brothers Cost Accounts, 1873-1916.(NRRO : Dorman Long M.S.S.). 
All the Cortcefcfr costs in the a c c o u n t were wtriftbfc m 
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An explanation of Consett 1s r i s e iri costs i n the. 'Home C o l l i e r i e s ' 
may be that a f t e r the establishment i n 1869 of the Durham Miners' Association 
any control the Company had over i t s labour supply was eroded by the 
improved organisation of the miners. 
Labour costs were the l a r g e s t single component i n t o t a l costs and as such 
had the greatest impact upon t o t a l costs. 
• Labour Costs 
In 1868 labour costs accounted for 52.3 per cent of t o t a l costs at the 
•Home C o l l i e r i e s ' and rose to 64.5 per cent by 1914; at South Brancepeth 
the figures were very s i m i l a r , 57«1 per cent i n 1871 and 67«3 per cent by 1913. 
Whilst t o t a l costs rose by f r a c t i o n a l l y over 100 per cent between 1868--, 1913 
labour costs increased one and a half times, and accounted for three quarters 
of the monetary increase. 
However labour costs varied between the c o l l i e r i e s , and p a r t i c u l a r l y 
between the 'Home C o l l i e r i e s ' and Langley Park, the d i f f e r e n t i a l being greatest 
between 1897-1910. Between 1885-1907 South Brancepeth's labour costs were also 
consistently below those at Consett, but never as dramaticall^as Langley 
Parks. Labour productivity was the c r u c i a l element i n labour costs, the higher 
V . l 
the productivity per man, the lower the l e v e l of costs. Chart shows the close 
correlation between productivity and cost a t the 'Home C o l l i e r i e s ' . Langley 
Park exhibited a s i m i l a r l y close relationship. The element of cost not 
explained by the l e v e l of productivity can be accounted for by varying prices for 
labour, and by the general decline i n the value of the money. However, 
the fac t that output per man year between 300-325 tons corresponds with a cost 
CHART Y.l 
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of 6a.6d to 7s.Od per ton a t both c o l l i e r i e s suggests that the prices paid for 
work were not s i g n i f i c a n t l y different between Consett and Langley Park. 
This adds further to the suspicion that Consett 1s i s o l a t i o n i n north west 
Durham offered no compensating monopsony i n the labour market. 
I n coal-mining, or any extractive industry, eventually diminishing returns 
w i l l be encountered. Hov/ever, i t has been claimed that on the whole the 
declining productivity encountered by the industry was caused as much by 
ine f f e c t i v e management and r e c a l c i t r a n t labour as by diminishing r e t u r n s . ^ 
I n 1925 the Samuel Commission claimed to find a marked correlation between 
(2) 
s i z e , labour productivity and p r o f i t a b i l i t y . ' The Commission's reasoning 
was however a t f a u l t since t h e i r r e s u l t s were biased by the influence of the 
new large c o l l i e r i e s opened i n the recently developed Nottingham and South 
Yorkshire c o a l f i e l d s . ^ 
More recently Professor Johnston has found that there i s no correlation 
between scale and costs i n operating a c o l l i e r y . S i n c e costs are so 
dependent upon labour productivity, there i s not l i k e l y to be any correlation 
between s i z e and labour productivity e i t h e r . The evidence within Consett 1s 
group of c o l l i e r i e s supports such a n u l l hypothesis. Productivity was i n f a c t 
more dependent upon geological conditions, and the age of p i t s . A s t r i k i n g 
example i n the Consett group was the difference between the Hunter P i t and 
Chopwell C o l l i e r y . 
(1) A.J. Taylor, "Labour Productivity and Technological Innovation i n the 
B r i t i s h Coal Trade, I85O-I914" Economic History Review, 2nd ser. XIV (1961). 
(2) Samuel Commission. P.P. 1925 (c .2600) XIV.1. I l l , pp. 216-217; I , pp. .259 et.sei 
(3) R.W. Dron, The Economics of Coal Mining (London, 1928) p.p. 111-112. 
(4) J . Johnston, S t a t i s t i c a l Cost Analysis (New York, 1960) p.p. 97-102. 
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Costs at Hunter P i t were consistently lower than those at Chopwell despite 
the p i t being nine years older (opened 1888), and i t s s i z e becoming progressively 
smaller r e l a t i v e to Chopwell. I n t e r - c o l l i e r y comparisons may be unrepresentative, 
but changes i n scale within one c o l l i e r y , over time, do not produce any 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r i n g conclusions. For instance Langley Park's output rose 
from 302,685 tons i n I898 to 494,295 tons i n 1905. yet labour productivity f e l l 
from 547*4 tons per man per annum to 447•7 tons, and costs rose from 3s.l0^d to 
4s.l0d*' There i s no positive statement that can be made about costs and s i z e . 
. Innovation and Technical Change 
Though the actual s i z e of the pi t s seems to have been of l i t t l e significance 
to cost functions, the s i z e of the firm may have been important. 
"The small firm, controlling one or two medium-sized c o l l i e r i e s , 
might wait many years to see a return on i t s investment; i t 
faced certain prospect that i n the perhaps not distant future i t s 
c a p i t a l assets would s t e a d i l y waste away, and i n the meantime i t 
was i n the grip of market forces which might bring prosperity but 
(5) 
could equally lead to l o s s . " x ' 
Consett was not a small firm, i n f a c t the Company was consistently amongst 
the top ten producers of coal i n Durham throughout the period. The s i z e of 
the Company endowed i t with c e r t a i n advantages, as did i t s d i v e r s i f i e d a c t i v i t i e s . 
The tendency of trade i n coal and s t e e l to be somewhat of f s e t , i f not counter-
(5) A.J. Taylor, "Labour Producivity...." p.64. 
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c y c l i c a l , enabled the Directors to show a good record of p r o f i t a b i l i t y , and 
so there was never any problem i n obtaining c a p i t a l . The Company's 
dis t r i b u t i o n of pr o f i t s was f a i r l y conservative by the standards of the time, 
and e s p e c i a l l y when compared the philosophy of some coal companies, 
" I think the best plan i n managing a c o l l i e r y i s to hand to 
your shareholders the money that i s made, keeping back a s u f f i c i e n t 
reserve fund f o r emergencies. I n the concerns I have to do with we 
(6) 
never put aside any redemption sum". 
A second advantage of s i z e was the machinery that was purchased could 
be transferred from one p i t to another, i f andwhen necessary. Smaller firms 
did not have so much scope, thus incurring losses i f a machine had to be sold 
or scrapped because i t proved unsuitable to that c o l l i e r y ' s needs. 
Given that the s i z e of Cbnsett's operations were amenable to innovation 
and technical change, what was the response of management? On the whole 
Consett 1s management did show responsiveness whenever costs demanded factor 
substitution. Often, the innovations implemented were not of a di r e c t cost 
saving nature, as for example the i n s t a l l a t i o n of e l e c t r i c l i g h t i n g at Langley 
Park, for though i t was unlikely to be cheaper "the screening at night would be 
(7) 
moreefficiently done." ' Two years l a t e r Mr. Logan anticipated that 
the introduction of e l e c t r i c l i g h t i n g would bring about "no dire c t cost saving.. 
(8) 
save that derived i n d i r e c t l y from a better quality of l i g h t . " The expenditure 
(6) R.C. on Coal Supply, .P.P. 1905 (c.2362) XVI,1. Emerson Bainbridge's 
Evidence. 
(7) Directors' Minute. 7 July I896, p.70.(DCR0 : D/CO/36). 
(8) Directors' Minute. 13 September l898,p.53.(DCRO : D/C0/37). 
- 152 -
on these two improvements was by no means extravagant; the Langley Park 
u n i t from the Corlett Engineering Company cost £5631 whilst the u n i t at 
Garesfield from Scott and Mountain cost £740. The l a t t e r had s u f f i c i e n t power 
(9) 
to supply part of the Blaydon Urban D i s t r i c t Council. 
Once e l e c t r i c i t y was i n s t a l l e d i n the p i t s f o r l i g h t i n g purposes 
i t increased the scope f o r further innovations. I n 1894 an e l e c t r i c 
hauling engine was i n s t a l l e d at Westwood, replacing 14 p i t porfies.^^ 
Not only was e l e c t r i c haulage more e f f i c i e n t than animal power, itwas also 
"better and cheaper than steam haulage."^^ After further piecemeal provision 
and expansion of e l e c t r i c a l plant during the f i r s t decade of the twentieth 
century, the Board eventually drew up a comprehensive scheme of e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n 
of t h e i r coal mines i n 1910. The scheme included a new generating station at 
Chopwell, with turbo-generators costing £1-3»148 from B e l l i s s and Morcom; a 
second high tension l i n e between Chopwell and Garesfield; new haulage plant 
underground; new e l e c t r i c a l v e n t i l l a t i n g plant at Langley Park; and the 
(12) 
e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n of screens and other apparatus. 
The i n s t a l l a t i o n of e l e c t r i c a l power i n t h e i r p i t s was the Consett 
management's one area of innovatory vigour. That they had a good deal of 
experience i n t h i s problem i s indicated by the appointment of one of t h e i r viewers, 
Mr. Palmer, to the Home Office Departmental Committee on the supply of e l e c t r i c i t y 
i n coal mines, i n 1904. 
(9) See footnotes (12) and (13). 
(10) Directors' Minute. 6 November 1894, p . 6 . (DCRO : D/CO/36). 
(11) Directors' Minute. 13 December I898, p.78. (DCRO : D/CO/37). 
(12) Directors' Minute. 1 March 1910, p.p. 25-28.(DCRO : D/CO/42). 
(13) Directors' Minute, 3 March 1903, p.155.(DCRO : D/CO/39)• 
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The introduction of e l e c t r i c i t y paved the way f o r another important 
innovation, the use of coal-cutting machinery and mechancial conveyance from 
the p i t face. E l e c t r i c i t y provided a more f l e x i b l e and mobile source of 
power than compressed a i r , the alternative source of power f o r d r i v i n g machinery 
underground. I t was also more e f f i c i e n t , since the transmission of compressed 
a i r over long distances often led to a loss of pressure, and a subsequent 
decline i n the working e f f i c i e n c y of the machines. ' However, the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of power was not the c r u c i a l factor i n the introduction of coal-
c u t t i n g machinery; of primary importance was the geological condition of the 
seam, i t s width, the texture of the coal, the condition of the f l o o r and roof, 
and the incidence of f a u l t i n g . Coal-cutters only became economically viable 
when either the hewer's productivity f e l l below between 2 ^ - 3 tons per s h i f t , 
(15) 
or when the cost of getting coal by hand rose above 2s,0d per ton. 
By the turn of the century the Consett Iron Company was confronted by 
c r i t i c a l l y high costs i n some of t h e i r 'Home C o l l i e r i e s ' , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
Medomsley and Derwent. 
TABLE V.3. 
Hewers productivity per s h i f t at Medomsley and 
Derwent P i t s . 1896 and 1901. 
Year Medomsley Derwent 
1896 
1901 
3.29 tons per s h i f t 
2.90 tons per s h i f t 
2.90 tons per s h i f t 
2.88 tons per s h i f t 
Source : The .Returns of the Durham Coal Owners' Association Output and 
Employment, 1896 & 1901. N.C.B. S t a t i s t i c a l Returns, Nos. 401 and 406. 
(DCRO : N.C.B. Deposits.) 
a. Derived on the basis of 10 s h i f t s per pay, and 26 pays per year. 
Output per year 
(Number of hewers) (Number of s h i f t s per year). 
(14) A.J.Taylor, "Labour Productivity....", p.59. 
( 15) R.C. on Coal Supplies. P.P. 1905 (c.2363) XVI.1. Appendix V I I pp. 44-46. 
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On the basis of the above Table, Medomsley was at the margin of f e a s i b i l i t y 
f o r machine c u t t i n g i n 1901. I n November of that year i t was reported to the 
Directors that Mr. Palmer and Mr. Greener, of Pease and Partners, had v i s i t e d 
some Belgian mines to inspect e l e c t r i c coal-cutting machinery. Arrangements 
were made f o r two representatives of the Morgan, Gardner Company of Chicago 
to v i s i t Medomsley and advise on the v i a b i l i t y of applying such a machine to 
the t h i n coal seams t h e r e . ^ " ^ 
The machine was tested at B l a c k h i l l , where there had also been a sharp 
r i s e i n costs. The month long t r i a l proved satisfactory and Consett ordered 
a 16 inch coal-cutter from Morgan, Gardner, costing £335• At the same time 
Palmer reported to the Board on the estimated labour saving by using mechanical 
(17) 
coal-cutters; unfortunately no s t a t i s t i c a l evidence was recorded. 
The pressure on innovation at the 'Home Co l l i e r i e s * had been the r i s i n g 
cost of mining coking coal, v/hich was having an adverse e f f e c t upon costs i n 
the ironworks. Much of the success of the ironworks depended upon the a v a i l a b i l i t y 
of a cheap f u e l . 
A contemporary innovation at Langley Park was stimulated by increased 
demand f o r coal, which raised the price, especially of non-coking coal. I n 1901 
the Company had approached the Earl of Durham f o r a reduction of the tentale f o r 
non-coking coat at Langley Park. Up to that time Consett had only worked the 
Busty and Hutton seams at Langley Park, but i n 1903 they began to work the 
Five Quarter and Low Main coal seams. Both of these were thinner than the Busty 
(16) Directors' Minute. 5 November 1901, p.64. (DCRO : D/CO/39). 
(17) Directors' Minute. 26 August 1902, p.l26.(DCR0 : D/CO/39). 
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and Button seams, and the normal Durham bord and p i l l a r method of working was 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e . During 1903 an award was made f o r hewing prices i n the Low 
Main seam which stipulated that f o r any method other than longwall working, 
the hewing price was to be 2s.3d per ton. Once again the conditions were 
suitable f o r applying mechanical c u t t i n g , that i s the opening out of a new 
(18) 
seam and hewing costs above 2s.Od per ton. ' At t h i s time a Diamond Coal 
Cutter was put to work i n the Five Quarter seam at Langley Park and gave a 
good account of i t s e l f . Shortly afterwards the Morgan Gardner 'Longwall 1 
machine was transferred from Derwent C o l l i e r y , where the conditions had been 
found to be unsatisfactory, and was put to work alongside the Diamond Coal 
Cutter. The introduction of these machines necessitated a change i n the 
method-of working from bord and p i l l a r to longwall. Although o f f e r i n g the 
opportunity of greater produ c t i v i t y , the longwall system was more susceptible 
i i 
to disruption through absenteeism which had a disproportionate e f f e c t on output 
(19) 
i n the c y c l i c a l system of mining required on longwall faces." 
Consett was by no means the only c o l l i e r y company i n County Durham to 
introduce coal-cutting machinery a t the beginning of the century. By 1905 
ninety four machines were at work i n various p i t s i n the County; f i f t y - f o u r 
driven by compressed a i r and f o r t y by e l e c t r i c i t y . 
Consett had f i v e coal cutters altogether, four at Langley Park and one 
at Chopwell. This bore no comparison to the numbers at some other companies; 
Lambton's were using twenty-nine, Bolckow Vaughan's sixteen; and the B i r t l e y 
I ron Company ten. However, Consett does seem to have made intensive use of 
i t s machines. The Siskol Compressed A i r coal-cutter a t Langley Park 
(18) R.C. on Coal Supplies, P.P. 1905 (c 2363) XVI.1 Appendix V I I p.46. 
(19) J« Johnston, op.cit.,p.101. 
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was working a three s h i f t day; only a similar machine at Mainsforth 
(Carlton Iron Company) was employed as intensively. Also the. e l e c t r i c a l l y 
driven machines worked two s h i f t s , w h i lst the majority of c o l l i e r i e s 
only worked t h e i r machines f o r one s h i f t . Apart from such intensive use, 
Consett also did well i n negotiating a low wage rate f o r working the 
machines, being undercut only by Murton, Houghton and Elemore c o l l i e r i e s . 
E a r l i e r i t was asserted that the economic threshhold f o r innovating 
coal c u t t i n g machinery was low labour productivity, or high piece rates 
at the coal face. To examine a l l the Companies l i s t e d i n Table V.4: 
would be too extensive a task, and beyond the scope of t h i s study. However 
Bolckow Vaughan's Byers Green Col l i e r y was randomly selected f o r comparison 
with Langley Park. I n this case a coal-cutting machine was introduced i n 
the wake a newly negotiated rate of 2s.Id per ton i n the t h i n Busty Seam 
(2ft. 4ins.). ( 2 0 ) 
The introduction of 'long wal l ' working also made possible the adoption 
of coal conveyors. I n 1903 the Company experimented with a Blackett's 
Patent Coal Conveyor i n the Low Main seam, with s t a r t l i n g improvements i n 
productivity and costs. Mr. Palmer "estimated that the men can now f i l l 12 tons 
per man s h i f t as compared with 4 i tons under ordinary conditions..." This 
led to a saving of almost ls.4d per ton compared with the previous mode of 
working i n the seam. The machine had an additional non-cost advantage 
i n that i t made f o r an increase i n the percentage of large coal, which was 
(21) 
more valuable and marketable than small. ' I n 1904 two more conveyors 
(20) Awards and Agreements: Byers Green Co l l i e r y , (DCRO : N.C.B. Deposits.) 
(21) Directors' Minute. 19 January 1904, D.207; Directors' Minute, 15 March 1904, 
p.217. (.DCRO : D/CO/39).. 
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were bought by Consett; one f o r work i n the ^ 'hree Quarter seam at Derwent Co l l i e r y ; 
and the other f o r conveying small coals i n the Hunter P i t . The Blackett 
conveyor was also operated with the 'longwall' system i n the Townley seam at 
Chopwell. 
Where the seams remained thick the adoption of the 1longwall' system, 
coal-cutters and conveyors was inappropriate. At Chopwell and Garesfield the 
seams were s t i l l r e l a t i v e l y t h i c k , about four f e e t , and only i n the Brockwell 
(22) 
seam at Chopwell was the hewing price close to the c r i t i c a l 2s.Od per ton. ' 
Furthermore the texture of the coal m i l i t a t e d against machine working; the 
s p l i n t coal of the Townley seam was b r i t t l e and negated any advantages a 
coal-cutter might have bestowed i n that t h i n seam. 
The examination of innovation i n Consett 1s c o l l i e r i e s tends to under-line 
the influence of geological factors upon the introduction of new working 
techniques. The case of Langley Park provides a disturbing paradox of 
rapidly declining labour productivity a f t e r 1903 (Chart' V.2 ) , concurrent 
with both an expansion of scale and technical innovation. An explanation 
f o r t h i s i s that the upward trend i n coal prices, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r non-coking 
coals, permitted the exp l o i t a t i o n of marginal deposits, and th i s had reper-
cussions upon aggregate labour productivity. I f t h i s was the case, then 
Professor Taylor 1s assertion that demand was not pressing upon supply requires 
(23) 
a review. ' For Consett 1s c o l l i e r i e s diminishing retur;ns were probably 
more s i g n i f i c a n t than inadequacies of management, at least with respect to 
innovation. There may s t i l l have been management i n e f f i c i e n c i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
(22) I t was 17s.6d per score ( l score = 20 tubs of 9 cwts,) or I s . l i d per ton. 
(23) A.J. Taylor, "Labour Productivity...." p.55« 
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i n the organisation of work, but at present these are impossible to assess. 
The upward trend i n the cost of mining coal was of c r i t i c a l importance 
to the Consett Iron Company, f o r i t threatened the basis of the firms i r o n and 
steel a c t i v i t i e s . Whilst the market f o r most types of coal, and t h e i r 
derivatives, continued to grow a f t e r 1890, that f o r coke levelled o f f , 
leading to a r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i s a t i o n of price, marginally above cost. During 
the 1890's Consett 1s coke costs were r i s i n g at a faster rate than those of 
B e l l Brothers, as -the following Table shows. 
TABLE V.5. 
Average Cost per ton of Coke; Consett Iron Company and 
B e l l Brothers, 1889-1899 
Year Consett Iron Company B e l l Brothers 
Av. Cost per Ton Av. Cost per 
1889 1890 
8s. Od 
9s. I d 
8s. 
8s. 
l i d 
5d 
1891 9s.l0d 8s. 54d 
1892 10s.lOd 8s. 
1893 9s. 6d 8s. l i d 
1894 9s. 4d 8s. Od 
1895 9s. 3d 8s. Od 
1896 8s.l0d 8s. I d 
1897 8 s . l i d 8s. I d 
1898 9s. 9d 8s. 3d 
1899 10s. 3d 10s. Od 
Source: Private Cost Book, 1868 - 1905 (DCRO : D/CO/97); B e l l Brothers, Ltd., 
Cost Accounts 1873-1916 (MHRO : Dorman Long MSS). 
see page 159 f o r footnote 24. 
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Consett 1s costs during the f i r s t part of the decade were both higher 
than Bell's and increasing more quickly. However, by 1899 the cost 
of coke was comparable. Consett could i l l - a f f o r d expensive coke since 
the location already placed i t at a disadvantage with regard to the 
importation of iron ore. 
The reason f o r the dramatic increase i n the cost of coke production 
was brought about because of the sharp r i s e i n the price of coal. The 
Company's alternatives i n attempting to remedy th i s s i t u a t i o n were either 
to economize on the use of coal i n the coke ovens, or to reduce the cost 
of coal. I n 1891-92 both were being considered by the management. 
Both William Jenkins and William Logan were exploring the p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
(25) 
of reducing labour costs and i n s t a l l i n g by-product ovens. ' The defeat 
of the miners i n I892 s e t t l e d the issue, and t r a d i t i o n a l bee-hive ovens were 
erected at several p i t s where the waste gas could be used f o r r a i s i n g steam.^ 
As a short term solution t h i s was not unreasonable, because Consett 
could convert coal in t o coke more e f f i c i e n t l y than any other company 
i n Durham, except North Brancepeth. 
(24) An interview with Mr. E. Farbridge, of Stanley, June 1972. Mr. Farbridge 
who worked i n B r i t i s h and American p i t s asserted that the American method 
of working 'longwall* was less labour intensive than i n B r i t a i n , because 
of the practice of allowing the roof to 'cave i n ' behind as the face 
moved forward, w h i l s t i n B r i t a i n the space l e f t by worked out coal was 
f i l l e d i n by waste rubble. 
(25) See p. 161 
(26) Directors' Minute. 5 July 1892. p.49. (DCRO : D/CO/35). 
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TABLE V.6. 
Cost of Converting Coal Into Coke i n 1880 t 1887, 1894. 
1880 1887 I 
Consett I r o n Company I s . 1,67* I s . 2.17d I s . 5.64d 
B e l l Brothers I s . 4.96d I s . 3.6ld I s . 6.43d 
North Brancepeth I s . 1.50d I s . 0.40d I s . 2.40d 
Pease and Partners I s . 10.6ld 2s. 0.33d 2s. 3.67d 
County Average I s . 8.29d I s . 8.57d I s . 11.19d 
Source: "Return as to the cost of converting coal into coke" 
National Coal Board S t a t i s t i c a l Returns, No. 36la 
(DCRO : N.C.B. Deposits.) 
I t may also be noted that Pease and Partners, the only company to have 
i n s t a l l e d by-product ovens (Simon-Caiyes) i n 1887 had s i g n i f i c a n t l y higher 
conversion costs, though no account i s taken of the rebate through sales 
of by-products. 
A number of factors probably combined to persuade Consett against the 
adoption of by-product ovens. I n I892 Jenkins was planning an increase i n 
output of p i g i r o n f o r use i n the New Angle M i l l ; he estimated an increased 
demand f o r coke of 700-1,000 tons per week, certaiK enough to j u s t i f y a 
by-product plant. Jenkins was not convinced of any clear cut advantage i n 
by-product ovens. 
(27) R. Mott, The History of Coke-making and of the Coke Oven Managers 
Association (Cambridge, 1936) p.69. 
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" I w i l l at a convenient moment confer w i t h my Directors upon i t , 
hut I r e a l l y do not entertain any hope of t h e i r talcing up these 
patent ovens. We have so much i n the way of manufacturing work going 
on t h a t i t w i l l be d i f f i c u l t to persuade us at present to di v e r t our 
attention i n the way you suggest. I t i s a l l very w e l l to proceed upon 
the presumption of a d e f i n i t e price f o r coke and the p r o f i t upon i t , 
but I do not believe i n the present i n f l a t e d condition of things, 
and the pr o b a b i l i t y i s that coke w i l l come to i t s former old l e v e l 
soon. Of course I may be wrong i n my judgement, but these are 
(28) 
p r e t t y much the Consett feelings j u s t at present." • 
However when costs refused to f a l l as readily as price i n 1892 
Jenkins thought that i n view of Consett's "large operations i n Coke making 
(29) 
we ought to aim at giving t h i s Coppee oven a t r i a l . What f i n a l l y 
m i l i t a t e d aginst the adoption of by-product ovens? The stickiness of costs 
was removed.by the strikes - but there were also other factors. The 
capital cost of i n s t a l l i n g a by-product oven was measured i n hundreds of 
pounds, as opposed to tens f o r the bee hive. The c o l l i e r y management f e l t 
there would be a greater advantage i n small batches of bee hive ovens at: the 
'Home C o l l i e r i e s ' f o r r a i s i n g steam. By-product ovens would only be 
feasible i n one large plant. F i n a l l y David Dale was also Managing Director 
of Pease and Partners where he was presumably instrumental i n innovating the 
Simon-Carve ovens. Had they been a success Dale's influence on Consett's Board 
would probably have been s u f f i c i e n t to over-ride a l l other objections. That 
Dale remained s i l e n t , and Consett i n f a c t only considered the Coppee ovens 
(28) Wm, Jenkins to J.R. Breckon, 13 March -1890. (DCRO : D/CO/72). 
(29) Wm. Jenkins to Wm. Logan, 5 February 1892. (DCRO : D/CO/79). 
(30) Directors' Minute, 5 July 1892, p.49. (DCRO : D/CO/35). 
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suggests that Pease and Partners were less than overjoyed by the success 
of t h e i r ovens. The decision to forego the chance to i n s t a l l by-product 
ovens was based upon r a t i o n a l considerations and not b l i n d prejudice. 
The cost c r i s i s of 1892 should however have been a warning signal, as 
i t was to a number of other i r o n companies with t h e i r own c o l l i e r i e s . 
When costs took another leap upwards during 1900 another c r i s i s confronted 
Consett. The r i s e i n costs was about t h i r t y per cent i n eight years 
as the Table below shows. 
TABLE V.7. 
The Increased Costs of Working the P i t s , 1895 and 1903« 
Year x 1895 
Company Wages Royalty Cost 
Stores, Average 1903 Stores, Average 
Wages Royalty Cost 
Rent Per Ton Rent Per Ton 
Consett 
B e l l Bros/ 
Bolckow ^ 
Vaughan 
3s. I d I s . l i d 5s. Od 
2s. 7d I s . l i d 4s. 6d 
3s. 8d I s . l i d 5s;;. 7d 
4s. I d 2s. 7d 6s. 8d 
3 s . l i d I s . l i d 5s.l0d 
4s. 9d 2s. 3d 7s. Od 
a. South Brancepeth only. 
b. Bolckow Vaughan commented on t h e i r return: "Best seams i n many of our 
p i t s are p r a c t i c a l l y exhaused, thinner and more expensive seams are 
being worked. Workings are much furt h e r away from shafts causing 
increased cost." 
Source: "The Increased Cost of Working the P i t s " . National Coal Board 
S t a t i s t i c a l Return, No. 523. (DCRO : N.C.B. Deposits); Private 
Cost Book. 1868 - 1905 (DCRO : D/CO/97); B e l l Brothers, Cost Accounts 
1873 - 1916 (NRRO : Dorman Long M.SS.). 
(31) D.L. Burn, Economic History of Steelmaking, pp. 204-207; Burnham & Hoskins, 
loan and. Steel in Britain % pp.122-123. 
- 163 -
The three companies above a l l responded by economizing upon t h e i r 
coal input. This was achieved by the introduction of by-product ovens 
which gave both a greater y i e l d and a marketable by-product. However, 
whilst the other companies i n s t a l l e d t h e i r ovens simultaneously, Consett 
lagged by two years. 
Introduction of By-Product Coke Ovens by North Eastern Iron 
Companies. 
Company Type & Number of Ovens Year of Introduction 
Newport Ironworks Simon -Carves 70 1894 - 96 
Newport Ironworks Otto 50 1898 
Newport Ironworks Otto 80 1900 - 02 
Carlton I r o n Coy, Ltd. Seraet - Solvay 60 I896 - 99 
North-Eastern Steel Coy. Semet - Solvay 50 1900 
B e l l Brothers Hussener 120 1901 - 04 
Cargo Fleet Iron Coy. Koppers 100 1903 
Bolckow, Vaughan & Coy. Otto 96 1903 
Consett Iron Coy. Otto - Hilgenstock 50 1905 
Source ; R.A. Mott, History of Coke-Making , pp. 80-81. 
Consett was slow i n adopting new ovens, th i s i n part may have been 
due to the time and care taken i n assessing the r e l a t i v e merits of the 
various types of by-product ovens. I n I896 David Dale reported to the Consett 
Board "that such information as he possessed i n reference to the working of the 
patent ovens at Pease and Partners C o l l i e r y was quite at the disposal of the 
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Company. Within a short time further important information would probably be 
(32) 
available from the Carlton Co. and from Messrs B. Samuelson and Co." 
Between 1896-1902 Consett appears to have l e t matters s l i p f o r no 
further action was taken upon the matter of by-product ovens. Then i n 
1902 George Ainsworth and Mr. Palmer paid several v i s i t s to companies operating 
by-product ovens, both i n Durham and on the Continent. Evance-Coppee, 
Simplex Patent, Kopper and Otto-Hilgenstock ovens were examined, arid f i n a l l y 
i n 1903 Messrs. Ainsworth and Palmer recommended the i n s t a l l a t i o n of f i f t y 
Otto-Hilgenstock ovens at a cost of £50,000. An estimated saving of I s . Od 
per ton was forecast, and this could be increased by the addition of a similar 
number of ovens i n the futur e ; a clear case of economies of scale. 
TABLE V.8 
Comparison Between Beehive Coke Costs and Otto-Hilgenstock costs, 
1906 - 1913 
Year ending Otto - Hilgenstock Ovens Bee - hive Ovens 
June Output Av. Cost per ton Yield# Output Av. Cost Yield# 
per ton. 
1906 9,240 13s. I d 66.68 250,925 l i s . 6d 67.84 
1907 77,882 9s. 8d 77. 3 230,027 12s. 2d 66.44 1908 91,301 10s.lOd 77- 5 194,505 13s.lOd 66.13 1909 86,646 l i s . 9d 77. 7 141,376 13s.lid 66.29 1910 87,883 lOs-.lld 76.1 191,971 14s. 7d 64.38 
1911 91,092 9s. 3d 75- 1 186,587 lls.5-£-d 67.66 1912 93,666 7s. 8d 74. 0 143,367 12s. 2d 62.90 
1913 178,817 8s. 2d 74. 3 112,521 13s. Od 65.62 
Source: Private Cost Books. 1892-1909: 1910-1926. (DCRO : D/C0/l00,10l). 
(32) Directors' Minute, 1 August 1896, pp. 84-85.(DCRO : D/CO/37)• 
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The Table V.8. above shows that the forecasts were more than j u s t i f i e d . 
The question remains however, whether Consett 1s delay i n adopting the new 
by-product ovens was j u s t i f i e d by t h e i r performance when compared with ovens 
adopted by other north eastern companies. 
B e l l Brothers' Hussener ovens could not compare i n the Yield, or cost, 
(see TableV.9»), with those of Consett. The Hussener ovens at Port Clarence 
with a benzole plant cost £101,116.12s.Od between 1899-1904. or £842.12s.0d per 
o v e n / " ^ By 1911 Consett's plant of 105 ovens cost £91,800, including a benzole 
plant of 400,000 gallons capacity per annum, or £874.05s.0d.^^ 
TABLE V.9. 
The Average Cost per Ton of Coke from B e l l Brother's Hussener Ovens, 
and the Coke Output as a percentage of Coal Input. 
Year Average Cost Per Ton Yield i» 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
16s. 4d 
18s. 8d 
17s. I d 
14s.lOd 
15s. 6d 
15s. 7d 
17s. I d 
19s. 6d 
64.5 
62.9 
63.5 
64.9 
63.9 
61.3 
63.2 : 
65.8 
Source: B e l l Brothers, Cost Accounts, 1873-1916. 
(NRR0 : Dorman Long MSS.") 
(33) B e l l Brothers, P r o f i t and Loss Accounts 1899-1916 (NRR0 : Dorkan Long MSS). 
(34) Directors' Minute. 9 March 1911. p.142. (DCR0 : D/CO/42). 
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The Carlton Iron Company who had i n s t a l l e d s i x t y Semet-Solvay ovens by 1901 
(35) 
expended £60,000, and there i s no record of a benzole plant. I n view of 
the i n f l a t i o n of the Edwardian decade Consett's c a p i t a l outlay per oven was not 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y greater than B e l l Brothers, but was conspicuously less than 
the Carlton Iron Company. 
I n addition the output per oven was much greater at Consett than that at 
Port Clarence, and also marginally greater than Semet-Solvay ovens used by 
Bolckow Vaughan and Company at Auckland Park. 
TABLE V.10. 
Comparative Output of Otto-Hilgenstock, Semet-Solvay and Hussener 
by-product Ovens, 1910 and 1914 
Annual Output Type of Ovens, Number of Ovens Output of M U i m j . ^ I n s t a l l a t i o n Coke Pe"r*0verT 
and Company 
Otto-Hilgenstock at ) 1910 55 86,389 1570. 7 
Templetown ) 
Consett I r o n Company) 1914 105 195,927 I865. 9 
Hussener, at Port ) 
Clarence J 1910 120 152,008 1266. 7 
B e l l Brothers. a j 1914 120 150,937 1257.8 
Semet-Solvay, Auckland) 
Park ) 1910 100 153*904 1539.04 
Bolckow Vaughan and ) 
Company ) 19H 100 161,923 1619.23 
a. B e l l Brothers, Cost Accounts, 1873 - 1916 (NRR0 : Dorman Long MSS) 
Source: National Coal 3oard S t a t i s t i c a l Returns, Hos. 6l4 i 684. 
TDCRO : N.C.B. Deposit.). 
(35) Carlton I r o n Company, Private Ledger, pp. 208-209. (NRR0 : Dorman Long MSS). 
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I n view of t h i s evidence Consett's care i n selecting the type of ovens 
to be i n s t a l l e d was j u s t i f i e d . There were c e r t a i n l y important improvements 
i n the design of by-product ovens between the early 1890's and 1903 which 
led to more consistent q u a l i t y and a larger o u t p u t . N e v e r t h e l e s s by 1902 
when Consett a c t i v e l y began to investigate by-product ovens most of i t s 
competitors had either had them i n s t a l l e d or were i n the process of doing so. 
Although Consett responded to the economic stimulus of high costs, i t should, 
reasonably, have foreseen the advent of such a c r i s i s . Labour productivity 
had been declining continuously i n the 'Home Collieries* since I896 with 
a subsequent r i s e i n costs. The quality of Consett's f i n a l decision was 
indisputably good, but the delay i n reaching i t was indica t i v e of declining 
standards of a l e r t management. 
At an e a r l i e r date the Company had been nearer the f r o n t runners i n 
innovation. During the 1860*s and l870's they were one of a number of coke 
makers attempting to minimise the loss of waste heat. I n I867 David Dale 
made an agreement with J.R. Breckon, that on the payment of £300 the Company 
should have the benefit i n perpetuity of a l l coke patents taken out by Mr. 
(37) 
Breckon, or his co-patentees. " The following year the f i r m b u i l t s i x t y - s i x 
Breckon and Dixon ovens. Though the coke from these ovens was considered 
i n f e r i o r they could be drawn three times weekly and had an increased;yield, 
( 38^ 
compared with the more common Stobart patent ovens. 
When during 1874 coal costs remained high whilst prices began to f a l l , 
Messrs. Boyd and Hedley reported upon the p r a c t i c a b i l i t y of u t i l i z i n g the waste 
heat from the coke ovens f o r generating steam f o r the C o l l i e r y engines. The waste 
(36) R.A. Mott, History of Coke making——, *p.76. 
(37) Directors' Minute, 21 December I 8 6 7 . p.172. (DCR0 : D/CO/29). 
(38) Directors' Minute, 11 January 1868. p . 178 . (DCR0 : D/CO/29); R.A. Mott, 
History of Coke making , p.51. 
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gas at Delves was already used f o r drying and burning bricks i n the Company's 
brickworks, and i t was also applied at the recently opened Westwood C o l l i e r y . 
Since i t was being successfully u t i l i z e d at these two i n s t a l l a t i o n s , the 
(39) 
Board decided t o extend i t s use to Medomsley and Derwent. 
The improvement i n ef f i c i e n c y brought about by the application of waste 
heat f o r r a i s i n g steam can be seen i n the following Table. This measures the 
decline i n the real cost of coal to c o l l i e r y engines per ton of coal raised. 
I t i s both an indicator of f u e l economies and technical improvements i n the c o l l i 
engines. 
TABLE V . l l . 
The Real Cost of Coal to Co l l i e r y Engines per Ton of Coal Raised, 
at ten Yearly Intervals 1868 - 1905: Consett 
•Home C o l l i e r i e s . ' 
Year 
Ending 
June 
Coal to 
Engines 
Per Ton 
of Coal 
Raised 
Total 
Average 
Cost Per 
Ton of 
Coal 
Cost 
Index 
Price 
Index 
Real Cost 
of Coal 
to the ^ 
Engines 
1868 1.07d 3s. 6.36d 100 100 100 
1875 0.84d 4s. 11.22d 78.5 139.8 56.2 
1885 0.60d 4s. 1.03d 56.1 115.7 48.5 
1895 0.8ld 5s. 0.03d 75-7 141-7 53.4 
1905 0.89d 6s. 6.26d 83.2 184.7 45.0 
a. The price index assumes that coal to the engines was charged at a price 
marginally above the t o t a l average cost of mining the coal. Thus the t o t a l 
average cost has been taken as the price of coal f o r c o l l i e r y consumption. 
b. Real Cost Index = Cost Index/Price Index. 
Source : Private Cost Book, 1868-1905. (DCR0 : D/CO/97). 
(39) Directors' Minute, 6 October 1874 pp.63-64. (DCR0 : D/C0/3l). 
The conversion at Derwent Col l i e r y was postponed u n t i l the mineral lease 
with the Allgoods had been renewed. Thus i n some instances the nature 
of mineral ownership could retard innovation. 
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The greatest savings i n r e a l cost concur with the u t i l i z a t i o n of waste 
heat i n the early 1870's and then again i n the decade between 1895-1905 
when e l e c t r i c a l haulage equipment was introduced into Consett's mines. 
The improving e f f i c i e n c y of c o l l i e r y engines was concurrent with periods of 
rapid growth of output. This i s the opposite to the s i t u a t i o n with regard 
to the innovation of by-product ovens, for the market for coke L;had 
stagnated whilst the adoption of by-product ovens was r e l a t i v e l y l a t e . 
With respect to the mechanisation of operations underground i t i s impossible 
to distinguish between geological conditions and poor management i n i t s slow 
adoption. 
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Labour : Supply and Relations with Management 
Besides c r i t i c i s i n g management f o r the decline i n labour productivity, 
Professor Taylor also draws attention to r i s i n g absenteeism, increased 
frequency of i n d u s t r i a l disputes, deliberate output r e s t r i c t i o n s and 
l e g i s l a t i o n reducing the hours of l a b o u r . T h e s e assertions w i l l be 
examined i n the following pages, along with some other problems encountered 
by Consett i n deploying i t s labour force, such as the existence of a 
competitive labour market, the influence of raw recrui t s i n the labour force, 
and f i n a l l y the q u a l i t y of c o l l i e r y management. 
A pattern emerges of generally very good labour relations at Consett u n t i l 
the Edwardian decade when a noticeably v/idespread deterioration set i n . This 
coincides with the death i n 1906 of David Dale, who had done so much to bring 
enlightenment to the m3jria,gement of labour. I n the years immediately preceeding 
1914 the attitudes adopted by both labour and management hardened. This was 
reflected i n the everyday operations of the p i t s by the speed with which small 
disputes blew up into stoppages. 
One explanation, that p a r t i a l l y exonerates labour from any part i n the 
decline i n labour productivity, was the suggestion that the decline was due to 
the r i s i n g proportion of the labour force which was new to the industry a f t e r 
1900. The rapid growth of output necessitated a great swelling i n the numbers 
employed i n coal-mining. I n the case of the single c o l l i e r y company the v a l i d i t y 
of t h i s suggestion i s d i f f i c u l t to establish since the proportion of raw 
recruit s i n the labour force cannot be estimated. I n 1900 i t v/as decided to 
(40) A.J. Taylor, "Labour Productivity...." p.55. 
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l a y - i n Westwood Col l i e r y and t h i s released almost 600 men. At the same time 
employment was being increased at Chopv/ell, Garesfield and Langley Park, 
whilst productivity was f a l l i n g . I t i s not improbable that many Westwood 
men were absorbed in t o the labour force of these expanding c o l l i e r i e s . I n 
general the extent of the decline i n labour productivity i n the Durham 
Coalfield while the numbers employed grew at a f a i r l y constant rate reduces the 
strength of the inexperienced labour argument. 
TABLE V.12 
Employment and Labour Productivity i n the Durham Coal F i e l d . 
Year Numbers Employed Output per Man Year 
1895 83,336 301.127 tons 
1896 85,850 307.563 tons 
1897 85,697 316.025 tons 
1898 88,084 320^803 tons 
1899 91,015 314.463 tons 
1900 101,804 305.536 tons 
1901 102,722 296.309 tons 
1902 106,064 295.029 tons 
1903 110,125 296.129 tons 
1904 112,471 293.670 tons 
1905 116,046 295.500 tons 
1906 120,099 296.693 tons 
1907 126,784 289.126 tons 
1908 131,357 278.8I6 tons 
1909 135,725 280.592 tons 
1910 144,039 254.438 tons 
1911 148,235 261.770 tons 
1912 153,649 237.680 tons 
1913 164,395 253.953 tons 
19H 149.390 254.150 tons 
Source : "Annual Returns of the Durham Coal Owner's Association, 1895-1914", 
National Coal Board S t a t i s t i c a l Returns. (DCR0 : NiCliB. Deposit). 
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I f the declining labour productivity i s not explained f u l l y by the growth 
of the labour force, i t may be caused p a r t l y by t h e i r employment i n seams which 
were increasingly d i f f i c u l t to work. This was probably an explanatory factor where 
a large part of the increased labour force was employed i n the newly opened 
and less productive coal seams, a t the turn of the century. 
Not only did the Consett labour force increase rapidly during the l a t e 
'nineties and early twentieth century, but also there was a steady growth 
of demand f o r labour i n the County as a whole. This presented the Company 
with d i f f i c u l t i e s i n r e c r u i t i n g c o l l i e r y labour. I n the early 1870's during 
the 'coal famine 1 the Consett Company had encountered similar problems. 
I n t h i s instance they had t r i e d to r e c r u i t men from as f a r a f i e l d as the 
South of England, but with l i t t l e success. 
At the turn of the century when the Chopwell C o l l i e r y was being expanded 
d i f f i c u l t y was encountered i n a t t r a c t i n g labour to v/ork there because of 
the i s o l a t i o n of the v i l l a g e . I n an e f f o r t to a l l e v i a t e the shortage, 
the' North Eastern Railway was induced to provide a temporary st a t i o n between 
Westwood and Lintz Green to break down the community's i s o l a t i o n . The 
management hoped that such a f a c i l i t y would a t t r a c t a better class of workmen 
(43) 
to Chopwell than was already there! 
Since the provision of housing f o r hewers was customary i n County Durham, 
empty cottages were reasonable indicators of labour shortage. There were ten 
such empty cottages a t Chopwell i n July 1899 • Some years e a r l i e r Wm. 
Jenkins had enquired of his Chief Viewer: 
(41) Directors' Minute, 12 October 1871, p,129.(DCR0 : D/CO/30). 
(42) Directors' Minute. 17 July 1899, p.134. (DCRO : D/CO/38). 
(43) Directors' Minute, 5 December 1899, p . l 6 l . (DCRO : D/CO/38). 
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"Is there a d i f f i c u l t y now i n getting hewers? I f i n d by my weekly 
return of the occupied cottages that there are today absolutely 14 good 
cottages empty at Leadgate." 
I n t h i s l a s t case ten or a dozen cottages were vacated i n the space of a 
few days, and t h i s may imply that a group of hewers had moved en bloc to a more 
remunerative c o l l i e r y . The implications of a l l t h i s are that Consett was by 
no means a monopsonist i n the labour market, f i r s t l y , because i t s growing labour 
requirements necessitated an i n f l u x of immigrants to the d i s t r i c t , a process 
not l i k e l y to occur i f wage rates were depressed a r t i f i c a l l y i n the l o c a l i t y . 
Secondly, the County unidn organisation and system of a r b i t r a t i o n produced a 
uniformity of bargaining pov/er throughout the c o a l f i e l d . 
The supply and mobility of labour w i t h i n the c o a l f i e l d v/as such that 
despite i t s location on the westerly f r i n g e , Consett was s t i l l e f f e c t i v e l y 
competing f o r labour with other c o l l i e r i e s a l l over the region. Companies 
not only competed f o r labour on a price basis but also by providing amenities, 
the most fundamental of which was housing. I n 1864 the Company owned over 1000 
freehold cottages, by the 1890's i t had 2700, and t h i s was furt h e r increased 
by the opening of Chopwell and expansion at Langley Park. 
By the early 1900's the Company had to expend large sums on alterations 
and improvements to many of i t s older cottages. At the outbreak of war i n 
1914 Consett owned approximately 3000 cottages f o r its workers. Less costly, 
but probably more indicative of the f e r o c i t y of the competition f o r labour was 
the provision of social amenities such as reading rooms, social clubs, schools 
and even public houses; a rare concession i n view of David Dale's s t r i c t temperance. 
(44) Wm. Jenkins to W.H. Hedley, 8 A p r i l 1890. (DCR0 : D/CO/73). 
(45) H.A. Clegg, A. Fox and A.P. Thompson, A History of B r i t i s h Trade Unions since 
1889, I (Oxford, 1964) p.103" ~ '— 
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The tightness of the labour market i n North west Durham around 1900 was 
not only f e l t by Consett. On a number of occasions the Chief Viewer at South 
Moor C o l l i e r y Company complained of d i f f i c u l t i n attracting, men, and then keeping 
the better types of w o r k m e n . C o n s e t t obviously could not hope to exploit any 
monopsonist powers i n such a competitive labour market, because of the mobility 
of some sections of the labour force. 
Having attracted the labour to t h e i r p i t s , how successful was Consett 
i n keeping them content? The evidence i s weightily on the side of very good 
labour relations at Consett through most of the period, 1864-1914. H6wever 
a f t e r 1897 a canker seems to have taken hold, namely Chopv/ell Colliery which 
was opened i n that year. Up to 1888 when returns about disputes and stoppages 
were begun, there i s no record i n the Directors' Minutes of any serious 
stoppages at Consett 1s p i t s , other than the General County Strike i n 1879• 
After 1888 the s i t u a t i o n i s much the same with only one hal f day l o s t through 
an i n d u s t r i a l dispute at a 'Home Colliery* between 1888-1913 except f o r 
general County action i n 1892, 1910 and 1912. The 'Sale C o l l i e r i e s ' were almost 
as quiet, apart from Chopwell where there v/ere no fev/er than eleven disputes 
between 1898-1913, two of them l a s t i n g more than ten days. However, a f t e r 
1910 there was a marked increase i n disputes at c o l l i e r i e s other than Chopwell. 
Though disputes did occur they did not lead to h o s t i l e i n d u s t r i a l action 
i n most instances. At Derwent Colliery.there were outbursts against non-unionists 
i n 1880 and then again i n 1897, but i n neither case was any stoppage of work 
reported, or any r e s t r i c t i o n of o u t p u t . I n 1891 a dispute at Langley Park 
(46) I am grate f u l to Dr. P..H. B r i t n e l l f o r passing on this information to me. 
(47) Directors' Minute, 14 June 1897, p.l80. (DCRO : D/CO/37); Directors' 
Minute, 5 February 1880, p.190. (DCRO : D/CO/32). 
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over the question of hewers being required to remove the coal from the face 
to the main tramways (work normally done by youths), led to a r e s t r i c t i o n 
of output by the hewers. This was the only recorded incident of deliberate 
r e s t r i c t i v e practices being employed at Consett 1s C o l l i e r i e s , though there 
were some references to possible r e s t r i c t i o n . ^ ^ 
Reference to increasing absenteeism i s also noticeable by i t s absence 
from the Company's records. The stoppages on Boxing Day and New Year's Day were 
normally expected, though not welcomed by the management, but apart from these 
special days when the whole labour force might absent i t s e l f there was no 
record of disruptive absenteeism during other times of the year. I f i t had 
been at a l l serious at Consett, one would have expected comment upon i t when 
the Company began to operate the 'longwall' system i n some of i t s p i t s . I t i s 
more than l i k e l y that output r e s t r i c t i o n during depression and absenteeism 
during booms were accepted as facts of mining l i f e , i n the north-east, and not 
j u s t phenomena that appeared i n the 1890's and a f t e r . Such practices were not 
condoned by either unions or m a n a g e m e n t , b u t at least i n the case of 
Consett there seems no reason to put much emphasis upon any r e l a t i o n between the 
declining labour productivity and these two practices. 
Since on the whole Consett enjoyed such r e l a t i v e l y peaceful labour r e l a t i o n s , 
i t i s a l l the more s t a r t l i n g that one c o l l i e r y should have stood out so 
prominently as troublesome. I t was u n l i k e l y that Consett's labour policy would 
have d i f f e r e d greatly between c o l l i e r i e s , so the causes of the disturbances 
at Chopwell can probably be a t t r i b u t e d to either the miner's militancy or 
(48) c f . footnote (44). 
(49) H.A. C l e g g e t a l . , op.cit.,p.19. 
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f a i l i n g s of individual managers at the C o l l i e r y . During the 1920's 
the Colliery became a hotbed of communism, and the foundations f o r th i s seem to 
been l a i d by a number of active Independent Labour Party men i n the pre-war 
years. The gound was f e r t i l e f o r such a c t i v i s t s as Vipond Hardy, and l a t e r 
William Lawther. Between 1901-1911 the population of Chopwell doubled because 
of the inflow of workmen to work i n the new p i t s . Men were attracted from a l l 
over the north; Cumberland, Lancashire, Yorkshire as we l l as Northumberland 
and D u r h a m . S o m e , l i k e the Lawthers, probably made t h e i r l i v i n g s by 
moving from one new c o l l i e r y to the next, because of the a t t r a c t i v e wage rates 
(51) 
paid. ' Such a community had few roots and no i d e n t i t y , and was therefore mos 
l i k e l y to be impressionable by a c t i v i s t s . The size of the Col l i e r y also 
m i l i t a t e d against amicable rel a t i o n s . I n the smaller p i t s there was more 
contact and mixing between the men and c o l l i e r y viewers , especially through the 
Church or Chapel. 
The seeds of prolonged trouble at Chopwell were sown from the outset 
i n 1897. William Logan, the Chief Viewer f o r Consett's C o l l i e r i e s was not 
s a t i s f i e d with the labour productivity, and a t t r i b u t e d t h i s to the fa c t the 
men were being paid day rates. At f i r s t the Men's Association was reluctant to 
accept tonnage rates, but they f i n a l l y stepped down and earnings and 
(52) 
productivity began to r i s e . ' Logan was anxious however to have wages fi x e d 
by the score (20 tubs of 9 cwts), and so the normal procedure of a r b i t r a t i o n was 
entered upon. When the a r b i t r a t o r s could not agree on terms an Umpire was 
(-.50) Interview with Sir William Lawther, 31 May 1972. 
(51) I b i d . 
(52) Directors' Minute. 13 A p r i l 1897, p.157. (DCRO : D/CO/37). 
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appointed,^ ' and he made an award i n December 1897' The award was 1 7 ^ above 
the County standard rate but William Logan was not s a t i s f i e d that s u f f i c i e n t 
data had been consulted to make an award. He complained to John Wilson 
M.P., the most i n f l u e n t i a l person i n the Durham Miners* movement, and he agreed 
to review the award a f t e r i t had operated f o r twelve weeks. However, at an 
informal meeting between John Forman, the Umpire, Mr. G i l c h r i s t , the Chopwell 
Viewer and Mr. Mackay the men's a r b i t r a t o r , G i l c h r i s t was informed that no 
were ( 5 4 ) 
ground would be given by the men, who prepared to get t h e i r way. ' At the 
same time the men prevented volunteers from working i n the Three - Quarters seam, 
at terms agreed upon p r i o r to the award. 
The matter had now developed into a serious dispute; the miners were 
adamant about maintaining the Award rates, whilst the Company claimed that the 
(55) 
Award put r t at a grave competitive disadvantage with neighbouring c o l l i e r i e s . ' 
Mr. Logan recommended the closing down of operations at Chopwell, and the Board 
agreed even though the dispute might have imperilled labour relations at the 
(56) 
Company's other p i t s . ' So began the strike/lock-out which lasted f o r 
ninety-nine days. The Company offered a r b i t r a t i o n and withdrew t h e i r notice, but 
the men remained determined to maintain Porman1s Award. The f i r m even offered 
to continue working the c o l l i e r y at the exi s t i n g rates whilst the a r b i t r a t i o n 
was being proceeded with, so that i t could at least take advantage of the r i s i n g 
t i d e of optimism i n the coal trade, but the men were either unaware of such an 
(53) Directors' Minute. 7 September 1897, p.205. (DCRO : D/CO/37). 
(54) Directors' Minute, 8 March I 8 9 8 , pp. 9-10. (DCRO : D/CO/38). 
(55) Directors' Minute. 3 May l898,pp .25-26. (DCRO : D/CO/38). 
(56) Directors' Minute. 14 A p r i l I 8 9 8 , p . l 8 . (DCRO : D/CO/38). 
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o f f e r , or suspected treachery. Staying out was c e r t a i n l y a s a c r i f i c e 
on the men's part f o r s t r i k e pay amounted to only 10s.Od per week, plus 
IsOd per c h i l d per week, and a further ls.2d a week from miscellaneous 
contributions. This compared very unfavourably with the 6s.Od per day 
earned by the men i n 1897• 
F i n a l l y on 6 September the men conceded, returning to work on terms 
offered by Wm. Logan and accepting an a r b i t r a t i o n , but the acrimony between 
the two sides continued through the a r b i t r a t i o n , the men making new demands 
one a f t e r another. I t soon became clear that the a r b i t r a t o r s would not agree 
and so the men nominated Thomas Lambert, a Gateshead s o l i c i t o r , as the 
Umpire; Logan had no reasonable grounds f o r objection. F i n a l l y on 20 
January 1899 an acceptable settlement was proposed by the Umpire. Consett 
claimed that i n some instances "the price f i x e d were what they had been 
(S8^ 
contending f o r during the l a s t twelve months." ' There was no recorded 
disagreement about the Award from the men, but af t e r such a protracted struggle 
they cannot have been overwhelmingly happy-y, but since Lambert was t h e i r choice, 
they had no grounds f o r complaint, and continued resistance would probably 
have aroused the h o s t i l i t y and withdrawal of support by the Durham Miners' 
Association. 
(57) Directors' Minute. 24 June I898, pp.33-34.(DCRO : D/CO/38). 
(58) Directors' Minute. 24 January I899, p.86.(DCRO : D/CO/38). 
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TABLE V.13. 
Awards at Chopwell 1897 and 1899 
EL TN 1 Price Stone Coal _. rt , „ Award Date , „ Five Quarters Townley Seam Seam 
Forman 2/ll/l897 14s. Od p.sc. 17s. Od p.sc 15s. Od p.sc 
Lambert 20/l/l899 9s. 3d p.sc. 9s. 9d p.sc 9s. 4d p.sc 
a. Price per score 
Source : Awards and Agreements :Chopwell Co l l i e r y . (DCRO : N.C.B. Deposit.) 
This bad s t a r t probably ensured a receptive audience f o r the more 
m i l i t a n t a c t i v i s t s . There were further disputes at Chopwell i n 1899> 
1904 and 1910-13, culminating i n a seventeen day stoppage during 1913.^°^ 
The f i n a l dispute at Chopwell i l l u s t r a t e s the depth to which labour 
relations at the Col l i e r y had sunk. The o r i g i n a l cause of the dispute was a 
confrontation between two groups of workmen over which conveyor they would 
work. However, when the men came out, i t transpired that numerous grievances 
had arisen. The men claimed that Harry Imrie, the Chopwell manager, had 
t r i e d to " f i l c h a l l the privileges from us that we have had outside of 
( 6 l ) 
any agreements."v ' The Consett Board, however, backed up Imrie and t o l d 
the men that they should return to work andjsettle the dispute through the 
normal channels. 
(60) "Returns of Stoppages Caused by Disputes with Workmen," National Coal 
Board S t a t i s t i c a l Returns. (DCRO : N.C.B. Deposit.). 
(61) Directors' Minute. 2 December 1913, pp.109 - 110. (DCRO : D/CO/43). 
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Imrie was generally well respected by the men, more so than the under-
managers, many of whom had not got t h e i r ' t i c k e t ' ( q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ) . W i l l 
Lawther's own opinion was that Imrie l a i d the foundations f o r the men's 
radicalism by an enlightened approach to dealing with labour. For instance 
Imrie had agreed with the men that they should have control over house 
(62) 
a l l o c a t i o n , and granted them the power, a rare p r i v i l e g e . 
Apart from Chopwell the only other strikes to seriously a f f e c t Consett 
were the general County wide strikes i n I 8 7 9 , 1892, 1910 and 1912. The f i r s t 
County s t r i k e i n 1879 was brought about by the Durham Coal Owners' Association' 
refusal to renew the s l i d i n g scale subject to an 'open a r b i t r a t i o n , ' i n spite 
of the e f f o r t s by David Dale and J.W. Pease to persuade them otherwise. 
The Owners demanded a 15$ reduction on the rates of underground labour, and 10$ 
f o r surface labour. At f i r s t some of the Consett C o l l i e r i e s which were 
u n a f f i l i a t e d to the union seemed prepared to accept the terms, but there was 
a change of heart and a l l the men came out, unionists and non-unionists, 
even the men at Iveston who had been i n open dispute with the u n i o n . T h i s 
led to an immediate curtailment of operations i n the ironworks, and4?umours 
became r i f e that Jenkins was preparing to bring i n 300 'scab' labourers from 
W a l e s T h e r e was l i t t l e foundation f o r such fears because of the influence 
of David Dale. 
(62) An Interview with Sir William Lawther, 31 May 1972. 
(63) Durham Chronicle, 2 May I 8 7 9 , p.8. 
(64) Consett Guardian, 11 A p r i l I 8 7 9 . 
(65) I b i d . 
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The 1879 s t r i k e was brought to an end when the Owners accepted 
a r b i t r a t i o n , a v i c t o r y f o r the persistence of Dale, Pease and Wm. Crawford, 
the Miners' leader. Nevertheless the men returned to work at a reduction, 
though i t was not as severe as the Owners had o r i g i n a l l y proposed, the 
underground workers' rates being reduced by 8f$ and the surfacemen's by 6f#. 
The s t r i k e had lasted six weeks, and Consett had to damp down the 
(66) 
blastfurnaces f o r the l a s t month/ 1 However, the most l a s t i n g repercussion 
was probably the co-operation of the Consett pitmen with the County union, 
thus destroying any base f o r the exploitation of labour at Consett. 
The stoppage i n I892 had similar o r i g i n s ; an attempted reduction of 
wages by the Durham Coal Owners' Association emphatically refused by the 
mineworkers. This time however, i t was the men who took the intransigent 
position r e j e c t i n g a modified reduction, and a r b i t r a t i o n . Consett was better 
prepared, having put 50,000 tons of coal to stock, s u f f i c i e n t to keep 
the ironworks going f o r three months i f the blastfurnaces were -damped down 
to h a l f b l a s t / 6 7 ^ 
The coal stocks at Consett proved to be one of the most troublesome areas 
during the s t r i k e . A large contingent of police had to be moved to Consett 
to give protection to those men employed i n moving coal from stock. Jenkins 
attacked the picketing of the miners b i t t e r l y , i n a l e t t e r to David Dale. 
"They (the police) are completely inadequate to cope with the 
present emergency, and i t would seem to me that at places similar 
to Consett where legitimate stocks of coal are held f o r consumption 
by peaceable men who have nothing to do with the Strike the proper plan 
would be to get the strongest possible legal force either a troop of 
(-66) Consett Guardian, 25 A p r i l I879. 
(67) Durham Chronicle, 18 March 1892. 
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dragoons o r of i n f a n t r y t o check t h i s barbarous progress. I t i s 
monstrous t h a t w h i l e we have coal on our own premises here ready t o 
be tr a n s p o r t e d i n t o m i l l s we are debarred by a l o t of men l i k e barbarians . 
( 6B) 
p e l t i n g stones &c. from doing t h i s . " 
That the a c t i v i t y o f the Company and the p i c k e t i n g d i d not lead to lo n g 
term d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s a t Consett, may be due to the f a c t 
t h a t some of the more m i l i t a n t p i c k e t i n g was done by men from Watson's 
C o l l i e r i e s / 6 9 ^  
As the s t r i k e dragged on i n t o May the Owners pressed f o r an even l a r g e r 
r e d u c t i o n of 13-2$ and as the intransigence of the men melted, the bloody-
mindedness of the Owners i n c r e a s e d . N e w s p a p e r r e p o r t s t h a t Consett 
would accept a r e t u r n t o work on the Owners' terms were denied by Jenkins, who 
(71) 
thought the r e p o r t i r r e s p o n s i b l e . ' The dispute was f i n a l l y resolved by 
the i n t e r v e n t i o n of the Bishop of Durham, who f e l t the Owners had gone too f a r 
w i t h t h e i r demands, His i n f l u e n c e p r e v a i l e d and theirmen r e t u r n e d to work a t a 
10$ r e d u c t i o n on the 7 June. 
The s t r i k e had several e f f e c t s upon Consett; most obviously i t d i s r u p t e d 
operations i n the ironworks through the ::damping down of the b l a s t f u r n a c e s . 
E f f o r t s t o import p i g i r o n from Maryport proved a b o r t i v e because of the poor 
(72) 
q u a l i t y of the metal. ' The Company had to bear the cost of l o d g i n g and fe e d i n g 
(73) 
the immigrant p o l i c e detachments. ' The i n t e r r u p t i o n o f work a t the coke ovens 
(68) Wm. Jenkins t o D. Dale, 21 March I892. (DCRO : D/CO/80). 
(69) Wm. Jenkins t o D. Dale, 28 A p r i l 1892. (DCRO : D/CO/80). 
(70) The Federation Board were prepared to accept a 10$ r e d u c t i o n but the Owners 
held out f o r 13^$. Durham Chronicle. 27 May 1892. 
(71) Newcastle Chronicle. 24 May 1892; Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 24 May 1392. 
tDCRO : D/CO/81J. 
(72) Durham Chronicle, 20 May 1892. 
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l e d t o a dispute between Consett and the Durham Cokemen's A s s o c i a t i o n , and 
f i n a l l y there was c u r t a i l m e n t of output a t Langley Park because of damage 
to the p i t through a f a i l u r e i n pumping e q u i p m e n t . C o n s e t t , however, 
does not appear to have s u f f e r e d from the p o s t - s t r i k e disputes about re-employment, 
which plagued some c o l l i e r i e s . Bolckow Vaughan s u f f e r e d p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h i s 
(75) 
respect. i J I From I892-I898 Consett's p i t s were f r e e from stoppages caused 
by labour d i s p u t e s . 
The 1879 a n d 1892 disputes had been i n t i m a t e l y connected w i t h the 
customary framework of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i n Durham, t h a t i s the s l i d i n g 
scale and the p r i n c i p l e o f a r b i t r a t i o n . The two s t r i k e s i n 1910 and 1912 
r e f l e c t acceptance by the County A s s o c i a t i o n of the p o l i c i e s o f the Miner's 
Federation of Great B r i t a i n . The 1910 stoppage was caused by grass-root 
resentment about the new three s h i f t system introduced t o f a c i l i t a t e e f f i c i e n t 
working under the % g h t Hours Act. At Consett, only the 'Home C o l l i e r i e s ' came 
out on s t r i k e , a t the others the hewers' hours were unchanged and the p u t t e r s were 
prepared t o work the system a f t e r being granted an advance i n t h e i r piece r a t e . 
At Chopwell the Company granted a f u r t h e r concession of no r a t e reductions f o r 
one year. Consett put the blame f o r the stoppage f a i r l y and squarely upon the 
shoulders of the union executive who f a i l e d t o r e f e r the matter, f o r general 
(76) 
consent, t o the men. ' The Durham Miners' A s s o c i a t i o n had agreed terms f o r 
working the mines w i t h the Owners on 13 December 1909t but they were not 
approved by the lodge. 
The eventual s o l u t i o n of the Eight Hour question enabled the D.M.A. and 
M.F.G.B. t o move cl o s e r together and devote t h e i r energies t o pressing f o r a 
(74) Win. Jenkins t o P.Williams, 10 June, 1892. (DCRO : D/C0/8l). 
(75) Durham Chronicle, 17 June 1892. 
(76) N a t i o n a l Coal Board S t a t i s t i c a l Returns, Nos. 602 & 613. (DCRO : N.C.B. 
Deposits). 
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mininpra wage. At the "beginning of 1912 the Company began t o consider the 
miners demand f o r a Minimum V/age and " i t was decided t h a t the a c t i o n o f the 
Coal Trade of Durham i n r e s i s t i n g the demand f o r a Minimum Wage made by the 
(77) Miners g e n e r a l l y be supported by t h i s Company to the extent of a s t r i k e " ' 
Unrest had been growing i n the p i t s d u r i n g 1911, e s p e c i a l l y a t Langley Park, 
and there g e n e r a l l y appears to have been a d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n labour r e l a t i o n s 
a t Consett 1s c o l l i e r i e s , beginning d u r i n g the 1908 depression. The miners 
a t the 'Home C o l l i e r i e s 1 had grown r e s e n t f u l o f t h e i r i r r e g u l a r 
v/orking when the s t e e l trade was i n r e c e s s i o n . ' The new system of s h i f t s 
introduced a t the beginning of 1910 f u r t h e r a l i e n a t e d labour and management. 
The Company's p i t s were plagued d u r i n g 1910-1912 w i t h a se r i e s of p e t t y 
stoppages, the nature of which seems t o confirm the impression of worsening 
r e l a t i o n s . This t r e n d culminated w i t h the General Coal S t r i k e between 29 
February and . 10 A p r i l 1912, when a l l the Company's c o l l i e r i e s were stopped. 
The miners were f o r once successful, and Consett s u f f e r e d a sharp u p t u r n i n 
labour costs d u r i n g 1913 and 1914» when the Minimum v/age was introduced. 
For t h e i r p a r t the management were t a k i n g an ever more i n t r a n s i g e n t 
p o s i t i o n against labour, making anonymous c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o the Trades Disputes 
(79) 
Act Reform League. The harmonious labour r e l a t i o n s which had once e x i s t e d 
w i t h i n the Consett c o l l i e r i e s had, by the outbreak of the Great War, 
evaporated. The s p i r i t o f co-operation had f i n a l l y passed away.from Consett 
w i t h the death o f David Dale i n 1906, and the Company s u f f e r e d the d i s r u p t i o n 
of i n d u s t r i a l s t r i f e as a c u t e l y as any other f i r m s . 
(77) D i r e c t o r ' s Minute, 19 January 1912. p.208. (DCRO : D/C0742)T 
(78) D i r e c t o r s ' Minute, 8 June 1909. pp.204-205. (DCRO : D/CO/41). 
(79) D i r e c t o r s ' Minute. 19 January 1912. p.206. (DCRO : D/CO/42). 
(80J Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 25 January 1892. (DCRO : D/CO/79). When i t was 
decided to close the Iv e s t o n p i t , Jenkins proposed to keep the p i t a t 
f u l l c apacity u n t i l the t e r m i n a t i o n of n o t i c e , so t h a t the men would expect 
a f u l l wage. Then by w i t h - h o l d i n g the wage, pressure could be exerted 
upon the men t o vacate t h e i r cottages. Dale advised against such a course 
and persuaded Jenkins of the f o l l y . 
" I confess I f e e l r a t h e r as you do t h a t f o r the sake of 3s.Od per week 
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Conclusion 
Consett had no apparent monopsony power i n the market f o r the major 
inp u t i n coal-mining,lahour. It- d i d have a s t r o n g b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n 
i n the a c q u i s i t i o n of r o y a l t i e s i n North west Durham. Labour was i n f a c t scarce, 
e s p e c i a l l y i n the boom years 1870-73 and 1899-1900 when the Company^ 
remoter c o l l i e r i e s had, i n common w i t h other c o l l i e r i e s i n the area, 
d i f f i c u l t y i n a t t r a c t i n g labour. 
Throughout the p e r i o d there was an upward tre n d i n labour costs, 
caused mainly through f a l l i n g labour p r o d u c t i v i t y , and probably i n the 
e a r l i e s t stages by spreading u n i o n i s a t i o n . However, there are no conclusive 
grounds t o support Professor Taylor's hypothesis t h a t the decline was g r e a t e r 
than could be expected by the operation of d i m i n i s h i n g r e t u r n s . The higher 
costs were made pos s i b l e by the r i s i n g demand of the market, and growing sales 
themselves brought the marginal seams i n t o production a t an i n c r e a s i n g r a t e . 
By 1914 approximately s i x t y m i l l i o n tons had been worked out of Consett's 
r o y a l t i e s . I n I867 W.H. Hedley had estimated t h i r t y m i l l i o n s tons of 
e a s i l y worked coal and twenty-six m i l l i o n tons i n more d i f f i c u l t seams. 
Twenty-two years l a t e r i n I889 he estimated there was a f u r t h e r twenty seven 
m i l l i o n tons i n the Chopwell Estate and i t s a d j o i n i n g r o y a l t i e s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y 
there were no records of the extent of Langley Parks coal reserves. However, 
i t i s c l e a r t h a t by 1914 Consett had worked out a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t of i t s 
estimated coal reserves, and presumably l i k e Bolckow Vaughan i t was f i n d i n g 
(81) 
the seams more d i f f i c u l t t o work. ' Geological c o n d i t i o n s r a t h e r than an 
u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o innovate, or d e l i b e r a t e r e s t r i c t i o n by the labour f o r c e , 
(80 cont.) or so per house i t i s h a r d l y worth while b r i n g i n g about 
an amount of h o s t i l i t y t h a t w i l l i n the end probably do us no good. 
"Of course-we must aim a t r e c o v e r i n g possession of the houses, 
but t h i s need not be done by needless f o r c e . " 
(81) c f . page 162 , Table V.7. 
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except p o s s i b l y d u r i n g the u n s e t t l e d years 1910-1912, d i c t a t e d the l e v e l 
of labour p r o d u c t i v i t y . By 1914 the mines had been e x t e n s i v e l y e l e c t r i f i e d , 
and the Company had i t s own g r i d system, i n some cases supplementing the 
supply of the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . Only i n the adoption of hy-product ovens can 
the clues of the receding d r i v e of Edwardian management by detected. I n t h i s 
instance the market f o r coke had s t a b i l i s e d w i t h l i t t l e prospect of any 
f u r t h e r r a p i d growth. 
Although the Company's record of in n o v a t i o n was f a r from e x c i t i n g , i t 
was adequate, "being tempered more by the c a r e f u l d e l i b e r a t i o n s of a w e l l 
e s t a b l i s h e d management s t r u c t u r e , than by the adventurous e x p l o i t a t i o n of 
new avenues by an entrepreneur. 
The one area i n which there was a c l e a r d e t e r i o r a t i o n a f t e r 1900 
was i n the conduct of labour r e l a t i o n s . This was i n p a r t due t o the growing 
m i l i t a n c y of the miners' union, but also t o more s p e c i f i c f a c t o r s such as 
unhappy, "labour-management r e l a t i o n s a t Chopwell from 18971 inexperienced 
a s s i s t a n t managers, and l a r g e bodies of men thrown together i n new communities. 
However, o v e r a l l the C o l l i e r y operations were conducted w i t h 
a d r o i t n e s s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the a c q u i s i t i o n of r o y a l t i e s which l a i d the 
foundation f o r the growth of coal sales, and t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n t o Ihe 
o v e r a l l p r o f i t a b i l i t y o f the Company. 
The supply o f management personnel was not scarce or inexperienced 
since the c o a l f i e l d was w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d , and had a s e l f - g e n e r a t i n g 
class o f c o l l i e r y viewers and engineers. Indeed, Consett never had to go 
beyond the boundaries of the c o a l f i e l d t o r e c r u i t c o l l i e r y managers, i n 
f a c t the Company r a r e l y went beyond t h e i r own personnel t o f i l l senior 
vacanies. Mr. Palmer was the l a s t s e n i o r appointment i n the c o l l i e r y 
d i v i s i o n , f o r almost from the outsell; promotion t o the p o s i t i o n of Chief Viewer 
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was from w i t h i n , W.H. Hedley being succeeded by Wm. Logan, then Palmer and 
f i n a l l y i n 1910, K i r k u p . I n the beginning the Company also appointed a 
Mineral Agent, Edward Boyd, who also h e l d a s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n w i t h the 
E c c l e s i a s t i c a l Commissioners. However a f t e r h i s death i n I889, 
t h i s r o l e seems t o have been undertaken by the Chief Viewer. By t h a t time 
most n e g o t i a t i o n s about minerals were f o r the renewal o f leases. 
During t h e i r mineral expansion p e r i o d the D i r e c t o r s also had recourse t o a 
consu l t a n t , Win. Armstrong, who was f r e q u e n t l y c a l l e d i n on n e g o t i a t i o n s d u r i n g 
the 1860«s and 1870's. 
Besides t h e i r executive management the Company1s Board of D i r e c t o r s 
was r i c h i n men w i t h experience of the Coal Trade. Needless to say foremost 
amongst them was David Dale, whose p o s i t i o n o f Chairman of Consett, Managing 
D i r e c t o r o f Pease and Partn e r s , and a D i r e c t o r of the North Eastern 
Railway gave him access t o a wide range of i n f o r m a t i o n oh the Northern coal 
tr a d e . Numerous other D i r e c t o r s also had i n t e r e s t s i n other c o l l i e r y concerns. 
On the lower echelons of management were the competent i f unimaginative 
c o l l i e r y managers, and t h e i r a s s i s t a n t s . These men formed the stratum o f 
middle-management and were f o r the most p a r t u n l i k e l y t o r i s e any f u r t h e r ; 
they had reached the l i m i t s of t h e i r a b i l i t y . Probably because of t h i s 
they were conservative and r i s k minimizers i n the decisions they took and the 
advice they gave. Wm. Jenkins observed i n a l e t t e r t o David Dale: 
"There i s however a good deal of conservative f e e l i n g on the p a r t 
of the c o l l i e r y managers i n the way of unw i l l i n g n e s s t o attempt a n y t h i n g 
new...."<83> 
(82) See pages 314.315. 
(83) Wm. Jenkins t o D. Dale, 6 March I 8 9 I . (DCRO : D/CO/75). 
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Caution became the keynote of Consett 1 s C o l l i e r y management as time 
passed by, and pr o f i t s were made through the exploitation of the extended 
r o y a l t i e s acquired by the enterprise of the Directors i n the 'seventies 
and 'eighties. 
fSTAPTOER : VI 
A Description of the Consett Iron Company's Iron and 
S t e e l Making 
The Consett Iron Company, which under Vice-Chancellor Kindersley's 
order of 18 March 1864 bought up the properties of the Derwent and Consett 
Iron Company» found i t s e l f the owners of a plant which i n terms of 
physical extent was the l a r g e s t i n England; hut the interrupted operations 
between 1857-1864 obviously took t h e i r t o l l on the e f f i c i e n c y of the works. 
Though the expectations expressed i n the new Company's Prospectus were not 
unreasonable/ 1^ the production of 150,000 tons of pig iron i n a year was not 
achieved u n t i l 1881 when the blastfurnace plant had been completely renewed. 
The s i m i l a r l y sanguine expectations for the production of fini s h e d iron were not 
f u l f i l l e d u n t i l 1870, when j u s t over 57»000 tons were produced. 
The Prospectus also spoke of the Company's reputation i n the "most 
(2) 
important and extending branch - plates for iron shipbuilding. 1 1 v ' However 
during the f i r s t dozen years of the new firm's existence the production of iron 
r a i l s remained as important as plates, as Consett was caught up i n the boom i n 
railway building which accompanied the cessation of the American C i v i l War and 
the Franco-Prussian War. With the collapse of the iro n r a i l trade i n 1876 Consett 
turned the whole of . i t s iron-making f a c i l i t i e s over to the production of iro n 
plates, and from then up to 1914 the metallurgical side of the business was 
intimately bound up with the fortunes of shipping and shipbuilding. 
(1) Shipperdson MSS, No. 1729.(University of Durham, Department of Paleography). 
(2) I b i d . 
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The capacity of the Consett Iron Company continued to expand; by 1883 the blast 
furnaces were capable of producing over 200,000 tons of pig iron annually, when 
a l l were i n b l a s t together, and by the turn of the century t h i s had been 
raised to almost 250000 tons per annum. The erection of a new modern 'type' of 
furnace i n 1908-09 eventually put the firm's pig iron capacity beyond 250,000 
tons. 
The puddling capacity grew to a peak of over 110,000 tons i n 1881, where-
a f t e r i t l e v e l l e d off and f i n a l l y began to t a i l off i n the l a t e 1880's as 
the firm changed over to the production of s t e e l . Iron plate production followed 
a s i m i l a r course a f t e r achieving a peak of 86,019 tons i n 1881. 
The f i r s t output of s t e e l i n 1883 was only 393 tons; but by 1888 over 
100,000 tons was being produced annually, and by 1894 t h i s had been doubled to 
200,000 tons. The 300,000 ton mark was eventually achieved i n 1904, The output 
of s t e e l was at f i r s t devoted s o l e l y to plate production, but then i n 1893 an 
Angle M i l l was opened f o r the r o l l i n g of sectional and s t r u c t u r a l s t e e l . After 
t h i s the output of s t e e l was s p l i t i n the r a t i o of 2:1 between plates and angles. 
The course of production at Consett f e l l into four phases of development. 
The f i r s t w as characterised by self-doubt and examination caused by the obsolete 
plant which made economical operations most d i f f i c u l t . This period ended i n 
1870 with the departure of Jonathan Friestman as resident Managing Director, and 
hi s replacement by William Jenkins. 
The v i a b i l i t y of Consett ironworks having a t l e a s t been t h e o r e t i c a l l y 
established, Jenkins began to convert the theory into practice. However the 
second phase between I87O-I886 was no l e s s trying, for the Company w a s confronted 
by rapid technical change which f i r s t destroyed the economic f e a s i b i l i t y of the 
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i r o n r a i l trade, and then threatened to undermine Gonsett's staple trade, plate 
manufacture. This change was the substitution of s t e e l f o r iron. I n the ear l y 
1880's the Company rose to the challenge, and by 1886, s t e e l had established i t s 
ascendancy overiron a t Consett. 
The t h i r d phase was one of intensive investment a c t i v i t y i n new s t e e l 
producing plant, and also i n consolidating the Company's position as a 
supplier of shipbuilding materials. The r o l l i n g m i l l s were remodelled to handle 
s t e e l , and new melting furnaces were b u i l t , and f i n a l l y an Angle M i l l was 
added. This period terminated i n 1894 with William Jenkins' retirement from 
management. The f e v e r i s h a c t i v i t y between 1886-1894 had two repercussions upon 
the future of Consett. Most immediately i t took a heavy t o l l upon senior 
management, which meant the Company entered the f i n a l phase with new men a t 
the helm. Less obvious a t f i r s t was the f i n a l i t y of t h i s investment, f or 
Consett had exhausted i t s reserves of space for expansion. Future expansion 
of output was only possible by the r a d i c a l reconstruction of the plant. 
F i n a l l y between 1894-1914 the Company was caught up i n the euphoria 
of the Edwardian Decade* I t s pr o f i t s were unprecedented but t h e i r 
plant was deteriorating. The constraint upon s p a t i a l expansion posed the 
problematic choice between foregone p r o f i t s and reconstruction. Renewal was 
either postponed or ca r r i e d out piecemeal, so that the iron and s t e e l plant of 
Consett must have been a very sorry sight by 1914* 
1864-1872: The emergence of the Consett Iron Company. 
When the property of the Derwent and Consett Iron Company was taken over 
i n I864 i t was proposed that the Bishopswearmouth works should be disposed of. 
Orig i n a l l y Vice-Chancellor Kindemley's Order permitting the sale of the 
Consett works excluded Bishopwearmouth Iron Works, which were under offer of 
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s a l e . ^ However i t i s not c l e a r whether t h i s Bale was ever car r i e d through, 
for a year l a t e r , i n 1865, the Consett Directors decided to offer the Works 
for s a l e . ^ The l o g i c behind the ownership of Bishopswearmouth by the 
Consett Works had always been doubtful and i t s disposal i n 1865 to Henry Ritson 
for £13,000 was advantageous i n that i t provided Consett with c a p i t a l to make 
(5) 
improvements i n i t s North-West Durham works. 
The f i r s t a l t e r a t i o n s to the plant were proposed i n August 1864 when the 
expediency of expanding forge capacity a t Consett, to bring i t into l i n f f i t h that 
of the F i n i s h i n g Mills-, was agreed upon. By December i t had been decided to 
purchase two horizontal high pressure engines from Messrs. Cowan, Sheldon & Co. 
for ,£760, and two 3 ton hammers from Tannett, Walker & Co. of Leeds for £844• 
This was the only major improvement undertaken i n the f i r s t year of the firms l i f e 
but there were portents of future developments to be found. At the beginning of 
I865 Jonathan Priestman agreed to aipply pig iron to the nearby Shotley Bridge 
Iron Company, Ltd. This company had no b l a s t furnace capacity but did 
have a medium s i z e forge and f i n i s h i n g department, and some coal r o y a l t i e s . 
Whilst Consett unloaded Bishopwearmouth i t was eminently sensible that i t 
should merge with the Sho.tley Bridge Ir o n Company. The f i r s t move for an 
(9) 
amalgamation was made by the Shotley Bridge Directors i n mid 1866. ' This was 
probably i n i t i a t e d by David Bale who was a director of both companies, and 
e f f e c t i v e l y Managing Director of both. 
(3) Vice-Chancellor Kindersley's Order, 18 March 1864, i n Directors' Minute, 26 
March 1864. (DCRO : D/CO/29). 
(4) Directors' Minute. 11 March 1865.(3. oc. c i t . ) . 
(5) Directors' Minute. 2 September I865. ( l o c . i c i t . ) . 
(6) Directors' Minute 6 August 1864. ( l o c . c i t . ) . 
(7; Directors' Minute. 10 December I864. (J.oc.cit.); 
(8; Directors' Minute. 11 February 1865.(loc.it.). 
(9) Shotley Bridge Iron Company Ltd., P i r o t o r s ' Minute. 25 July 1866. (DCRO:D/CO/0 
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The Shotley Bridge Iron Company had been formed on the 29 July 1863 when 
i t took over the works and property formerly belonging to J.B. Richardson from 
the Trustees. I t s ori g i n was not very different from Consett's, and i t had as 
i t s Directors some of the North's leading ironmasters, David Dale, James 
Morrison and Isaac Wilson. Under the direction of Dale the firm set about 
expanding i t s capacity and improving the quality of the plant. The bo i l e r s 
were waste heat f i r e d and patent hammers had replaced the cruder helves 
i n a l l the Shotley Bridge Company expended £ 2 1 , 4 2 0 . 0 4 s . 6 d . on c a p i t a l plant 
between 1863-66. I n addition, i n 1864 the company had entered into an agreement 
with Messrs. J . Backhouse & Co., the bankers, to accjuire the East Consett 
Estate and the Royalties of Jonathan Richardson. The Bank would pay Richardson 
£ 3 0 , 0 0 0 and then r e s e l l them to the Shotley Bridge Company at the same price, to 
(12) 
be paid with 5$ i n t e r e s t by in s t a l m e n t s of £ 1 , 5 0 0 per h a l f year. ' 
During the f i r s t couple of years the firm prospered on an upturn i n trade 
and an absence of competition, there being only two other firms making iron plates 
i n the North of England. The summer of 1864 brought about a break i n the 
prosperity: the price of plates f e l l , and Shotley Bridge was stuck with f i x e d 
price raw material contracts. What p r o f i t s were made, were cut down by a spate 
of bad debts, and the imprudent d i s t r i b u t i o n of pr o f i t s i n previous years 
l e f t the firm without any r e s e r v e s . 1 8 6 5 - ^ 6 proved to be no better and t h i s 
convinced the Shotley Bridge Board of the a d v i s a b i l i t y of a mergerwith the 
Consett Iron Company, the alternative of a large c a p i t a l infusion to extensively 
expand the works being considered unwise. Since the formation of the Company 
(10) Shotley Bridge Iron Company Ltd., General Meeting Minute, 29 J u l y 1863. 
(DCRO : D/CO/2). 
(11) A helve was a heavy cast iron hammer, pivoted at one end, l i f t e d by cams 
and allowed to f a l l by gravity. W.K.V. Gale, The Iron and St e e l Industry: 
A Dictionary of Terms, (Newton Abbott 197l) p .105. 
(12) Shotley Bridge Iron Company, Ltd. Directors' Minute. 28 June 1864 
(DCRO : D/C0/I). 
(13) Shotley Bridge Iron Company, Ltd. General Meeting Minute, 7 August I 865 . 
(DCRO : D/CO/2). 
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competition i n iron plates had become intense the number of firms i n the North-
(14) 
east increasing from three to eleven. ' Isaac Wilson and James Morrison were 
appointed to produce an offer to the Consett Iron Company and carry through the 
negotiations. They valued the property a t £64,802.15s.9d which included the £30,000 
(15) 
owed to J . Backhouse and Co. but Consett was not prepared to pay so much/ ' 
and made a counter-offer at £55*000. I t was Consettkgood fortune that a buyer's 
market prevailed and the Shotley Bridge Directors were anxious to be r i d of 
the Company. Because the Directors and Edward R. Whitwell, the Secretary, held 
£8 , 4 5 5 » 1 0 s . 0 d of the £ 1 3 , 0 4 1 share c a p i t a l , they were able to carry the decision 
to s e l l a t below value. 
Consett thus aquired a very valuable addition to i t s forge and m i l l 
capacity, a l l e v i a t i n g some of the imbalance between the departments which had 
existed i n I864 . Before Shotley Bridge was aquired Jonathan Priestman was active 
i n making improvements at Consett. I n 1865 he proposed that reversing motion 
(16) 
be adopted in,the No. 4 Plate m i l l . ' The i n s t a l l a t i o n was completed by the 
end of the year, since expenditure was shown i n the Company's half-ye a r l y 
(17) 
accounts. This was before Ramsbottom i n s t a l l e d the technique at the railway 
steelworks i n Crewe, and he and Dowlais are generally considered the pioneers 
( l 8 ) 
of the technique. ' At the same time a new steam hammer was i n s t a l l e d i n No. 2 
(19) 
Forge i enabling another 7 or 8 puddling furnaces to be added. ' Six months 
l a t e r Priestman produced a plan to convert the No. 1 Plate M i l l into a Puddling 
M i l l with 20 furnaces with waste heat b o i l e r s , and a steam hammer from R. Morrison 
& Co., Jonathan Priestman was anxious that waste heat bo i l e r s should be i n s t a l l e d 
(14) Shotley Bridge Iron Company, Ltd., General Meeting Minute, An Extraordinary 
General Meeting. 8 October, 1866. (DCR0 : D/CO/2). ~~ 
(15) Directors' Minute, 1 September 1866. (DCR0 : D/CO/29). 
(16) Directors' Minute 8 A p r i l l865.Q.oc.cit.). 
(17) Directors' Minute 3 February 1866. ( l o c . c i t . ) . 
(18) A. B i r c h , The Economic History of the B r i t i s h Iron & S t e e l Industry, p. 194^-5. 
(19) Directors' Minute. 8 A p r i l l865.(loc.cit.). 
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throughout the works., replacing the labour and material intensive hand-fired 
b o i l e r s . The scale of saving was appreciable, 44 waste heat b o i l e r s , costing 
about €16,000, would save 30,000 tons of coal per annum. 
At the same time as they were overhauling t h e i r forges the Board commissioned 
Thomas Whitwell to produce a report and recommendations for the remodelling of 
the b l a s t furnace plant. This was of high p r i o r i t y since there had been 
important advances i n b l a s t furnace technology during the l a t e 1850's 
and early 1860's. Since most of Consett's plant had been l a i d out and erected i n 
the 1840's i t was rapidly made obsolete. 
The chief weaknesses of Consett's plant were, the non-utilisation of waste 
heat and gases to warm the stoves; the Player's stoves which heated the b l a s t i n 
old fashioned cast i r o n pipes; the laborious hand charging of the furnaces by 
wheeling the raw materials over gantries to the furnace tops from a ridge 
running p a r a l l e l to the row of furnaces; and f i n a l l y the small dimensions of 
(21) 
the Consett furnaces. ' 
TABLE VI.1 
The Dimension of the Consett Iron Company's Blastfurnaces i n 1866. 
Furnace Height from the Hearth to Charging Stage 
Diameter of 
the Bosh + 
Width of 
the Hearth 
I 44ft. 13ft. 4ft. 
2 44ft. 13ft. 4&ft. 
3 44ft. 13ft. 4&ft. 
4 44ft. 13ft. 4£ft. 
5 50ft ,@ 20ft. 8ft. 
6 45ft. 20ft. 8ft. 
7 45ft. 13ft. 4£ft. 
Source: "Thomas Whitwell's Recommendations", Directors' Minute, 6 January 1866. p.7' 
(DCRO : D/C.O/29). 
+ The bosh i s the part of the furnace which tapers outwards from the well or 
crucible to j o i n the stack. I t i s the widest part of the furnace. (W. . . Gale 
op.cit. p.28.) @So. 5- furnace i n process of rebuilding. 
(20) D i r e c t o r ' s MJnnta, 11 WnvnmTvaT. Iflft^Cnren . T>/nn/ooj i ^ ^ i f . 
(21) Journal of the Iron & S t e e l I n s t i t u t e , I 8 7 I i . pp. 142-144. 
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Oh Teeside the ironmasters using the l o c a l Cleveland ironstone had by the 
mid 1860's r a i s e d t h e i r furnaces to 80ft. and even 90ft. i n height and 
(22) introduced closed top furnaces so that the waste heat and gas might be u t i l i s e d . 
Whitwell however was not convinced as to the value of such high blastfurnaces to 
Consett since they made a mixed Cleveland and Hematite pig iron. At Whitehaven 
where hematite ore only was used, the furnaces were between 50-60ft. high to 
prevent fusion of the minerals t o ; the furnace l i n i n g and the choking of the 
burden which stopped the b l a s t penetrating throughout. I n view of these d i f f i c u l t -
i e s the Consett Directors opted for a compromise; they would remodel only one 
(23) 
blastfurnace, No. 5» and r a i s e i t to about 70ft. ' 
During the next 20 months progress with new technical developments a t 
Consett appears to have been slow. After the purchase of the Shotley Bridge 
works i n 1866 no further improvements or extensions were authorised i n the 
f i n i s h i n g departments by the Board, and the proposal to i n s t a l l stack (waste heat) 
b o i l e r s did not mat e r i a l i s e . I t was not a propitious time f o r c a p i t a l expenditure 
because of the prolonged Ironworkers' S t r i k e i n 1866 and the depressed condition 
of business. 
However i n August 1867 the Company lurched forward again i n the programme 
to renew i t s blastfurnace plant. No. 5 had been completed and the board 
authorised £5»950 f o r improvements to No.6. and a u x i l i a r y plant. I t s dimensions 
however were not to be f i n a l i s e d u n t i l No.5. had been reduced to 55ft. i n height, anc 
t e s t e d / 2 4 ^ 
(22) Thomas Whitwell's Recommendations, Directors' Minute. 6 January 1866, p,76. 
(DCRO : D/CO/29). 
(23) I b i d . 
(24) Directors' Minute. 21 August 1867 p.158. ( l o c . c i t . ) . 
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Thomas Whitwell was s t i l l acting i n the capacity of advisor to the 
Company, and since i t was proposed to build s i x new stoves for No.6. furnace, 
he suggested that the Consett Iron Company try a new type of stove patented by 
(25) 
himself. ' The management a t Consett were always wary about new inventions 
with grand claims, and at f i r s t were s c e p t i c a l about the Whitwell stoves, which 
at that time were only i n s t a l l e d a t Thornaby. Nevertheless Whitwell was 
anxious to get his idea accepted and offered one set of stoves to Consett 
(26) 
without charge, and any subsequent sets a t £625* 
Whilst these alterations were being made to the plant, the f i n a n c i a l 
performance was deteriorating because of losses incurred i n the manufacture of 
r a i l s and plates. For the s i x months ending 31st December 1868 £4,528.l8s.3d 
was l o s t by the ironmaking side of the business, w h i l s t £18,996.16s.3d 
p r o f i t was made on coal, coke, r o y a l t i e s and rent. There were c l e a r l y serious 
operating i n e f f i c i e n c e s i n the ironmaking departments. I n an e f f o r t to remove 
the problems the Board decided upon the d e s i r a b i l i t y of employing a p r a c t i c a l 
ironmaster to examine the manufacturing operations of the Company. David Dale had 
already secured '.the services, of such a man, Edward Williams, the General Manager 
(27) 
of Bolckow Vaughan and Co., Ltd. His report was of fundamental importance to 
the future policy of the Consett Iron Company, for i t s objective was to examine 
whether Consett was fe a s i b l e as an iron making concern or whether the firm could 
better carry on as a coal and coke producer. 
(25) Directors 1, Minute. 11 January 1868 pp.l75-176.(loc.cit.), 
(26) Directors' Minute. 18 A p r i l 1868 pp. 195-196.(loc.cit.). 
Whitwell had to pay £250 per set of stoves to the holders of Cowpers and 
Siemens patents. He priced the units a t £500, and since the Consett plans 
were f o r f i v e furnaces the cost of stoves would be £2,500. The set offered 
to Consett were thus on a free t r i a l basis since the Company would pay 
£2,500 for a complete system of Whitwell Stoves. 
(27) Directors' Minute, 6 February l869.(loc.cit.). 
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Williams produced his f i r s t report i n March and dispelled at.once any notion 
of Consett as a coal vendor only. I f Consett relinquished the ironworks i t was 
unlikely that anyone else would buy them and thus the Company would lose i t s 
most important market for coal and coke. I f this happened i t was not well placed 
to compete on the open markets, and Consett's lower grade coke and ordinary coal 
would not find ready marke-fein Darlington and Middlesbrough. For this reason 
Williams f e l t i t was desirable to continue the ironworks since i f the Company 
charged i t s coal at 4s«2d per ton and coke at 9s.Od per ton i t would make a 
f a i r overall p r o f i t , even i f there were a small loss i n ironmaking. Williams' 
second conclusion, was that the ironworks were grossly inefficient, but that 
i f properly managed they ought to be able to produce wrought iron r a i l s and 
plates at less than the average for Cleveland and Durham works. 
Williams confirmed the calculations of the founders of the Derwent Iron 
Company that the works were not well located to compete i n the sale of pig.iron 
with the Cleveland and West Coast makers. The firm ought to have been able 
to produce a goodish quality pig iron at a moderate cost, but this was thwarted 
by the obsolescent nature of the blastfurnaces and stoves. They were hopelessly 
wasteful of fuel, using as much as 26 cwts. of coke and 10 cwts. of coal per 
ton of pig iron, whilst i n Cleveland the best practice adopted by the makers 
had reduced the consumption of coke to about 21owts of coke and barely any coal. 
The reduction i n the use of coal was achieved by the u t i l i s a t i o n of waste heat 
and gas from the blastfurnaces; only a l i t t l e coal was necessary for the 
calcining of ironstone. In money terms this was adding 4s.4d per ton to the 
(29} 
cost of making pig iron. ' 
(28) Edwards Williams F i r s t Report, Directors' Minute, 13 March 1869.(loc.cit). 
(29) I b i d . 
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In Williams' view No.5» blastfurnace was of the correct design, and he 
approved of the Whitwell stoves, i f only because they were superior to the ones 
currently at work. He also recommended the installation of Lancashire or 
Cornish boilers which would eliminate the need for coal. I f the cost of 
pig iron were reduced, then Williams believed that Consett should be able to 
produce a puddled bar as cheaply as anywhere i n England. Before this end 
could be achieved i t would be necessary to reduce the coal consumption of the 
Puddling Mills by as much as 25%. Consett w as indulging i n one of the cardinal 
sins of the ironmaster, producing a quality of metal which was unnecessarily 
better than was required, and this had pushed up f e t t l i n g and labour costs. 
I f these improvements were undertaken Consett would become a viable 
integrated works yielding a very good return on the moderate capital outlay. 
> 
Such was Williams prophetic conclusion. This attack on inefficiency by an outsider 
galvanised the Board into action; they immediately authorised the reconstruction 
of a third blastfurnace and asked Edward Williams to produce more detailed 
recommendations on certain aspects of the Company's a c t i v i t i e s / ^ 
In his second report he was more sanguine about the production of pig iron^ 
estimating that Consett could probably produce pig iron more cheaply than the 
weekly output of 
Cleveland and most favoured Welsh makers, i f for aj13,350 tons of pig they used 
m i l l cinder, Cleveland and Hematite ores i n the ratio of 12:20:25. He was 
however more explicit about the inefficiences i n the forge and r o l l i n g mills: i n 
the former. 31cwts. of coal were used per ton of puddled bar, f u l l y 10 cwts. i n 
excess of the optimum; f e t t l i n g was three times the acceptable level because of 
(30) I b i d . 
(31) Directors' Minute. 3 April l869.(loc.cit.). 
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the production of the unnecessarily high quality iron; and labour costs of 
l6s.2d were f u l l y 4s.Od per ton above the best practice. In the r o l l i n g mills 
the piles were being hammered before blooming, a process which yielded no 
advantage. Williams was also c r i t i c a l of the process introduced by James 
(32) 
Radcliffe, the Assistant Manager, since i t was neither economical nor superior. 
The introduction of an out side authority was i n i t s e l f an undermining 
influence upon the resident management at Cbnsett, but Edward Williams* f i n a l 
conclusion l e f t no doubt as to his opinion of the management: 
" I am however convinced that there should be added to your present staff 
someone skilled i n forge and m i l l operations, and able to take a 
comprehensive practical view of both - Such a man having also notions of 
economy, would be able to correct numerous details, i n which serious loss 
is occurring to you at present. "^"^ 
Priestman was l e f t i n the unenviable position of answering the criticism, 
whilst conscious of the insecurity of his own position. His main defence 
was that Williams had i n fact examined an unrepresentative year (1867-68) when 
experiment had been going on with mixtures of ore i n the blastfurnaces. Furthermore, 
although the Cinder Pig was not approved of by Edward Williams, i t was the only 
pig iron that Consett were able to s e l l at a p r o f i t . I n the forges the cost 
of f e t t l i n g had been reduced by 25$ since 1867, but i t was l i k e l y to remain 
higher than that which Williams was accustomed to since the 'Grey Fig' 
for plates required more f e t t l i n g than the mixtures of pigs used for rail-making. 
(32) Directors' Minute. 8 May l869.-(-loo.oit.). 
(33) Edward Williams' Second Report, DirectorsV Minute, 8'May 1869. ( l o c . c i t ^ 
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The high coal consumption was due to the non-completion of the replacement 
of boilers which Friestman had recommended as a major cost reducer i n 
1865,^^ and not to the use of high quality irons. Priestman produced further 
evidence contradicting, or at least modifying Mr. Williams observations, 
but he was clearly on the defensive and concluded by being agreeable to work i n 
(35) 
conjunction with a 'more practical man'. N ' 
Williams had suggested sweeping changes and the Consett Board on balance 
accepted them, but many of them had been under consideration since 1865. I t 
i s d i f f i c u l t to lay a l l the blame for the inefficiency upon Jonathan Friestman 
because he had made positive suggestions for improvement which at best had 
been only part i a l l y implemented. Priestman however took the report as a personal 
attack and offered his resignation, as did the Assistant Manager James Radcliffe. 
The Company presumably accepted Williams* interpretation and accepted the 
resignations 
The Company immediately advertised "for a Gentleman thoroughly competent 
to undertake the Practical as well as the Commercial Management of their 
(37) 
extensive Iron Works... I , w, and received sixty-four applications. A short-list 
of half a dozen was drawn up by David Sale and John Henderson (Chairman), and 
the post was offered to William Jenkins, at a s alary of £1,500 p.a. plus £1 per 
cent on the amount paid as dividend. Though no mention of Edward Williams 
is made i n the appointment process i t seems very l i k e l y that he was consulted. 
William Jenkins, l i k e Williams came from the Dowlais works, and his daughter 
married Edward's son IlltycL , several years later. 
(34) See note (19). 
(35) Directors' Minute. 
(36) Directors' Minute. 
(37) Directors' Minute. 
22 May I869. ( l o c . c i t A 
5 June 1869,.(loc.citA 
3 July l869*(loc.cit.). 
- 201 -
The two reports of 1869 thus set the policy direction for Consett during 
the next twenty years or so. Jenkins* recommendations on the use of Cumberland 
ore increased the consumption almost immediately, eventually causing Consett 
to look to Spain for its supply. The doubts he expressed about Consett•s 
a b i l i t y to survive as a coal producer prompted the vigorous expansion of the Company 
royalties and the opening of special sale collieries at Westwood and Langley 
Park i n the 1870's^ and Garesfield and Chopwell i n the 1890's. 
The Board immediatelyspeeded up the expenditure^ reconstruction of the 
blastfurnaces, and one of Jenkin's f i r s t tasks was to report on progress. He 
recommended that the remaining 3 small furnaces be pulled down and replaced by 
two large furnaces with Whitwell stoves which had proved their efficiency at 
(38) 
Consett. ' The budget for the completion of the programme was £40,000, 
but certain important ancillaries were necessary, such as calcining k i l n s , new 
locos, railway lines and slag roads, and these increased the expenditure by an 
(39) 
estimated £19,500* Jenkins sought Williams' o p i n i o n , " and he recommended 
John Row, an engineer who was later employed by Consett and designed the 
staithes and loading f a c i l i t i e s for the Orconera Company i n Spain. Roe revised 
Jenkins' estimate upwards, but stated that "the contemplated expenditure is 
l i k e l y to effect a considerable ultimate s a v i n g " T h e locomotives would 
replace horsedrawn carts i n removing the slag, enabling a reduction i n costs through 
saving fodder and labour. 
The business of the Company was increasing so quickly during the early l870's 
that there was a continual pressure upon the blast furnace capacity. No sooner 
were the five new model furnaces constructed than Jenkins approached the Board, 
(38Q' Directors' Minute. 3 July 1869. ( l o c . c l t . ) 6 
( Priestman found that the Whitwell stoves consumed 18-21 cwt. of coke per ton 
of pig, compared to 22 cwts. consumed by the Player's stoves. 
(39) Directors' Minute. 31 January 1871. (DGR0 : D/CO/30). 
(40) Directors' Minute. 7 March, 1871 pp.99-101.(loc.cit). 
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proposing to build a sixth furnace, to cover the Company i n the event of a 
furnace breakdown. He was also anxious to blow out No.3. and replace the 
(41) 
wasteful cast iron piped stoves by Whitwell's. ' Within another eighteen months 
the Board had approved the addition of a seventh blast furnace, which 
completed the major investments i n this department u n t i l the f i r s t decade 
of the twentieth century. 
Consett had completed i t s f i r s t phase of development by thejsnd of 1873, 
with the reconstruction of /the blastfurnace plant and expansion of the other 
departments. Important advances had also been achieved. Within the limits of 
contemporary technology the decision to build the furnaces to only 55ft. 
appears wise: other firms using hematite also opted for lower furnaces than those 
of Cleveland. The Barrow Hematite Steel Company had experimented with a 75ft. 
furnace but then reduced i t to 6 l f t . ^ ^ and although the Purness Iron and 
Steel Company, at Askam had a 75ft. furnace, Whitwell claimed i t s coke 
consumption was 20.75 cwts. per ton of pig as compared to under 20 cwts. 
at ConBett where less rich materials were produced. 
The Consett Works became a show place for the operation of Y/hitwell's stoves. 
In a paper given to the Iron and Steel Institute i n 1871 Whitwell used data from 
Consett as evidence that by increasing the temperature of the blast from 1200-
1250P a saving of 2cwts. of coke per ton of pig iron could be obtained. 
Jenkins himself became an avid supporter of the Whitwell stoves, almost to the 
(41) Directors' Minute. 5 March 1872 p.l54 D(loc.cit.). (42) Journal of the Iron and Steel In s t i t u t e , I87I I , pp.145-6. 
(43) Journal of the Iron and Steel I n s t i t u t e , 18*71 I I , pp.408-409. 
(44') Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute. 1871, I I , p.223. 
T. Whitwell, "Further Results from the use of Hot Blast Fire Brick Stoves," 
Iron and Coal Trades Review, 5 January 1870 p.4. In advertisements i n 
this trade paper Thomas Whitwell advised interested parties to see his new 
patented Hot Blast Fire Brick Stoves i n operation at Consett. 
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extent of blind loyalty, but this rare excursion by Consett into pioneering 
innovation was an unqualified success. 
As the discussion about blastfurnace practice died down the debate switched 
to an ef f o r t to find a mechanised puddling technique which could compete with 
the new Bessemer process. Many papers at the 1872 meeting of the Iron and 
Steel Institute were devoted to examine the merits and drawbacks of various 
rotary puddling machines, particularly Bank's machine. Consett was involved 
i n this debate since its laboratory f a c i l i t i e s under the direction of 
George Ainsworth,^^ the chemist, were used to test samples of wrought 
iron made i n Spencer's revolving c o n v e r t e r . H o w e v e r there is no evidence 
that Consett followed the lead of some north-eastern firms i n adopting 
mechancial puddling. 
Thus the f i r s t eight years were very eventful. After Williams' close 
scrutiny of the operations of. the Company, i t was able to survive a crisis 
of self doubt about the course of development i t should follow. As a direct 
result of the Reports there was a change i n senior management, bringing together 
the very effective team of David Dale and William Jenkins. However one cannot 
help feel that Jonathan Priestman was shabbily treated and that a considerable 
portion of the blame for the inefficiency was shifted on to his shoulders, when 
i t might more justly have been placed upon the Directors' who were tardy i n the 
adoption of new investment. I t may have been that the Directors had l i t t l e 
f a i t h i n the new concern u n t i l Williams clearly ill u s t r a t e d to them i t s immense 
potential. His expectations were f u l f i l l e d more than amply during the ensuing 
forty years. 
(45) George Ainsworth employed at £120 per annum as a chemist, later became 
blastfurnace manager and eventually i n 1894 successor to William 
Jenkins. 
(46) A. Spencer, "Spencer's Revolving Converter of Puddling Machine" 
Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute, 1872, I I pp. 321-22. 
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2. 1872-1886: Adjustment and Change 
This period was marked by two fundamental changes i n the activities of 
the Consett Iron Company. The f i r s t of these was the collapse of the iron 
r a i l trade i n 1876, and this was attended by the question of whether to 
introduce steel making; the second was the rapid introduction of steelmaking 
after 1881, so that by 1886 steel had established i t s pre-eminence over iron 
as the major product of the Company. 
In 1872 David Dale withdrew from a c t i v i t y management of the firm leaving 
the control solely with William Jenkins/ 1^' whose f i r s t two years at 
Consett had been so successful that the Directors revised his contract i n 
(2-) 
appreciation. The void l e f t by Dale was f i l l e d by the appointment of 
committees for Coal and Finance matters and also a Company Secretary to look 
after commercial aspects of the Company's business. The f i r s t Secretary 
was an internal appointment, Richard Latimer, the firm's cashier and 
accountant, but he resigned i n 1873 and was replaced by Richard Evans. 
He was a compatriot of Jenkins and had also begun his career at Dowlais though 
he came to Consett from the ironworks at Maryport i n Cumberland. 
The years 1872-74 were ones of feverish activity and f u l l production 
and i n view of this there was l i t t l e renewal to plant. However i n 
December 1874 i t was decided to blow out No. 3 and 4 blastfurnaces for re lining', 
the opportunity was also taken to replace the inefficient cast iron pipe stores 
s t i l l i n operation at No.3 furnace. During I875 as trade eased off f i r s t No.3 
(1) Directors' Minute. 3 August 1872. p.187. (DCRO : D/CO/30). 
(2) ; Directors' Minute. 9 A p r i l 1872 pp . l71-172.(loc.cit.). 
- 205 -
and then at the t a i l end of the year No. 4 was blown o u t . ^ 
By the summer of 1875 concern was expressed about the condition of 
trade. The Company began to s e l l Cinder Fig and stock puddled bars, a 
sure sign that trade was i n a state of slump. Worse had yet to come; i n 
November Jenkins reported to the Board that orders for r a i l s were exhausted. 
In an effort to keep the Rail M i l l operative Jenkins was authorised to s e l l 
r a i l s for immediate delivery at 2s.6d per ton below cost including a l l fixed 
charges.^ The collapse was more fundamental than can have at f i r s t been 
realised for the sharp f a l l i n steel r a i l s had by the end of 1875 made iron 
r a i l s obsolete. Wrought iron r a i l s wore out so quickly that even whilst the 
price of steel was significantly greater a market could be found for steel r a i l s • 
With the proliferation of Bessemer steel plants i n the early 1870's and the 
expiry of Bessemer's royalty the cost of Bessemer steel tumbled down relative to 
wrought i r o n . ^ 
TABLE VI.2. 
Production of Iron & Steel Rails i n Great Britain 1870-1880 
Figures published by Sir David Dale. ( '000 tons). 
Year Wrought Iron Steel* 
1870 1350 
1871 1370 200 
1872 1270 250 
1873 1005 300 
1874 1005 350 
1875 865 400 
1876 855 470 
1877 820 565 
1878 775 700 
1879 675 560 
1880 350 810 . 
Source : Burnham and Hoskins, op.cit. p.158; A . B i r c h The Economic History 
of British Iron and Steel Industry, pp. 354-5. 
(3) Directors' Minuts T 2 February l875t P-90.(DCR0:D/C0/3l)o 
Directore' Minute,29 November, 1875., p .146. ( l o c . c i t . ) i 
(4) Ibid., p.145. 
(5) A. Birch, o.cit. pp.354-355. 
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Duncan Burn observed that 'by 1876 i t was recognised i n England that the 
iron rail-trade was dead'.^ At Consett the realisation had also sunk i n 
by I876, for by June the firm had only 2000 tons of iron r a i l s on order for 
the North Eastern Railway, and there was a total absence of any further r a i l 
" . < (7) enquiries. 
11 
Rather than have the plant lying idle Wm. Jenkins proposed that to meet 
the increased demand for ship-plates the present Rail Mill/be altered/ 
into a plate M i l l , which might be made interchangeable for r a i l s at a short 
(8) 
notice."- ' For many small firms i n the North east the depression of 
1876-77 was f a t a l . The Iron and Steel Institute reported that 33$ of a l l 
pudding furnaces and r o l l i n g mills were idle i n the North of England for a 
considerable part of 1877 • However though the market for r a i l s had 
collapsed, the returns of the Board of Arbitration showed that plate and angle 
sales were maintained. 
Consett had moved into ship-plates and the shipbuilding industry remained 
i t s most important single customer u n t i l the 1920's. However no sooner 
had'; i t taken this most important decision, largely through force of 
circumstance, than the threat of steel began to encroach into ship-plates. On 
7 November I876 the Board requested Wm. Jenkins i n conjunction with Edward 
Williams to look into the question of "the comparative position of Consett as 
a site for a steel producing concern together with the probability of such trade 
being remunerative."^^ 
(6) D.L. Burn, Economic History of Steelmaking. (London, 1940) p.28. 
(7) Directors' Minute. 17 June, I876. p.204 ('DCRO:D/C0/3l). 
(8) Directors' Minute. 3 October, I876 p.232. ( l o c . c i t . ) . 
(9) Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute.. 1877 p.477. 
(10) Messrs. Williams & Jenkins Steel Report, Directors' Minute. 6 March 1877. 
PP.4-13. (DCR0:D/C0/32). 
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The previous year Nathaniel Barnaby, the Director of Naval Construction i n 
Britain had visited Lorient i n Prance to see the developments made by the French 
metallurgists i n improving steel for shipbuilding purposes. The new mild steel 
made by the addition of ferro-manganese was ideal for ship-building purpose i n 
Bamaby's v i e w / 1 1 ) The technique was taken up by the Bolton Steelworks, a 
Bessemer plant,and Landore Works i n South Wales, an open hearth plant. The 
sucess of the process lay i n the l a t t e r method of steel production, and James 
Riley the. manager at Landore subsequently moved to the Steel Company of Scotland 
(12) 
where the new process proved a salvation. ' 
Williams and Jenkins however were not immediately interested i n steel as 
a substitute for iron i n plate making. As far as they were concerned there were 
no advantages to be gained i n producing steel plates because of the existing 
price d i f f e r e n t i a l . Their chief concern was whether Consett should build a steel 
plant for the manufacture of r a i l s and they concluded that the Company was 
well located to compete with other steel railmakers, because of its. cheap fuel 
and access to pl e n t i f u l hematite supplies. 
In addition the Report contains information which highlights one of the 
ironmasters chief complaints at this time, the level of railway freights. The 
North-Eastern Railway were accused of charging excessively high rates on raw 
materials which put the manufacturers of Durham and Cleveland at a disadvantage. 
The complaints became a l l the more vociferous as trade collapsed i n 1875, and 
the North Eastern Railway's monopoly was so much resented that i t was proposed to 
introduce a B i l l i n Parliament to build an additional railway i n Durham and York-
s h i r e / 1 ^ The pressure was successful to a degree, i n that the North Eastern 
Ul) Transactions of the Institute of Naval Architects. I876, p.149. 
( 1 2 ) Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute. 1884, I I . p.223. 
(13) "Messrs Williams & Jenkins Steel Report," Directors' Minute. 6 March I877. 
pp.4-13. (DCR0:D/C0/32.) 
(H) Iron and Coal Trades Review. 5 March 1875, p.264. 
- 208 -
Railway were at last forced to take notice of their customers' grievances and 
acknowledged the need to improve their handling f a c i l i t i e s ; they also eventually 
announced an abatement i n their charges for materials used i n the manufacture of 
iron at works on their system/ J l Such concessions wrung from the railway were 
more important to Consett than to many of the other makers, thus the reraonstratiore 
of Jenkins and Williams about r a i l freights were well founded as was Williams' 
compliment about the well integrated nature of the Company's works which 
reduced railway dues. As he observed this alone was "of enormous importance 
and enables you, even i n times lik e the present^to make a p r o f i t upon the plates 
sold".^"^ Consett kept up almost a continuous correspondence with the Railway 
Company's o f f i c i a l s i n an effort to get rates reduced and services improved. 
However i n 1881 David Dale was elected to the Board of the North Eastern 
Railway, which enabled him to put the case of ironmasters and coalowners more 
(17) 
forcibly. x ' Amongst the iron companies Consett was probably the best 
represented, having five Directors i n common with the North Eastern Railway 
between 1864-1914• At most times there were effectively two Directors i n 
common as can be seen from Table VI.3. below. 
TABLE VI.3. 
Directors i n Common; Consett Iron Co. and the North Eastern 
Railway Company. 
Director Period of Directorship 
Consett North Eastern Railway 
Joseph Whitwell Pease 1864-1867* 1863-1902 
John Fogg E l l i o t I864-I88I 1862-1881 
David Dale 1864-1906 1881-1906 
Henry Thomas Morton 1869-1893 I88I-I898 
Frank Stobart 1905-1918 1902-
* Though Jeseph Whitwell Pease retired i n I867 from his Directorship at Consett 
he continued as a large shareholder, and was closely associated with David Dale. 
Source : W.W. Tomlinson, The North Eastern Railway: I t s rise and development. 
PP.768-770. 
(15) Iron and Coal Trades Review. 23 July, I875, p.892. 
(16) "Messrs Williams and Jenkins Steel Report," Directors' Minute. 6 March 1877. 
p.6. (DCRO : D/CO/32). 
(17) Sirs Edward Grey, Sir David Dale: Inaugral address delivered for the Dale 
Memorial Trust (London 1911) p.21. 
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The factor which seems to have deterred Consett from undertaking any 
investment i n Steel at this point was the estimated cost of the necessary 
plant. A 50,000 ton capacity plant would have cost £250,000 whilst a 30,000 
ton plant would have been i n the region of £170,000 - £180,000, v By 
the end of 1877, however, Wm. Jenkins had noted that steel was becoming a 
1 
demanded product for shipbuilding. He drew the Boards attention to this 
development and was advised to keep a close watch on the progress of steel 
plates and formulate means whereby Consett might meet the d e m a n d . { 
By 1877 Consett's connexion with the Bilbao iron ore producers was being 
established on a more regular footing with the conclusion of the Carlist War 
and the consummation of Consett's investment i n the Orconera Mines. 
Williams and Jenkins had both stressed the importance of non-phosphoric ores for 
the current methods of steelmaking. Progress i n this direction l a i d the v i t a l 
foundation for the Company's eventual switch over to steel. The shrewd decision 
to seek an alternative ore supply i n 1870-71 when West Coast Hematite began 
to show t e l l - t a l e signs of short supply also proved fortunate for the Company's 
later development. 
By 1878 James Riley had established the Steel Company of Scotland as the 
(21) 
sole producer of mild steel for private shipbuilding. ' Jenkins had kept i n 
touch with developments; during 1879 he and Williams visited several shipyards 
and steelworks to obtain information on the f e a s i b i l i t y of substituting steel 
plates for iron. Their investigations were spurred on by a strong demand for 
(22) 
steel plates during the early part of 1879• I t is l i k e l y that the two 
(18) "Messrs Williams & Jenkins Steel Report" Directors' Minute. 6 March 1877. 
p.13. (DCR0:D/C0/32). 
(19) Directors' Minute. 14 December, 1877. P«59. ( l o c . c i t . ) . 
(20) Directors' Minute. 1 May 1877- P.29. ( l o c . c i t ) . Jenkins concluded an 
agreement for the shipment of 30,000 - 40,000 tons of ore i n the following 
year, from Bilbao to Sunderland at a rate of lls.Od per ton. 
( 2 1 ) Journal of the Iron and Steel Insti t u t e . I884 I I . p.443. 
(22) "Me8srs w i l l i a m 8 ^ J e n k i n s S e c £ > n d J o i n t Director w- + 
6 September 1 8 7 9 . Pp . l 5 7 - 5 8 . (DCR0:D/C0/32). R e c t o r s Mxnute, 
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men visited the Blochairn and Landore steelworks for both were mentioned 
i n some detail i n their second report. Landore was producing between 200-300 
tons per week of excellent steel mainly for Government contracts; this meant 
they secured a higher price than they would otherwise get for private 
contracts, thus avoiding some of the competition with iron plates. On the other 
hand the Steel Company of Scotland was expanding i t s capacity at i t s 
Blochairn. works to produce 400-500 tons of Siemens-Martin steel per week for 
sale to private shipbuilders. From what they saw they were convinced that 
Consett could undertake the manufacture of steel with l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y and 
(23) 
at very l i t t l e cost/ J / 
They did, however, consider the possibilities of the u t i l i z a t i o n of 
phosphoric ores, i n l i g h t of the Gilchrist-Thomas breakthrough, and concluded 
that Consett would be able to hold i t s own. Most important i n this respect 
was the observation that the "best judgement i s that the abandonment of the 
Consett VTorks either wholly or i n part would be very unwise."^4) 
The report thought that the process of the future would be that of 
Bessemer which was "much the most economical while i t is capable we believe of 
producing any wished for quality of steel", but some Siemen's regenerative 
furnaces were to be installed for working scrap. However, to begin with i t 
was recommended that two 10 ton Siemens-Martin furnaces, with a weekly capacity 
of 100-150 tons should be installed with the necessary hammering and r o l l i n g 
f a c i l i t i e s . The report,; en* with the warning that i t would be unwise for 
Consett to "be behind hand i n i t s special business. 1^ 2^ 
(23) Ibid., p.616. 
(24) Ibid., p.162. 
(25) Ibid., p.I64. 
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The Board took heed and arrangements were made for the Installation of 
two 10 ton furnaces upon a site adjoining No.2. Plate M i l l with the necessary gas 
producers, hydraulic apparatus &c. Consett was the f i r s t works i n the 
North of England to take the i n i t i a t i v e and go forward into steel production 
for ship-plates. Contrary to Richardson and Bass's assertion that Consett 
(27) 
was very slow i n adopting steel production, ' given the. market situation 
the firm were i n fact very responsive. 1878 was probably the turning point 
when the lighter construction possible with steel, which gave greater dead-weight 
( 28) 
cargo capacity/began to offset the higher i n i t i a l cost. 1 Such a reaction 
proved sound management even i f i t lacked the entrepreneurial i n i t i a t i v e 
shown by James Riley i n I876 at Landore. However, the advantages of original 
innovation i n a heavy industry such as iron and steel are unproven. 
The Board's decision was timely, for by 1880-81 the controversy over the 
merits of iron or steel was swinging firmly i n the favour of the l a t t e r . 
In August 1880 the plans of the "S.S. City of Rome" were examined by the 
Institute of Mechanical Engineers who were c r i t i c a l of the non-use of steel 
i n parts of this very large ship. Though the engineers were largely won over 
to steel the owners who made the i n i t i a l specifications were s t i l l bucking 
(29) 
under the extra expense.v " The following year Wm. Denny the Clyde 
shipbuilder argued the economic superiority of steel b u i l t over iron b u i l t ships, 
i n terms of their deadweight cargo c a p a c i t y . I n the same year William Parker 
(26) Directors' Minute. 2 December 1879, P -177-(loc.cit.). 
(27) H.W. Richardson and J.M. Bass, "The P r o f i t a b i l i t y of the Consett Iron Co., 
Limited before 1914" Business History. YJl (1965) P«75» 
(28) Carr and Taplin, op.cit.,p ,112. 
(29) J.D. Marshall, Furness and the Industrial Revolution (Barrow, 1958) pp.388-9. 
(30) Wm. Denny, "The Economical Advantages of Steel Shipbuilding" Journal of 
the Iron and Steel Insti t u t e . 1881. 
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dispelled any notions that steel was more susceptible to corrosion than iron 
before the Iron and Steel I n s t i t u t e / " ^ 
In April 1880 the Consett Board budgeted £10,000 for the construction of 
their experimental steelworks, considerably less than they had estimated the 
cost to be i n 1 8 7 7 . ^ 2 ^ Agreement was reached with Dr. C.W. Siemens, whose 
licence was s t i l l current, though about to expire for a payment of £2,250 
for the f i r s t two furnaces and thereafter on terms equal to his most favoured 
l i c e n s e e . T h e furnaces were eventually started i n June 1883. 
Within five months the Board authorised further expenditure on four new 
(34) 
furnaces because of the success of the two prototypes. ' Demand for 
steel continued to grow and before the four new furnaces were even completed 
sanction had been given (Tor the addition of a further two open-hearth furnaces:* 
By 1886 output exceeded 40,000 tons per annum and the production of wrought iron 
was i n decline. 
Whilst such fundamental changes were taking place to the finishing 
departments, impressive strides were being made at the blastfurnace plant. 
In the early 1870's the capacity of the blastfurnaces was about 350 tons per 
furnace per week, by the end of the seventies the average output of the furnaces 
had risen to about 700 tons per week whilst No.l was able to produce over 800 
(36) 
tons a week. ' This was i n every respect comparable with the best practice 
used i n the United States. This was largely achieved by the improved 
handling f a c i l i t i e s around the blastfurnaces and the increased power and heat 
(31) Wm. Parker, "The Relative Corrosion of Iron and Steel", Journal of the Iron 
and Steel Institute 1881. 
(32) Taken for the f i r s t year the 1880 plant could produce a projected 5,000 tons 
per annum, or £ 2 . per ton of steel, whereas the cheapest 1&77 plant was 
£5 per ton of steel. 
(33) Directors' Minute. 3 A p r i l 1880 p.201.(DCR0 : D/CO/32). 
(34) Directors' Minute. 6 November 1883. (DCR0: D/CO/32). 
(35) Journal of the Iron and Steel Insti t u t e . 1883 I I . pp.622-24 Journal of 
the Iron andSteel In s t i t u t e , 1880 I & I I , pp. 219, 636. ' 
footnotes (36) and (37) on following page. 
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of the b l a s t . I n 1880 a seventh furnace was added to the plant at an 
estimated cost of £22,000jthis was part of a larger scheme of expenditure 
which included the steelworks and additional Lancashire double-flued boilers 
to improve the power of the b l a s t - e n g i n e s . ^ ^ 
Apart from the spectacular increase i n the output of the blastfurnaces, 
e f f o r t s were made to raise the productivity of the r o l l i n g m i l l s . Wm. 
Jenkins advised the Board to convert one of the m i l l s to a reversing m i l l , the 
(30) 
p r i n c i p l e which Priestman had f i r s t introduced i n 1865-66.V ' The f a c i l i t i e s 
of the m i l l s were further improved by the i n s t a l l a t i o n of larger plate shears 
i n No.4. during 1880 and by the purchase of l i f t i n g , hauling and turning gear 
(jo) 
f o r No.2 m i l l i n the same year. ' The introduction of s t e e l manufacture l e d 
to the more general use of cogging to produce slabs rather than hammering, 
which was more costly. At Blochairn James Riley had. endorsed t h i s innovation 
because of the repeated disputes with the hammermen, cle a r l y an instance of 
labour militancy leading to the adoption of superior techniques as a 
substitute f o r labour. 
The substitution of s t e e l f o r i r o n progressed at a rapid pace between 
1883-86 J, i n the l a t t e r year only 48,033 tons of No. 1 puddled bar was 
produced compared with 109,206 tons i n 1883, whilst 40,184 tons of steel were 
produced compared with 9?454 tons of steel i n 1884, the f i r s t year of f u l l 
production. For the country as a whole 1886 marked the year i n which 
(36) 'Journal of the Ir o n and Steel I n s t i t u t e , 1887, I I . pp.163-166. I b i d . , 
1877 I . pp.163-166. I n 1882 the blastfurnaces of the South Chicago Works 
of the N 0 r t h Chicago R o l l i n g M i l l Co. had an average weekly output of 900 
tons with coke consumption of about 25 cwt. per ton of p i g i r o n . 
(37) . Directors' Minute. 2 December 1879. p.178. (DCR0:D/C0/32). 
(38) Directors' Minute. 2 July I878 p.87. ( l o c . c i t ) . 
(39) Directors' Minute. 3 A p r i l 1880. pp.202-203. ( l o c . c i t . ) . 
(40) E.J. Hobshawm, Labouring Men. (London, 1964) p. 172). 
(41) Private Cost Books. 1868-1905, (DCR0:D/C0/97). 
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the tonnage of shipping constructed of steel exceeded that made of wrought 
i r o n / ^ Although the years 1883-86 were ones of sharp depression f o r 
shipbuilders and so also f o r the companies which supplied them, Consett main-
tained the pace of innovation set during the 1870's. The l l u i i l was i n f a c t 
used to carry out maintenance and repairs,, and even to project expansion, a 
policy comparable to that followed by Andrew Carnegie;(43) -bu-t a s Carnegie 
observed, t h i s policy required substantial reserves and i n t h i s respect Dale's 
f i n a n c i a l planning and wisdom served Consett w e l l . 
I n 1884 Jenkins was asked by the Board to explore the opportunities f o r 
r o l l i n g steel angles at Consett, but he was unable to o f f e r any encouragement 
(44) 
since none of the ex i s t i n g m i l l s could be adapted to steel angle r o l l i n g . 
Before anything f u r t h e r was done on t h i s count the ste e l plate m i l l s were 
expanded t o even greater capacity* I n February 1886 Wm. Jenkins produced 
a report on proposed extensions - the plan envisaged the construction of a 
fu r t h e r ten Siemens-Martin furnaces and the remodelling of the Plate M i l l s , 
No. 3t 4 and 5« I n the weeks before the report was prepared the Heads of 
the various steel making departments v i s i t e d the works at Jarrow, Barrow, 
Workington and Tudhoe to ascertain the best process f o r steelmaking and the 
most up-to-date, m e t h o d s . T h e two West Coast works were Bessemer plants 
w h i l s t Jarrow and Tudhoe were open-hearth ste e l plants.. The Weardale I r o n 
and Coal Company had only recently changed over to the Siemens process, 
replacing the Bessemer converters which had been i n s t a l l e d i n l 8 6 l / ^ 
(42) J.C. Carr and W. Taplin, History of the B r i t i s h Steel Industry (Oxford, 
1962) p.110. 
(43) D.L. Burn, op.cit.,p.26l. 
(44) Directors' Minute. 21 October, I884. p.173. (DCRO : D/CO/33). 
(45) Wm. Jenkins' Report on the Steelworks Extensions," Directors' Minute. 
16 February, 1886, pp.233-239- ( l o c . c i t . ) 0 
(46) H.W. H o l l i s , "The Tudhoe Works of the Weardale Iron and Coal Co. Ltd.," 
Journal of the Iron and Steel I n s t i t u t e . 1893. I I . pp.144-153. 
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The r e s u l t of these investigations was that Jenkins revised his opinion 
expressed i n his ,1879 Report, that the Bessemer process was the steelmaking 
method of the future.. By 1886 he was convinced that the Siemens-Martin 
process was more suitable f o r ship-plates manufacture than either the acid or 
basic Bessemer p r o c e s s e s . I n t h i s decision, apart from Weardale's change 
over, he was probably aided by the opinion of George Snelus at the Workington 
works of the West Cumberland Iron Company, who i n 1877 had admitted "that 
there might be a l i t t l e more trouble" i n applying the ferro-manganese 
process to Bessemer than to Siemens steelmaking. 
The new extensions would cost between £75,000 - 100,00 and the Board 
anticipated that t h i s would be w r i t t e n o f f w i t h i n eight to ten years. This 
was not a t a l l u n r e a l i s t i c , and i f anything^given the pace with which technolog-
i c a l progress was being made i n the industry at the time, i t was possibly even 
conservative. Up to the end of 1885 £67f945.04s.Id had been expended on the 
steelworks and had been w r i t t e n o f f at the rate of about £10,000 per annum. 
However the Company was making p r o f i t s over £1. per ton of plate sold* 
£33,859.04s.l0d p r o f i t on only 28,210 tons of plate i n the two and a half 
years up to December l 8 8 5 " i . . ^ ^ 
During the f i r s t decade of his control at Consett Wm. Jenkins had been 
faced with two d i f f i c u l t problems; a f t e r the halycon days of 1873 the i r o n 
r a i l trade collapsed completely under the pressure of declining trade and 
intense competition from s t e e l . Fortunately Consett was able t o switch 
f a i r l y painlessly to i t s other important branch of manufacture, ship-plates 
(47) "Wm. Jenkins' Report on the Steelworks Extensions," Directors' Minute. 
16 February, p.234. (DCR0 : D/C0/34.)« 
(48) Journal of the Iron and Steel I n s t i t u t e . 1877. p.91. 
(49) "Wm. Jenkins' Report on the Steelworks Extensions," Directors' Minute. 
16 February p.239. (DCR0 :D/CO/34). 
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a market which was growing r a p i d l y during the 1870's. 
The triumph of steel i n the r a i l industry was a portent of a similar 
substitution i n the production of plates, and Jenkins was absorbed i n the 
problem i n the l a s t h a l f of the l870's. I n 1879 i t was resolved to adopt 
steelmaking, by the open-hearth process, j u s t a t the time when shipowners 
and shipbuilders began to appreciate the advantages of steel over i r o n . 
This period was a triumph of careful and considered management, which produced 
good f i n a n c i a l results whilst other makers were i n d i f f i c u l t y . I t was 
l i t t l e wonder that the Board were appreciative of William Jenkins' 
contribution. 
1886-18941 The Zenith of Consett's Enterprise. 
Between I886-I894 Consett added a new melting shop, with nine furnaces, 
remodelled t h e i r plate m i l l s , and f i n a l l y constructed a new Angle M i l l with 
additional steel melting capacity. There were signs however that Consett 
had reached the l i m i t s of its growth. Space and the legacy of past 
technologies began to exert a considerable influence upon future 
investment decisions before 1914. 
During these eight years there was a great deal of a c t i v i t y i n the North 
of England as 'erstwhile ironmakers' such as Consett reorganised t h e i r plant 
to make s t e e l . I n 1886 Bolckow Vaughan and Company increased the capacity of 
t h e i r Eston plant, whilst i n I889 Palmer's added an Angle m i l l to t h e i r f a c i l i t i e s 
meanwhile both Parkgate i n Rotherham and John Brown's i n Sheffield were undertak-
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ing extensive remodelling of t h e i r plant. 
Though the decision to change over to steel had been taken by Consett 
i n the early 1880's the period between 1886-1894 was when the decision 
was carried through, with a resultant s t r a i n upon the personnel of the 
Company, f o r as w e l l as the development programme f o r the steelworks, a f t e r 
1890 there was the increased capacity of the Company1s coal interests to be 
developed north of the r i v e r Derwent. The r e s u l t of the s t r a i n disrupted the 
management of the Company, f o r i n A p r i l 1894 Richard Evans died suddenly, 
then i n August William Jenkins offered his resignation a f t e r many months of 
inter m i t t e n t i l l n e s s . The following year W.H. Hedley, the Chief Viewer, 
also r e t i r e d owing to i l l health, thus removing the three men who had^had' 
a great influence i n b u i l d i n g Consett up since the early 1870*s. 
The period i s also p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l documented because the Company's 
Letterbooks have survived f o r most of the period between 1887-1894* I t i s 
therefore possible to discern more v i v i d l y the tension and pressure i n f l i c t e d 
upon Jenkins and Evans i n p a r t i c u l a r , i n carrying through the changes. 
Apart from the construction of additional melting furnaces i n the new 
East Shop i t was necessary to improve the Plate M i l l s by introducing cogging 
f o r hammering, i n s t a l l i n g a more powerful shear, capable of c u t t i n g hot 
slabs 30" by 9"» and to increase the pressure and quantity of steam 
f o r the engines i n the M i l l s . The steelworks were designed by J.P. Roe, the 
engineer who designed the a n c i l l a r y equipment f o r the blastfurnaces and the 
staithes at Bilbao, a f t e r several t r i p s to other works i n the North-East. 
(50) W.A. S i n c l a i r , "The Growth of the B r i t i s h Steel Industry i n the Late 
Nineteenth Centry," Scottish Journal of P o l i t i c a l Economy. V I . (19S&) 
p.36. 
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The work was carried out by a number of contractors, who also were engaged 
l a t e r to do simi l a r work f o r the Angle M i l l . A l l presented t h e i r problems; 
slow progress, poor workmanship and la t e delivery, and t h i s a l l took i t s t o l l 
on the energy of the men who had to co-ordinate the whole project. 
Most of the excavation, brickwork and masonry was undertaken by a 
Redcar contractor, T.D. Ridley. I n May 1886 his f i r m were given the contract 
f o r the excavations for. the steelworks; once on s i t e however, the f i r m 
got more work merely because of t h e i r a v a i l a b i l i t y . I n 1887 Jenkins wrote 
to T.D. Ridley, Snr. 
"The prices which I have assented to are more than those given to 
me by another tender, but looking at the f a c t you have your foreman 
and your plant already on the ground and the inconvenience which would 
arise from two or three sets of contractors and t h e i r men being present 
(51) 
I have r e a d i l y assented to the amended terms." 
Ridley's men, however, had to be constantly pressed i n order to keep the 
work going a t the necessary speed. I n 1887 Jenkins complained to Dale that 
return 
w h i l s t he had been away l i t t l e progress had been made; however, on hisjand 
(52) 
overtures to Ridley work was speeded up. ' Four years l a t e r , on the Angle M i l l 
contract, Ridley was making such slow progress with the brickwork and masonry 
that he was summoned before the Consett Board, to have impressed upon him the 
(53) 
urgency of the work. ' 
The superstructure f o r the m i l l s was mainly erected by the Teesside I r o n 
and Engine Works Company of Middlesbrough, though Hawks, Crawshay and Sons 
(51) Wm. Jenkins to T.D. Ridley, 15 March I887. (DCRO : D/CO/68). 
(52) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 28 A p r i l , I887. (DCRO : D/CO/69). 
(53) Directors' Minute. 1 September, 1891, p.270. (DCRO : D/CO/34) 
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of Gateshead did some. The Teesside f i r m also undertook some of the castings 
f o r ladles, carriages, and furnaces. This f i r m too were a source of concern 
to William Jenkins: i n 1887 a casting received f o r the m i l l from Teesside 
broke, causing the stoppage of the m i l l . The work was of such poor q u a l i t y 
that Jenkins was very disturbed about outstanding orders - his f a i t h was 
exhausted. Yet i n spite of t h i s at a l a t e r date Jenkins expressed the 
hope that the Teesside Iron and Engine Works should get a. Consett contract 
(55) 
i n face of competition from Scotland and Hawks, Crawshay. ' The l i n k 
between Consett and Teesside appears to be yet another instance of the 
importance of i n t e r - l i n k i n g directorships i n securing work. The chain was 
s l i g h t l y extended i n t h i s case, through Pease and Partners, where David 
Dale was able to pressure or be s o l i c i t e d by Henry F e l l Pease, a Director 
of the Teesside I r o n and Engine W o r k s . T h e necessity to 
supervise closely the work done by Teesside, however, was yet another 
burden placed upon Jenkins and his s t a f f . 
This was not the only contractor with whom Consett had d i f f i c u l t i e s 
over poor q u a l i t y workmanship. M i l l e r and Company of Coatbridge who were 
supplying the cogging m i l l were possibly even worse. They sent parts i n 
(57) 
which the defects had been deliberately concealed, ' but as Jenkins 
pointed out to Dale: 
"Our old experience here and especially that of our two m i l l engineers 
Mr. Roe and Mr. Scott, i s quite able t o cope with the doings of those 
who supply us with material, and we must be f i r m and get what we want."^^ 
(54) Wm. Jenkins to M.W. Proudlock, 16 March,l887. (DCRO : D/CO/68). 
(55) Wm. Jenkins to David Dale, 28 A p r i l , 1887, (DCRO : D/CO/69). 
(56) Wm. Jenkins to David Dale, 11 February, I887. (DCRO : D/CO/68). 
(57) Wm. Jenkins to Messrs. M i l l e r & Co. 31 May, 1887. (DCRO : D/CO/69). 
(58) Wm. Jenkins to David Dale, 11 June, I887. (DCRO : D/CO/69). 
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Nevertheless, the effe c t of these delays and deceptions were cumulative 
and drove Jenkins t o complain that the "extensions and reconstructions are giving 
me much anxiety. The contractors f o r machinery, castings &c. at a l l points 
are day a f t e r day requiring pressure and watching as to the d e t a i l s , while the 
(59) 
contractors on the ground are slow to move."x ' I t was l i t t l e wonder that one 
of Consett's competitors, Palmers Shipbuilding and Iro n Company complained i n the 
I r o n and Coal Trades Review of the delays i n the delivery of machinery i n 1889, 
by; which time engineering firms were f u l l y employed and delays a t t h e i r 
maximum. 
The additional nine melting furnaces were completed during the l a t t e r part 
of 1887, and the m i l l s several months l a t e r i n 1888. There was no l e t up 
i n the pressure upon Wm. Jenkins f o r i n March of 1888 the Board gave the go-
ahead on the programme to construct a steel Angle M i l l , bn a s i t e l e f t when the 
Puddling plant was demolished. I t was also decided to fu r t h e r c u r t a i l i r o n plate 
( 6 l ) 
production and l i m i t i t to Shotley Bridge works. ' However beforeany work 
could s t a r t a suitable large s i t e had to be found, a problem that persistently 
i n t e r f e r e d with Consett's desires to reconstruct plant. Wm. Jenkins complained 
to David Dale, 
"The f i x i n g of the s i t e , the d i f f i c u l t i e s surrounding i t , and the 
extraordinary e f f o r t s requisite f o r concentrating the (gas) producers 
melting furnaces and m i l l s i n a suitable manner has been a work of 
considerable labour and anxiety. I am assuming now that the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
(62) 
as regards defining the s i t e are surmounted."v ' 
(59) Wm. Jenkins to David Dale, 18 June, 1887. (DCRO : D/CO/69). 
(60) Iron and Coal Trades Review. 6 September, I889. 
(61) Directors' Minute. 6 March, 1888. p.40 (DCRO : D/CO/34). 
(62) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 6 March,I89O. (DCRO : D/CO/72). 
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Before the F i r s t World War t h i s probably proved a greater handicap to 
the development of the Company than i t s distance from the Coast. Eventually 
a s i t e was found between the General Offices and the Tin M i l l and the 
Board gave authorisation to Jenkins to commence the scheme. I n a l l the 
Angle M i l l would consist of seven melting furnaces, a large cogging m i l l , 
a 32" Angle M i l l , a 22" Angle M i l l and a 12" Guide M i l l , costing an 
estimated £150,000. ^ 
(63) Directors' Minute. 3 September 1889,p.125.(DCRO : D/CO/34). 
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During the early part of 1890 James Scott, the engineer i n charge of 
M i l l construction, v i s i t e d several works, p a r t i c u l a r Palmer's new Angle 
(64) 
m i l l and the r e l a t i v e l y new works of the North Eastern Steel Company• 
After such preliminary f a c t f i n d i n g investigations the designs were probably 
drawn up and offered out f o r tenders. The f i r s t contracts were made by 
the end of A p r i l with T.D. Ridley f o r brickwork and masonry, and with the 
Leeds' engineering f i r m , Joseph Booth and Bros, who were to supply the 
overhead t r a v e l l i n g cranes. Many of the contractors engaged upon the e a r l i e r 
extensions were successful i n winning further work from Consett, with the 
notable exception of Hawks, Crawshay and Sons - the cogging m i l l engine was 
ordered from Lamberton and Company of Coatbridge. The Teesside I r o n and 
Engine Works probably got the largest single contract, £20,400 f o r the erection 
of a l l the ironwork f o r the roofs. v 3' M i l l e r ' s of Coatbridge were also 
doing well out of the steel companies' investment, f o r they won the contract 
f o r the Bar m i l l engines from Consett, and also about the same time a contract 
f o r the new cogging m i l l at the Weardale Iron and Coal Company's Tudhoe works. 
The Consett Angle m i l l was commissioned i n March 18931 twenty-one months 
a f t e r the f i r s t contracts had been put out. By t h i s time, however, William 
Jenkins was worn out, and during 1893 he had to have two long absences from 
his duties. Apart from the two major projects and the problems of organising, 
planning and co-ordinating them, he had several other problems of major importance 
to contend w i t h . 
(64) Wm. Jenkins to John Price, Palmer's Shipbuilding & Iron Co., 29 
January, 1890.-(DCRO : D/CO/71). 
Wm.^Jenkins to A. Cooper, North Eastern Steel Co., 10 March, 1890, 
(DCR0:D/C0/72). 
(65) Directors' Minute. 13 September, 1890 p.204.(DCR©r:D/C0/34). 
(66) H.W. H o l l i s , "The Tudhoe Works of the Weardale Iron and Coal Co. Ltd.," 
Journal' of the Iron andSteel I n s t i t u t e . 1893 I I . pp.144-153. 
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A f t e r the completion of the seventh furnace i n 1880, l i t t l e had been done 
to improve the blastfurnace plant, but t h i s was an area s t i l l a l i v e with 
debate and controversy. I n the North East i t was centred around the r e l a t i v e merits 
of the Whitwell and Cowper stoves. I n 1883 Jenkins defended st o u t l y the merits 
of the Whitwell hot blast stove, mainly on the count of t h e i r easy maintenance, 
but there was l i t t l e doubt that Cowper's could a t t a i n greater heats; as 
E.P. Martin, the Dowlais manager pointed out, however, the average heat was 
lower because of the d i f f i c u l t y and time taken i n cleaning them. ' On a 
broader f r o n t there were revolutionary advances being made i n blastfurnace practice 
i n the U.S.A. I n 1887 E.C. Potter reported upon the new practice adopted 
at the South Chicago Works, which had increased the output of the furnace to about 
(68) 
1^00-^500 tons of p i g i r o n per week with a coke consumption of 17.1 cwts. ' 
However such practice necessitated more frequent l i n i n g of the blastfurnace, 
and t h i s was a possible obstacle to the long run e f f i c i e n c y , but t h i s had been 
overcome by Potter who claimed h i s furnaces could be r e l i n e d i n s i x t y days. 
Commenting upon the paper Jenkins lamented to I l l t y d Williams, of Linthorpe, that 
r e l i n i n g at Consett took six months at least and thus such hard d r i v i n g was not 
feasible u n t i l the r e l i n i n g procedure was improved. 
Jenkins was concerned about the neglect to the blastfurnace plant; one 
furnace had been operating eight years by I887, without r e l i n i n g , but was showing 
signs of wear. As Consett had been doing i t s own r e l i n i n g f o r ten to twelve years 
Jenkins was unsure about the current views on l i n i n g s and so asked Williams 
(67) Journal of the I r o n and Steel Institute.,1883, II,pp.622-25. 
(68) E.C. Potter,"The South Chicago Works of the North Chicago R o l l i n g M i l l Co.," 
Journal of the Iron and Steel I n s t i t u t e . 1887. I . pp.163-66. 
(69) Wm. Jenkins to I . Williams, 3 June 1887. (DCRO : D/CO/69). 
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advice, p a r t i c u l a r l y as to Bolckow Vaughan's s u p p l i e r s . A l l the blastfurnaces 
were showing signs of deterioration i n 1887 and there was generally an unsatisfactory 
consumption of f u e l . I n an e f f o r t to r i g h t t h i s Jenkins remained l o y a l to his 
Whitwell stoves, negotiating f o r a licence from Thomas Whitwell to adopt 
improvements. The Board approved the payment of £500 to secure the licence f o r 
(71) 
Whitwell's Patent improved stoves. ' However the weight of opinion was by the 
l a t e r 'eighties swinging c l e a r l y i n favour of Cowper's stoves. 
By I89I Jenkins was on the verge of conversion, but s t i l l had to contend 
wi t h the l o y a l t y of the blastfurnace manager to the Whitwell stoves. The main 
change which altered his opinion was the r i s i n g cost of cleaning Whitwell-stoves and 
the f a l l i n g cost f o r Cowper's stoves. His doubts were summed up i n a communication 
to David Dale. 
...."We are not doing as well as we ought to a t Consett with our stoves 
i . e . we do not maintain the high standard of heat, nor do we get the 
uniform equable current of hot blast from our stoves, and we here at 
Consett.are now concluding that t h i s r e g u l a r i t y of heat i s an item of as 
great importance as the maximum heat i t s e l f 
One serious defect we f i n d i n the Whitwell stove i s that i t has to be 
cleaned a t a greater cost than the Cowper - that the Whitwell stove a f t e r 
being cleaned continues to gradually accumulate dust f o r six weeks u n t i l 
(72) 
the cleaning operation i s repeated... 1" ' 
Since i t was proposed to repair some of the blastfurnace plant Jenkins began 
to accumulate details and s t a t i s t i c s on the performance of the Cowper stoves, and 
(70) I b i d . 
(71) Directors' Minute. 20 August,1887. p.24. (DCRO : D/CO/34). 
(72) Wm. Jenkins to David Dale, 20 March, l891.(DCRO : D/CO/75). 
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of Consett's own Whitwell stoves. George Ainsworth, CP. Douglas and E.G. 
Kirkhouse, the managers of the blastfurnaces went to Middlesbrough to see the stoves 
at Linthorpe, Port Clarence and the Teesside Company, and by June, Jenkins had 
decided to give^-. the Cowper stoves a t r i a l . He continued to seek the valuable 
assistance and advice of I l l t y d Williams but also ci r c u l a r i s e d the other Cleveland 
makers i n order to get more information on the nature of t h e i r blastfurnace 
(73) 
plant and the type of stoves used i n r e l a t i o n to t h i s . ' Since Cowper's 
o r i g i n a l patent had lapsed Consett decided to i n s t a l l his early type of stove 
f o r the t r i a l , neglecting some of his most recent i n n o v a t i o n s . ^ ' h r e e 
stoves were to be erected f o r No.5» furnace replacing the four Whitwell stoves;-
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y the reconstruction took almost a year but when complete the 
results were conclusively i n favour of further adoption of Cowper's stoves: 
. . . . " I may mention that our new Cowper stoves, three of them erected a t 
our No.5> furnace which has recently been blown i n made 767 tons of 
Bessemer pig l a s t week with a consumption of l8f cwts of coke whereas our 
No.3* furnace, a very old one with i n f e r i o r stoves, consumed 24§ cwts of coke 
per ton f o r 630 tons of Bessemer pigs made - a saving as you w i l l see i n one 
week of 190 tons of coke. You w i l l thus observe what prompt action should 
be taken constantly year a f t e r year i n bringing up the efficiency of our blast 
(7*5) 
furnace plants to the best condition. 1 1 v , J J 
Such savings were at t h i s time c r i t i c a l f o r the cost of coke had become 
•most seriously high' during 1891, furthermore the harder d r i v i n g of the 
furnaces during 1891 had pushed them past t h e i r optimal capacity with a 
(74) Wm. Jenkins to E.A. Cowper, 24 August l891t(DCR0 : D/CO/77). 
(75) Wm. Jenkins to David Dale, 1 August 1892B(DCRO : D/C0/8l). 
(73) Wm. Jenkins to: S i r Bernhard Samuelson & Co. Ltd., Teesside I r o n and 
Engine Works Company} B e l l Brothers; ^ j e r s , M i l l s and Co.j Dowlais; 
Palmer's Shipbuilding and I r o n Company, 3 August l891.(DCR0:D/C0/77). 
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consequent deterioration i n f u e l economy/' ' A policy of substitution of 
Cowper stoves f o r Whitwell's was adopted from 1891 onwards, whenever a furnace 
was blown out f o r repairs. Fuel economy was not the only sphere i n which at t e n t i o n 
was directed i n the interests of cost reduction; i n 1893 much was being done i n 
an e f f o r t to minimise costs a t the blastfurnace p i g beds, i n removing the pigs, 
(77) 
breaking them and loading them i n t o trucks. v ' A f t e r a decade of neglect the 
blastfurnaces were restored, and t h e i r productivity began to r i s e . 
The increase i n the cost of coal, which had made the i n e f f i c i e n c y of the 
blastfurnaces c r i t i c a l i n 1891, also led to cost problems i n the melting shops 
and m i l l s . The hand-fired b o i l e r s , which were used f o r r a i s i n g steam, and 
reheating ingots, were extravagant i n both f u e l and labour, and the price of both 
was r i s i n g . To contain or reduce costs some method of using these inputs more 
productively had to be sought. 
I n 1890 Jenkins was interested i n the su b s t i t u t i o n of c a p i t a l f o r labour; 
he wrote to D. Evans of Barrow Hematite Steel Company: 
" I note also that you r e f e r again to your heating furnaces and b o i l e r s , 
and your mechanical arrangements f o r feeding the gas producers and that 
(78) 
you w i l l be so good as to send me a tracing of these i n a few days.. l , v ' 
During 1891 devices f o r saving labour and coal were being a c t i v e l y 
marketed - Consett was approached by a James Procter who had patented a 
mechanical stoker which had been i n s t a l l e d at the works of Bolckow Vaughan. 
(76) " I have been, going through a process of economising the coke used per ton 
of hematite p i g i r o n , but t h i s has entailed a diminished product of p i g i r o n " 
Wm. Jenkins to David Dale, 9 October, l891.(DCR0:D/C0/78). 
(77) Wm. Jenkins to CwP.* Douglas, 3 August, 1893. (DCRO:D/CO/84). 
(78) Wm. Jenkins to D. Evans, 29 October, I89O. (DCR0:D/G0/74). 
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However, a f t e r an enquiry to Franklin H i l t o n , the manager at Bolckow's, 
Jenkins was disappointed to f i n d that there was not the saving he anticipated, 
(79) 
especially i n manual labour. v ' Fourteen months l a t e r , however, Jenkins was 
more favourable toward mechanical stoking, probably because of f u r t h e r increases 
i n labour costs and the cost of coal. He enquired of W.H. Hedley, the Chief Viewer, 
the f e a s i b i l i t y of supplying 700 tons of small coals per week, as he was 
considering the question of applying mechanical stokers to a range of twelve new 
boilers at the Angle M i l l . His conversion had been achieved because of the 
performance of four mechanically stoked double-flued Adamson boilers which 
consumed i n f e r i o r coal i n smaller quantities and gave larger volumes of steam 
than hand-fired boilers using a better class of c o a l . ^ ^ 
Since a l l the ingots and slabs had to be heated, before being cogged or 
r o l l e d , i n furnaces f i r e d by coal, any savings here were a c t i v e l y sought. A 
patent coal economizer and regenerator was brought to Consett 1 s notice by 
(8l) 
A. Anderson, but nothing appears to have been done. ' A few months l a t e r , 
Wm. Jenkins did i n s t r u c t C. Farnaby, the m i l l manager, to arrange f o r the 
i n s t a l l a t i o n of a heating furnace offered by Mr. T.S. F o r s t e r . ^ 2 ^ Thus the 
search f o r input savers continued, whilst the cost of coal remained high during 
1893 ; however when costs began to subside i n 1894 so did the apparent int e r e s t 
i n new equipment. Mechanical stoking was c e r t a i n l y adopted on a large scale i n 
the Angle M i l l s , and although i t i s d i f f i c u l t to ascertain what improvements were 
made to heating furnaces & c , the examples do show that the Company was. aware of 
i t s competitive environment, and reacted to protect its competitive position. 
(79) Wm. Jenkins to J. Procter & Co., 1 August, 1891P(DCR0 : D/CO/77). 
(80) Wm. Jenkins to W.H. Hedley, 1 October, 1892. (LCRO : D/C0/82). 
(81) Wm. Jenkins to A. Anderson, 21 December, l891.(DCRO : D/CO/79). 
(82) Wm. Jenkins to C. Parnaby, 10 February, 1892. (DCRO : D/CO/79). 
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The plate m i l l s were less obviously improved but Jenkins was a l e r t to the 
new developments. The Company's most d i f f i c u l t problem i n t h i s area of manufacture 
was increasing capacity, because the r e l a t i v e l y scarce input was the land on 
which to b u i l d or expand the m i l l s . This may at f i r s t seem a strange predicament 
i n west Airham, but the problem was due to the unsuitable topography, which 
l i m i t e d the a v a i l a b i l i t y of sites f o r constructing large m i l l s . To the west 
the land was rendered unsuitable bacause of i t s use f o r dumping slag, and the 
drop down to the Derwent Valley. On the east side the township of Consett 
l i m i t e d any growth i n that d i r e c t i o n . Furthermore the heavy nature of some of 
the constructions necessitated sound foundations, and i n some areas around the 
works t h i s was d i f f i c u l t because of the honeycomb of old coal workings. 
The problem could best be overcome by speeding up the production i n the 
ex i s t i n g f a c i l i t i e s and thus increase the output. The m i l l s at Consett were of 
the reversing type, on the pr i n c i p l e introduced by Jonathan Priestman. The 
plates produced by these required to be sheared on a l l sides to reduce them to 
t h e i r specified size. The amount ' of shearing and possibly waste scrap could 
be reduced by the introduction of a 'Universal' m i l l which would have v e r t i c a l as 
well as horizontal r o l l s , which would r o l l the edges of the plate to s i z e . ^ ^ 
The 'Universal' m i l l had been invented as early as 1829 but was not put i n t o 
operation i n B r i t a i n u n t i l 1878, when one was erected at Samuelson's B r i t t a n i a 
Works. During 1889 James Riley put one down at the Blochairn works of the Steel 
Company of Scotland/ ' and Consett began to take notice. Jenkins had 
acquired the patent f o r the Adams and Bealey Universal M i l l i n the Autumn of I889, 
(83) H.J. Skelton, Economics of Iron and Steel, (London 1924, 2nd Ed), pp.298-99. 
(84) Carr and Taplin, op.cit.,p . l 6 0 . 
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f o r £ 5 0 0 . / ^ Taut i n his customary cautious manner he wanted to have 
information on the m i l l ' s performance before he committed the Company. Jenkins 
f i r s t t r i e d to f i n d out details of Riley's progress with the m i l l through the 
Company's Glasgow agent, A.D. T o l m i e , ^ ^ but t h i s cannot have been f r u i t f u l 
f o r three months l a t e r he wrote to E.F. Martin at Dowlaisi 
" I t i s whispered that you have actually been to see Riley's progress, and 
your Engineer Mr. Fattinson with you and i f you have had some 
insight i n t o Mr. Riley's progress you w i l l now be better able to 
proceed on your own account, but clear l y I have no r i g h t to ask you what 
you have seen, nor do I wish to press f o r t h i s unless you can f e e l that 
you can volunteer to t e l l me what there i s i n the way of new features i n 
the matter, i n the same way as I have t o l d you a l l I know from the beginning. 
At your convenience perhaps you w i l l drop me a word or two about t h i s 
Universal M i l l b u s i n e s s . " ^ ) 
Martin i n f a c t had not been to Glasgow but did furnish as much information 
as he was able to help Jenkins. However nothing fu r t h e r was done, and when the 
works were described i n 1893, there was no mention of Universal m i l l s . 
An alternative method of quickening production was the three high m i l l , and 
th i s was i n f a c t t r i e d at Consett i n 1887-1888 i n one of the l i g h t plate m i l l s , 
but the technique was abandoned. Jenkins however was s t i l l i n 1891 open minded 
on the question and conceded the arrangements i n the m i l l had not been i d e a l . 
However he f e l t that the most suitable practice f o r heavy work was the two high 
(85) Directors' Minute. 8 October, I889, p.129. (DCRO ,:. D/CO/34). 
(86) Wm. Jenkins to A.D. Tolmie, 13 November,I889. (DCRO : D/CO/70). 
(87) Wm. Jenkins to E.P. Martin, 26 February,1890. (DCRO : D/CO/72). 
(88) Wm. Jenkins to E.P. Martin, 14 September, 1891. (DCRO : D/CO/77). 
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reversing m i l l , despite.American claims of success with the three high m i l l i n 
a l l classes of work. This was not a purely B r i t i s h view eit h e r , f o r i n 1902 
R.M.Daelen observed that German practice favoured the two high m i l l f o r heavy 
w o r k / 8 9 ) 
Jenkins was l i k e many other makers, bound by the plant he had andthis 
l i m i t e d the range of adapt a b i l i t y . 
. . . . " I may say t h i s , that i f we, at Consett, were to begin afresh 
again f o r laying down a new plant f o r steel plates f o r what I would c a l l 
shipbuilding and b o i l e r plates, plus heavy and wide plates, we should do 
something as follows. 
" I n the matter of l i g h t e r plates f o r shipbuilding we would erect a 
three high m i l l with such arrangements as we are i n our experience thinking 
of, but i n addition to the three, high m i l l , we should add a subsidiary 
pair of two high r o l l s through which the plates would pass, as a f i n i s h i n g 
s a l t . For the l a t t e r l i g h t e r m i l l we should look f o r r o l l s 7'0" x 26" 
diameter. 
"For a heavier m i l l - that i s f o r heavier plates f o r shipbuilding or f o r 
b o i l e r plates we i n our judgement, should lay down a strong pair of reversing 
engines with a pair of r o l l s f o r roughing and f i n i s h i n g the 10-x 6 plates, 
but added to the l a t t e r , a pa i r of 8 - 0 c h i l l r o l l s f o r r o l l i n g ship-
building plates of ordinary heavy sizes. n^Q) 
I t seems that once again space l i m i t e d the options open to the Company, as 
well as other heavy ca p i t a l expenditure commitments, and consequently the m i l l s 
(89) R.M. Daelen, "Progress i n Steelworks Practice i n Germany since 1880" 
Journal of the Ir o n and Steel I n s t i t u t e . 1902 I I . p.53. 
(90) Wm. Jenkins to E.P. Martin, 28 September l891.(DCR0 : D/CO/78). 
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suffered. 
Consett was s t r i v i n g to improve the handling f a c i l i t i e s i n the Plate m i l l s , 
but i n th i s i t , w.a6 troubled by allegations of patent infringement - Jenkins 
was adamant that there had been no piracy: 
"What I f e e l i s that movable platforms and l i v e r o l l e r s have existed long 
before the date of your patent; they have been i n use f o r 20 years or more, 
but as stated above I would l i k e to know what the precise deta i l s of your claim 
are." <»> 
Jenkins' suspicions were confirmed by H.W. H o l l i s of the Weardale Iron and 
Steel Company, who t e s t i f i e d that the traversing platform, the source of the 
(92) 
allegation, had been i n use f o r twenty years or more at Codnor Park. ' 
This phase came to an end with the retirementbf Wm. Jenkins and the death of 
Richard Evans. They were succeeded by George Ainsworth, who rose from chemist 
to General Manager, and Henry Holliday who had been the General Manager of the Leeds 
Steel Works, Ltd., and had also spent some twenty years working under Edward 
W i l l i a m s / 9 3 ^ 
I n 1889 Consett had reached the zenith of i t s development, when i t was the 
largest plate m i l l i n the world. However Jenkins was shortly afterwards 
complaining of the l i m i t a t i o n s imposed upon him by old plant. Space f o r f u r t h e r 
expansion was not rea d i l y available, and many of the new techniques could not be 
(91) Wm. Jenkins to Franklin H i l t o n (Bolckow Vaughan), 18 March, 1890.(DCRO :D/CO/72) 
(92) Wm. Jenkins to H.W. H o l l i s , 13 November,1889. (DCRO : D/CO/70). 
(93) Directors' Minute. 15 May, 1894, pp.179-180.(DCRO : D/CO/35). 
(94) Wm. Jenkins to the Editor, 'Pittsburgh Times', P.A. HS.A. 22 November,1889. 
(DCRO : D/CO/70). Jenkins wrote correcting a statement appearing i n the 
Pittsburgh Times that the Homestead plant was the largest plate m i l l i n the 
world. On the basis of the figures quoted Consett was larger. 
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(95) p r o f i t a b l y adopted, except i n new custom b u i l t p l a n t s . s y " Relocation was never 
seriously considered f o r the plant as a whole; the only p o s s i b i l i t y explored 
was the removal of the blastfurnace plant to Lerwenthaugh. This l e f t the Company 
with the decision of whether to p u l l down old plant and reconstruct, or whether 
j u s t to overhaul and patch i t up. 
Wm. Jenkins had reached the b a r r i e r imposed upon future innovation and 
investment. George Ainsworth f a i l e d to overcome i t . The problems and pressures 
endured by Jenkins and his s t a f f took a high t o l l on the management resources of 
the Consett Iron Company. 
(95) J . C. Carr and W. Taplin, op.ctt. p. 160. 
- 233 -
1894-1914. Delay and Indecision. 
The period between 1894-1914 was characterised by large p r o f i t s and 
dividends, ostensibly the trappings of business success. However the 
f i n a n c i a l performance concealed a developing malaise. The Company was 
confronted by a.j number of unprecedented setbacks, such as the f a i l u r e s to 
secure another i r o n ore source, deteriorating labour relations i n t h e i r 
c o l l i e r i e s , and less, obvious, but equally pervasive, the inadequate 
replacement of plant. 
The Board showed reluctance to procede with capital development 
projects, and a tendency to modify them to such an extent that they became 
merely piecemeal replacements. The primary reason f o r t h i s was that 
p r o f i t would have to be foregone through reconstruction and disruption. 
Not u n t i l 1910 was there any positive move to carry out a whole hearted 
programme of reconstruction. The coincidence of the renewal of the lease 
from the Ecclesiastical Commissioners and the proposed reconstruction i s 
evidence of the Board's lack of int e r e s t i n a new plant, f o r the plan could 
not be undertaken without the security of a long lease. 
The balance between p r o f i t and replacement of ca p i t a l f e l l f i r m l y on 
the side of p r o f i t . George Ainsworth may have lacked the force of character 
to persuade the Board of the necessity of replacement, and accepted 
repeated postponement. I n 1895 "Mr. Ainsworth referred generally to the 
d e s i r a b i l i t y of improving our plate m i l l capacity, more p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
the d i r e c t i o n of increased speed and increased strength of r o l l s . He was 
not yet prepared with a d e f i n i t e recommendation, and had hesitated to bring 
the matter forward because of the probable heavy outlay. I t was, however, 
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desirable to bear i n mind that before long i t would be necessary to 
obtain either an e n t i r e l y new m i l l , or to remodel extensively one of the 
exi s t i n g m i l l s . The matter was l e f t over f o r mature c o n s i d e r a t i o n . " ^ 
Mature consideration meant i n e f f e c t that the matter was brushed aside u n t i l 
i t became more pressing. Almost two years a f t e r his o r i g i n a l tentative 
suggestions Ainsworth introduced the matter i n more urgent terms, describing 
No. 2 M i l l as being i n a 'rickety condition'. The alternatives of a 
complete overhaul or new m i l l were once again discussed and: "After very 
f u l l y considering the question he (Ainsworth) had decided to recommend the 
overhauling of the M i l l at a t o t a l cost of about £10,000, to be spread over 
(2) 
a period as circumstances might d i c t a t e . " v ' And so the pattern of delay 
and half measures was set; but the consequences were blurred by the p r o f i t 
and loss account and the harvest of ine f f i c i e n c y was not reaped u n t i l a f t e r 1914• 
Though the period a f t e r 1880 was not marked by any revolutionary new technical 
developments, there was a number of s i g n i f i c a n t innovations i n the operation 
of the e x i s t i n g techniques. I n America, enormous advances had been made i n 
blastfurnace practice, beyond those claimed by Potter i n 1887; by 1901 the 
best practice was producing 500 tons of pig i r o n from one furnace, per day. 
Blast pressures were commonly four to f i v e times greater than i n B r i t i s h 
furnaces, and there was no ind i c a t i o n by 1900 that Consett had advanced past 
Ah lbs per sq. inch - about normal i n B r i t a i n . The pig casting and breaking 
machine had been widely adopted i n the U.S.A., as had devices to enable a 
continuous system of charging and tapping, without c u t t i n g o f f the b l a s t . ^ 
(1) Directors' Minute. 26 July, 1895. p.110.(DCRO : D/CO/36). 
(2) Directors' Minute. 18 May, 1897. p.175. (DCRO : D/CO/37). 
(3) Carr & Taplin, op.cit.,pp. 208-210. 
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I n 1894 B.H. Thwaite had patented a gas engine which u t i l i z e d surplus 
gas from the blastfurnaces; B r i t i s h firms on the whole ignored i t because of 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n cleaning the gas. These engines had a wide range of 
application i n the i r o n and steelworks and effected greater savings i n f u e l . 
The continued assertion that the cheapness of f u e l was a retarding factor 
i n B r i t a i n , i n the Light of Consett's own experience i n the early twentieth 
(4) 
century seems a very limp excuse. 
Another important development brought i n t o the public glare i n 1894 was 
the adoption of e l e c t r i c i t y f o r d r i v i n g engines as well as producing 
l i g h t i n i r o n and steelworks. Apart from Dorman, Long & Co. Selby-Bigge 1s 
(5) 
exhortations f e l l upon stony ground f o r several y e a r s . w / At Consett 
the working areas around the blastfurnaces were l i t by e l e c t r i c lamps, 
but nothing was done to extend the use to d r i v i n g m i l l engines, despite the 
considerable energy expended by the Company i n introducing e l e c t r i c i t y on a 
large scale to t h e i r p i t s up to 1914* 
I n the early part of the twentieth century the technology of gas engines 
and e l e c t r i c i t y converged and i n 1908 a uniform e l e c t r i c i t y supply g r i d 
(1) 
was established on the North-east coast. 1 There can be l i t t l e doubt that 
e l e c t r i c a l l y driven motors would be more economical i n steel m i l l s than yards 
(4) See Chapter V, section on adoption of by-product ovens. 
(5) D. Selby-Bigge, " E l e c t r i c i t y as a Motive power i n the I r o n andSteel 
Industries" Journal of the Iron and Steel I n s t i t u t e . I894. I . pp.252-291. 
(6) Wm. Jenkins, Description of the Consett Iron Work3, p.30. 
(7) B.H. Thwaite, "The Economic D i s t r i b u t i o n of El e c t r i c Power from Blastfurnace, 
Journal of the Iron & Steel I n s t i t u t e . , 1907. 
C.H. Merz, "Power Supply and i t s e f f e c t on the Industries of N.E. Coast." 
Journal of the Iron and Steel I n s t i t u t e . 1908. 
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of lagged pipes and steam engines, but i n Consett's case such a innovation 
would probably have necessitated new m i l l s - thus the piecemeal policy adopted 
by the Board was a l l the more regrettable, f o r i t t i e d the company to investment 
i n an increasingly obsolete technology. 
I n the steelmaking process attention was directed towards a continuous 
open-hearth method, an end achieved by the t i l t i n g furnace developed by 
Benjamin Talbot i n B r i t a i n . Talbot was the managing director of the new 
Cargo Fleet Iron Company where the technique was adopted i n the reconstructed 
works i n 1905-06. ' With t h i s continuous process emerged a completely new 
scale of furnace sizes, with capacities of 175-200,tons. By increasing the 
size the amount of heat l o s t through radiation was reduced thus e f f e c t i n g a 
(9) 
most important economy i n f u e l . * ' Consett stuck to f i x e d open-hearth furnaces 
and between 1894-1914 increased t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l capacity from 20 tons to 35 
tons, but t h i s was s t i l l below the maximum capacities which had been introduced 
at Dorraan, Long & Co. 
Another f u e l saving development pioneered i n the la t e 1890's was the 
charging of the open^hearth furnace with molten metal. James Riley 
reported on his success to the I r o n and Steel I n s t i t u t e i n 1900 and neither 
he nor the two Welsh firms who adopted the method had found any serious 
d i f f i c u l t y / 1 0 ^  I n 1897, "Mr. Ainswath explained that he was desirous of 
experimenting with the use of f l u i d metal instead of pigs at the Melting 
Furnaces. He estimated that such a t r i a l he had i n view would cost f o r 
(8) Carr and Taplin, op*ci.t.,p .2l6. 
(9) H.J. Skelton, Economics of I r o n and Steel, p.232. 
(10) D.L. Burn, op.cit., pp. 202-203. 
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ladles, carriages &c. about £500."v ' This was approved by the Board but 
nothing f u r t h e r i s mentioned about the experiments and i t was not introduced 
on a permanent basis. Perhaps the Consett s t a f f lacked the engineering compet-
ence to i n s t a l l such a system, or maybe they were hindered by the tortuous 
lay out of the plant, and the tap-holes on the blastfurnaces were too 
close to the ground to allow easy charging of the ladles. 
Possibly the area of greatest concern and derision was stee l m i l l 
practice i n B r i t a i n . I n 1901 William Garrett compared B r i t i s h practice most 
unfavourably with that i n the U.S.A. The most s i g n i f i c a n t development was 
probably the application of e l e c t r i c i t y to m i l l engines. However, as 
Consett used two-high reversing m i l l s , t h i s proved an obstacle to the adoption 
of e l e c t r i c power, because of the high cost of the German Ilgner reversing 
(12) 
motor. N ' A suitable reversing motor was not developed u n t i l 1906. However 
Andrew Lamberton, of Coatbridge a m i l l builder of world-wide reknown, 
s t i l l f e l t that there was l i t t l e between steam engines and e l e c t r i c motors. 
I t was only i n integrated plants with e l e c t r i c i t y cheaply produced by large 
(11) 
blastfurnace gas engines that s i g n i f i c a n t economies could be made. J ' Once 
more we t e t u r n to Consett's dilemma of i n s u f f i c i e n t space f o r necessary 
reconstruction. I n a report on the capacity of the steelworks i n 1905, George 
Ainsworth r e i t e r a t e d the f a m i l i a r complaint about the congested conditions i n 
the works, which not only made extensions d i f f i c u l t but even i n t e r f e r r e d with 
the normal running of the plant. The only alternative appeared to be relocation; 
i n 1899 James Scott had planned a blastfurnace plant f o r Derwenthaugh and 
(11) Directors' Minute. 20 July 1897 p.91.(DCR0; B/CO/37^. 
(12) Carr & Taplin, op.cit.,p.226. 
(13) I b i d . 
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borings shov/ed that the s i t e was sound enough to withstand the weight of any-
building or p l a n t . N o t h i n g f u r t h e r was done, mainly because the saving 
i n cost between Derwenthaugh and Consett was i n s i g n i f i c a n t , because of the 
railway hauls, and also because the Derwenthaugh s i t e was also i n s u f f i c i e n t l y 
large to accomodate a f u l l y integratediron and steelworks. 
What then did Consett achieve i n plant improvements between 1894-1914? 
I n 1897 approval was grant d f o r the thorough overhaul of No.2. M i l l , 
and this was effected between I898 - 1904. Much of the e f f o r t was directed 
at improving the steam power by replacing c y l i n d r i c a l boilers with Lancashire 
b o i l e r s , and also by the i n s t a l l a t i o n of two water tube boilers of the 
(15) 
Babcock and Wilcox type. ' The work was spasmodic because of the 
int e r r u p t i o n of booming trade and the renewal of the m i l l ' s foundations was 
not undertaken u n t i l 1904 when the trade i n plates had s l a c k e n e d . T h e 
business prosperity which had i t s roots as early as 1897 and went through u n t i l 
1902 proved an effective brake on most developments/since the works were 
stretched to f u l l capacity. There can be no doubt'that AinBWorth was aware of 
the shortcomings of the plant f o r i n 1900 he paid a v i s i t to Belgian Steel works 
to monitor t h e i r developments and the following year, Henry Holliday v i s i t e d 
the U.S.A. to report on the causes of the competition from American works, and 
(17) 
then Ainsworth and Scott also went to v i s i t American steelworks. ' The 
principal aim of the t r i p s was probably the examination of blastfurnace practice 
because i n 1897 Ainsworth put forward proposals f o r rearrangement of the blast 
(15) Directors' Minute, 
(16) Directors' Minute, 
(17) Directors' Minutes 
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engines, boilers and other f a c i l i t i e s at the blastfurnaces. The whole scheme 
he estimated would cost about £100,000 over several years. Though i t was agreed 
(18) 
to i n p r i n c i p l e f i n a l judgement was yet... again postponed. ' The timing 
i s i n i t s e l f s i g n i f i c a n t f o r i t marks the introduction of three eight hour 
s h i f t s to blastfurnace working, and though the blastfurnacemen's union undertook 
to encourage t h e i r members to greater e f f o r t , there was no noticeable 
(19) 
improvement i n labour productivity and thus costs rose. 
After the proposal of 1897 operations a t the blastfurnaces were so 
hectic f o r the next four years that no alterations could be undertaken. 
Ainsworth was s t i l l aware of the necessity to reduce the labour component 
i n cost and he v i s i t e d several works i n 1901 to inspect p i g breaking 
machines, and a machine was offered to Consett which would have saved 1-jjfd -
l f d per ton i n labour costs. 
Later i n 1901 Consett engaged the services of an American blastfurnace 
s p e c i a l i s t , Frank C. Roberts, to advise them upon the reconstruction of t h e i r 
plant - his fee was $100 per day and t r a v e l l i n g expenses. His f i r s t plan, 
submitted at the end of the year, was considered unsatisfactory and 
unworkable, but his l a t e r proposals to dismantle the e x i s t i n g plant and replace 
(21) 
i t with four furnaces of the American type was adopted. ' 
At f i r s t only two new furnaces were to be put up, and a contract was 
given to Messrs. Westgarth, English & Co. to provide the blowing engines f o r 
(18) Directors' Minute. 7 August, 1897, p.198. (DCROlD/CO/37) 
(19) G.T. Jones, Increasing Returns. (Cambridge, 1933 ) p.127. 
(20) Directors' Minute. 30 March, 1901,p.20. (DCRO : D/CO/39). 
(21) Directors' Minutes.. 4 March,1902, p.93. (DCRO : D/CO/39)» -2 August, 
1902, p.123. (DCRO : D/CO/39). 
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£22,000 . The project was barely nine months old when Ainsworth cancelled i t 
on the grounds that i t was more costly than anticipated, and there were 
serious d i f f i c u l t i e s i n keeping the works i n operation during reconstruction 
which was l i k e l y to be prolonged. He estimated that the economies did not 
warrant the outlay. The whole scheme was mutilated u n t i l i t was no more 
(22) 
than a patching up of the e x i s t i n g plant. 
The old egg-ended boilers were replaced by more e f f i c i e n t Babcdck 
bo i l e r s , w h i l s t Richardson, Westgarth supplied two new blowing engines at the 
end of 1904• The new water pumping u n i t also i n s t a l l e d during 1904 was 
e l e c t r i c a l l y powered. The following year i t was decided to construct an 
eighth blastfurnace so that the weekly output of pig i r o n could be raised to 
meet the demand of the steelworks, a step made necessary by the f a i l u r e 
(23) 
of the modified plant to l i v e up to George Ainsworth 1s predictions. 
Whether or not the f a u l t f o r t h i s shortcoming lay with the Richardson, Westgarth 
blowing engines, the contract f o r the engines f o r No.8. went to Parsons & Co. 
fo r turbine blowing e n g i n e s . F u r t h e r minor improvements were effected to 
the blowing power and temperature of the blast by the addition of a 
Sturtevant fan i n 1908 to increase the draught to the stoves of furnaces, Nos. 
1 
5, 6 and 7» The persistence of the s p a t i a l problem pervadeaevery attempt by 
the Company to revolutionise the. Consett plant. Even the/construction of 
the 8th furnace posed insufferable problems of lack of space. Only the most 
radi c a l programme of demolition and replacement could have removed t h i s 
(22) Directors' Minute. 5 May, 1903, p.170. (DCR0 : D/CO/39). 
(23) Directors' Minute, 12 April ,1904, pp.224-225. (DCR0 : D/CO/39):- I n t h i s 
Ainsworth predicted a weekly output of 5,400 tons from six blastfurnaces 
However i n 1905 the capacity achieved was only 4,772 tons per week. 
Directors Minute. 5 September, 1905,pp.77-78.(DCR0 :D/C0/40). 
(24) Directors' Minute. 6 February, 1906, p.123. (DCR0 : D/CO/40). 
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constraint upon the growth of Consett 1s output. However despite large p r o f i t s 
such a programme would have necessitated a cessation of operation 
(thus foregoing l u c r a t i v e p r o f i t s ) and possibly even large borrowing. 
The equation didn't work, the foregone revenue and the disruption always 
outweighed the benefits. I n view of the evident disadvantages of the Consett 
s i t e i t i s surprising that more attention was not given to the alternative 
r 
of relocation* Whether t h i s was because of a l t u i s t i c concern-for the economic 
and social well-being of Consett as a community or f o r purely economic reasons, 
such as cheaper f u e l , proximity to markets &c. i t i s impossible t o conclude. 
By 1910 the Company appear more o p t i m i s t i c , having negotiated a favourable 
renewed lease f o r 42 years from the Ecclesiastical Commissioners on the large 
tracts of land around Consett. This was .the preliminary step i n establishing 
a base f o r the reconstruction of i t s manufacturing a c t i v i t i e s . The 
Company was already engaged i n assorted negotiation to secure i t s hematite 
ore supply, and was carrying out extensive innovations i n t h e i r coke making 
departments. I t - proposed to add to t h i s the redevelopment of it& 
blastfurnace plant along the lines of i t s new No.8 furnace, to extend 
the e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n programme to the Works, to open a new c o l l i e r y at 
Crookhall and carry out a bui l d i n g programme f o r the housing of its workmen. 
The t o t a l cost of these proposals was estimated a t £600,000 I t was 
certai n l y an ambitious scheme and would have put Consett back amongst the 
leaders i n the technology of the industry. 
The renewal of the lease was c r u c i a l , f o r the raison d'etre of the 
Consett Iron Company i n Consett was s t i l l the abundant coal supplies which 
(25) Directors' Minute. 1 November, 1910 pp.97-98. (DCR0 : D/CO/42) 
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were to be exploited by the new Crookhall C o l l i e r y . The Board's di s i n t e r e s t 
i n renewing the lease before 1910 therefore indicates that they never r e a l l y 
contemplated any major renewal before then. Once they were assured of a 
renewed long lease they could contemplate the c a p i t a l outlay which would 
have to be w r i t t e n o f f over a long time period 1. Coal was s t i l l the dominant 
a 
factor i n location, and with secure coal supply the pressure to look f o r an 
( 26) 
alternative location vaporised. ' 
Such a large scale scheme would take a considerable time to prepare, 
and unfortunately Consett was. to be thwarted by the declaration of War i n 
1914 and an inevitable postponment of a l l but the most necessary c a p i t a l 
investments. Since 1894 there had been l i t t l e investment of any consequence 
except at the blastfurnaces and that had only been a hal f measure. The m i l l s 
were f o r a l l intents and purposes being operated with the antiquated 
technology of the 1880's, whi l s t the melting furnaces were already suboptimal. 
The slowing down i n the rate of technical development may be explained 
by two factors which emerged i n t h i s period which had not been present i n 
the 1870 - 1894 span. The f i r s t was the reversal i n the secular price 
movement, from a downward trend, to an upward one. This led to a favourable 
s i t u a t i o n f o r employers i n the employer-employee relationship, f o r wages 
were i n most departments of i r o n and steelworks automatically adjusted by 
s l i d i n g scales, which had a three month lag b u i l t i n . Thus when prices were 
r i s i n g the wages of labour were r e l a t i v e l y low, that i s the wage paid had 
been f i x e d by prices during the previous quarter, but as price rose wages 
(26) R.W. Cooper to Sir Lindsay Wood, (Ecclesiastical Commissioners),15 
November 1910 pp.99-100.(DCRO : D/cO/42). 
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remained f i x e d f o r a quarter ensuring an increasing margin to the employer, 
and thus a disincentive to substitute other factors f o r labour. This was 
i n contrast to the s i t u a t i o n between I873-I896 when there had been a secular 
price f a l l , which operated i n the opposite manner, putting pressure upon 
management from the labour sector. 
The second new condition which prevailed was the marked deceleration i n 
the growth of output of steel plates. After a period of excess demand i n the 
1880's the st e e l industry extended i t s capacity to meet the demand. This 
led to the alternatives of price war or collusion, and the makers of steel 
plates and angles opted f o r the l a t t e r . The Scots were as i n the mid-l880'>s 
the f i r s t to form an association f o r the protection of t h e i r markets and they 
(28^ 
were joined i n 1904 by the makers i n the North east. ' The Association 
was durable, extending to angles i n 1906 and l a s t i n g i n t a c t u n t i l the outbreak 
of war. The presence of monopoly would have provided a disincentive to 
innovation since price would no longer equal marginal cost as under a 
perfectly competitive industry. 
The Company had by 1914 shown signs of staidness and o l d age, and t h i s 
was a t t r i b u t a b l e i n part to a less f o r c e f u l management, which gladly embraced 
the comfort of collusion rather than competition, but more p a r t i c u l a r l y to an 
external f a c t o r , the slowing down i n the growth rate of the market f o r steel 
ship-plates. 
(28) D.L. Burn, op.cit.,p.278. 
CHAPTER VII 
The Markets for Iron and Steel 
As the name the Consett Iron Company suggests, the principal purpose of 
the firm was the production and sale of iron, and later steel, products. The . 
uses to which iron and steel could be put were manifold. Consett, however, 
was only concerned with the manufacture of r a i l s , ship-plates, and; angles; 
the rail-trade was abruptly terminated i n I876 and from then on the Company 
was inextricably linked to the demand generated by the shipbuilding industry. 
When the iron r a i l trade collapsed i n I876, due to the competition from 
steel, the Company moved quickly into production of ship-plates. This was a 
sector i n which demand was growing, especially on the North-east coast, because 
of rapid technological changes i n shipping. Consett's own technical progress 
was to a certain degree fashioned by the demands of its market. In the l880's 
the change over to steel was i n part induced by the'shipbuilders acceptance of that 
material. By the 1900's the excess capacity of the shipbuilders and the stabilisat-
ion of the size of the market drove the steelmakers to collusive action. 
This chapter w i l l trace the disappearance of r a i l manufacture, the 
background to the demand for shipbuilding materials, the commercial methods, of 
the Company, and f i n a l l y the trend from competition to collusion. 
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1. The Iron Rail Trade 
Consett had close ties with the Railway Companies, especially the 
North Eastern Railway which had absorbed the numerous independent lines i n 
the North-east during the late l850's and early sixties. Consequently the 
North Eastern Railway was by far Consett1 s.'. largest customer, regularly 
purchasing over half the weekly output of about 600 tons of r a i l s . ^ 
Consett produced both l i g h t (56 lbs.) and heavy (82 lbs) r a i l s , the 
lat t e r being mainly for the use of main-line railways, whilst the l i g h t r a i l s 
were sold to colliery owners and other industrial entrepreneurs, such as 
the Earl of Durham and Lord Londonderry. Consett's output reached i t s peak 
i n the year ending June 1871 when 32,027 tons of r a i l s were manufactured. 
From 1871 there was a gradual decline i n the number of r a i l s made, and a 
relative increase i n the production of iron ship-plates. 
TABLE VII.1 
The Output of Rails at Consett 1865 - 1876 
Year* Output Year Output Year Output 
1865 13,893 tons. 1869 21,179 tons. 1873 25,858 tons. 
1866 18,901 tons. 1870 30,152 tons. 1874 29,321 tons. 
1867 11,782 tons. 1871 32,027 tons. 1875 28,583 tons. 
1868 14,502 tons. 1872 24,680 tons. 1876 17,727 tons. 
* ending June. 
Source: Profit & Loss Accounts. 1873-93 (DCRO : D/CO/89); Production & Stock 
Book, 1869-1888 (DCRO : D/C0/l07). 
(10) Production and Stock Book. 1869-1888.(DCRO : D/co/l07). 
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The reason for the trend away from r a i l production to iron ship-plates 
is not d i f f i c u l t to ascertain - there was a far greater margin of p r o f i t 
per ton of iron plate, than per ton of r a i l , even though there was l i t t l e 
difference i n the cost of production. Thus by changing to plate production 
even i n the relatively prosperous years for r a i l sales, Consett were earning 
a far higher return upon their working capital at least. 
TABLE V I I . 2 
Comparative P r o f i t a b i l i t y of Rails and Plates, 
Year Ending June 1873-June 1877 
Year Cost 
Rails* 
Price Pr o f i t Cost 
Plates* 
Price Profit 
1873 £8.04s. 2d £?.l6s. Id £1.lis.lid £8.18s. 9d £11.07s.lld £2.09s 2 
1874 £7.07s. Id £10.Is.lid £2.14s.l0d £8.09s. 8d £11.19s.3d £3.09s 7c 
1875 £7.04s. 6d £8.16s. 9d £1.12s. 3d £7.06s. 5d £ 9.08s.4d £2.01sIB 
1876 £6.13s. Od £6.13s. 6d £0.00s. 6d £7.01s. Id £ 7.13s. 2d £0.12s 03 
1877 £5.17s. 9d £6.04s. 5d £0.063. 8d £6.09s. 2d £7.01s. 4d £0.12s. 2c 
* per ton 
Source: P r o f i t and LOBS Accounts. 1873-1893. (DCR0 : D/CO/89). 
Between 1871 - 1875 the make of plates rose from 33,669 tons to 
53,494 tons whilst that of r a i l s dropped', from i t s peak of 32,027 tons to 
27,624 tons. 
Apart from the North Eastern Railway Consett's other large railway customers 
were the Stockton and Darlington, which had formerly been one of the 
Company's largest creditors, the Blythe and Tyne, and the Caledonian; these 
were a l l regular buyers of iron r a i l s from Consett. Most other customers took 
orders over three or six months, and there were occassional small orders. The 
Company's overseas sales were hot at a l l large, the chief destinations being 
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Australia and France, with smaller quantities going to North America and 
(2) 
Russia/ ' 
Prom the cost and price data i t seems clear that Consett transferred 
out of the sector i n which there was the most competition into an 
area where demand was outstripping supply. This stood i.t'! i n good stead 
when the iron r a i l trade disintegrated i n 1876, making easier the complete 
change over to iron plate production. 
Growth and Change in British Shipbuilding 
Consett succeeded to the good reputation i n the manufacture of ship-
plates established by -its forerunners. By I864 the construction of iron 
ships was firmly established along the River Tyne, and on the Wear William 
Pile's shipyard employed 2000 men i n building iron ships i n 1863.^ 
Further south at Hartlepool and on Teesside ship-building had grown quickly 
since the mid-1830's, the f i r s t iron ships appear to have been h u i l t by Pile, 
Spence and Company at West Hartlepool about 1855*^ and the f i r s t one 
launched on the Tees was i n 1854 by.the Iron Shipbuilding Company at South 
Stockton/ 5^ 
So long as timber remained the predominant material i n the construction 
of ships the shipbuilding industry had been ubiquitous, the output of each 
(6) 
centre being closely proportionate to the trade of the particular port. ' 
(2) Production and Stock Book, 1869^ 1888.(PCRO : D/C0/107). 
(3) D. Dougan, The History of North East Shipbuilding. (London, 1968). p.44 
(4) R. Wood, West Hartlepool; The Rise and Development of a Victorian New 
Town (West Hartlepool, 1967) p.72. 
(5) Thomas Richmond, The Local Records of Stockton and the Neighbourhood 
(London 1868) p.222. 
(6) S. Pollard, The Economic History of British Shipbuilding. 1870-1914 
(University of London Ph.D., 1951 Unpublished), p.213. 
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However, with the development of the iron resources of the North-east, originally 
on a small scale at Wilson, Losh and Bell at Walker on the Tyne, then at 
Consett and later i n South Durham and Tees-side, the developed industries 
at Newcastle and Sunderland and the nascent industries of the Hartlepools 
and Tees were driven forward i n a surge of innovation. 
Apart from the favourable movement i n factor prices, against timber 
(7) 
and i n favour of iron, ' the advances i n steam technology i n the second 
half of the nineteenth century which induced the substitution of steam for s a i l , 
reinforced the trend towards the construction of iron ships. ' In an 
atmosphere of a growing demand for iron b u i l t cargo vessels, shipbuilders 
and men of enterprise i n the North-east were able to take advantage of the 
ava i l a b i l i t y of the iron and coal resources i n the region. There was a 
large element of inter-relatedness between the development of iron-making 
and shipbuilding. 
In the mid-years of the 1860's a number of important innovations,took 
plaice i n shipbuilding, the most important being the development and general 
adoption of the compound engine. This extended the range within which steam 
(9) 
vessels were competitive with s a i l . w ' More particularly on the North east 
Coast some builders were making significant strides forward i n the design of 
iron ships, which were i n the early days designed on much the same pattern and 
principles as wooden vessels. In 1869 the f i r s t well-decked steamer, designed 
by George Pyman was b u i l t at West Hartlepool, and after Plimsoll's 
Merchant Shipping Act (1876) this type of vessel was able to replace the old 
wooden barques. 
(7) I b i d . p.24. 
(8) C.K. Hurley, "The Shift from sailing ships to steamships, 1850-1890: a 
study i n technological change and i t s diffusion." i n D.N. McCloskey, 
Essays on a Mature Economy (London, 1971) p.218 
(9) S. Pollard, op.cit.,p.325. 
(10) R. Wood, op.cit., p.62. 
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Between 1864-1872 the tonnage of shipping launched on the '^ yne and Wear 
rose from 123,987 tons to 218,497 tons, whilst there was equally rapid 
progress made around the Tees as builders such as Denton, Gray & Co. expanded 
and new businesses l i k e Withy, Alexander and Company were established. 
However, the industry suffered during the recession between 1866-69, 
largely precipitated by the collapse of the London Bankers, Overend, 
Gurney and Co. i n 1866. I t was most severe i n West Hartlepool where Pile, 
Spence and Company went bankrupt i n the summer of 1866. However the 
opening of the Suez Canal and the flood of emigrants to North America between 
1869-71 created a fresh optimism amongst ship owners and the prosperity lasted 
through u n t i l 1874• This was an important phase i n the development of 
the North-east's shipbuilding; the post-1866 recession had sounded the death 
knell for private shipbuilders on the Thames, hitherto the single most 
important centre, whilst much of the p r o f i t earned i n the boom of 1869-74 
was ploughed back by the firms on the North east Coast i n the consolidation of 
their y a r d s . T h e builders were also specialising?; the North-east became 
the centre for the construction of tramp ships, or general purpose cargo 
(12) 
vessels. ' 
After 1874 & prolonged depression i n shipbuilding set i n which lasted 
u n t i l the end of 1879• However during the I870's there was a persistent 
endeavour to produce a steel suitable for shipbuilding, and this was achieved 
i n 1875 "by the metallurgists at Terre Noire in Prance. The process was 
eagerly taken up by James Riley at Landore i n South Wales, as i t offered an 
alternative use for the Siemens works, other than a lingering existence i n 
(13) 
the rail-trade. v Shortly afterwards Riley moved to the Steel Company 
(11) S. Pollard, op.cit.,p.328. 
(12) R. Wood, op.cit.,p.64. 
(13) S. Pollard, op.cit.,p.334. 
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of Scotland which "became the f i r s t major producer of steel ship-plates for 
private builders. Although i n 1879 William Denny, the Dumbarton shipbuilder 
expressed doubts about s t e e l , b y 1881 his yard had turned over almost 
entirely to construction of steel vessels. He himself was convinced of the 
(15) 
economy of steel b u i l t ships. ' 
The resurgenoe of prosperity i n 1880 was due partly to the increasing 
acceptance by shipowners of steel as a more than suitable alternative to iron, 
and partly to the adoption of the t r i p l e expansion engine which extended the 
range of steamers, to China and the P a c i f i c . T h e reduction of scantlings 
required i n a ship b u i l t of steel, and the rapidly improving fuel economy 
of the new engines, increased the capacity of the vessel which could be turned 
over to cargo space, and this increased the rate at which existing vessels 
became obsolete. 
The proliferation of one ship companies' during the boom of 1880 - 8 l , and 
the general ease of credit for investment i n shipping had created a massive 
addition to capacity. This i n turn reduced freights and discouraged any further 
building. The depression was particularly severe i n the North-east, 'the 
cradle of cargo vessels,™ and unemployment i n 1885-86 was the worst i n the 
(17) 
shipbuilding industry before 1914.x " Clydeside and Belfast continued to 
receive some orders for the construction of liners and cargo-liners. 
In 1886 the depression began to ease, but there was no sustained recovery 
u n t i l late I887. The following boom was fundamentally of a restocking 
and normal growth nature, for there was no significant upward s h i f t i n freight 
(14) Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute. 1880, I , p.221. 
(15) S. Pollard, op.cit.,p.341. 
(16) Ibid.,p.347. 
(17) Ibid.,p.381. 
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rates. I t s course was spent by 1889 although the work i n hand at the yards did 
not begin to drop u n t i l the middle of 1890 
Because of the stunted character of the 1888-1890 boom, the following 
recession was not particularly sharp, and freight rates declined only very slowly. 
This was also helped i n part by the a c t i v i t y i n liner construction i n 1891-92 
which did not have a great impact upon tramp freights. This factor did however 
lead to a standstill i n launchings of liners i n the ensuing.;:? years, which h i t the 
Clyde 'yards particularly hard. 
In an effort to employ their yards the Clyde builders courted the 
Government to extend their naval programme, and the expectation of large naval 
orders i n 1894 precipitated a false boom, as owners rushed to expand their 
capacity before the Admiralty orders drove prices up. 
A weak recovery from the 1895 depression was recorded during I896, 
instigated partly "by a renewed upward movement of freight rates, and also by 
the nadir i n the price for new ships. This was the beginning of a prolonged 
upward movement i n the a c t i v i t y of the shipbuilding industry which 
culminated with a shortage of shipping space and consequent high freight rates 
brought about by the f l u r r y of military a c t i v i t y i n the Eastern Mediterranean, 
(19") 
the Sudan, the Caribbean, the Philippines and South Africa between l898-1900.v 7 1 
The collapse of the 1900 boom was the f i r s t for which the description of a 
world over-production of tonnage was permissible. The investments and technical 
improvements i n ships and shipyards between 1896-1902 were only par t i a l l y 
j u s t i f i e d by commercial requirements. This resulted i n shipbuilding capacity 
permanently i n excess of the demands of world trade before 1913-^^ 
(18) Ibid.,p.384. 
(19) Ibid.,pp.435-36. 
(20) Ibid., p.465. 
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The recovery which began i n 1905 was unreal, being induced by the low 
price of ships and the desire of the shipowners, who were engaged i n a rate war, . 
to purchase larger and more efficient vessels. The yards were caught between 
the low prices they contracted at, and the raised costs imposed upon them by the 
(21) 
well cartelized steelmakers. ' 
1906 was the peak year i n North-east shipbuilding, with 1,005,148 tons 
of merchant shipping launched, an increase of 434»852 tons over 1892 when the 
(22) 
detailed l i s t s began.v ' In the slump of 1908 the launchings on the North-east 
Coast plummeted to only 355t859 tons. Sunderland was particularly badly 
h i t with 8,000 men put out of work i n the Wear yards by December 19071 and 
(23) 
over half the berths empty i n the North-east i n February 1908. ' Despite 
the slump the North east s t i l l had the three leading yards i n the world, Doxfords', 
Swan Hunter and Armstrong Whitworth, but other firms were less lucky including 
such famous names as Laing's, Palmers' and Robert Stephenson and Company. 
Labour relations also deteriorated with trade; the Wear Conciliation Board 
came to an abrupt end i n 1906, and when the employers t r i e d to enforce a reduction 
of wages at the end of 1907» the shipwrights refused to accept calling a strike 
at the beginning of January 1908. The Employers' Federation replied with a 
lock-out inspite of the men's willingness to submit the case to arbitration, an 
indication of the severity of the trade depression. 
An upturn began i n 1909 as foreign fleets bought second hand Brit i s h ships 
and the Brit i s h owners restocked with new tonnage, encouraged by the low price 
(21) Ibid.,p.468 
(22) D. Dougan, op.cit.,p.223. 
(23) S. Pollard, op.cit.,p .488. 
(24) D. Dougan, op.cit., p.127. 
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of vessels. The recovery uncharacteristically maintained i t impetus, 
without the customary short relapse; probably because of the severity of 
the over-capacity, the owners resisted the temptation to buy when the only 
(25) 
ju s t i f i c a t i o n was low price and not a demand for increased shipping space. 
In 1910 the recovery was interrupted by another lock-out, caused by the 
refusal of some boilermakers to accept the National Working Agreement of 1909 
which was designed to prevent a repercussion of the 1907-08 dispute, where 
the action of one group of workers caused the close down of the whole 
(26) 
industry.^ ' However during the three month dispute, orders and demand 
were merely posponed for a very excited boom between 1911-13» which was main-
tained by the irrepressible optimism of Briti s h shipowners, the sprint to 
enlarge the Koyal Navy's fleet of new 'Dreadnought' class warships, and f i n a l l y 
by the increase i n foreign merchant fleets under the inducement of subsidies 
(27) 
and direct grants. ' By 1914 recession had set i n yet again, and i t i s 
arguable that without the distortion caused by the 1914-18 War shipbuilding 
could have sunk into i t s worst depression ever. 
Sales and Marketing Techniques. 
At the outset of operations the Consett Iron Company had no formal channels 
for conducting sales policy outside the region. This was remedied i n 1865 when 
Jasper Mounsey was appointed to represent the Company i n London - an important 
market because of i t s overseas connexions. Mounsey had been an agent for the 
Derwent Iron Company, working i n conjunction with Charles I'anson of Darlington. 
His terms of employment were £400 per annum plus 1$ on dividends paid by the 
(25) S. Pollard, op.cit.,p .492. 
(26) The Economist. 10 September 1910. p.505. 
(27) S. Pollard, op.cit., p.498. 
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Company. ' As London and the Thames was the major centre of shipbuilding i n 
the 1860's, the promotion of sales i n the area was only natural. 
Another bustling centre of industry and shipbuilding was Merseyside 
and the Lancashire conurbation; however, when i t was proposed to appoint _ . 
Mr. Joseph Simpson of Eccles as the Liverpool agent the arrangement did not 
mature because Simpson was unwilling both to leave Manchester and to act 
(29) 
solely for Consett. ' 
Business i n London, and profits for the Company as a whole did so well 
that i n 1871 the Company renegotiated its . arrangement with Mounsey. Since 
his original appointment his average earnings had been £959 per annum, and with 
the profits of the Company rising sharply i n 1870-71, i t was f e l t that the 
remuneration was becoming excessive. This was a l l the more the case as the 
business with London declined, owing to the run down of Thames shipbuilding and 
the Company's own sh i f t away from r a i l production. Mounsey s t i l l could not 
complain since his commission was only reduced to %fo on dividends. 
As iron ship-plates became a more important aspect of the firm's trade, i t 
sought to establish links i n the other developing shipbuilding d i s t r i c t s ; next 
to the North east Coast, the West of Scotland was most important, and i n an 
effort to expand its small trade with that part of the world, Consett 
appointed Alexander Tolmie, as its Glasgow agent i n 1 8 7 4 W h i l s t Mounsey's 
business declined during the 1870's and l880's, Tolmie's increased as Consett 
increased i t s specialisation i n ship-plates, and sought out new markets for the 
ever increasing output. Tolmie's own influence also extended beyond the bounds 
(28) Directors' Minute. 9 August, 1865, p.58.(DCRO : DCO/29). 
(29) Directors' Minute. 11 November, I865, p.71- (DCRO : D/CO/29). 
(30) Directors' Minute. 10 March, I874,p.27.(DCRO : D/CO/31). 
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of Clydeside, as he developed business for Consett on Tayside, Belfast and to 
some extent Barrow. The Company developed : its own business i n the North east 
through their Newcastleoffice. Thus Andrew Tolmie, who succeeded his father 
i n 1878, and Prank Hodges, the agent i n Newcastle were responsible for Consett1s 
most important markets. Because the British shipbuilding industry became 
so dominant upon the world scene by the end of the nineteenth century, Consett 
W S L S not much concerned with overseas outlets for its plates. I t was loath 
to appoint special sales agents abroad, i n 1891 William Jenkins wrote: 
" I am much obliged for the perusal of the l e t t e r of Messrs Veringhorn 
Brothers, which i s returned herewith. 
We have so far disliked appointing a special agent i n Canada trusting 
rather to our old customers coming now and then to us direct.. ."^"^ 
However four years later the Company did appoint Mr. G.A. Goodwin to act 
(32) 
as its agent for sales i n China and Japan. * 
• The normal method of payment was by a four month b i l l , less a discount of 
i 
% or 2^$, often dependent upon the state of trade. The b i l l extended credit, 
whilst the discount encouraged cash payment; the buyer had the option between 
the two.^^ Some ship-plate manufacturers allowed their customers, to 
extend their credit by permitting the renewal of outstanding b i l l s , but this 
(34) 
was not Cohsett's practice because of the inherent risk. 
Another aspect of trade concessions that Corisett was loath to succumb to, 
was the payment of commission for the placing of orders. Reluctantly Jenkins 
(31) Wm. Jenkins to A.D. Tolmie, 15 December, 1891. (DCRO : D/CO/79). 
(32) Directors' Minute. 3 August, 1895, p . H 5 - (DCRO : D/CO/36). 
(33) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 14 January, 1893. (DCRO :.D/CO/83). 
(34) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale 6 September, I892. (DCRO : D/CO/82). 
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conceded: 
"There.is a great scarcity of orders for steel. I think i t would be 
well to pacify Sir Raylton, and possibly well to sacrifice 1$ upon 
our steel plates and angles i f we can get a large share of his orders 
I f you think on the whole we had better not run the risk attending the 
committing of ourselves to even one single customer on the east coast 
(35) 
to 1$ commission pray t e l l me so..." 
The relationship on the North-east Coast was that between the iron and 
steel producers and the shipbuilders direct but i n Scotland and to a lesser 
extent Belfast and Barrow, there existed an uneasy relationship between 
the steelmakers, and a group of middlemen, the merchants. 
Just as the sub-contract system i n the labour market relieved a part of the 
capital burden from the entrepreneurial capitalist, so topthe merchant system, 
helped out the working capital shortages of the iron and steel manufacturers. 
The merchants were not as Burn suggestfttprimarily responsible for co-ordination 
between manufacturers and consumers, or at least not i n Consett's case/"^ 
This role was f i l l e d by Company agents, such as Tolmie and Mounsey, who were 
employees i n that they received salaries, which were supplemented by a type of 
performance bonus. In Tolmie's case, his job primarily was to take the pulse of 
the market areas he was operating i n , and to seek out business which came largely 
from the merchants. 
The merchants were i n fact speculators, who had a role to f i l l within the 
laissez-faire economy of nineteenth century Britain. In i t s most simple terms 
that role was to carry stocks; purchasing when price was low, and selling when 
(35) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 18 February, 1893.(DCRO : D/CO/84). 
(36) D.L. Burn, op.cit.,p.227. 
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price rose. The advantages this offered were that manufacturers' plants were 
kept f a i r l y well employed during slumps, whilst during the booms customers 
were kept adequately supplied without price being forced up exorbitantly. By 
stocking the merchants were able to match supply and demand over the range of the 
business cycle and thus lubricate the system. 
Why then were the manufacturers so resentful "of the merchants activities? 
Probably because they believed that whilst the industry was growing, they 
could match their own supply to demand by their price regulation. That i s , 
during recession price reduction would induce shipbuilders to maintain their 
demand, whilst during booms excess demand drove up prices. The interference 
of merchants i n their view merely constrained the extent to which price would 
rise i n the boom, whilst offering no advantages i n recession. Once 
overcapacity was reached then not even the intervention of the speculators could 
keep plants f u l l y employed at a remunerative level - the makers' alternative was 
collusion to raise price. 
Inspite of the resentment, the steelmakers had to s e l l to the merchants, 
because they had not the resources to carry heavy stocks. During the slump 
of 1892 Neilson, a Glasgow merchant, told Tolmie that "the Barrow Steel Co., 
(37) 
are rather anxious sellers of 3000 tons at a very low price.. 1 1 * ' Even 
Consett WITMCW was financially very strong, could only go on stocking to a certain 
limit*, during the same slump when the value of Consett's stocks reached 
£55»000 Jenkins f e l t that they should begin to l i m i t the cash value. ' 
Conditions such as these drove the manufacturers into the arms of the merchants. 
A few months after Consett had to abandon the stock building policy 
Wm. Jenkins complained to David Dale: 
(37) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 26 July, 1892. (DCRO : D/CO/81). 
(38) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 6 September, I892. (DCRO : D/CO/82). 
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"Obviously there i s a great effort being made by merchants, who 
grasp at enormous quantities of plates for sales, to speculate largely 
and to keep i n their hands very large quantities of plates for 
(39) 
immediate delivery but at deplorably low prices." 
The second strength of the merchants, which was closely bound up with their 
a b i l i t y to hold stocks, was that they were prepared to extend credit to their 
customers. Ideally the steelmakers preferred to be paid i n cash on a monthly 
basis whereas the merchants were more w i l l i n g to extend credit. In an effort 
to oust the merchants Consett had to be prepared to offer credit, as Jenkins 
pointed out to Dale:-
" I f the Naval Construction Company desire the option of payment 
by 4 monthly b i l l , I presume you would not object as i t i s one of the 
advantages which the merchants offer to the shipbuilders."^^ 
On Clydeside the. merchants were usurping a role which the steel makers 
would dearly liked to have held, that of an oligopolist. I t s significance lay 
not i n the merchants'enhanced selling power, but i n his increased purchasing 
power. The fewer the merchants the easier their task i n subordinating the 
steel manufacturers. 
Consett1s policy had always been to minimize individual quantities, but 
this was d i f f i c u l t as vigorous merchants pushed their sales with important 
shipbuilders. I f Consett did not take the work, then some other manufacturer 
would/ 4 1 ^  
(39) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 27 December, 1892. (DCRO:D/CO/83). 
(40) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 18 May, 1891.(DCRO : D/CO/76). 
( 4 1 ) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 16 December,1889»(DCRO : D/C0/7l). 
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As Consett's local market was free from the merchants'influence the 
Company was used to the handling of customers, and i t tried to extend its 
direct relationship into i t s other markets. Disputed ground appears to have 
"been Belfast and Barrow. 
"At Consett we certainly have every desire to checkmate the merchants 
i n their action, especially outside the area of the Scotch consumers on the 
Clyde, and have always aimed at going direct to the consumers such as 
the Barrow Shipbuilding Company." 
However, at Barrow its efforts were thwarted by the willingness of the 
Barrow Steel Company to deal with the Glasgow merchants. In Belfast, 
the Neilson Brothers of Glasgow seem to have had the edge i n their selling 
technique for they "Had so ingratiated themselves with Messrs Harland and 
(43) 
Wolff as to practically secure the whole of their contracts.".... 
The shipbuilders themselves seem to have been more amenable towards the 
merchants - i t made their purchasing more straight forward, and having 
established a reliable connexion they could put f a i t h i n the merchants^ a b i l i t y 
to secure good materials. This i n particular rankled Consett and other northern 
plate makers who objected to the practice of Merchant brands on the plates, 
and not the makers. They were so adamant on this point that they advocated 
(44) 
legislation to prevent any mark but the. makers appearing on plates. ' 
On the whole Consett was unable to break down the hegemony of the 
merchants i n Scotland, and they persisted as a thorn i n the side of the plate 
(42) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 26 July, 1892. (DCRO : D/C0/8l). 
(43) R. Evans to D. Dale, 16 November, 1892. (DCRO : D/CO/83). 
(44) Wm. Jenkins to J.S. Jeans, 1? March,l887. (DCRO : D/CO/68) 
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makers even a f t e r the formation of the Associations i n the 1 9 0 0 ' s / ^ The 
best that the Company could do was to minimise t h e i r influence, and the e f f e c t 
with which they could do t h i s tended t o fluctuate with the course of the 
business cycle. 
Sales Policy 
The l a s t aspect of the Company's marketing policy to be considered here 
i s i t s sales policy. This had a chameleon l i k e q u a l i t y , changing i t s tone as 
the business cycle took i t s course. The fundamental considerations were that 
at a l l times the Company's plant should be kept as close to capacity as 
possible, but t h i s had to be traded o f f against the need to have capacity 
available at short notice i n order to take advantage of any price r i s e s . A 
second feature was the -desire to maintain a large number of customers, so that the 
f a i l u r e of one would not imperil the whole business, and also that no-one 
customer could exert unfavourable purchasing power. 
For example l e t us take the case where Consett lias worked o f f a l l the 
contracts made during the boom and i s faced by empty order books and low prices. 
Such was the s i t u a t i o n i n l a t e summer, of 1892. I n order to keep the m i l l s 
employed Jenkins was prepared to slash his price quotations f o r specifications f o r 
immediate d e l i v e r y . H o w e v e r Jenkins was anxious that the orders be f o r 
immediate delivery and not f o r sale over several months. I t was Jenkins' opinion 
on an enquiry by Neilson's that " i t would not be prudent to go i n f o r such a 
quantity as 10,000 tons as a speculation with them at t h i s time while things are 
at t h e i r very lowest. The buyer can't go f a r wrong i n buying but to s e l l ahead 
(45) The Economist, 6 October, 1906. p.1619. 
(46) Wm. Jenkins to A.D. Tolmie, 25 August, 1892. (DCR0 : D/CO/82). 
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largely i s not I think prudent on the part of the plate maker. 
Once the trough of a recession had been reached, then the steelmaker 
"became a l e r t to the necessity of keeping his options open f o r a r i s e i n price. 
However, i t was concurrent with the time when he was most hard pressed "by the 
merchants who were anxious to b u i l d up t h e i r stocks during the low prices. 
Although he resented the merchants, William Jenkins often had no option i n the 
depth of depression, but to accept orders from them. For example i n August 
1892 Adam Tennant, one of the Glasgow merchants was prepared to take up 1250 tons 
of plates a t £5«15s. per ton less 5$,an o f f e r Jenkins could not r e j e c t / ^ 
Once trade began to pick up Jenkins became less concerned with long orders, 
and more interested i n pressing forward price. I n the upturn of 1887 he f e l t 
three or four weeks work i n hand was s u f f i c i e n t , and further forward s e l l i n g 
without an advance i n price would be i m p r u d e n t . W h e n price began to move 
up and the business cycle was clearly i n the upswing, i t became necessary to 
watch against over-commitment, and to leave leeway f o r new. contracts at 
advantageous prices. 
When orders eventually began to slacken then Jenkins began to seek ways 
and means by which the customers could be induced to make fu r t h e r purchases. 
At t h i s stage, v/hen i t became necessary to make price concessions he f i x e d his 
attention upon extending the amount of plates on order, and t h i s policy would 
be persevered with u n t i l no orders were forth-coming, and work i n hand was 
completely despatched. 
There were variations to t h i s general pattern, the most s i g n i f i c a n t being 
a s h i f t from production of p i g i r o n f o r the Company's own use to a policy of 
sales. Up to 1893 Consett had a pig i r o n surplus which was sold, s p l i t t i n g 
(47) Wm. Jenkins to A.I). Tolmie, 27 August, 1891*(DCRO : D/CO/77). 
(48) Wm. Jenkins to A.D. Tolraie, 23 August, 1892»(DCR0 :D/C0/82). 
(49) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 15 January, I887.(DCRO : D/C0/68). 
(50) Wm. Jenkins to A.D. Tomlie, 20 January, I887. (DCBO : D/C/68). 
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roughly equally between Bessemer and cinder pigs. The l a t t e r were produced 
purely f o r sale purposes, "being most suitable f o r low grade foundry work. 
The Bessemer pig was probably sold to other steel producers, though there i s 
no reference to i t s destination. However, a common policy was, during a slump, 
to produce more cinder p i g , thus keeping the blastfurnaces operational and 
avoiding the high cost of a cessation of work i n t h i s department. The output 
was then sold either to merchants such as Messrs. Matheson & Co., or to a 
(51} 
regular foundry consumer such as Rio Tinto Co. J ' The advantage i n s e l l i n g 
cinder p i g to merchants was that i t would not have repercussions upon t h e i r 
own plate business i n an upswing. I f they sold large quantities of Bessemer 
pi g at low prices then they might well play i n t o the hands of the unintegrated 
plate m i l l s , who might then be able to buy Consett Bessemer pig i n an upswing 
from the merchant, at prices competitive with Consett's own production costs, 
as these would also r i s e i n the "upswing. I n I89O at the summit of the boom, 
many unintegrated Scottish producers were severely handicapped by the high 
price of pig i r o n , giving Consett the competitive advantage; had the Durham f i r m 
flooded the market with Bessemer pigs during the previous slump i t might have 
(52) 
prevented t h i s and done r t s e l f immeasurable harm. w ' 
When Consett began producing steel angles i n 1893 i t . was confronted 
by a d i f f e r e n t sales problem. As Jenkins explained to Dale 
.4 
"Ship's angles are peculiar i n the commercial action with regard to 
them. A shipbuilder when he wants his angles, he wishes them delivered 
immediately r i g h t o f f , and he w i l l not e f f e c t a sale f o r these f o r any 
(53) 
deferred period of d e l i v e r y . " w / 
Consett had to s t a r t a new establishing a reputation f o r q u a l i t y and promptitude 
i n delivery. 
(51) Directors' Minute, 12 October, 1886. p.274. (DCRO : D/CO/33); and 
Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 8 December, l891.(DCRO : D/CO/79). 
(52) Wm. Jenkins to A.D. Tolmie, 25 February, I89O. (DCRO : D/CO/72); and 
Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale 19 February, 1890. (DCRO : D/co/80). 
(53) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 9 January, I893. (DCRO : D/CO/83). 
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I n i t s . other "branches of steel business the Company did have an 
established reputation. Jenkins was able to boast i n 1890 to H.J. Boolde, 
a Lloyds 1 Surveyor: 
" I t may be said without the s l i g h t e s t exaggeration that i n the course 
of our manufacture and delivery of over 300,000 tons of steel which i s 
about the gross quantity we have made since the commencement of our 
operations six years ago, there has r e a l l y been nothing i n the way of 
complaint of our q u a l i t y . " ^ 4 ) 
A few years l a t e r Swan Hunter, the Tyneside shipbuilders, actually wrote 
to Consett commending i t f o r plates i t had p r o d u c e d . D u r i n g the 1890's 
David Dale took time out to v i s i t the l o c a l yards himself, i n order to 
ascertain the amount and type of work i n hand.^"^ His national 
reputation was also an advantage f o r Consett i n i t s sales e f f o r t s . I n 1891 
when the Cunard Company had an order out f o r two cargo vessels, Jenkins 
suggested that Dale might be able to improve Consett 1 s case by approaching 
Mr. Ismay of the Cunard Company, and a fellow member of the Royal Commission 
(57) 
on Labour. ' 
I n contrast the atmosphere of euphoria i n the Edwardian decade appears 
to have transmitted the same lack of drive to the Company's sales awareness 
as i t d id to i t s innovatory vigour. I n 1913 Swan Hunter and Whigham Richardson 
of Wallsend enquired about the provision of 96" wide plates instead of t r a d i t i o n a l 
84" plates. Consett claimed t h i s was a completely new development, although 
(54) Wm. Jenkins to H.J. Boolde, 24 January, I89O.(DCR0 : D/CO/71). 
(55) Directors' Minute. 5 June, 1894,p.183o(DCR0 L D/CO/35). 
(56) Directors' Minute. 3 August, 1895, p.115. (DCR0 : D/CO/36). 
(57) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 30 May, 1891.(DCR0 : D/CO/76). 
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Swan Hunter intimated that several other shipbuilders were seeking a supplier 
of such large p l a t e s . T h i s i s indic a t i v e of the v i t a l absence of 
attention to the consumers'requirements, and the Company's neglect of new 
product developments i n the Edwardian decade. 
The f i n a l factor i n the sales policy was the avoidance of over-
dependence on one customer, and the surety of a customer's c r e d i b i l i t y . One 
of Consett's most prolonged wrangles over a debt was with the Sligo and 
Ballaghdaren Junction Railway i n the early 1870's. The Company was owed 
£H,l6l.06s.l0d by the contractor P. Nowell, but the only means of recouping 
the. loss was to increase the cr e d i t so that the railway could be completed. 
By 1874 the Consett Iron Company had extended the cr e d i t to the Sligo 
Railway to £20,000. The working of the railway was then taken over by the 
Midland and Great Western Railway Company of Ireland, but they were unable 
to run i t at a p r o f i t . A f ter almost a year of negotiations they did agree to 
purchase the l i n e f o r £24,000, £5,000 of which was to go toward Consett's 
c l a i m . a f t e r six years Consett's experience of extending loans and c r e d i t 
to a consumer ended i n quite a substantial loss to the Company. 
This may have discouraged the Company over t h i r t y years l a t e r from 
extending finance to s h i p b u i l d e r s . ^ ^ When S i r James Laing & Co. went under 
i n the slump of 1908 Consett one of t h e i r main trade creditors was reluctant 
to take part extensively i n the c a p i t a l reconstruction of the company. It-
only accepted shares i n l i e u of i t s debt, and these were sold i n 1914. No 
more i n t e r e s t was shown i n the Middlesbrough shipbuilders, R. Craggs and Sons 
who went under i n the same slump; as the receiver wrote down the value of the 
(58) Directors' Minute. 17 January. 1913, p .28. (DCR0 : D/CO/43). 
(59) Directors' Minute. 4 A p r i l , 1871, pp.l07-108o(DCR0 : D/CO/30). 
• 
(60) Directors' Minute, 7 November 1876, pp.238-240. (DCR0 : L/CO/31). 
(61) Directors'Minute, 12 September 1907, p.36. (DCR0 : D/CO/41.) 
(59 
- 265 -
assets substantially and i t was proposed that Consett and three other 
major creditors should f l o a t a new company. Conset was once again not 
(62) 
amenable the scheme and i t did not get o f f the ground. 
These were the only two serious f a i l u r e s amongst Consett 1s shipbuilding 
customers 1 probably because of the care and watchfulness exercised by the 
management i n s e l l i n g to new consumers. Prompt attention was also paid 
to customers who might be i n d i f f i c u l t y or l a t e i n paying accounts. However 
the best insurance was spreading the output amongst a f a i r l y large number 
of purchasers. Consett's policy was explained i n considerable d e t a i l by 
Wm. Jenkins to David Dale, who was enquiring on behalf of the Barrow 
Hematite Steel Company, of which he was also a Director. Basically 
Jenkins t r i e d to l i m i t the specifications outstanding to one customer 
to about 5»000 tons at a t i m e . ^ ^ Thus the power of any one consumer was 
minimised as much as possible, i n order to secure the Company's position 
i n the market. 
(62) . Directors' Minute. 3 May, 1910,pp.44-45.(DCRO : D/CO/42). 
(63) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 15 November, 1889*(DCRO : D/CO/70). 
- 266 -
Competition to Collusion. 
Throughout the period between 1864-1914 technological developments 
elsewhere impinged upon the competitive position of the Consett Iron Company. 
In the 1860's the growth of i r o n shipbuilding i n the North-east generated 
a demand f o r iron-plates which appears to have created a lag between demand 
and supply, as one would expect Consett'B response was to move from r a i l 
production to plate production where the return was much greater. The change 
was put i n t o sharp r e l i e f by the events of I876, which not only forced Consett 
out of ir o n r a i l production altogether, but created a surplus of puddling 
capacity, which i n many instances was directed to the manufacture of i r o n 
Although the tonnage of ships launched on the Tyne and Wear continued to 
grow a f t e r I876, the supply and demand conditions were turned i n favour of the 
shipbuilders, so much so that i n the spring of 1879 Jenkins reported a 
c r i t i c a l position i n the sale of plates. Inevitably a scheme was proposed 
amongst the makers f o r combined action to r e s t r i c t the output of plates over a 
l i m i t e d period, as well as resorting to the t r a d i t i o n a l wage reductions. ' 
I n an e f f o r t to keep the m i l l s employed Jenkins was advised to s e l l plates 
f o r early or immediate delivery, a sure sign of under employment. The 
position was further aggravated by the discriminatory p r i c i n g practice of the X 
Scottish Railway Companies which e f f e c t i v e l y protected the Scottish 
(66) 
ironmakers from competition from the North-east producers. 
With the reduction i n p r o f i t s there had been a related reduction of costs, 
i n part due to lower input costs but also a t t r i b u t a b l e to the improvements i n 
(64) H.G. Reid, Middlesbrough and i t s Jubilee (Middlesbrough, l88l) p.92. 
(65) Directors' Minute. 1 A p r i l , 1879,p.131. (DCRO : D/CO/32). 
plates. (64) 
(66) Ironworkers' Journal. 1 February , 1879. The. ScatasH ^flu/way Coivifxviiex 
ctoceck -freight rates by \5% &r Scofcfcrs/i ironrvictsfcers. re 
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TABLE V I I . 
P r o f i t per Ton on Iro n Plates 1873 - 1883. 
Year P r o f i t per ton Year. P r o f i t per ton 
1873 £2.09s. 2d 1879 l i s . 8d 
1874 £3.09s. 7d 1880 12s.Od 
1875 £2.01s.lid 1881 £1.05s.l0d 
1876 £0.12s. Od 1882 17s. 5d 
1877 12s. 2d 1883 18s. 6d 
1878 08s.lOd 
Source : P r o f i t and Loss Accounts, 1873-1893. (DCRO : D/CO/89). 
the e f f i c i e n c y of the m i l l s . However i t i s p l a i n to see that even i n the 
boom of 1880-1 there was only a p a r t i a l recovery i n the p r o f i t a b i l i t y of 
ir o n plates. This was probably, i n part, due to the emergence of steel 
as a substitute, f o r the a c t i v i t y i n shipbuilding industry was caused, to 
some extent, by the construction of new steel vessels. The recovery was not 
large enough to stretch the capacity of the iron-plate makers and thus drive 
up price. 
However the boom i n the early 'eighties did i l l u s t r a t e that steel 
was acceptable i n terms of q u a l i t y and price, and that there was a 
(67) 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y greater margin of p r o f i t , because of i t s short supply. 
(67) Journal of the Ir o n and Steel I n s t i t u t e , 1880,1, p.221. 
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TABLE V I I . . 
Comparative Cost of Production and P r o f i t per Ton on Iron and 
S t e e l P l a t e s . 1884-1886 
Iron S t e e l 
Year Cost P r o f i t Cost P r o f i t 
1884 £5.02s. 9d 13s.2d £6.12s. 6d £1.01s. 6d 
1885 £4.10s. 9d 6s.0d £5.05s. 4d £1.03s. Od 
1886 £4.08s. 6d 5s.Id £ 4 . l i s . l i d £1.09s. 4d 
Source:Profit and Loss Accounts. 1873-1893. (DCRO : D/CO/89). 
After production of s t e e l began i n June 1883 capacity was expanded rapidly,. 
and by 1886 the cost of producing iron and s t e e l plates was more or l e s s 
equalised. I n 1885 the Consett Directors decided to make large additions 
to t h e i r steelmaking and r o l l i n g capacity, and t h i s coincided with s i m i l a r 
investment decisions by Bolckow Vaughan, Parkgate, John Brown's and other 
(68} 
northern producers. ' 
I885 was a year of depression i n shipbuilding p a r t i c u l a r l y on the North-east 
Coast, but i t s severity was probably most acutely f e l t by the Scotbishsteelmakers 
who had an e a r l i e r s t a r t i n the l a t e 1870's. By 1885 the Scotfcishmakers' 
capacity was probably approaching that demanded by the Clydeside shipbuilders. 
Up to then they had a monopoly of s t e e l boilder plates, ship-plates and 
(69) 
angles, purely because of the i n a b i l i t y of any other d i s t r i c t to export a surplus. 
The severity of the depression i n the North-east yards, compared with those on 
(68) W.A. S i n c l a i r , "The Growth of the B r i t i s h S t e e l Industry i n the Late 
Nineteenth Century," Scottish Journal of P o l i t i c a l Economy, VI, (1958) 
p.36. 
(69) H.W.. Macrosty, The Trust Movement i n B r i t i s h Industry : A Study of 
Business Organisation (London, 1907) p.66. 
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Clydeside, l e f t the north of England steel makers with the spectre of i d l e 
capacity, following the preliminary expansion between 1881-1885. To protect 
themselves from competition the Scotti&makers found the Scotch Steelmakers 1 
Association i n 1885 and raised t h e i r prices by 10s.Od per ton. However 
t h e i r e f f o r t s proved f r u i t l e s s , f o r i n the winter of I885-86 they were 
subjected to f i e r c e price competition from.the English makers and forced 
to reduce t h e i r price by 7s.6d per ton. Consett was i n the vanguard of the 
assault. 
I t seems clear that t h i s onslaught by the English producers was taken 
from a position of strength, i n that they had newer plant, which they 
desired to operate at capacity, and which was capable of turning out steel 
a t costs which could undercut the Scottish. Although i t was a short and sharp 
c o n f l i c t which was soon settled:- by the renewal of a c t i v i t y i n the shipyards 
on the North east Coast and Clydeside, i t did set a precedent f o r l a t e r 
inter-regional competition. ' 
The recovery of business i n I887 soon re-established the p r o f i t a b i l i t y of 
the steel plate trade, as supply was unable to keep abreast of demand. I n 
1888, H.E. Moss & Co., a f i r m of merchants^were complaining of "the d i f f i c u l t y 
of g e t t i n g quick delivery of steel plates, the demand being so great and the 
(72) 
manufacture so l i m i t e d . " ^ ' 
The decision to construct new Angle M i l l s i n I889 was an indicator that 
the tide was beginning to flow against the steel-producers, f o r although i t was 
(70) I b i d . 
(71) I b i d . 
(72) Iron and Coal Trades Review« 30 March, 1888. 
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a response to increasing demand, i t was also a conscious e f f o r t on the part of 
the Consett management to increase the marketability of t h e i r steel plates. 
The period between 1887-1894 i s well documented i n the letterbooks of 
William Jenkins, and enables one more c l e a r l y to ascertain Consett's position 
i n the industry, and whether i n f a c t the Company held any monopoly. I n I889 
499»093 tons of shipping were launched on the Tyne and Wear, and Consett 
produced i n the region of 120,000 - 130,000 tons of stee l and i r o n plates. 
Probably only about 60 per cent of the tonnage launched wa3 accounted f o r by 
(73) 
the plate input, ' but Consett also sold to Tees-side and Clydeside. 
Thus allowing f o r one t h i r d of Consett's plate sales going to other areas, the 
Company' s t i l l held about 25$ of the market on the two important r i v e r s of the 
Tyne and Wear. By I894 the Company was producing almost 200,000 tons of 
materials f o r shipbuilding, whilst the t o t a l tonnage launched on the North-east 
Coast had .risen to only 544*768 g . r . t . ; i t seems l i k e l y that Consett had at 
least maintained i t s market position. 
Proximity to the yards was obviously important, and only Spencers and 
Palmers on Tyneside and the Wear Steel Company at Sunderland had an advantage 
over Gonsett i n those markets; neither Spencernor the Wear Steel Co., were very 
large, and the Wear Steel Company was ce r t a i n l y unsuccessful. ' Hartlepool 
had a distance advantage over Consett f o r the Wear market, but the West 
Hartlepool Steel and Ir o n Company were unintegrated, and besides they had close 
(75V 
t i e s with William Gray, the West Hartlepool s h i p b u i l d e r ^ ' The other 
Tees-side works and Consett were about equidistant from the Wear, and the 
former were the source of most competition on that r i v e r , but were not so 
(73) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 22 September I89O. (DCR0 : D/C0/74). Jenkins 
estimated the stee l input f o r a ship to be 10 parts plate, 3 parts angles, 
1 part r i v e i s . 
(74) Durham Chronicle, 26 February 1892. p.5. 
(75) R. Wood, op.cit.,pp.74-75. 
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troublesome on the Tyne. 
The factor of distance created a delicate balance of p a r t i a l monopoly, 
i n which Consett was able to secure d i f f e r e n t i a l s i n price between the three 
r i v e r s . By 1893 when the boom had run i t s course and prices had f a l l e n , 
William Jenkins was s t i l l able to report to David Dale: 
"We have not f e l t i t necessary i n the case of stee l plates to force 
prices down f o r Stockton, l o c a l and export dly., lower than say the 
Wear and Tyne prices, but there i s now so small a margin of p r o f i t 
and so fierce competition that we f e e l i t r equisite to compete with 
Stockton makers to come down to t h e i r prices i . e . prices at which 
they are able to s e l l at by v i r t u e of t h e i r close proximity to the 
shipbuilding yards. The danger i n our doing t h i s i s that a Tyne or 
Wear shipbuilder would probably claim to have such a price quoted to 
him f o r steel plates and angles at his yard as were quoted to shipbuilders 
(76) 
on the Tees - but we hope we s h a l l avoid t h i s . " w ' 
However when the competition began to become f i e r c e as i n the Autumn of 
1892 Consett was able to price cut to better e f f e c t than other makers, and s t i l l 
r e turn p r o f i t s . Several ste e l producers were i n d i r e s t r a i t s i n 1892-93, most 
notably Palmer's Shipbuilding and Iron Company, which had been troubled by 
(77) 
labour problems and an i n e f f i c i e n t i r o n and steel department. ' Spencers at 
Newbum were equally hard pressed, and the Wear Steel Company which had been 
formed i n 1890 was i n d i f f i c u l t y i n the succeeding two years, mainly because of 
(HQ) 
high costs, and competition from Consett. w ' 
(76) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 30 May, 1893. (DCRO : D/CO/84). 
(77) Newcastle Daily Chronicle. 24 September 1890 & 17 November 1893. 
(78) Wm. Jenkins to Wm. Stobart, 13 March l891.(DCR0 : D/C0/75); and Durham 
Chronicle, 26 February, 1892. 
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The main influence upon Consett i n adopting price-cutting t a c t i c s does not 
appear to have been the ste e l producers i n competition, but the shipbuilders 
who i n depression could a f f o r d to postpone purchases, and thus unless 
Consett competed they would be able to extend t h e i r demand over a longer 
period, drawing upon the business of the agglomeration of smaller steel 
(79) 
producers. ' 
Consett by the l890's. had established a f a i r l y strong secondary sales 
area on Clydeside, but i t d i f f e r e d i n many respects from that i n the North-East. 
The Scottish trade was dominated by merchant buyers, and invariably merchants 
were able to assert t h e i r strength when a downturn began, since they were 
w i l l i n g to buy speculatively and thus relieve steelmakers of stocks. The makers 
who most readily succumbed were those who had i n s u f f i c i e n t cash assets and were 
forced to s e l l from a position of weakness. By the recession of 1892 Consett 
had to follow s u i t , reducing price and increasing its. commitments to a l i m i t e d 
number of merchants. The increasing s trength of the merchants was indicative 
of. the r i s e i n capacity between 1886-1892, and the approach of excess supply. 
There were t e l l - t a l e signs of price co-operation i n 1892 when some makers 
t r i e d to introduce a scheme of uniform prices f o r certain extras. This was an 
e f f o r t to raise price by stopping •Chiselling* of the price of extrasf(®^ 
but Jenkins was dubious of i t s chances of success. 
I n the wake of the boom i n 1889 Consett had turned to the Clyde 
market, to look f o r orders. Jenkins wrote to Andrew Tolmie that he was of 
(79) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 11 January 1890. (DCRO : D/C0/7l). 
(80) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 11 August 1892. (DCRO : D/CO/81). 
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"the b e l i e f that the Clyde Steel Plate makers are now so handicapped 
with the high price of Pigs that they are s t r a i n i n g unduly the high 
price of Steel Plate. I n your sheet of yesterday you say 'makers 
would w i l l i n g l y s e l l a t £9« less 5#*. I have no doubt they would do 
t h i s . At Consett however we are placed i n what might be called 
superior circumstances and i t w i l l not do f o r us to s t r a i n at anything 
l i k e £9- per ton less 5$ on the Clyde i f we wish to add to our 
contract book. 
Up to the present we have been aiming at £8 per ton less 2-3$ on 
the East Coast which would roughly be say £7*12s.6d n e t t at Consett. 
The equivalent of t h i s would be £8.12s.6d less 5$ f o r Clyde delivery."' 
Consett could comfortably undercut the Scottish producers, and the l a t t e r 
reaped t h e i r sad harvest i n 1892 with very depressing trading r e s u l t s . The 
by 
p l i g h t of the Scottish-makers was a t t r i b u t e d J. Cronin, the General Secretary of 
the Associated Society of Millmen i n Scotland, to the un f a i r competition of 
northern firms, and Consett i n p a r t i c u l a r . He alleged that they were able 
to undercut by paying lower wages i n t h e i r m i l l s , but t h i s was v i g o r o u s l y 
denied by Edward Trow, the Secretary of the Associated I r o n and Steel Workers. 
I n a f a i r l y long winded debate i t transpired that the labour productivity i n 
Consett 1s m i l l s was f a r i n advance of that i n Scottish m i l l s . 
I n view of t h i s evidence, and the e a r l i e r evidence about the weakness of 
Palmers, the Wear Steel Company, Spencers, and the Barrow Steel Company i t i s 
clear that Consett's e f f i c i e n c y was f a r i n advance of that of many of i t s 
competitors. I n response to the competition from the south there was a spate of 
(81) Wm. Jenkins to A.D. Tolmie, 25 February I89O. (DCRO : D/CO/72). 
(82) R.C. on Labour pp. I892. /c6795-iv_7 XXXVI, QQ.16134-16178, 
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investment i n Scottish steelworks between 1890-94, but ove r a l l Cleveland 
was establishing i t s ascendancy as the main centre of ship-plate 
production. ' 
By 1894 when most of the new Scottish plant was being brought or had been 
brought i n t o operation the Scottish makers were getting a id from the railway 
companies to protect t h e i r home market and had sett l e d upon a combination 
to raise price. Jenkins was sceptical about the value of combination, 
and "had no great b e l i e f i n combinations f o r r a i s i n g p r i c e . " v ' Although 
price was low early i n 1894> Consett's order books were f a i r l y f u l l , and the 
Company was able to choose between supplying plates to Neilsons or the 
Admiralty; the l a t t e r being a direc t contract was in e v i t a b l y given 
preference.^ ' I n contrast the Scottish steelmakers were short of 
specifications. 
The inter-regional competition was becoming b i t t e r ; i n the Autumn of 
1893 the Scottish Railway Companies "made very l i b e r a l concessions to s t e e l -
makers i n Glasgow f o r the conveyance of material from t h e i r works to the 
(87) 
coast and especially f o r continental enquiries.?.' ' Despite appeals and 
altercations by Consett and the North Eastern Railway the Scottish Railways 
steadfastly refused to extend any similar concession to English makers, 
of even to put Consett upon the lower rate paid by Jarrow. As Jarrow was. a 
( 88} 
high-cost f i r m i t was l i t t l e threat to the Scots makers.^ ' 
(83) W.A. S i n c l a i r , op.cit.,pp.38-39. 
(84) Wm. Jenkins to J. Neilson, 10 February, 1894.(DCRO : D/CO/88). 
(85) I b i d . 
(86) R. Evans to D. Dale, 5 January, 1894. (DCRO : D/CO/88). 
(87) R. Evans to D. Dale, 30 October l893.(DCRO : D/CO/85). 
(88) G. Aihsworth to A.D. Tolmie, 2 June 1894.(DCR0 : D/CO/88). 
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When the Angle M i l l was opened at Consett early i n 1893. the Company was 
put i n a d i f f i c u l t position because of the depression i n shipbuilding. 
Mr. Jenkins was most concerned about the implications of such slack trade. 
a 
" I t w i l l be very awkward business i f a f t e r a l l our e f f o r t s and a l l 
our anxiety i n c o l l e c t i n g men together, and pushing on the work i f we 
sh a l l have to come to a dead lock with our angle m i l l so soon a f t e r 
beginning. The danger w i l l be that our men w i l l leave u s . " ^ ^ 
Dorman Long's were eager to take advantage of Consett's temporary weakness, 
by doing a deal to s p l i t the markets f o r s t r u c t u r a l s t e e l . Mr. Echalaz, 
Dorman Long's sales agent i n the North East proposed that Consett should take 
over t h e i r angle contracts, about 10,000 tons, on the undertaking that 
Dorman's should have a free hand i n the sale of girders, channels & c , f o r which 
there was a better price. However Wm. Jenkins treated the proposal coaly, as 
the price f o r angles was very low, and by taking up such a large contract 
Consett would be unable to take advantage of any upswing f o r some months. 
Richard Evans was more amenable^feeling that i t would at least keep the new 
m i l l s employed f o r the rest of 1893» however, Jenkins'view prevailed. 
By the mid-18901s i t was evident that the rapid growth of the Scottish 
market was over, and to continue to prosper the Scotttdimakers had to abandon the 
internecine price warfare and adopt a policy of co-operation. The need 
f o r t h i s was reinforced by the collapse i n demand f o r l i n e r s a f t e r 1896. I n 
the North East, saturation of the market had not quite been achieved, as the 
shipbuilding industry maintained i t s expansion? however the early d i f f i c u l t i e s 
(89) Wm. Jenkins to D. Dale, 2 June, 1893,(DCRO : D/CO/84). 
(90) R. Evans, to D. Dale, 3 August, 1893, (DCRO : D/CO/85) 
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Consett experienced i n s e l l i n g s t e e l angles, and the willingness of another 
producer to carve up the markets, i s i n d i c a t i v e of approaching equilibrium 
between supply and demand. 
I n the Autumn of 1894 Consett succumbed to the necessity to conduct 
negotiations to control the price of s t e e l angles, and had successful 
(91) 
negotiations with Bolckow Vaughan, ' but there i s no further mention about 
the progress of the proposals and i t i s not c l e a r whether they ever took 
e f f e c t . I f they did so i t i s unlikely that they were either effective or long 
l a s t i n g . 
Further proposals for co-operation were not mooted u n t i l l a t e i n 1897 when 
a meeting was held by the North-east steelmakers to form an Association along 
the l i n e s of that adopted by the Ste e l R a i l Association; After consideration 
Consett decided i n favour of the scheme, and began to encourage other North 
eastern producers to adhere to a common fixed s e l l i n g price a t various points 
of d e l i v e r y / 9 2 ^ 
I n Macrosty's th e s i s , the formation of l o c a l i s e d association was the f i r s t 
step toward closer industry-wide co-operation, but at f i r s t i t was related to 
(93i> 
vigorous inter-regional competition. ' The North east plate makers were 
able to maximise price up to the l i m i t where transport costs gave protection, 
they were also able to maintain capacity by 'dumping' outside t h e i r a r e a / * ^ 
V/hen the North-east producers proposed a 2s.6d per ton advance i n A p r i l I898, 
Consett made known i t s disapproval, since i t expected such an advance would 
(91) Directors' Minute. 2 October, 1894. p.280.(DCR0 : D/CO/35). 
(92) Directors' Minute. 18 December,1897. p.242. (DCRO : D/CO/37). 
(93) H.W. Macrosty, op.cit., p.13. 
(94) I b i d . 
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(95) open the door to Scottish competition on the Tyne. 
However as trade improved, and industry began to boom at the turn of 
the century, much of the argument for association disappeared', demand f i l l e d 
up capacity and drove up the p r i c e . 
The successive passing of booms brought progressively tighter markets i n 
t h e i r wake. The problem of external competition became more than j u s t a 
matter of price warfare with the Scots, for by the end of 1900 the North-east 
Coast producers were being undercut by Germans, Belgians and even Americans. 
The depression of 1903-04 which followed was most s i g n i f i c a n t to the s t e e l -
plate producers i n that i t was caused b a s i c a l l y by excess capacity of shipping 
tonnage, and thus not much was l i k e l y to be gained by a price war to induce 
demand. The alternative solution was the adoption of co-operation to maintain 
price. 
I n 1904 as the depression reached i t s bottom, the ScottishSteelraakers 1 Assoc-
i a t i o n r a i s e d t h e i r prices i n Scotland and B e l f a s t , so that they might dump 
fr e e l y i n England. This was a preliminary move to threaten the North east 
makers with an a l l out price war, or a l t e r n a t i v e l y to reach an agreement of 
(97) 
mutual a d v a n t a g e . v / The proposal was that the makers should respect the 
i n t e g r i t y of each others d i s t r i c t s , thus removing needless competition, and 
making important savings on railway charges. Consett was agreeable to such a 
scheme, on the understanding that i t should be terminable at short notice. 
At the same time as the plate makers moved forward towards a national 
framework of price control, Consett was anxious that an Association should be 
formed to remove unnecessary competition from the sale of angles. I n February 
1905 a temporary arrangement was adopted by Consett, Palmers, Dorman Long, and 
(95) Directors' Minute. 3 May, I898, p.30.(DCR0 : D/CO/38). 
(96) The Economist. 3 November, 1900 p.1551. 
(97) M.W. Macrosty, op.cit.,p.69. 
(98) Dire -D i r e c t o r Minute. 6 June, 1905. p.55.(DCRO : D/CO/40). 
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(qq) 
Frodingham . and it.was formalised i n June. ' 
A l l was not w e l l , however, amongst the plate-makers, because those who 
made boiler-plates resorted to t h e i r past practice of securing orders for the 
more valuable boiler-plates by making concessions upon ship-plates and 
angles, which were commoner grades. This was possible by manipulating the price 
•extras' that were invariably attached to the basic price f o r b o i l e r - p l a t e s . 
This price ' c h i s e l l i n g ' culminated i n a serious c r i s i s f o r the steelmakers i n the 
summer of 1905i and threats of withdrawal from the c o m b i n a t i o n . H o w e v e r , the 
Association was maintained i n t a c t , and the following year was strengthened by 
the extension of the agreement on plates, to angles. There was s t i l l a chink 
i n the protective armour of the Association, for although i n the Autumn of 1906 
i t was agreed that the B e l f a s t market be allocated to the North-east makers 
t h i s was not effective because of the invasion of the market by Guest, Keen and 
an unassociated English m a k e r . T h i s had an effect upon the shipbuilders 
on Clydeside and the North-east Coast who were resentful of the advantage held 
by the B e l f a s t makers. The Clydeside builders claimed that the d i f f e r e n t i a l was 
as much a 15s.Od per ton on plates, and although t h i s was disclaimed by the Scottish 
makers, there was a substantial d i f f e r e n t i a l . The scale of difference was 
s i m i l a r i n angles and boiler-plates sold i n the Midlands, the price being the same 
despite transport costs of 10s.Od to 14s.Od per ton.^"^^ 
I n view of the above evidence, McCloskey's assertion that the ship-plate 
trade was never e f f e c t i v e l y c a r t e l i z e d prior to 1914 i s unfounded, for although 
Belfast remained a renegade competitive area, by f a r the two most important 
areas f o r shipbuilding were t i g h t l y controlled by the steelmakers. 
" TO Directors1 Minute . 6 Jtwve, I9Q5". *> 55 ( i t O O .0>lCol40X 
^01) The Economist. »5 J u l y , 1?05. ? p . l p ? - 6 . _ _ 
(101) " Directors' Minute, 6 November, 1906." p.198. (DCRO : b/CO/40). 
(102) The Economist, 6 October, 1906. p.1619. 
(103) I b i d . , Using McCloskey 1s estimate Ps - MCs the excess of price over 
marginal cost, then i n 1906 Scotlands MCs was about 13?*>, i . e . 117$-(117^-141 
117^-14 
(104) D.N. McCloskey, Economic Maturity and Entrepreneurial Decline., p.51. 
- 279 -
Furthermore, i n h i s study of shipbuilding Sidney Pollard attributes the low l e v e l 
of p r o f i t s i n the 1905-6 boom to the monopolistic power of the plate makers* 
coll u s i o n . ^ ^-^ 
C a r t e l i s a t i o n i s a retarding factor i n an industry i f that industry suffers 
from, or i t s single most important customer suffers from overcapacity, since 
innovation only becomes profitable i f i t can earn p r o f i t s larger than those 
secured under c a r t e l i s a t i o n . I f one firm were to reduce i t s marginal cost, then i t s 
maximum p r o f i t a b i l i t y within the c a r t e l could be achieved only by increasing i t s 
quota, which would be unacceptable to other c a r t e l members who would have to 
forego part of t h e i r quotas. Alternatively the firm could leave the c a r t e l 
i n which case the members of the c a r t e l would r e t a l i a t e by a price war, i n order 
to maintain t h e i r market share and to drive the renegade firm back into the 
combine. Under such conditions, a company would have to be sure that the 
innovation I n conditions of price warfare would be able to sustain a prolonged 
onslaught from a very much larger group acting i n concert. As the industry suffers 
from overcapacity i t i s necessary for the renegade either t o have a s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
lower marginal cost or that the t o t a l demand of the industry's products cannot be 
supplied by.the c a r t e l operating a t f u l l capacity. 
Neither of these conditions would have held for the s t e e l plate and angle 
industries, primarily because there were serious drawbacks to the main technical 
developments; the Talbot furnace was prone to breakdown, and was most suitable 
for basic s t e e l production, which s t e e l makers were s t i l l wary of, and the 
introduction of e l e c t r i c a l machinery into the m i l l s was retarded by the absence 
of a r e l i a b l e reversing e l e c t r i c a l motor u n t i l 1907* Secondly as the 
shipbuilding industry was l i a b l e to sharp fluctuations i n demand between boom 
and slump, i t would not have been beyond the firms remaining to f u l f i l the demand 
except during the most fervent a c t i v i t y . 
(105) S. Pollard, op.cit.,pp.466-67 
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I t was for these reasons that c a r t e l i s a t i o n had a depressing influence upon 
innovation during the Edwardian era, as the measurements of Consett's r e a l costs 
bears out. However, fundamentally i t was the slowing of the growth of demand 
which provided the conducive atmosphere f o r c a r t e l i s a t i o n . This bears out 
Temin's hypothesis that the decline i n entrepreneurial vigour was a function 
of the market sit u a t i o n and not v i c e versa. 
Although the Association was unable to encompass the Welsh firms i t was 
becoming during 1907-1908 more ubiquitous. I n 1907 preliminary discussions 
were undertaken to e s t a b l i s h the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a j o i n t export s e l l i n g agency, 
and even more ambitious a combination with Continental makers. ^ * 0 ^ I n 
February 1908 Consett agreed to the fusion of the North East Coast Plate and 
Angle Associations, aid by J u l y an arrangement had been reached for a j o i n t 
s e l l i n g agency for export m a t e r i a l s / 1 ^ 
During the depression of 1908 price was driven so low that Continental 
competition i n the domestic market declined. However once trade began to pick up 
again i n the second h a l f of 1909 imports of foreign s t e e l began to r i s e once 
again. The Association, however, was remaining r e l a t i v e l y e f f e c t i v e , for both 
Dorman, Long and Company and Consett submitted to fines for s e l l i n g i n excess of 
thei r quotas. Consett was fined 6s.Od per ton on an excess sa l e of 18,106 tons 
(£5,431.06s.Od)(l08) 
However the resurgence of foreign competition prompted the Scottish Association 
i n 1911 to propose a 5s0d per ton rebate for customers buying only from 
(106) Directors' Minute. 20 Ju l y , 1907 p.15. (DCR0 SS D/CO/41). 
(107) Directors' Minute.May 1908 . (DCR0 : D#C0/4l). 
(108) Directors' Minute. 5 October, 1909, p.232.(DCR0 : D/CO/41). 
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Association members. After a very f u l l and thorough discussion Consett f e l t 
i t was unable to be party to such a scheme, because of i t s dubious l e g a l i t y ^ 0 9 ) 
Later i n the year a modified scheme was discussed and approved by Consett. The 
main difference was that the scheme should be terminated and rebates paid up 
when and i f any member withdrew. This overcame the problem r a i s e d by the 
previous scheme, whereby customers of a company that withdrew would be 
i n e l i g i b l e for rebate, although through no design of t h e i r o w n . ^ ^ 
The rebate scheme lasted two years before i t was abandoned by the Scottish 
firms because of the secession of the Lanarkshire Steel Company, but the 
English makers resolved to continue as best they could with the scheme.^^"^ 
The departure of Lanarkshire S t e e l Co. and the r e v i v a l of the Cambuslang 
Works by a consortium of shipbuilders brought about the complete collapse of 
the Association i n Scotland but many Scottish makers undertook to respect the 
i n t e g r i t y of the North-east market. However the collapse of price i n 1914 
on Clydeside led to such b i t t e r complaints from Tyne, Wear and Tees 
(112) 
shipbuilders that some concessions had to be made by the North east steelmakers. 
For i t s part Consett had matured to acceptance a scheme for a Central S e l l i n g 
Agency of S t e e l by the outbreak of the War. 
During the decade up to World War I Consett was party to an arrangement 
whereby the North east s t e e l producers were e f f e c t i v e l y able to monopolise the 
sale of s t e e l plate and angles to shipbuilders i n t h e i r own regions, which over 
the period accounted for approximately half the shipping launched i n the B r i t i s h 
(109) S c o t t i s h Steelmakers' Association to W.B. Feat, 24 June 1911, i n 
Directors' Minute. 5 October, 1909, p.232.(loc.cit.)„ 
(110) Directors' Minute. 5 September 1911, pp. 182-3. (DCRO : D/CO/42). 
(111) Directors' Minute. 2 December, 1913, p.l04.(DCR0 : D/CO/43). 
(112) Carr and Taplin, op.cit.,p.260. 
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I s l e s . Furthermore within the region the number of firms had been sharply 
reduced by the amalgamations i n the l a t e 1890's directed by S i r Christopher 
Furness, and Dorman, Long. The ef f e c t of t h i s was to contribute to the 
decline of the firm's operating e f f i c i e n c y , whilst helping to maintain a 
healthy record of p r o f i t a b i l i t y . 
I 
CHAPTER V I I I 
LABOUR IN THE IRON AND STEELWORKS 
This chapter w i l l begin by t r a c k i n g the movement from c r i s i s i n labour 
r e l a t i o n s i n the 1860's, through the d i s r u p t i o n and i n t e r - u n i o n squabbling of 
the e a r l y l890's, t o the r e l a t i v e peace of the Edwardian Decade. However, 
p h y s i c a l i n p u t i s only one aspect of the labour supply necessary f o r the 
o p e r a t i o n of a l a r g e concern. The l a s t two sections w i l l deal w i t h the 
s t r u c t u r e o f management and the p e r s o n a l i t i e s of the men who f i l l e d the 
important posts. 
I r o n and s t e e l works can be d i v i d e d i n t o three d i s t i n c t o p e r a t i n g 
departments, smelting the p i g i r o n ; r e f i n i n g i t i n t o wrought i r o n or s t e e l ; 
and f i n a l l y f i n i s h i n g i t o f f i n r o l l i n g m i l l s . The men employed i n these 
departments were pai d by tonnage or d a t a l r a t e s . The tonnageUrates were most 
commonly pai d t o the most s k i l l e d operators, o r those c a r r y i n g the most 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the working of the process, w h i l s t the d a t a l r a t e s were 
paid t o the u n s k i l l e d l a b o u r e r s . Incorporated i n t h i s system of payment 
was the p r a c t i c e o f sub-contracting labour: i n o t h e r words the s k i l l e d 
operators were d i r e c t l y employed by the Company and paid tonnage r a t e s , 
and they i n t u r n employed the necessary labourers t o a s s i s t w i t h the process, 
and paid them d a t a l wage-rates. This dichotomy i n the labour f o r c e was 
marked both i n terms o f earnings and s t a t u s , and was probably the main 
source of i n d u s t r i a l d i s p u t e . 
The labour r e l a t i o n s i n Consett's i r o n and s t e e l works tend t o u n d e r - l i n e 
the importance of a s e t t l e d community as a c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r t o a passive 
labour f o r c e . A f t e r the mid-1890 1s there was no s i g n i f i c a n t a d d i t i o n t o the 
numbers employed i n the steelworks, and a t r a d i t i o n had been w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d of 
sons f o l l o w i n g f a t h e r s i n t o the works. 
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I n d u s t r i a l A r b i t r a t i o n i n the I r o n Trade 
When the Consett I r o n Company took over the ironworks i n 1864» 
the p o p u l a t i o n of Consett was about 5,000 almost a l l o f whom had 
migrated i n t o the d i s t r i c t since 1841. Equally s i g n i f i c a n t was the f a c t 
t h a t the vast m a j o r i t y were e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y dependent upon the 
fortunes of the I r o n Company f o r t h e i r l i v e l i h o o d . I n 1873 i t was 
estimated t h a t the Consett I r o n Company employed about 6,000 men, 
probably f a i r l y evenly d i v i d e d between the coal-mines and the i r o n w o r k s . ^ 
Up t o the I89O's there does not appear t o have been a great change. I n 
I889 Win. Jenkins described the works as employing 4 ,000 men and 1,000 
boys and youths, and also educating i n Company schools about 4,000 c h i l d r e n . 
However d u r i n g the l890*s and e a r l y 1900's the s i z e of the Company's 
labour f o r c e grew very r a p i d l y , l a r g e l y due t o the expansion of " i t s 
coal-mining a c t i v i t i e s a t Chopwell. Though employment increased from 
7,400 i n 19021in 1914 f o r the f i r m as a whole, the numbers employed i n the 
ironworks rose from only 3,200 t o 3,300 men. 
The r a p i d growth of Consett was not u n t y p i c a l o f what was happening 
i n County Durham between 1820-1880, and because rapid.growth was t y p i c a l 
throughout the County i t i s probable t h a t much o f the Consett labour f o r c e 
o r i g i n a t e d outside the County. The growth o f the Ca t h o l i c p o p u l a t i o n i s a 
rough i n d i c a t o r o f the s i z e of the I r i s h immigrant p o p u l a t i o n . 
t o 9,200 
(1 ) K e l l y ' s Post O f f i c e D i r e c t o r y , 1873. 
(2 ) D e t a i l s of the Consett I r o n Company f o r the Paris E x h i b i t i o n , I889 
pp. 40-4. (DCR0 : D/CO/71). 
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TABLE V I I I . 1 . 
C a t h o l i c Population i n Brooms and B l a c k h i l l 1861 - 1882 
Year Broom B l a c k h i l l 
1861 1,134 2,760 
1874 2,052 3,220 
1882 1,800* 3,600* 
* Approximate. 
Source : Status Animarum* _ f o r the Diocese of Hexham & Newcastle 
V.2, 1847-1912.'6) 
During the 1840's there was a great deal of s e c t a r i a n antagonism i n 
Consett, and the township had the r e p u t a t i o n f o r being w i l d and lawless. 
The f u s i o n o f so many people of d i f f e r e n t o r i g i n s generated considerable 
s t r e s s i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , and the 1860's were marked by a war o f a t t r i t i o n 
between employers and employees. The d e c i s i v e campaign was undoubtedly the 
s t r i k e of 1866, f o r I t created a degree of war weariness upon both sides which 
culminated i n the f o r m a t i o n of machinery t o s e t t l e dTsputes amicably^in 1869) 
Consett was plagued by i n d u s t r i a l unrest d u r i n g the d i f f i c u l t 
t r a n s i t i o n a l years between 1857-1864, most p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 1861. However 
as trade improved d u r i n g 1863 so d i d the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . The downturn 
i n 1866 p r e c i p i t a t e d -a-, new c o l l i s i o n between workmen and employers. During 
J u l y the i r o n s h i p b u i l d e r s began to press f o r wage re d u c t i o n s , and were 
q u i c k l y emulated by the ironmasters. Messrs W h i t w e l l of Thornaby proposed 
a ls.Od per ton r e d u c t i o n on puddling and a 10$ r e d u c t i o n on other forge and 
m i l l w o r k . ^ 
(3) For t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n I am g r a t e f u l t o Mr. R.J. Cooter. 
(4) Durham Chronicle, 13 J u l y , 1866 p.5. 
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Consett 1s forges and m i l l s were closed on the 14th J u l y , 1866. The 
Company, claimed they were unable t o continue w h i l s t wages remained so h i g h , 
(5) 
w h i l e the puddlers proposed a year's moratorium on wage r a t e s . 
This was r e a l l y the f i r s t a l l out a s s a u l t on the p a r t o f the ironmasters 
t o c u t back the h i g h wage r a t e s t h a t had become customary i n a t t r a c t i n g 
labour from other d i s t r i c t s , and which had been maintained d u r i n g the 
boom co n d i t i o n s of the e a r l y 1860's. The competition which f o r c e d the 
Shotley Bridge I r o n Company i n t o the arms of Consett was adversely 
a f f e c t i n g the whole tr a d e . This was f u r t h e r aggravated by the t i g h t 
money market and the suspension o f the important London Bank, Overend and 
Gurney. I n such an atmosphere the l o c a l press expressed the b e l i e f t h a t . . 
"This w i l l have a tendency to encourage the masters i n t h i s 
d i s t r i c t i n lengthening the s t r i k e . " ^ 
Everyone seems to have expected a long struggle? the employers were 
r e s o l u t e i n t h e i r determination t o f o r c e the r e d u c t i o n , w h i l s t a t Consett 
"many of the workmen are preparing f o r removal to other centres of i n d u s t r y 
where work i s expected t o be abundant."^7) The b e t t e r o f f puddlers a t 
Bolckow Vaughan's W i t t o n Park works were even t a k i n g the o p p o r t u n i t y t o 
v i s i t r e l a t i v e s and f r i e n d s back i n Wales I By the end o f J u l y the whole of the 
Consett works were i d l e , and the cessation of the f i n i s h e d i r o n trade had an 
e f f e c t upon the p i g i r o n manufacturers. B e l l Brothers' men accepted a 10$ 
r e d u c t i o n on c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e i r wages would "advance again....when the 
s t a t e o f the " i r o n trade i s such t o warrant i t . " ^ 
(5) Durham Chronicle, 20 J u l y , 1866. p.6. 
(6) I b i d . 
(7) Durham Chronicle. 27 J u l y , 1866. p.6. 
(8) Durham Chronicle. 3 August, }866 p.5. 
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P u b l i c o p i n i o n was not behind the men. There were even misgivings voiced by 
working men themselves, about the j u s t i c e o f the ironworkers case. Although 
no reductions were proposed i n S t a f f o r d s h i r e , Wales or Scotland, t h i s was 
because the n o r t h e r n men were r e c e i v i n g higher wages than i n the other d i s t r i c t s . 
One 'Working Man* feared t h a t " i f the men concede n o t h i n g now, we may expect 
(9) 
i n the f u t u r e t o see concessions l i t t l e thought o f on e i t h e r s i d e . " N ' 
By the end o f August b i t t e r n e s s grew amongst the men; the union was 
c r i t i c a l l y s h o r t o f funds. On 27th August a very boisterous meeting was h e l d 
i n Consett, a t which a large number o f men voiced t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o r e t u r n 
to work, and there was very n e a r l y a r i o t between u n i o n i s t s and * black-legs J, 
I t seems c l e a r t h a t the movement f o r a r e t u r n t o work was favoured most by 
the lower wage d a t a l labourers i w h i l s t the puddlers who h i r e d the labourers 
out o f t h e i r piece-rates v/ere determined t o r e s i s t . H u n d r e d s o f men 
had l e f t the Consett d i s t r i c t t o seek work elsewhere, w h i l s t others sought 
casual employment on r a i l w a y c o n s t r u c t i o n , roadwork &c. 
The s t r i k e was showing signs of breaking up. Messrs. V/. Whitwell's 
blastfurnacemen r e t u r n e d t o work on the advice o f t h e i r leaders, since 
t h e i r funds were exhausted. At Consett there was i n c r e a s i n g hardship and 
antagonism because of the s t r i k e , and the t i d e was running i n favour of a 
r e t u r n t o work. 
At the end o f September, the town bellman announced t h a t the men were 
t o r e t u r n t o work, although t h i s d i d not o r i g i n a t e w i t h the Consett 
management.When the puddlers appeared f o r work they were provided w i t h 
puddling furnaces t o s t a r t . By mid day of the 29th September men i n a l l the 
(9) Durham Chronicle^ 10 August, 1846 p. 8 
0°) Durham Chronicle. 3LAugust, 1866 p.8. 
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(11) departments had agreed t o r e t u r n t o work upon the 10$ r e d u c t i o n . 
The s t r i k e / l o c k o u t had been po o r l y l e d . John Kane, the leader of the 
Amalgamated Malleable I r o n Workers was badly received i n Consett a t 
the end of the s t r i k e , and was only able t o escape s a f e l y w i t h assistance 
from the l o c a l P r i e s t . Thei'.- men's case was not a good one, as t h e i r 
wages v/ere very h i g h , a t l e a s t the earnings o f those who prosecuted the 
stoppage most f e r v e n t l y were h i g h . A p l a t e r o l l e r earned an average of 
£2.4s.2d a day, a p l a t e m i l l shearer £7. a week and even the more l o w l y 
(12} 
puddler made £2.11s.6d per week. ' These were h i g h earnings by contemporary 
standards, although a p o r t i o n had t o be pai d t o c o n t r a c t labour, and i t was 
t h i s group who s u f f e r e d the most, through low d a t a l wage ra t e s and v i r t u a l l y 
n on-existant union r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . 
C l e a r l y the o r g a n i s a t i o n o f the Amalgamated Malleable I r o n Workers' 
As s o c i a t i o n waB d e f e c t i v e . I t s s t r i k e fund paid a t Consett d r i e d up 
before the end o f August, and one i r a t e union member proclaimed t h a t 
(13) 
"he had paid. £14 i n t o the union, and he had j u s t received 24s.Od o u t . " v 
I n view of t h i s debacle of union o r g a n i s a t i o n i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t 
John Kane should have turned h i s a t t e n t i o n t o a more s u i t a b l e method of 
s e t t l i n g d i sputes. He began by 1868 t o toy w i t h the idea o f a Board of A r b i t -
(14) 
r a t i o n composed of men and masters w i t h an independent chairman. 
However h i s p o s i t i o n was severely weakened a f t e r 1866. Two f u r t h e r 10$ . 
reductions were enforced d u r i n g l867,.and union membership f e l l d r a s t i c a l l y . 
A f t e r t h e i r v i c t o r y of 1866 the employers were not a t f i r s t disposed t o 
e n t e r t a i n the n o t i o n o f a Board of A r b i t r a t i o n / J ' I n 1868, however, Kane 
(11) Durham Chronicle. 5 October, 1866, p.7. 
(12) Durham Chronicle, 12 October, l866,p.5. 
(13) Durham Chronicle, 31 August, l866,p.8. 
( H ) Carr and T a p l i n , 0p.cit.p67. 
(15) J.H. P o r t e r , "David tfale and C o n c i l i a t i o n i n The Northern Manufactured 
I r o n Trade, 1869-1914", i n Northern H i s t o r y . 1970 vol.V, P P . l 5 9 - i 6 0 . 
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r e c o n s t i t u t e d h i s union, as t h e Amalgamated Malleable Ironworkers of Great 
B r i t a i n , and began a vigourous membership d r i v e throughout a l l the i r o n 
making d i s t r i c t s of the n a t i o n w i t h marked e f f e c t / " ^ Demand began to improve 
once again i n 1869 pushing up p r i c e s , and the lessons t h a t had been preached 
d u r i n g the 1866 dispute began t o be heard by the employers. 
foremost among the employers who took heed was David Dale,Consett 1s 
Managing D i r e c t o r . He had been p a r t i c u l a r l y impressed by the r e s u l t s achieved 
(17) 
by A.J. Mundella i n Nottingham/ " and when he became secretary of the 
ironmasters' a s s o c i a t i o n he urged the f o r m a t i o n of a j o i n t committee. Though 
Kane and Edward Trow, the union leaders, were favourable, the ironmasters 
were s t i l l h e s i t a n t , b u t t h e i r views a l t e r e d as trade became more favourable. 
At the beginning o f 1869 the workmen a t several Teesside and D a r l i n g t o n 
works requested advances i n t h e i r wages. Along w i t h the wage claims came a 
request f o r the f o r m a t i o n of a Board of A r b i t r a t i o n along Mr. Mundella's 
(18) 
l i n e s . ' C l e a r l y i f the masters had r e j e c t e d e i t h e r proposal out o f hand 
they would have p r e c i p i t a t e d another b i t t e r d i s p u t e , i n which p u b l i c o p i n i o n 
would probably have p o l a r i s e d around the union's cause. The 'Board o f 
A r b i t r a t i o n and C o n c i l i a t i o n f o r the Manufactured I r o n Trade of the North o f 
England' was c o n s t i t u t e d on 22nd March 1869,with David Dale as i t s f i r s t 
(19) 
e l e c t e d p r e s i d e n t . 
A l l was not p l a i n s a i l i n g y e t , f o r a r b i t r a t o r s s t i l l had t o be c a l l e d 
i n to s e t t l e claims, b u t i t was soon suggested by Rupert K e t t l e , the f i r s t 
a r b i t r a t o r ^ t h a t a s e l l i n g p r i c e s l i d i n g scale should be adopted to 
r e g u l a t e wages a u t o m a t i c a l l y . ^ 2 0 ^ This too took time t o be accepted and 
adopted, and meanwhile Consett were not above d i s t o r t i n g the a r b i t r a t o r s ' 
awards. I n 1870 i t was a l l e g e d by the union t h a t 
f o r f o o t n o t e s see page 2 ^ 0 . 
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"An attempt has been made t o a l t e r the terms of working i n p l a t e 
and r a i l m i l l s , v/hich w i l l amount t o a r e d u c t i o n instead of an 
advance and the Consett I r o n Company were accused of " p l a y i n g f a s t and 
(21) loose w i t h the r e s o l u t i o n which was signed by Mr. Thomas Hughes, M.P.I|X ' 
Though Consett may not have kept complete f a i t h w i t h the s p i r i t 
o f a r b i t r a t i o n and c o n c i l i a t i o n , David Dale d i d , and h i s r e p u t a t i o n f o r 
f a i r n e s s grew i n s t r e n g t h amongst the workmen. I n 1872 he was i n s t r u m e n t a l 
i n launching the f i r s t s e l l i n g p r i c e s l i d i n g scale t o r e g u l a t e wages i n the 
(22) 
North o f England i r o n t r a d e . This scale was s h o r t - l i v e d , however, 
mainly because of the i n t e r - r e g i o n a l competition; i t was not r e v i v e d u n t i l 
1880, and then was o n l y s h o r t - l i v e d . A successful scale was not introduced 
u n t i l 1889 when p r i c e was moving upward once again, but by t h i s date 
malleable i r o n was r a p i d l y being replaced by s t e e l , e s p e c i a l l y a t Consett 1s 
own works. 
During the e a r l y years of the Boards existence Consett was c e n t r a l i n 
i t s success, as one trade u n i o n i s t a t t e s t e d i n 1902: 
" I n the f o r m a t i o n of the C o n c i l i a t i o n Board, i n the b u i l d i n g up 
o f the a s s o c i a t i o n /~union_7 throughout the years of depression and c r i s i s 
which f o l l o w e d upon the rush of the seventies down t o the e i g h t i e s , 
no one can lose s i g h t of the f a c t t h a t Consett was both the e n e r g i s i n g , 
(16) Carr and T a p l i n , op.cit.,p.69. 
(17) S i r Edward Grey, S i r David Dale : I n a u g r a l address d e l i v e r e d f o r the 
Dale Memorial Trust^ (London, 1911) p.35* 
(18) Durham Chronicle, 26 February, I869 p.5. 
(19) J.H. P o r t e r , o p . c i t . 9 p . l 6 l . 
(20) I b i d . 
(21) I r o n and Coal Trades Review, 6 A p r i l , 1870, p.219 
(22) J.H. P o r t e r , op.cit.,p.l62. 
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v i t a l i s i n g and also steadying power, i n f l u e n c i n g and i n a l a r g e 
measure governing the new p o l i c y of i n d u s t r i a l peace and common sense 
i n i t i a t e d a f t e r the deplorable c o n f l i c t s t o which they had been 
(23) 
accustomed. 1 1 x ' 
The Company c o n s i s t e n t l y took advantage of the a r b i t r a t i o n procedure 
e s t a b l i s h e d by the Board to regulate wages and modes of working and the 
method was extended to most of the o p e r a t i n g areas of the ironworks. The 
blastfurnacemen, who were a t f i r s t associatedv^iththe Malleable Ironworkers, 
broke away i n I878 and then set up t h e i r own j o i n t r e g u l a t i n g machinery upon 
(24) 
s i m i l a r l i n e s t o the wrought-iron t r a d e . 
When Consett began t o produce s t e e l i n the l880's the r e v i s e d methods 
o f working were a r b i t r a t e d by the Standing Committee o f the Board o f 
(25) 
A r b i t r a t i o n . ^ The only area o f d i f f i c u l t y which arose was t h a t 
generated by the h o s t i l i t y between the o l d Associated I r o n and S t e e l Workers 
A f t e r the t u r m o i l i n labour r e l a t i o n s i n 1866 Consett had an almost 
s t r i k e f r e e record i n the i r o n and steelworks. Consett was a f f e c t e d 
i n 1880 by the general s t r i k e of ironworkers who took issue w i t h Waterhouse's 
s e l l i n g p r i c e c e r t i f i c a t e which imposed a 5$ wage r e d u c t i o n . The men f e l t 
the p r i c e had been c a l c u l a t e d by a method d e t r i m e n t a l t o them. However 
the dispute was over w i t h i n a week, when the men were convinced o f the f a i r n e s s 
(27) 
of the c a l c u l a t i o n s . ' Six years l a t e r Consett's blastfumacemen came out 
(23) Ironworkers' J o u r n a l , May, 1902. 
(24) H.A. Clegg, A. Fox, and A.F. Thompson, A H i s t o r y o f B r i t i s h Trade Unions 
since 1889. I (Oxford, 1964) p.210. 
(25) Ironworkers' J o u r n a l . J u l y , I 8 8 5 . 
(26) Ironworkers' J o u r n a l . J u l y , 1890. 
(27) Ironworkers' J o u r n a l . June, 1880 p.5. 
eld 
fas Kane si union evolved t o ^ and John Hodge's S t e e l Smelters Union. (26) 
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on a s t r i k e against a proposed % reduction, against the advice of. t h e i r 
Union, but a f t e r eleven days they accepted the employer's terms and 
returned to work/ 2*^ Then again i n I89O the firm's operations were 
interrupted f o r two weeks "by a s t r i k e i n the steel melting shops. 
These were the only major stoppages which originated i n the ironworks. 
I n I89O William Aucott of the A.I.S.W. crystallised the harmony that 
existed i n labour relations at Consett's works: 
"For years past i t had been his boast throughout the whole trade 
of the United Kingdom, that the men at Consett had always acted 
f a i t h f u l l y and l o y a l l y to t h e i r p rinciples, and that the Lodge a t 
Consett, i n regard to the relationship between the employers and 
the operatives, was the easiest and best, and the most perfect 
(29) 
that he knew of i n any great concern i n the country. 
The reason f o r such i n d u s t r i a l peace at Consett seems to have been 
the s t a b i l i t y of the community; i n 1902 the reporter of the A.I.S.W.'s annual 
meeting of the Consett Lodge was struck by negligible change i n personnel 
at Consett, as compared with other w o r k s . F u r t h e r m o r e interest i n 
trade unionism on the whole seems to have waned, §t least amongst the men 
employed i n the m i l l s . A regular lament at A.I.S.W. meetings was the 
declining i n t e r e s t i n the advantages of unionism. 
This r e l a t i v e freedom from strife,however,over such a long term 
may have had an adverse a f f e c t upon Consett's management, i n that i t 
(28) Durham County Advertiser, 23 A p r i l , 1886 p.7. 
(29) Ironworkers' Journal. July, I89O. 
(30) Ironworkers' Journal, May, 1902. 
(31) e.g. Mr. John Orr (President of Durham-Colliery Mechanics) f e l t i t 
was '.'a shame that so few of the men of Consett were organised" 
Ironworkers' Journal. January, 1892. 
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removed an incentive to innovate. Several writers have observed the 
(32) importance of s t r i k e action and m i l i t a n t labour on inducing innovation. 
Since t h i s v/as absent i n Consett's case over most of the period, i t i s feasible 
that i t contributed to the poor productivity performance from the l a t e l890's 
onwards. The period covered by t h i s study more or less encompasses 
the secular price decline between 1873-1896, and then the secular price 
r i s e between 1896-1914 i t may be that there was pressure from labour costs 
before 1896, but t h i s was al l e v i a t e d a f t e r I896. The s e l l i n g price 
s l i d i n g scale would have an influence upon t h i s because of the lag between 
price movements and wage adjustments. William Jenkins observed t h i s 
e f f e c t i n 1882, pointing out that because of the 3 months lag between 
prices and wage adjustments ironworkers might get low rates whilst price 
was r i s i n g and high rates whilst price was f a l l i n g . A s the f i r s t 
h a l f of the period was one of price decline, manufacturers were faced with 
f a l l i n g s e l l i n g prices and high wage rates more often than r i s i n g prices 
and low rates, which became more normall. a f t e r I896. S l i d i n g scales 
and wage a r b i t r a t i o n s based on the average price f o r the previous 3months 
may have had an e f f e c t upon technical innovation. 
A possible abuse that the Board of A r b i t r a t i o n avoided with respect 
to changes i n productivity, was the r i s k of discouraging innovation by 
reducing the return on c a p i t a l . Since many men were paid piece rates 
then i t would have been unjust to the ironmaster had they been 
accredited with the f u l l ; benefit of improved productivity bestowed by new 
machinery. There were several cases of a r b i t r a t i o n to reduce the piece 
(32) E.iJ. Hobsbawm, Labouring Men, (London,1964 ) p.172.; J.P. Clarke 
Labour Relations i n Engineering and Shipbuilding on the North-East 
Coast i n the Second Half of the 19th Century." (University of Hewcastie, 
M.A. Thesis, I966) p.504. 
(33) Ironworkers' Journal, 1st March, 1882. p.2. 
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rates because of the greater efficiency of the machine. This was not 
an attack on the men's earnings, merely an insurance that increments to 
pro d u c t i v i t y contributed by c a p i t a l should be d i s t r i b u t e d to c a p i t a l . 
The adjudication of the Board was not always perfect, and t h e i r 
effectiveness i n re-negotiating rates i n l i n e with technical improvements 
appears to have deteriorated over time. I n 1900 Consett complained that; 
"There i s no doubt that where r o l l e r s are placed i n a position 
to earn £900 a year net by the character of the equipment 
placed at his disposal, some more consideration i s due to the 
Company or f i r m than would be due to concerns that were not so 
well u p - t o - d a t e . 3 4 ^ 
The Structure of Employment ; The change from Iron to Steel. 
One reason f o r the paucity of figures on numbers of men employed 
by Consett i n the. ironworks, i s the mode of employment which was 
prevalent i n the 19th Century - that of sub-contract labour. The system 
had probably evolved as a means of minimising the management problems of 
the new large scale entrepreneurs, and possibly also to reduce the burden 
(35) 
upon working c a p i t a l : ' i t was maintained i n the forges and the f i n i s h i n g 
departments at Consett through the whole p e r i o d , ^ 3 ^ although only i n a 
very rudimentary form, since the Company increased i t s control over the 
amounts paid to datal men and labourers. ' 
The three t i e r system of masters, contractors and helpers was 
probably an advantage i n f a c i l i t a t i n g the success of the Board of A r b i t r a t i o n , 
(34) Ironworkers' Journal, June, 1900. 
(35) A.J. Taylor, "The Sub-contract System i n the B r i t i s h Goal Industry" i n 
LS. Pressnell, Studies i n the I n d u s t r i a l Revolution. (London 1960 ) p.217. 
(36) Ironworkers' Journal. June 1908. 
(37) Ironworkers' Journal.. May, 1886. 
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f o r as the Malleable Ironworkers' Association was i n favour of a r b i t r a t i o n , 
and was made up predominantly of contractors, i t was able to impose an 
effec t i v e measure of d i s c i p l i n e upon i t s members. This was possible since 
there was always a large pool of underhands anxious to r i s e to the 
position of contractor. The masters and Association were thus favourably 
(38 ^ 
placed to remove any contractor who disregarded Board decisions. 
However there were problems; i n the slump of 1878-79 Cohsett was 
anxious to effect a reduction of wages, but wished to be discriminating 
i n that i t wanted i t to apply only to the 'high-class' workmen, u/ho were 
the contractors. Naturally Edward Trow' the Associations secretary 
was adamant, since t h i s was ah attack upon his members. When David Dale 
eventually made the award of a reduction i n 1878 there ensued a protracted 
dispute' about whether the contractors should pass the reduction on to 
(39) 
t h e i r helpers. ' 
The helpers, who were contributors to the Board, but not necessarily 
members of Trow's union, were determined that they should not suffer 
a reduction, as the Board did not authorise one f o r them. The helpers were 
doubly affronted since they had increased the output of the forges and m i l l s 
without any advance i n t h e i r wages. F i n a l l y David Dale a r b i t r a t e d , awarding 
that no reduction should be made i n helpers' wages, whilst the contractors 
should be p a r t i a l l y relieved of some of the reduction. 
Sub-contracting had never been an important element at the blastfurnaces, 
and during the mid and l a t e 1880's i t began to lose ground i n other, departments, 
(38) H.A. Clegg. e t a l . , op.cit., pp.22-23. 
(39) Ironworkers' Journal. November 1879• 
(40) Ironworkers' Journal, February, 1880 p . l . 
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The p r i n c i p a l reason f o r t h i s was the substitution of steel f o r i r o n , 
and the emergence of a new system of working and a new union. I n the 
ironworks a contractor would control one process, i . e . a puddler or r o l l e r , 
but i n the new steel works the contractor controlled the whole workshop 
or m i l l . ^ " ^ This meant the majority of workmen were subordinated to a 
datal wage system; the f i r s t assault upon t h i s system was made by John 
(42) 
Hodge i n Scotland, and the Scottish employers acquiesced. Hodge was 
also the i n i t i a t o r of the Associated Society of Millmen i n 1888, but he 
resigned the following year to concentrate upon his duties as Secretary 
of the Smelters' Association and was replaced by John Cronin. 
Having established himself i n Scotland, Hodge began to invade the North 
of England f o r members. I n Scotland he had not been confronted by any 
well organised u n i o n , b u t i n England he came up against Edward Trow's 
A.I.S.W.. Hodge's campaign i n the North of England was c l e a r l y planned upon 
the classical lines of Napoleon and Wellington. As he remembered...."In 
the early days of the Union, I copied t h e i r " t a c t i c s , ever endeavouring 
to tackle employers singly - a h i n t to one of what his r i v a l thought 
kept them jealous of one another."^44) 
Hodge's tact i c s appear to have worked, and the f i r m he singled out 
was Consett. When prices began to improve i n 1887 there was a claim f o r 
an advance i n piece rates. William Jenkins attempted to encourage 
(45) 
co-operation amongst the producers of the North of England. However 
(41) H.A. Clegg et a l . op.cit., p.205. 
(42) Carr and Taplin, op.cit.,p.l40. 
(43) I b i d . , p.139. 
(44) John Hodge, Workman's Cottage to Windsor Castle (London, 193l) p.103 . 
(45) Wm. Jenkins t o : - Bolckow, Vaughan & Co.; Dorman, Long & Co; Moer Iron 
Co.; Palmers Shipbuilding & Iron Co.; and Weardale Iron & Coal Cos; 
25 January I887. (DCRO : D/CO/68). 
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there does not seem to have been a willingness as Jenkins l a t e r complained... 
" I have recently aimed at get t i n g some co-operation i n the case of those 
firms who are r o l l i n g s t e e l , but there i s not much encouragement. 
Jenkins had recognised Hodge's t a c t i c s , f o r a l i t t l e l a t e r i n 1887 
he wrote to David Dale: 
"Our men have a f f i l i a t e d themselves with the Glasgow Steel Melters 
Union and they appear to have singled us out f o r attack, as 
turning out about the largest quantities i n the North of England, 
and i f t h e i r point i s carried here no doubt they w i l l follow i t up 
by pressing the same claim at other works." 
The lines of b a t t l e between the new union and Consett were thus drawn, 
but there was also a second f r o n t , between the Smelters and the A.I.S.W.. 
Although trade unionism was not strong at Consett, - possibly a reason 
why Hodge choose the Company f o r his main assault, • i t had been 
. l o n g established. As the new steelworks were constructed, displaced 
puddlers were moved to work at the open-hearth f u r n a c e s . A n t a g o n i s m 
between the Smelters and the A.I.S.W. reached a climax i n I89O when the 
Smelters called a s t r i k e , closing the works. Trow and Aucott of the A.I.S.W. 
complained b i t t e r l y about the Smelters'attempts to coerce t h e i r members 
to j o i n the Smelters' A s s o c i a t i o n . R e l a t i o n s between the two unions 
remained strained, but at least t h e i r strengths polarised i n the melting 
shops and m i l l s respectively,thus reducing the prospect of further 
inter-union warfare over membership. 
(46 ) Wm.. Jenkins to Wm. Whitwell, 28 February, I887, (DCRO :D /CO/68). 
(47) Wm. Jenkins to David Dale, 7 A p r i l , 1887, (DCRO : D/CO/68). 
(48) R. Evans to David Dale, 4 A p r i l , 1887. (DCRO : D/CO/68). 
(49) Ironworkers' Journal. J u l y ? l 8 9 0 . 
(50) Ironworkers' Journal. January, I 8 9 2 . 
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On the main f r o n t , however, John Hodge v/as faced by an able and 
energetic opponent i n Wm. Jenkins, f o r Consett's General Manager knew that 
the l i n e of defence, or even counter-attack to adopt was that of co-operation 
between a l l employers on Smelters' wages. Jenkins took a central role i n 
the organisation of the employers, and as Hodge's own success grew, r a i s i n g 
the wage of a f i r s t melter from 17s.Od a day i n 1887 to £9.12s.7d a week 
at the end of 1889, the steel-makers gradually came round to the wisdom 
of j o i n t action. Jenkins had complained to Windsor Richards of Bolckow 
Vaughan i n 1887 that the higher wages at his f i r m i n c i t e d the Consett 
men to ask f o r an advance and as la t e as the end of 1889 he was s t i l l 
s t r i v i n g to f i t the Moor Iron and Steel Works i n t o the pattern of co-operation. 
" I t i s a p i t y that you do not unite with the other employers i n 
aiming at something l i k e strength on the part of employers to meet 
(51) 
the superior wisdom and strength of the operatives themselves," w ' 
However, Jenkins' strategy was taking shape by the beginning of I89O. 
For the f i r s t time he began to get co-operation not only from the English 
(52) 
makers but also t h e i r Scottish counterparts. ' Hodge was also changing 
his t a c t i c s , f o r as he recalled, "as soon as I had the position of the 
society consolidated and rates and conditions of employment f a i r l y well 
s t a b i l i s e d , I realised the importance and the benefit of coll e c t i v e 
(53) 
bargaining." x ' 
Prom 1890 the relationship between the Smelters* Association and the 
steel makers was s t a b i l i s e d , and eventually i n 1905 a s e l l i n g price s l i d i n g 
(51) Wm. Jenkins to C.J. Bagley, Moor Iron & Steel Co., 13 December,I889. 
(DCRO : D/CO/70). 
(52) Wm. Jenkins to A.D. ToLmc, 14th January, 1890.. (DCRO : D/CO/71) 
(53) John Hodge, op.cit.,p,103. 
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scale was negotiated, probably because Hodge saw the advantages which would 
accrue once a price combine had been formed between the English and 
(54) 
Scottish makers i n 1 9 0 4 . w ^ / 
The emergence of the Steel Smelters' Association was i l l u s t r a t i v e of 
the a b i l i t y of a 'new' union to gain extensive concessions and then 
successfully consolidate. Hodge's strategy proved successful i n exp l o i t i n g 
the employers' weakness to organise themselves, despite Jenkins' e f f o r t s , 
and he gained s i g n i f i c a n t wage advances f o r his men'. I n contrast the 
steelmillmen do not appear to have fared as w e l l . I n 1888 agreement was 
reached with the mailmen at Consett and Jarrow to regulate t h e i r wages 
(55) 
by a s l i d i n g scale. ' When the millmen's scale came up f o r renewal i n 
1890 the boom had passed i t s peak and bargaining strength was swinging back 
towards the manufacturers. The men claimed f o r meal breaks, short hours 
on Saturdays &c. and a 2-3$ advance on the basic rate. The employers 
a f t e r long negotiations were.able to s t r i p o f f and dismiss a l l 'the 
extraneous items', conceding only the 2-2$ advance, ' a poor reward f o r 
two years l o y a l t y to the s l i d i n g scale during such a period of agitated 
labour re l a t i o n s . I n 1892 when the slump was at i t s worst, the millmen 
(57) 
got no concessions f o r agreeing to continue with the scale. 
Hodges tact i c s won large advances during the boom years but these were 
eroded i n the depression, whereas the millmen's advances were more 
conservative, but then so were the l a t e r reductions. Hodge could have done 
better f o r his members by negotiating a s l i d i n g scale when his strength 
(54) H.A. Clegg et a l . , op.cit., p.350. 
(55) Ironworkers' Journal, May, 1888. 
(56) ' Wm. Jenkins t o : - R. Stephenson (Stockton Malleable Iron Co.); J. Price, 
(Palmers) A. March, I89O (DCRO : D/CO/72). 
(57) Wm. Jenkins to J. Price (Palmer's) 15 March,1892. 
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was at i t s peak i n 1889-1890. 
TABLE V I I I . 2 . 
Advances and Reductions made to Steelsmelters 
and Steel Millmen Between March 1888 - March 1891 
Smelters Millmen 
Advance $ Reduction^ Advance^ Reduction 
Mar 1888 8.33 5.00 
June 1888 2.50 
Apr. 1889 3.80 2.50 
May 1889 3.70 
July 1889 2.50 
Nov. 1889 10.00 
Jan. 1890 2.50 
Mar. 1890 5.00 
June 1890 10.00 
Aug. 1890 5.00 
Sept 1890 2.50 
Dec. 1890 7.50 
Feb. 1891 5.00 
Mar. 1891 5.00 7.50 
Source : William Jenkin's Letterbook, pp. 208-209.(DCR0 : D/C0/75). 
The problems experienced i n labour relations i n the period between I887-
I89O show up some of the problems involved i n the introduction of new plant 
and techniques. I n I889 Jenkins complained to E.P. Martin, of Dowlais, 
that he could not contemplate introducing a new machine into the steei m i l l s 
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because of the d i f f i c u l t relations with the shearmen. 
Jenkins also resented new entrants i n t o the industry taking advantage 
of Consett's hard won experience i n labour management. 
"At Stockton Malleable Mr. Robert Stephenson and his men are i n a 
very great state of confusion as to progress i n f i x i n g wages f o r t h e i r 
new steel m i l l plant. We at Consett are ge t t i n g rather t i r e d of 
assisting and posting up people who come i n t o the trade a f t e r a l l 
(59) 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s and experience we have gone through. ' 
Consett's own entry i n t o the sectional steel trade presented i-t 
with problems of labour supply and wage rates. Jenkins sought his 
information on wage rates* from JiH.iyWinpenny, the Secretary of the 
North of England Ironmasters' Association. The recruitment of Labour was more 
of a problem. Jenkins was anxious to minimise the number of strange men 
he required at the plant, as he f e l t they would be a disruptive influence. 
However, the headmen who were experienced and s k i l l e d i n an Angle M i l l 
had to be brought from elsewhere. Jenkins went to great lengths to f i n d the 
best man who could "by his presence and experience give one an assurance 
that he i s capable of managing- "Men" Most of the labourers and other 
semi-skilled men were redeployed from the Tin M i l l which was being 
run down. 
Consett was, l i k e many other plants, troubled by the normal labour 
problems such as absenteeism, r e s t r i c t i v e practices, uncontrollable 
m i l i t a n t s and careless workmen. The f i r s t was. so bad i n the puddling shops 
that prize money was paid to the men to encourage them to f e t t l e t h e i r 
furnaces on Sunday evenings so that a prompt s t a r t would be possible on 
(59) Wm. Jenkins to David Dale, 29 October 1890.(DCR0 : D/CO/74). 
(60) Wm. Jenkins to A.D. Tolmie, 21 Fenruary 1890<.(DCR0 : D/C0/72)» 
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M o n d a y s . T h e r e s t r i c t i o n of output was also commonly used when 
new piece rates were being f i x e d . 
I n most other national issues such as the eight hour day Consett 
followed the stream of opinion, except i n the case of i t s millmen. 
I n 1900 the men appointed a deputation f o r negotiating an eight hour 
(62) 
s h i f t . v ' Though Ainsworth was v i o l e n t l y against the proposal at f i r s t , 
he seems to have eventually conceded. I n 1903» E. Holliday the Consett 
representative at the Annual Conference of the A.I.S.W. proposed that the 
union should take the i n i t a t i v e and open negotiations f o r a three s h i f t 
system. I t was already, he claimed,acceptable i n p r i n c i p l e to Consett's 
management. However, i t was the union membership who quashed Holliday 1s 
(63) 
motion, since they feared such a system would reduce t h e i r earnings. 
The eight hour s h i f t was adopted at the blastfurnaces i n 18971 but nowhere 
else i n the s t e e l plant u n t i l 1919• 
. Wage3 at Consett 
Because of the varying working conditions and rates applied to them 
i t is d i f f i c u l t to ascertain where Consett stood i n r e l a t i o n to other companies 
i n the payment of labour. I n 1892 J. Cronin of the Associated Society of 
Millmen i n Scotland alleged that Consett paid lower wages than Scottish 
works. However under cross-examination from Edward Trow, his English 
counter-part, i t was shown that though piece rates were s l i g h t l y lower, 
productivity was higher and so were earnings. 
(61) Ironworkers' Journal, 1 June, I878; and 1 July 5l888. 
£62) Directors' Minute, 3 A p r i l , 1900 p.193. (DCRO : D/CO/38). 
(63) Ironworkers' Journal, July, 1903. 
(64) R.C. on Labour, P.P. 1892 /7c6795 - iv_7 XXXVI, QQ.16134-16178. 
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I n 1895 George Ainsworth made as good a comparison as possible between 
the numbers employed at Consett and. Barrow and the wages paid. 
He concluded that "the general impression received i s t h a t i f the 
reductions sought are obtained the rates paid w i l l not i n many instances 
be lower than now paid at Consett." He also thought Consett was not i n 
(65) 
a 'disadvantageous condition' with regard to the numbers employed. ' 
Although i r o n and steelworkers wages were good, and well above average 
by contemporary standards (see Table V I I I . 3 ) the men were not immune 
from hardship caused by slack trade or cessation of work. 
TABLE V I I I . 3 . 
Money wages paid to d i f f e r e n t classes of workmen 
at the Consett Iron Company's Works c .1890 
Occupation 
Steel smelter 1st Hand 
Steel smelter 2nd Hand 
Steel smelter 3rd Hand 
Blastfurnace keeper 
Blastfurnace labourer 
Boiler minders & B'furnace 
Loco Enginemen 
Rollers 
Money Wage 
£ 9 . 1 2 s . 7 d per week 
£6 .03s.lOd per week 
£ 3 * l 6 s . 2 d . per week 
6s. 7& per s h i f t 
3s . 2d per s h i f t 
4 s . 6d per s h i f t 
4 s . 2d per s h i f t 
£16 - £18.per week. 
Source: * Wm. Jenkins to David Dale, 15 November,l889.(DCRO : D/CO/70), 
+ R.C. on Labour. Group A. P.P. I892 (c.6795 - i v ) XXXVI 
Q. 14 ,240. 
* I b i d . Q. 16177. 
(65) George Ainsworth to David Dale, 27 February, 1895.(DCRO : D/CO/86). 
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I n 1877 there were twenty-one operatives at Consett who earned the 
very a t t r a c t i v e sum of £200 - £400 per annum, which was more than many 
(66) 
of the Company1s managers were earning^ ' and equivalent to the income 
of the average incumbent i n County Durham. 
However i n times of distress the men had only t h e i r savings on which 
to f a l l back, As trade unionism amongst the ironworkers decreased so did 
the opportunity of partaking of any unemployment or sickness benefits. I n 
1894 Consett had only l i m i t e d f a c i l i t i e s f o r personal insurance or saving, 
but had a s u r f e i t of public houses. Wm. Jenkins lamented that the highly 
paid steel smelters were "said to be spending the bulk of t h e i r money and 
(67) 
spare time i n bet t i n g and gambling." ' 
When the Company undertook the a l t e r a t i o n of i t s m i l l s i n 1886 - 87 
fo r the production of steel large numbers of men were thrown out of employment 
or took large reductions i n earnings by working on excavations &c. The 
distress was such i n the winter of 1887 that the Company opened a soup 
kitchen, providing 1200 quarts of soup a day. Jenkins was indignant 
(68) 
about some unemployed men who were 'unbearable i n t h e i r conduct'/ ' He 
could not reconcile himself with the imprudent behaviour of the men who 
were forced to work twelve hours a day i n appalling conditions, and then 
suffer the humiliation of charity. 
the 
Thus most prominent feature of the labour relations between Consett and 
the iron and steelworkers i s the r e l a t i v e l y easy atmosphere i n which they 
were conducted. The widespread implementation of s e l l i n g price s l i d i n g scales 
from the l890's onward i n a l l departments removed the major source of 
(66) Directors' Minute. 5 November,I872. (DCRO : D/co/30). 
(67) Wm. Jenkins to David Dale, 15 November,I889. (DGR0 : D/CO/70). 
(68) Wm. Jenkins to David Dale, 21 January, 1887. (DCRO : D/CO/68)„ 
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f r i c t i o n , wage adjustment. Work place disputes were normally handled 
through the Boards of A r b i t r a t i o n , and on the whole both sides abided by 
decisions made. When i n 1907 the shearmen's helpers i n the two l i g h t plate 
m i l l s refused to accept an a r b i t r a t o r s decision, the Standing Committee of 
the Board of A r b i t r a t i o n authorised Consett to dismiss the men and replace 
them, and they were supported by the Union, the A.I.S.W., who condemned 
the men f o r t h e i r r e f u t a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e of a r b i t r a t i o n and 
c o n c i l i a t i o n . ^ ^ 
Consett was blessed with a co-operative labour force, which although 
a great benefit, may have been a p a r t i a l drawback i n the long term process 
of technological change. 
. The Structure of Management 
Consett was one of the largest ironworks i n the kingdom i n I864, 
and as such was probably amongst the largest i n d u s t r i a l enterprises. I t 
had adopted the new form of l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y which opened the door to an 
even greater scale of operations. However i n terms of organisation i t s 
development was s t i l l very rudimentary. The Company was managed by two 
Managing Directors, Jonathan Priestman and David Dale. Priestman had 
been i n control since the unsuccessful attempt to f l o a t the Derwent and 
Consett I r o n Company i n 1859• David Dale's association began as an 
inspector appointed by J.W. Pease, one of the Derwent Iron Company's 
chief creditors, i n 1 8 5 7 H i s shareholding appears to have been as 
a trustee f o r the Pease in t e r e s t s , and the Stockton and Darlington 
(69) Ironworkers' Journal, May, 1907. 
(70) J.8. Jeans, Pioneers of the Cleveland Iron Trade (Middlesbrough, 1875) 
p.200. 
- 306 -
Railway, as he held his shares i n conjunction with Henry P e l l Pease, 
Emerson Bainbridge and Thomas MacNay. David Dale's salary was £500 p.a., 
whilst Priestman was given a f i v e year contract and a l l o t t e d 854 shares. 
He gave f i v e promissory notes each f o r £1,281 plus 10$ simple i n t e r e s t , and 
received one back each year as payment. The Board of Directors was otherwise 
non-executive. 
Between them Dale and Priestman v/ere responsible f o r the operations 
of the Company - i n sales they were aided by a London agent. There was a 
number of departmental managers, the most senior of whom was James Radcliffe 
the Assistant Manager. I n 1868 Radcliffe's contract was revised and his 
(71) 
salary f i x e d at £800 p.a. I t i s most probable that he was a pr a c t i c a l 
ironmaster who undertook the day to day running of the works. The other 
departmental managers were paid by salary and commission, i n that they 
(72) 
received as a bonus a percentage on the Dividends paid. (See Table V I I I . 4 . ) 
The Table shows the extent of the Company's management network i n the 
l860's. A few of the more senior members of the Company's management were 
also shareholders, among them, Robert Greenwell, Thomas Green, Richard 
Latimer, James R a t c l i f f e , William Keenleyside and CP. Douglas. 
The structure remained very much of thi s form u n t i l David Dale's 
retirement from active management i n 1872. Then a Company Secretary was 
appointed; f i r s t Richard Latimer, who resigned w i t h i n a few months, and 
second Richard Evans. By 1872 the growth of the firm's business had led to 
a p r o l i f e r a t i o n i n the number of salaried s t a f f . There had also been a 
(71) Directors' Minute. 19 November 1868. (DCRO : D/CO/29). 
(72) Directors' Minute, 10 June I 8 6 5 . (DCRO : D/CO/29). 
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TABLE V I I I . 4 . 
Payment of Company Agents 1864 - 65 
Fixed $ on 
Name of Agent Nature of Employment Salary Dividend 
James R a t c l i f f e Corresponding Clerk &c. £400 £ 1 . 0 0 s . Od 
Richard Latimer Cashier None £ 1 . 0 5 s . Od 
Robert Greenwell Newcastle Agent £200 5s. Od 
Edward Charlton Railway & T r a f f i c Manager £200 10s. Od 
Thos. Ridley Pay Clerk &c. £200 5s. Od 
Wm. Prosser Rai l M i l l Foreman £124 10s. Od 
James Jones Plate M i l l Foreman None £1.02s. Od 
John Lishman Resident Viewer £150 5s. Od 
Thos. Siddell Puddling M i l l Foreman £120 6s . Od 
John Wilson Puddling M i l l Foreman £120 6s . Od. 
Jos Cuthbertson Consett B'furnace Foreman £132 4s . 0d 
Thos. Green Store Keeper £100 5s. Od 
Wm. Keenleyside Coke Oven Foreman £100 5s. Od 
Thos. Elsden Crookhall B'furnace Foreman £100 5s. Od 
CP. Douglas Draughtsman £110 4 s . Od 
W. Brown Ass. Railway & T r a f f i c Manager £ 80 4s . Od 
J.T. L i t t l e Crookhall Clerk £100 2s . 0d 
George Grant Plate Inspector None 12s. Od 
Wm. Stockton Loco Foreman £100 2s . Od 
Chas. Young Boiler Smiths Foreman £100 2s. Od 
John Dowson Commercial Ledger Keeper £ 80 2s. Od 
John Heymer Manufacturing Ledger Keeper £ 80 2s . Od 
Source: Directors' Minute. 14 October 1865,pp. 67-68 (DCRO : D/CO/29). 
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change i n the method of remuneration, since a l l were paid a fixed s a l a r y . 
C P . Douglas had r i s e n from the r e l a t i v e l y lowly rank of draughtsman to 
blastfurnace engineer, earning £500 p.a. The main growth area appears to 
have been junior o f f i c e s t a f f to handle the increasing volume of correspondence, 
invoicing, cost records &c. that was necessitated by the growth i n the scale of 
operations. Whereas only 22 men were l i s t e d as s a l a r i e d agents i n 1865, t h i s 
had r i s e n to 41 by 1872. Unfortunately t h i s i s the l a s t f u l l account of 
sa l a r i e d employees given i n the records, but i t i s most certain that the numbers 
rose, i f only because of the expansion of the administration to supervise 
the new c o l l i e r i e s which were opened, from the l870's onwards. 
When David Dale withdrew from active management, apart from the 
appointment of a Secretary, two sub-committees of the Board of Directors were 
set up to di r e c t policy for the C o l l i e r i e s and Fi n a n c i a l matters. Within 
the new structure of management William Jenkins became primarily responsible 
for the operation of the ironworks and the sale of a l l products, whilst 
Richard Evans was responsible for administrative functions, and acted.as 
Jenkins* chief lieutenant, whenever he was absent. 
The structure remained fundamentally the same u n t i l 1894 when Jenkins 
r e t i r e d , and Evans died. H. Holliday, who came from a post as General 
Jenkins' replacement, George Ainsworth, came from within the Company: he had 
entered the Consett Iron Company as a chemist, sometime between I865-I872. 
Along with the change i n personnel, there was an a l t e r a t i o n i n structure. 
Ainsworth was to be responsible for the iron and steelworks alone, whilst 
the s e c r e t a r i a l and commercial functions were transferred to Holliday. The 
c o l l i e r y a f f a i r s were by the l890's s p l i t between the managers at Langley 
Park, Garesfield and Consett and th i s remained the format of organisation 
1914. Chart VHUshows the relationships within the management structure 
Manager ./of the Leeds Steelworks was appointed to f i l l Evans 1 place; 5 / 
about 1893. 
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I d e a l l y , Alfred Sloan believed the concept of management of a business 
reorganisation to be -
"to divide i t into as many parts as consistently can be done, 
place i n charge of each part the most capable executive that 
can be found, develop a system of co-ordination so that each 
part may strengthen and support each other part; 
thus not only welding a l l parts together i n the common 
inte r e s t s of a j o i n t enterprise, but importantly developing 
a b i l i t y and i n i t i a t i v e through the instrumentalities of 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and ambition - developing men and giving them an 
opportunity to exercise the i r talents, both i n t h e i r own 
(73) 
i n t e r e s t s as well as i n that of the business.*^ 
Jenkins' own views were not f a r removed from those of the master of 
organisation Sloan, for he explained to David Dale: 
. . . . " i t w i l l be well i f we can organise these several departments 
i n such a way that good and responsible men are attached to 
them, having d i s t i n c t duties c l e a r l y defined."^4) 
Having established what the framework was 5the question a r i s e s whether i t 
was necessary to fi n d men to f i t the various posts, or whether the framework -
evolved because of the men available? The l a t t e r seems to have been the case 
since the major changes i n the organisation of management coincided with 
breaks i n continuity caused by the departure from management of a leading 
figure. 
(73) R.S. Edwards and H. Townsend, Studies i n Business Organisation, 
(London; 1967) p.88. 
(74) Wm. Jenkins to David Dale, 6 March, I89O. (DCRO : D/CO/72). 
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5« The Managers 
The two outstanding figures i n Consett's management rare William 
Jenkins and David Dale, for they guided the Company through the 
c r i t i c a l period of readjustment i n the 1870's and 1880's. 
Jenkins was the son of the schoolmaster of the Dowlais Iron Company i n 
Merthyr Tydv.il. After a b r i e f education i n his father's school he 
entered the employment of the Dowlais firm at one of th e i r c o l l i e r i e s . 
He eventually moved through a l l the departments of the firm gaining 
a sound knowledge of the iron-trade, and i n 1852 when S i r John Guest 
died, Wra. Jenkins was appointed commercial manager for the whole Company. 
Jenkins was therefore a contemporary of Edward Williams i n the management 
of the Dowlais "business, and i t i s not surprising that, when i n I869 Williams, 
then the manager of Bolckow, Vaughan, advised Consett to appoint a new 
manager, Jenkins should have got the post. He was one of several prominent 
19th century ironmasters to begin t h e i r careers at Dowlais. 
When Consett then appointed a Secretary i n 1872 the link with South 
Wales was maintained, for ^ichard Evans had h i s early commercial tr a i n i n g i n 
the o f f i c e s of the Dowlais concern. He then went to an ironworks i n 
Maryport, Cumberland, whence he went to Consett. 
Jenkins views were those that one would expect of a middle-class 
Victorian dissenter. He was a staunch L i b e r a l , and i f not t o t a l l y i n favour 
of abstinence, he believed that the hours for liquor sales should be c l o s e l y 
(75) 
supervised and r e s t r i c t e d . W i t h regard to labour he f e l t men should 
(75) Wm. Jenkins to I . Williams, 17 June, 1887. (DCRO : D/CO/69). 
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have the free choice whether to enter a union or not, and steadfastly 
(76) 
maintained an 'open shop1 at Consett. John Hodge, the Steel 
Smelters* leader, remembered Jenkins as a man who "could talk l i k e a 
parson", he was fair-minded but stubborn i n wage negotiations, and gave 
(77) 
ground slowly and r e l u c t a n t l y . • His attitude to technical innovation 
i n many respects was not d i s s i m i l a r , as he was very conservative about the 
introduction of new techniques. I n f a c t he could never have been described 
as an innovator since he prefered any new machinery adopted at Consett 
to have been proven elsewhere. He was l o y a l to h i s managers and engineers, 
however, and was ever reluctant to allow strangers an insight 
(18) 
of the Consett plant. ' 
The greatest disservice that Wm. Jenkins may have bestowed upon 
Consett was his own capacity for control, and a strong preference for 
•home grown1 managers. In retrospect i t i s d i f f i c u l t to assess how 
much r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was delegated, but from Jenkins 1 own correspondence i t i s 
evident that he submerged himself, not only i n the general directing 
of the development undertaken i n the 1880's, but also i n the f i n e s t d e t a i l 
of t h e i r execution. As early as 1887» before work began on the new Angle 
M i l l even, Jenkins confided to Dale, 
"Our extensions and reconstructions are giving me much anxiety. 
The contracts for machinery, casting &c. at a l l points are day a f t e r 
detail 
,,(79) 
day requiring pressure and watching as°the a i l s while the 
contractors on the ground are slow to move.1 
Wm. Jenkins to David Dale, 3 May,l890. (DCRO : D/CO/73). 
John Hodge, op.cit. 9pp. 105-106. 
Wm. Jenkins to J . Scott, 18 August, 1892.(DCRO : D/CO/82). 
Wra. Jenkins to D. Dale, 18 June, I887. (DCRO : D/co/69). 
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Because Jenkins took so much on by himself, his subordinates 
management c a p a b i l i t i e s were developed i n a. sit u a t i o n i n which they were aware 
of the problems but were not given the scope to solve them. I t i s possible 
that George Ainsworth ascended to control, with a framework of decision 
making which had been dictated by William Jenkins. Thus problems of space 
for development which evolved during Jenkins 1 era, were accepted by Ainsworth. 
A man appointed from outside the organisation might have dealt more boldly with 
some of the p a r t i c u l a r problems Consett faced a f t e r 1900. The outstanding 
examples of s t e e l managers i n the l a t e 19th and early 20th centuries, on the 
whole, were men who came from outside the organisation, they came to control, 
for example, Edward Williams, E. Windsor Richards, Benjamin Talbot, and 
Wm. Jenkins himself. 
Spanning a much longer period of Consett 1s history than Jenkins was David 
Dale. He was most noted for h i s association with i n d u s t r i a l relations and the 
formation of the Board of. Arbitration and Co n c i l i a t i o n i n 1869.^°^ 
Besides t h i s however, he was probably one of the most astute businessmen i n the 
North of England at the time. His greatest .attribute i n business was his 
talent for f i n a n c i a l matters, and he played a central role i n resurrecting 
the Consett Ironworks and then guiding t h e i r f i n a n c i a l policy along sound l i n e s . 
His appetite for work was as insatiable as that of Jenkins, and S i r Alfred Pease 
"never knew anyone who took such immense pains nor who so delighted, as i t 
(8l} 
were i n the drudgery of f i g u r e s . " v ' 
(80) J.H. Porter, op.cit . c 
(81) S i r Edw. Grey, op.cit. 3p.31. 
i 
1 
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Although he resigned from h i s executive position with the Gonsett Iron 
Company i n 1 8 7 2 , and took up a position as Managing Director of the 
(Q2) 
Pease family's mineral i n t e r e s t s , ' he remained closely i d e n t i f i e d with 
Consett as a Director, and then as Chairman from I 8 8 4 , u n t i l h i s death i n 
1 9 0 6 . He served on both the Coal and Finance sub-committees of the Board bringing 
to bear h i s great knowledge of the former through t h i s position with Pease and 
Partners, and h i s fine talent to the l a t t e r . Besides these two important 
directorships he was also a member of the North Eastern Railway's Board from 
1 8 8 1 , and Consett's representative on the Board of the Barrow Hematite Steel 
Co. L t d . ( 8 3 ) 
David Dale also had a b r i e f but. - from Consett*s point of view - s i g n i f i c a n t 
association with some Tees-side shipbuilders. I n 1 8 6 6 three engineering and 
shipbuilding firms proposed to amalgamate t h e i r i n t e r e s t s into one company. The 
three concerned were Richardson, Denton, Duck & Co., Denton, Grey & Co., and 
Thos. Richardson & Sons, and David Dale was elected Vice-Chairman of the new 
company. However, the benefits of the merger were not r e a l i s e d and the 
concerns reverted to t h e i r separate i d e n t i t i e s . ^ 8 ^ Nevertheless t h i s indicates 
that Consett had some potent linkages with the shipbuilding f r a t e r n i t y . 
Amongst the. other Directors Consett had a wide range of experience, 
int e r e s t s and c a p a b i l i t i e s . I t s f i r s t Chairman Henry Fenwick was an M.P. 
However, his successor John Henderson was a prominent l o c a l businessman, building up 
a substantial carpet factory i n Durham C i t y . His connection with Consett, l i k e 
many others, was through the Northumberland and Durham D i s t r i c t Bank i n which 
( 8 2 ) I b i d . 
( 8 3 ) Consett held shares i n the B arrow Hematite Steel Co. i n l i e u of a debt 
owed to them by Hannay & Co.. 
( 8 4 ) J.S. Jeans, Pioneers p.p. 2 0 5 - 2 0 6 . 
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he had been a large shareholder, and i t i s probable that h i s l i n k s with 
/ O r \ 
Northumberland c o l l i e r i e s were formed i n the same way. ' Henderson's 
son succeeded David Dale as Chairman i n 1906. Important l i n k s were established 
with other iron and s t e e l producers, Thomas Spencer (I864-I890) was also a 
partner i n John Spencer & Sons of Newburn, the ^yneside Steel Company. 
Thomas Hedley (I869-I890) was a Director of the Solway Hematite Iron Co. 
(Qn\ 
i n Cumberland, ' probably the same firm as the one from which Richard Evans 
came. Hedley also had an i n t e r - l i n k i n g Directorship with the I'yne Steam 
Shipping Company, whi l s t several other Consett Directors were member of 
shipbuilding companies' Boards. T.H. Bainbridge (1890-1912) held directorships 
(aa\ 
i n the Wallsend Slipway Company, and Swan, Hunter and Wigham, Richardson. 
The Company's most ubiquitous directors, however, were Wm. Stobart and Roland Philipson; the former had int e r e s t i n coal, s t e e l , marine engineering 
Ld ad 
(90) 
and shipping, outside h i s i n t e r e s t i n C o n s e t t , w h i l s t Philipson could d 
railways, insurance and ten miscellaneous firms to Stobart's c o l l e c t i o n . 
The i n t e r e s t of the Directors were broad, but i t i s d i f f i c u l t y L f not 
impossible, to assess whether Consett derived any benefit other than that, of 
experienced direction. I t would have been unl i k e l y for example for Wm. Stobart v i a 
h i s shipping i n t e r e s t to put work Consett's way, when his own foundation the 
We^r Ste e l Company was labouring so pitifulfyunder the s t r a i n of Consett's compet-
i t i o n , or, for the coal owners to arouse competition from Consett. These men 
(85) Newcastle Daily Journal, 5 A p r i l , I884. 
(86) Newcastle D a i l y Chronicle, 1 May91905. 
(87) Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 14 November,1890. 
(88) Newcastle Daily Journal, 13 November,1912. 
(89) Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 26 June, 1905. 
(90) S. Pollard, op.cit.,p .457. 
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were however, successful businessmen who would have been able to bring 
a wealth of experience to the direction of Consett. 
CHAPTER IX 
POSTCRIPT ; 1914-1939 
. The War 1914-1918 
Although B r i t a i n had been preparing for a major c o n f l i c t since 
1906 when the naval race to build 'Dreadnoughts' had begun and the 
formation of a General Staff f o r the Army had been effected by 
Haldane, the nation was unprepared both materially and 
psychologically for the holocaust they entered upon on 4th August, 1914« 
The view was widely held, even by those i n the most responsible positions 
fee . . ( l ) that the War would won within a matter of months. ' Few could have 
imagined a war of a t t r i t i o n with the whole economy directed by 
Central Government as the driving cog of the whole war machine. 
Within a matter of weeks Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for 
War, had recognised that the chief d i f f i c u l t y was 'one of material rather 
than personnel. 1 The uncontrolled patriotism of the Autumn of 1914 
created the ludicrous spectacle of an armed force without munitions. 
By the end of 1914 there was a shortage of s h e l l s and at f i r s t 
Kitchener refused to extend the l i s t of authorised manufacturers, 
i n s i s t i n g that only experienced firms could make a sa t i s f a c t o r y product. 
Though th i s was i n fa c t proved to be the case, the l i s t had to be extended 
and new firms given the experience, because there was i n s u f f i c i e n t 
capacity amongst the old firms to meet greatly increased demand. 
Gonsett was i n the most c r u c i a l sector of the economy being both 
a s t e e l producer and fu e l producer. When the War broke out i n 1914 
the Company had been sunk i n a deep depression, suffering from the 
(1) A.J.P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (Oxford 1966) p.4. 
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slump i n shipbuilding, severe competition from Germany and the drought 
(2) during the summer which almost brought the steelworks to a s t a n d s t i l l . ' 
The War na t u r a l l y removed the spectre of German competition but 
i t did not bring an immediate r e v i v a l of the Company's prosperity 
because of the number of contracts undertaken during the depression of 1914» 
at low prices, which had to be completed i n an atmosphere of escalating 
costs. The profits up to June 1915 were 50$ lower than i n 1914 and the 
dividend of 12^ per cent was the lowest of the c e n t u r y . ^ 
The immediate e f f e c t of the War was a shortage of shipping space, 
and within a month and a half of the outbreak the price of timber from 
the B a l t i c for p i t props had soared. At the end of August the Company 
purchased the cargo of the 'S.S. Advance1 for £6,696, an increase of 100 
per cent over the pre-war r a t e s . By October £78,000 had been expended 
on purchasing timber, though the stocks were so increased as to l a s t 
u n t i l December 1 9 1 5 * ^ The Board also negotiated with the Commissioners 
f o r Woods and Forests to get permission to f e l l timber i n Chopwell Wood 
for c o l l i e r y purposes. ' 
• 
However much more serious than the escalation of timber prices 
because of the shortage of shipping space, and cessation of trading 
relations with Finland, was the potential short supply of imported 
Spanish hematite which would seriously interrupt the operations of the 
iron and steel-works. By January 1915 George Ainsworth reported to the 
Board the extreme d i f f i c u l t y i n obtaining boats to carry ore. S i r James 
(2) Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 3 August,1914. 
(3) Newcastle Daily Chronicle. 9 August,1915. 
(4) Directors' Minute 6 October,1914f p.l6l.(DCR0 : D/CO/43). 
(5) Directors' Minute 1 Septermber, 1914, p.l55.(DCRO : D/CO/43). 
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B. Dale one of Consett*s Directors met with Dr. Macnaraara and the 
Director of Transport at the Admiralty i n the middle of January to 
arrange some system whereby shipping space would be allocated for the 
shipment of ore from Bilbao. One solution was that steamers returning 
from the Mediterranean should c a l l i n at Bilbao and Santander to c o l l e c t 
(6) 
ore shipments. The Company had considered purchasing two steamers 
of its own but the Government would give no undertaking that the boats 
(7) 
would not be comandeered. Consett also began to negotiate with the 
other hematite users of the North East Coast to form a c o l l e c t i v e action 
( 8) 
group for the purchase of ore. ' Consett eventually did buy two steamers 
i n the second half of 1919i and appropriately they were ca l l e d the 
S.S. Consett and S.S. B l a c k h i l l . ^ 
As Consett was a partner with Krupp i n the Orconera Iron Ore Company 
th i s could have r a i s e d some problems. Fortunately the custom of the 
Germans to r e g i s t e r limited companies i n London averted another possible 
c r i s i s . Krupp's shares i n the Orconera Company were taken over by the 
Public Trustee, and a l l t h e i r d e l i v e r i e s under contract were cancelled. 
Thus the very large share of the ore taken by Krupp's was available for 
dist r i b u t i o n to B r i t i s h w o r k s / A f t e r the disruptions of the f i r s t 
h a l f of 1915 there does not appear to have been a c r i t i c a l shortage of 
hematite ore, for a f t e r f a l l i n g to 94,952 tons the f i r s t 6 months of 1915, 
pig iron production picked up to top 142,000 tons i n the f i r s t s i x months 
of 1918. This was a l l achieved on hematite o r e . ^ * ^ 
(6) George Ainsworth to Director of Transport, the Admiralty, 25 January 
1915 pp.192-193.(DCRO : D/CO/43). 
(7) Directors' Minute.25 January 1915 p.192.(DCRO : D/CO/43). 
(8) Directors' Minute^ February 1915, p.196.(DCRO : D/CO/43). 
(9) P r o f i t and Loss Accounts 1917-1937. (DCRO : D/CO/90). 
(10) F.W. Harbord, Ministry of Munitions to the Consett Iron Company, 29 
October 1915 p.254.(DCRO : D/CO/43). 
(11) Private Cost Book.(DCRO : D/CO/lOl). 
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TABLE IX.1. 
Output of Pig Iron 1914-1919 
Year ending June Quantity 
1914 231,258 tons 
1919 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
206,223 
210,212 
258,594 
290,723 
219,206 
A more persistent shortage which arose during the f i r s t few weeks 
of the war was that of manpower. At the Annual General Meeting on 
7th August 1915» Mark Penwick reported that output had f a l l e n by 33$ 
due largely to the massive migration of men to j o i n the forces. 
Altogether 2400 employees had joined up, almost one quarter of the Company's 
labour force, and 65O of these had been men from the steelworks. The 
o f f i c e s t a f f had also been decimated by the surge of patriotism and i t 
(12) 
was composed by mid-1915 larg e l y of women and g i r l s . 
' The Company had also undertaken to pay a separation allowance to 
men who had gone to the front, and t h i s cost i t £34»000 up to June 1915• 
Families were allowed to stay i n Company cottages rent free and allowances 
were paid to those who did not have Company housing. However, probably 
most important was the promise that "the places of a l l men who have 
(13) 
gone to the front i n any capacity w i l l be kept open for them". ' 
(12) Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 9 August 1915. 
( 13) Directors' Minute 1 September 1914 p.l55.(DCR0 : D/co/43). 
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This was a promise that Consett found more d i f f i c u l t to implement than 
to make, for i n 1919 i t suffered serious f r i c t i o n between the 
men returning to t h e i r old jobs and the men recruited during the War to 
replace them. The si t u a t i o n was such that the Company had to open a 
d r i f t near Chopwell to employ about 400 men and youths who were demobilized 
during 1919.^ 
After the rush to j o i n the colours during the f i r s t nine months of 
the war there was a marked slackening i n the desire to go to the front, for 
by June 1917 only 2707 employees were under arms. The h o r r i f i c slaughter 
of the W ar obviously had a stringent effect, upon recruitment even before 
the introduction of the M i l i t a r y Service Act. i n January 1916 which imposed 
not only conscription, but also exemptions for men employed i n sectors 
(15) 
v i t a l to. the prosecution of the war, such as s t e e l and coal. 
Not everyone was as p a t r i o t i c i n t h e i r e f f o r t s towards winning the war 
as Mark Fenwick, the Company's Chairman could have wished. He complained 
that at "some c o l l i e r i e s they (the miners) had hardly done a l l -that the 
nation might expect from them, and at one p i t at the beginning of the week 
(16) 
absentees t o t a l l e d f u l l y 20$ on the average." v ' Howevesj the Company 
i tsel f was not unblemished for i n September 1915, the 32" Bar M i l l 
(17) 
engine broke down, and was out of operation for 3 months. ' The s t r a i n 
of the war was taking i t s t o l l upon the old equipment i n the m i l l s , and the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for this l a y at the management's door. 
(14) W.R. Garside, The Durham Miners', 1919-1960 (London 197l),p.l03. 
(15) A.J.P. Taylor,op.cit. ?pp.53-55. 
(16) Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 14 August, 1916. 
(!7) Directors' Minute . 7 September, 1915. p.24-3. ( T > C R O ; Djc0143). 
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F i n a l l y i n November 1915 Consett came under the control of the 
Ministry of Munitions, as the need to bring a l l v i t a l establishments 
(l8) 
to the task of s h e l l production increased. ' The Company had only i n 
September decided against opting to be controlled, although i t wa& 
acutely short of labour and had had to cease operations i n No.2. Plate 
M i l l . . The control was also extended over the Company's c o l l i e r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y 
with regard to p r i c e . Exports were r e s t r i c t e d and diverted to l e s s 
profitable channels and even the price of coal exports to France was 
(19) 
controlled. The mines were eventually brought under the guidance of 
the Coal Controller on 1st March 1917* 
Despite the price l i m i t a t i o n s , controls on sales and the excess 
p r o f i t s tax imposed by Mckenna i n 1915 the Company's pr o f i t s blossomed. 
On 30th June 1914 the Consett Iron Company had £631,000 set aside for 
reconstruction, of which £404,452 had been spent since the opening of 
the Account a t the beginning of the century. By 30th June 1919 i t 
had been increased to £681,000 and expenditure had r i s e n to £471»548^,added 
to t h i s however undivided p r o f i t s rose from £3,257 i n 1914 to £229,952 
i n 1919 giving the Company £439»403 available for reconstruction. This 
had been achieved whilst dividends of 12%f0 i n 1915, 50$ i n 1916, 40$ 
i n 1917, 40$ i n 1918 and 35$ i n 1919 had been paid to the shareholders. 
I n addition Consett paid £500,000 Excess P r o f i t duty i n 1918 alone. 
(18) W.H. Beveridge to the Consett Iron Company, 26 October 1915 p.253. 
(DCR0 : D/CO/43). 
(19) Ordinary General Meeting. 12 August 19l6.(DCR0 : D/CO/57). 
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TABLE IX.2 
Nett P r o f i t s of the Consett Iron Company Ltd. 1914-1919. 
Year ending June Nett. P r o f i t Distributed P r o f i t s 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
£408,014.01s..00d. 
£2l4,383.15s.03d. 
£625,937.06s.06d. 
£521,661.04s.lid. 
£5l6,224.00s.05d. 
£5l2,291,12s.08d. 
£340,000 
£165,000 
£540,000 
£440,000 
£440,000 
£390,000 
I n view of the state of the Company's s t e e l plant before the outbreak 
of the War, and the immense s t r a i n that was placed upon i t during the 
h o s t i l i t i e s , the f i n a n c i a l policy of the Consett Iron Company was 
d i s t i n c t l y l i b e r a l . Not u n t i l 1918 was any money put s p e c i f i c a l l y aside 
for deferred r e p a i r s , and then only £50,000 and i n the following year 
another £100,000 was put aside; but a f t e r June 1915 actual expenditure on 
reconstructions was negligible. 
2. The I n t e r War Years 1919-1939. 
The years between 1919-1939 were ones of almost unbroken gloom for 
those basic sectors of B r i t i s h industry i n which the Consett Iron Company 
was firmly entrenched. After the f r a n t i c post-war boom Consett was 
plunged into sixteen years of unrelieved d i f f i c u l t y , only recovering i n 
the years a f t e r 1936. 
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The problems which confronted the Company were many. After the 
F i r s t World War i t was faced with the necessity of reconstructing 
much of the steelworks. This required the f l o a t i n g of two large debenture 
issues. This burden of debt upset the balance between the Company's 
f i n a n c i a l structure and i t s p r o f i t a b i l i t y during the lean years of the 
1920's and early 1930*s. F i n a l l y i n 1936 a comprehensive ca p i t a l reorganisation 
had to be undertaken, i n order to ensure the future prosperity of the 
Company. 
These years also drove the Company to rethink i t s market orientation. 
I t had to do so f i r s t l y , because of the reversal of roles i n the coal and 
coke market from excess demand ,to excess supply. Then l a t e r the collapse 
of the shipbuilding industry forced Consett to seek alternative markets 
f o r i t s steel products. This led to the establishment of marketing 
and sales techniques to a degree of sophistication which had never before 
been necessary. 
F i n a l l y the c r i s i s i n the coal trade generated another and more tragic 
problem; the confrontation between the miners and the coal owners during 
the ear]y and mid-19201s. 
I n 1919 the works and c o l l i e r i e s of the Consett Iron Company were 
valued at £31500,000 excluding any temporary appreciation caused by 
ex i s t i n g economic c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s emphasised the under-capitalisation 
of the Company's nominal share value of £1,500,000. I n order to redress t h i s 
imbalance an additional £2,000,000 of Ordinary shares was created. This 
operation was merely the c a p i t a l i s a t i o n of assets on the balance sheet, 
(20) Ralph Alsop to Ordinary and Preference Shareholders31 July 1919,(DCRO: 
D/CO/57).. 
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and elsewhere, which represented at least £2,000,000 of undivided p r o f i t . 
I t was w i t h i n t h i s under valuation that the myth of the Company's 
exceptional p r o f i t a b i l i t y had flourished before 1914. I n 1920 the 
dividend was only 12^ per cent, although the nett p r o f i t was £599»144«14s.lOd. 
whereas p r i o r to the re c a p i t a l i s a t i o n , the p r o f i t of £512,000 i n 1919 
had yielded 35 per cent. 
When the Company eventually turned i t s attention to extensive 
reconstruction of i t s plant i n 1922, the reserves accumulated during 
the previously p r o f i t a b l e years were not large enough to carry out the 
whole programme. Thus i n May 1922 Consett offered £1,500,000 of 1st Debenture 
Stock a/t 6 per cent per annum. This stock was to be redeemed over 30 
years from 1933 at par, but the Company reserved the r i g h t to repay the 
(21) 
whole at £102 per cent at any time a f t e r 1933» upon three months notice. 
The issue was made to f a c i l i t a t e the refund to the Company of £950,000 already 
expended on reconstruction out of reserves, and to enable i t to 
complete the programme. The sum proved i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r i n October 1924 
a fu r t h e r £1,000,000 of 6 per cent Debenture Stock was float e d , on the 
same conditions as the previous loan. This issue was largely taken 
up by one i n s t i t u t i o n a l investor. 
Consett had thus to pay £150,000 per annum f i x e d i n t e r e s t , and a f t e r 
1933 provide f o r the redemption of £2,500,000 of stock. I n the trading 
conditions of the 1920's and 1930's t h i s was to prove an impossible task. 
The burden of f i x e d interest stock crippled several other famous steel 
companies, among them Bolckow Vaughan who were absorbed by Dorman Long i n 
(21) Prospectus f o r the Issue of £1,500,000 1st Debenture Stock. 
(DCR0 : D/CO/58). 
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1929, and, Bb'bw Vale. After 1924 Consett f a i l e d to pay a dividend on i t s 
Ordinary shares u n t i l 1937» and could only i n t e r m i t t e n t l y pay the 
dividend on Preference shares. I t had however succeeded i n paying the in t e r e s t 
on the Debentures. By 1933 the shareholders were becoming r e s t i v e ^ f o r 
the future could o f f e r them l i t t l e encouragement as the Company had to 
s t a r t s e t t i n g aside a fund f o r the eventual redemption of the Debenture 
Stock; 
Thus i n 1933 the Company had no option but to ask i t s Debenture 
holders f o r a p a r t i a l moratorium. I t proposed to reduce in t e r e s t on 
the stock to 4 per cent between 1933-35* whilst the unpaid 2 per cent 
would be carried forward and paid out of p r o f i t s f o r the year ending 
March 19375"" i t f u rther suggested that i n calculating p r o f i t s the 
Company should be allowed to charge a modest £50,000 a year f o r 
depreciation. I n addition the Company was precluded from exercising i t s 
r i g h t to redeem stock on three months notice u n t i l 1 July 1942. F i n a l l y 
a sinking fund, absorbing £62,500 per annum was to be operated, from 1942 
(22) 
f o r the eventual redemption of the stock. The proposals which had 
been worked out i n conjunction with the large i n s t i t u t i o n a l investors 
were carried by an overwhelming majority; 162414 votes f o r and only 1051 
against. 
The optimism, engendered by the introduction of a 33^ ad valorem 
duty on steel imports at the end of 1932, which had encouraged Consett 
to apply f o r only a postponement of repayment, proved unfounded. By 
1936 i t was apparent that Consett would be unable to carry out the 
proposals of the 1933 moratorium. Greater provision f o r depreciation and 
(22) Notice of a Meeting of 6 per cent F i r s t Debenture Stockholders, 1933. 
(DCR0 : D/CO/57). 
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obsolescence was necessary, w h i l s t there were nine years arrears of 
dividend on Preference shares. I n addition i f the Company was to maintain 
i t s position i n the iron and st e e l industry i t would be necessary to carry 
out substantial alterations to the plant. I t was also an opportune moment 
f o r i t to move i n t o the constructional engineering industry, and plans 
(23) 
were afoot to take over a large company i n t h i s sector. The gearing between 
equity and stock was so unsatisfactory, that i t was un l i k e l y that Consett could 
raise any fresh c a p i t a l , either by equity or stock. 
Fundamentally the scheme agreed upon by Consett and the large i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
investors was that £2,000,000 should be w r i t t e n o f f the Ordinary share c a p i t a l , 
and a fresh £2,000,000 raised by the issue of 6,000,000 6s.8d shares. I n 
additions £1,000,000 was to be w r i t t e n o f f the Debenture c a p i t a l . This would 
be achieved by repaying the whole of the 6 per cent Stock and i t s accrued i n t e r e s t , 
on 1 July 1936. As an inducement to Stockholders i t was to be repaid at a 
premium of £109£. 
I n place of the 6 per cent Stock, £1,500,000 of 4^ per cent Debenture 
Stock was to be issued on a pro rata basis, and also 1,500,000 6s.8d 
Ordinary shares a t a value of 8s.6d. The Stockholders had to pay cash 
f o r both the Ai per cent Stock and the shares, the amount payable being 
set o f f against the amounts payable to them by the Company i n repayment of 
the 6 per cent Stock. 
The Preference shareholders were allotted 400,000 ordinary shares i n l i e u 
of t h e i r dividend arrears. Though t h i s was not f u l l compensation they 
benefitted from the reduction i n c a p i t a l ranked above them, w h i l s t the 
(23) The Consett Iron Company to Debenture Stockholders and Members, 23 
March 1936.(DCR0 : D/CO/58). 
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deferred i n t e r e s t on the Debentures was paid out of the receipts from 
the new share c a p i t a l , which ranked behind them. F i n a l l y future p r o f i t s 
would be reduced by s e t t i n g aside funds f o r arrears of depreciation, 
since these were accounted f o r by the reduction of the book value of 
fix e d assets. 
Not unnaturally i t was the Ordinary shareholders who bore the brunt of 
the reorganisation. However i t did o f f e r them the prospect of . 
future dividends, w h i l s t the only r e a l losers were those who had 
purchased shares since the r e c a p i t a l i s a t i o n i n 1919. 
TABLE IX.^ 
Capital Structure of the Consett Iron Company Ltd 
1919 - 1936 
6$ Debenture Stock - £2500,000. 
8$ Preference Shares - 500,000. 
Ordinary £1. Shares - 3000,000. 
Total £6000,000. 
Aft e r 1936 Nominal Issued 
i Debenture Stock £1,500,000 £1,500,000 
1o Preference.Shares 500,000 500,000 
9 m i l l i o n Ordinary ) 3,000,000 2,800,000 
6s.8d. Shares ) 
£5,000,000 £4,800,000 
Source: The Consett Iron Company to Debenture Stockholders and Members, 
23 March 1936. (DCRO:D/CO/58). 
Since the scheme was supported by the large i n s t i t u t i o n a l Stockholders, 
i t s adoption and implementation was a formality. As i n l857j Consett had come 
perilously close to f i n a n c i a l collapse because of excessive indebtedness. However 
the reorganisation was a complete success; i n 1937 the Company paid a 
dividend of 7 i per cent, whilst i t was also able to put aside considerable 
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amounts f o r depreciation. The Company was.-' also able to buy a subsidiary 
i n the construction engineering industry. 
After the i n t e r r u p t i o n of the Great War Consett began to reconsider 
the problem of reconstruction i n 1920. A new p i t was opened at Crookhall 
to take over from the older Home Co l l i e r i e s with t h e i r high costs. I t 
was also decided to erect an additional Coke and By-product Plant to 
replace the i n e f f i c i e n t bee-hive ovens A s t a r t on the actual work 
of reconstruction was postponed u n t i l 1921 because of the high cost of 
labour and materials during the boom of 1920. However, once unemployment 
began to r i s e work was started upon the F e l l Coke Works, using labour 
thrown out of work i n the steel m i l l s * 
For the year ending June 1921 the Company sustained heavy losses on 
(25) 
the manufacture of steel plates (£100,194) and sectional steel(£45,608). 
The condition of the steelworks was such that they could not possibly 
compete in. the frenzy of competition and low prices. A f t e r only i n t e r m i t t e n t 
working during 1921 reconstruction of the melting shops began early i n 
1922. The old plant was replaced by nine new 75 ton f i x e d open-hearth 
furnaces. Later during 1922-23 the extensive remodelling and e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n 
of the r o l l i n g m i l l s was started. Only modest alterations were made to 
the very antiquated blastfurnace plant. 
The f a i l u r e to reconstruct the blastfurnaces imposed certain 
l i m i t a t i o n s upon the extent of the economies possible i n the reconstructed 
(24) Report of the Directors of the Consett Iron Company, August 1920* 
(DCRO:D/CO/57). 
(25) P r o f i t and Loss Accounts. (DCR0 : D/C0/90^ 
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melting shops and m i l l s . The low l e v e l of the tapping holes on the 
blastfurnaces prevented the supply of molten p i g i r o n to the melting 
shops, thus the Company had to work cold metal. 
TABLE I X . 4 
Comparative size and performance of open-hearth furnaces. 
Works Furnace Capacity Fuel Consumption Nature of Charge 
per ton of steel 
Appleby T i l t i n g 250 tons 17.90 Hot phosphoric pig 
Bochum it 180 tons 16.5$ Hot & Cold pig 
Consett Fixed 75 tons 26.0% Cold metal 
John Lysaght " Terni 50 tons 19.79* Hot metal 
Schneider Le Bre u i l i i it 60 tons 19*5% Cold metal 
Source : Journal of the Iron and Steel I n s t i t u t e , 1930 I I . p.121. 
The gas used from the Wilputte by-product ovens at the melting shop 
was not s u f f i c i e n t to be used f o r reheating slabs i n the pl a t e m i l l s , thus 
producer gas had to be manufactured especially. This gas shortage was 
also caused by the inadequacy of the blastfurnace plant, which had no 
(26) 
arrangement f o r cleaning waste gas. ' 
Except f o r t h e i r f a i l u r e to u t i l i z e f u l l y a l l the possible f u e l 
economies the m i l l s did incorporate the best modern practice. They were able 
to r o l l plates between 6-10 tons, varying i n thickness from % inch to 3 
(26) Iron and Coal Trades Review. 13 September 1929. 
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inches, and up to 9 feet wide. A l l the new equipment was e l e c t r i c a l l y driven, and 
the system was so designed that Consett could draw upon additional power from the 
l o c a l E l e c t r i c i t y Supply companies or, conversely deliver any surplus power 
(27) 
i n t o i t s _ g r i d system. ' 
The most conspicuous success of the reconstruction was the opening 
of the P e l l Coke and By-product Works i n 1924. The s i x t y Wilputte 
regenerative high-temperature ovens were the f i r s t i n s t a l l e d i n B r i t a i n , 
and they were to revolutionise B r i t i s h coking practice. The ovens were 
capable of carbonising 6,000 tons of coal a week and gave great yields of 
by-products from the a n c i l l a r y Coppee plant. The gamble was successful 
because of the production of high q u a l i t y s i l i c a bricks at Consett 1s own 
(28} 
Templetown brickworks. ' 
The success of the P e l l Works encouraged Consett to b u i l d another coke 
and by-product plant at Derwenthaugh between 1927 -29. &s wel l as the usual 
range of by-products the works supplied gas to the Newcastle and Gateshead 
Gas Company. The coke from the Derwenthaugh works was exported via the 
Company's staithes, which provided probably the quickest loading f a c i l i t i e s 
available on the North East Coast. 
Besides the conversion of some of the open-hearth furnaces to the 
•Terni' system i n 1929 there was no s i g n i f i c a n t renewal of the i r o n and 
steel plant u n t i l the end of the 1930's. However i n 1936 Consett became 
(27) I b i d ; and Iron and Coal Trades Review, 10 September 1923. 
(28) The Mining Journal. 22 September 1923. p.716. 
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involved i n the scheme to develop a new steel complex at Jarrow. I n 1935 
the B r i t i s h Iron and Steel Federation commissioned H.A. Brassert and 
Company to produce a f e a s i b i l i t y study upon the Jarrow scheme. His 
report was favourable, contending that the Tyne was as we l l suited as 
the Tees f o r major development. However, the Teesside makers scotched 
the scheme by what the Economist l a t e r described as t h e i r 'jealous 
(29) 
exclusiveness 1 The great surge i n demand f o r ste e l during 1936 
was most easily accomodated by extensions to e x i s t i n g plant, and once 
firms began to expand output by t h i s means, Consett withdrew support f o r 
the o r i g i n a l comprehensive scheme. Consett suggested a smaller alt e r n a t i v e 
scheme which Brassert suspected would be uneconomical. 
Despite the e f f o r t s of Walter Runciman, the President of the Board 
of Trade, to persuade the steelmakers to change t h e i r minds about 
t h e 
the Jarrow project, and^tragic protest of the Jarrow Marchers, the North-East 
st e e l men remained h o s t i l e . However, i n June 1937 Runciman was elected 
to the Cdnsett Board, and inside a week he announced a new scheme to 
b u i l d a steel r o l l i n g m i l l at Jarrow. The project involved the j o i n t 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n of Consett, the Bankers' I n d u s t r i a l Development Company, 
the N u f f i e l d Trustees and a loan from the Government under the provisions 
of the new Special Areas Act (1937) to raise the £1,000,000 f o r the proposed 
(31) 
development.s ' 
i (29) The Economist. 26 June 1937 
(30) Carr and Taplin, op.cit.jp.535* 
(31) The Economist. 26 June 1937 
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The next year, 1938, the New Jarrow Steel Company was incorporated, 
and Consett held 20 per cent of the c a p i t a l . Consett also undertook to 
supply the m i l l with semi-finished s t e e l , and controlled i t s operations. 
Once Consett was placed back on a sound f i n a n c i a l footing i t 
was able to return to the task of modifying . its plant. I n 1938 
the Board began to consider the expediency of replacing t h e i r old 
sectional steel m i l l . They also f i n a l l y i n s t a l l e d gas cleaning plant, at 
the blastfurnaces, and i n 1940 the C i v i l Defence Act's anti-glare provisions 
prompted the Company in t o the very belated adoption of mechanical pig 
(32) 
casting, to replace the old fashioned sand-casting. ' 
One aspect of reconstruction not yet considered was the house 
rebuilding programme. The programme was seen as an instrumental 
factor i n improving labour r e l a t i o n s . Clarence D. Smith, the Company's 
Chairman^was convinced that bad housing conditions were one of the chief 
factors i n promoting i n d u s t r i a l unrest. Consett b u i l t almost twelve 
hundred new homes i n the f i r s t h a l f of the 1920's^"^ 
A single issue dominated the operation of c o l l i e r i e s during the f i r s t 
h a l f of the 1920*s, the question of miners' pay and i t s r e l a t i o n to 
labour costs. The f i r s t clash between the miners and owners occurred i n 
October 1920, when the men struck f o r an advance of 2s.0d per s h i f t to 
bring them up to the r e a l standard of l i v i n g they had enjoyed i n 1914• 
By the beginning of 1921 the coal industry was plunged into depression. 
The Government reacted by handing the control of the industry back to 
private enterprise on 31 March 1921 and the Durham owners immediately 
(32) The Times. 14 June 1940. 
(33) Newcastle Evening Chronicle. 26 June 1924. 
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demanded an average reduction i n wages of 5s.Od per s h i f t . The miners 
would not concede without a f i g h t a n d a f t e r three months defending 
t h e i r position under impossible conditions they were forced back to 
work on the Owners* terms. 
I n contrast to the miners the men i n the steelworks had accepted a 
reduction without even the threat of a s t r i k e ; a laudable gesture i n the 
opinion of the Company's Chairman. The report f o r the year ending June 
1921 was closed with an appeal "to the workmen. to increase 
production i n every possible way, i n order to meet that very keen 
(35) 
foreign c o m p e t i t i o n . 0 ' 
The tension i n labour relations i n the coal industry was eased 
a l i t t l e with an improvement i n trade i n 1923-24. However the improvement 
was only temporary and once conditions were normalised on the Continent, 
B r i t i s h coal exports were savagely reduced. 
However, at the Annual General Meeting i n 1924 Smith was preparing 
the ground f o r yet another assault upon the miners' standard of l i v i n g . 
He complained that output was 26,000 tons less i n the year ending March 1924 
than i t had been f o r the year ending March 1913» despite the employment of 
an additional 2,800 men i n 1924» The blame was l a i d at the door of shorter 
hours and more non-productive men.^^ 
During July 1924 an agreement was made to raise the minimum wage 
of miners by 21 per cent, whatever the conditions of trade. When prices 
(34) Durham Chronicle, 1 A p r i l 1921 p . l . 
(35) Newcastle D a i l y Chronicle, 8 August 1921. 
(36) Newcastle Evening Chronicle. 26 June 1924. 
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began to f a l l i n the autumn the increased labour costs imposed a c r i p p l i n g 
burden.^ 3 7^ 
Consett was handicapped by the age of some of i t s p i t s ; out of the 
seven hours working day, 1 hour 10 minutes was spent t r a v e l l i n g to and 
(38) 
from the seams. ' As trade conditions continued to deteriorate 
during the winter of 1924-25 the management attempted to a l l e v i a t e t h e i r 
(39) 
high costs by asking f o r a reduction i n wage rates and longer hours. ' 
Conset.t was on the brink of the most b i t t e r i n d u s t r i a l struggle of 
t h e i r h i s t o r y ; a c o n f l i c t that convulsed most of the Company's c o l l i e r i e s 
during the second ha l f of 1925» and paved the way towards the General Strike 
i n May 1926. 
Consett was among several c o l l i e r y companies which i n the early summer 
of 1925 launched an a l l out attack upon i t s . men by locking them out. 
The lock outs began f i r s t of a l l at Sherburn House, one of the Lambton 
p i t s , but was quickly followed by threats and notice of closure from 
the Horden Coal Company, the S t e l l a Coal Company and Consett. I n June 
Consett gave notice to the men a t the. Chopwell C o l l i e r i e s , Derwent, 
Busty, Hunter and Westwood p i t s , about 4>500 men i n a l l . ^ 4 ^ 
The Chopwell Lodge had refused the Company's proposal f o r a f u l l 
seven hours working day bank to bank and f o r reductions i n piece rates; 
Westwood had been undecided and had sought the advice of the Durham Miners* 
(37) Report of Proceedings at the Annual General Meeting, 25 June 1925. 
(DCRO : D/CO/57). 
(38) Report of Proceedings , 17 June 1926 (DCRO : D/CO/57). 
(39) Newcastle Evening Chronicle. 25 June 1925. 
(40) Durham Chronicle. 13 June 1925. 
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Association's headquarters, at R e d h i l l . ^ 1 ) As i n the years before the 
war, Chopwell was the most m i l i t a n t c o l l i e r y ? a t r a d i t i o n of radical 
p o l i t i c a l opinion had been fostered by workmen such as Vipond Hardy, 
J.W. Callender, and l a t e r by William Lawther and his brothers. The 
socialism of the Independent Labour Party was the p o l i t i c a l creed upheld 
by the Chopwell Lodge. William Lawther had moved from Chopwell 
to the nearby V i c t o r i a Garesfield C o l l i e r y i n 1919» and became i t s 
representative to the new Miners' Communist Movement i n January, 1921. 
The V i c t o r i a Garesfield Lodge followed the road of Chopwell in t o m i l i t a n t 
socialism as the following extract from the 'Durham Chronicle' i l l u s t r a t e s . 
"Marxist Socialism among Durham Miners - One has only to study the 
voting at the Lodges where t h i s teaching i s predominant and the 
evidence of t h e i r influence with the rank and f i l e i s seen. To 
c i t e only one Lodge, V i c t o r i a Garesfield, i n Durham, there the 
voting was overwhelmingly against compromise to the very l a s t . 
That lodge, as i s well known i n the county, i s revolutionary i n 
the extreme. ' 
Chopwell was geographically close to V i c t o r i a Garesfield, and W i l l 
Lawther s t i l l had most of his brothers working at Chopwell. I t i s not 
therefore surprising that Chopwell refused even to negotiate with the 
Consett Iron Company over the proposed reductions.(43) Conditions i n the 
v i l l a g e were approaching anarchy - the c o l l i e r i e s had closed on the 20th 
June. Harry Imrie, the c o l l i e r y manager, was asked to resign because he 
refused to declare the lock-out an i n d u s t r i a l dispute.(44) There was 
(41) Durham Chronicle, 6 June,1925. 
(42) Durham Chronicle, 21 January, 1921. 
(43) Report of Proceedings 17 June, 1926. (DCRO : D/CO/57). 
(44) Information given by'•• S i r William Lawther i n an interview on the 31st May, 1972. 
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persistent stealing of coal from the Company's trucks, and during August 
1925, twenty police reinforcements were moved i n t o the v i l l a g e . 
The offices at the c o l l i e r y were picketed and the Company's o f f i c i a l s 
harrassed i n t r a v e l l i n g to and from work. Peeling amongst the men was 
running very high, and at the Gala i n August 1925 they demonstrated t h e i r 
s o l i d a r i t y and enthusiasm to t h e i r cause. 
"The Chopwell miners again brought t h e i r banner containing 
p o r t r a i t s of Marx, Lenin and Keir Hardie, and the men following sung 
The Red Flag. I n S i l v e r Street they jeered at the Union Jack 
displayed by Messrs. Neale, and threatened to haul i t down. As the 
Lodge moved on some of the followers turned round and made i n s u l t i n g 
remarks about the f l a g . 1 1 
I n October a number of men from Ghopwell were t r i e d a t Gateshead 
Magistrates' Court; yet t h i s was not enough f o r the harassed o f f i c i a l s 
at Chopwell who complained to the Home Secretary, W. Joynson. Hicks of 
l i g h t sentences, and the dangers that Communism might present. 
At the beginning of 1926 the Durham Miners' Association gave permission 
to those lodges affected by the lock-outs to negotiate t h e i r own settlements!^"^ 
More positive action was taken on the weekend of the 16th January when 
Peter Lee and T. Trotter both v i s i t e d the Consett men, and encouraged them 
to enter upon negotiations. An important consideration was that even i f 
only a few men were restarted., a l l the others would be e n t i t l e d to t h e i r 
unemployment b e n e f i t . T h e u r g e n c y 0 f t h i s was highlighted by a decision 
(45) Durham Chronicle, 1 August, 1925. 
(46) Chopwell C o l l i e r y O f f i c i a l s to the Rt. Hon. W. Joynson Hicks, 16 Octobert. 
1925. I n the c o l l e c t i o n of papers held by Mr. Andrew Lawther. 
(47) Durham County Advertiser. 8 January, 1926. 
(48) Durham County Advertiser. 22 January, 1926. 
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the following week i n which the Court of Referees disallowed the men's 
claim f o r further unemployment r e l i e f at Langley Park; 1,175 men were 
(49) 
affected by the decision. ' 
F i n a l l y men and management met to s e t t l e the dispute, and a b a l l o t 
was held to ascertain the views of the men. Westwood, Derwent, Medomsley 
and Langley Park allowed the D.M.A. to conduct t h e i r b a l l o t , but Chopwell 
refused to allow outside interference; predictably the f i r s t four were 
favourable to the terms, but Chopwell voted against, with the u n l i k e l y 
coincidence of exactly 1000 votes being cast against the proposals. The 
obstinacy of Chopwell protracted the dispute u n t i l almost the end of A p r i l 
and even then the Chopwell lodge remained renegade, and so merged the l o c a l 
dispute i n t o the greater framework of the General S t r i k e . 
The lawlessness that had been characteristic of the Chopwell dispute 
up to May 1926 became during the General Strike an alternative lawfulness, 
as the l o c a l leadership established Councils of Action i n an e f f o r t to 
combat the organisation of the Government.^However, whilst the regions 
and l o c a l organisations may have been resolute i n t h e i r desire to f i g h t a 
General Strike, the T.U.C. and Trade Union leadership generally was 
uncertain whether merely to make a gesture of support or to prosecute the 
Strike i n a determined fashion . The General Strike collapsed a f t e r nine 
days amongst the empty echoes of promises by coalowners and the Government 
and innuendoes about the i l l e g a l i t y of such a strike^by Government Ministers. 
The miners were l e f t to f i g h t alone, and i t in e v i t a b l y proved to be an 
uneven struggle. 
(49) Durham County Advertiser. 29 January, 1926. 
(50) A. Mason, The General Strike i n the North East. ( H u l l , 1971) p.36. 
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The men that had led the miners' struggle were victimised imprisoned 
and then denied employment - noi-one i n the Lawther family was restarted at 
(51) 
Chopwell i n 1926, and many other men were bl a c k l i s t e d . 
A fter 1926 the labour force became passive, and even the a t t i t u d e of 
the management mellowed. The b i t t e r lesson of the 1920's was well heeded; 
i n 1937 the Coal Owners of Durham reached an agreement with the Durham 
Miners' Association s t a b i l i s i n g wages f o r the following three years. The 
same year the blastfurnacemen also gained a six day week, to replace 
t r a d i t i o n a l seven day week. F i n a l l y i n 1938 agreement was reached 
between Employers and Unions to introduce annual holidays with pay. 
The f i n a l f actor which disrupted the Company's c a p i t a l i s a t i o n 
and i t s . labour relations was the collapse of the markets i n which 
Consett competed. I n response the Company attempted to improve t h e i r 
competitiveness by better marketing, and by exploring new outlets f o r 
t h e i r productive capacity. One of Consett's e a r l i e s t successes was i n 
establishing a good reputation f o r the production of s i l i c a bricks. This 
made feasible the adoption of the new high-temperature coke ovens, a s i g n i f i c a n t 
technical step forward i n the production of coke. As more coke producers 
b u i l t high-temperature ovens i n the l a t e 'twenties and the t h i r t i e s , Consett 
was able to secure many orders f o r s i l i c a bricks. This was the most valuable 
'spin-off* from the construction of the F e l l Coke Works. However, an 
important and forward looking addition to the new Coke Works was a t a r 
d i s t i l l a t i o n plant, giving the Company access to the expanding market of 
road construction both at home and abroad. 
(51) Interview with S i r . Wm. Lawther, 31 May 1972, also a b l a c k - l i s t from 
the Chopwell C o l l i e r y i n a c o l l e c t i o n of papers held by Mr. Andrew 
Lawther. 
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By maintaining the coke works at the forefront of technical 
developments Consett was able to continue operating them at something 
near their capacity. Between 1927-29 a new plant was b u i l t at Derwenthaugh, 
to maintain the export capabilities of the Company but also to sell gas 
to Newcastle and Gateshead. In addition Consett had started to produce 
•coke nuts' for sale to the household market, and these were distributed 
(52) 
locally by the firm's own fleet of lo r r i e s . 
Externally imposed schemes such as the Coal Mines Act (1930) were 
generally ill-received by individual firms? Consett particularly resented 
any intrusion which would interfere with its competitiveness, especially 
with regard to quotas and the control of export prices. 
The potential for developing new markets and uses for the products 
was much greater on the iron and steel side, than i n the sale of coal. 
Consett had naturally begun to use steel p i t props and supports, and its 
own mines were used as a showplace for these developments. In the early 
1920*s when the steel plant was reconstructed, the blastfurnace management 
showed f l e x i b i l i t y and resourcefulness i n seeking out new markets for pig 
iron. These efforts were sustained even after the new steelworks were 
(53) 
opened. ' However, the major drive forward was not embarked upon u n t i l 
the shipbuilding industry sank into i t s abyss after 1930. Consett then 
began to develop a range of special steels for use by the chemical 
engineering industry, the motor industry, the Admiralty and for wire 
drawing. 
(52) Report of Proceedings , 14 June 1928.(DCRO : D/CO/57). 
(53) C.S. G i l l , "Blastfurnace Practice at Consett11, Foundry Trade Journal 
XXXV (1927) pp.331-334. 
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Consett also became an active lobbyist i n an effort to restore the 
buoyancy of i t * . , markets. Clarence Smith was a very vocal advocate of 
protection for the steel industry, on the grounds that not only was 
i t good for the industry but also for the nation as a whole. In 1928 
he asserted: 
"Our own experience has proved beyond any doubt that i f we 
could operate our Plants at two-thirds of their capacity -
and much more so at f u l l capacity - we could effect such savings that 
the prices at which we are selling today could be substantially 
reduced and B r i t i s h consumers of steel would consequently benefit as 
a result of safeguarding." (^A) 
The industry's own attempts at solving the problems of foreign 
competition, such as the payment of rebates to consumers who used only 
(55) 
B r i t i s h steel, proved generally unsuccessful. ' 
The demise of the shipbuilding industry and the impact this had 
upon Consett, diverted Smith's attentions to another type of Government 
backed scheme to stimulate demand. He attempted to induce the Government 
to adopt a nation-wide scheme to rehabilitate the shipbuilding industry, 
by encouraging owners to scrap old tonnage, and replace i t by new. 
Revenue nothing positive was introduced u n t i l 1935* However the B r i t i s h 
Shipping Act (1935) was not wholly satisfactory, for though grants were 
made to encourage scrapping, this was effectively negated by other 
subsidies paid on tramp freight rates. 
Apart from]concession on depreciation allowed on shipping by the Inland 
(56) Report of Proceedings 14 June 1928. (DCRO : D/CO/57). 
(57) Ibid. 
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The advent of protection i n 1933 and rearmament from 1936 put Consett 
back upon the road to prosperity. By the outbreak of the Second World War 
i n 1939 the Company had gone a long way to restoring something of i t s 
Victorian prestige. I t had successfully survived the very d i f f i c u l t 
years of depression, which claimed a number of famous steel companies. 
It, had also moved forward into the realm of modern commercial philosophy 
with considerably more emphasis upon the search for aril promotion of 
new demand. The f i r s t hundred years was marked by an uncanny symmetry of 
a half century of prosperity flanked on both sides by twenty-five years 
of doubt and c r i s i s . 
TABLE IX .5 
The Financial Performace of Consett, 1914 - 3-940* 
Year 
end Profit 
June§+ 
Ordinary 
Dividend 
Preference Retained 
Profits 
Provision 
Depreciation 
Debenture 
1914 £408014 30% 8% £ 6 2 , 6 0 6 
£ 4 0 , 0 0 0 * 5 £214384 124% 8% £ 3,535 
6 £ 6 2 5 , 9 3 7 50% 8% £ 8 2 , 6 6 8 
7 £521661 40% 8% £ 6 1 , 6 6 1 £ 2 0 , 0 0 0 * 
8 £516224 49% 8% £ 1 6 , 2 2 4 ( £ 5 0 , 0 0 0 ** 
I £ 1 0 , 0 0 0 * 
9 £512292 35% 8% £ 2 1 , 5 8 2 £100000 ** 
1920 £599145 124% 8% £ 4 0 , 9 4 6 (•£50,000** 
( .£90,000* 
1 £356430 10% 8% £ 9,605 
2 £194344 4% 8% £ 2 0 , 6 7 0 
£ 3 0 , 7 8 9 - * J 3++ £266162 5% 
74% 
8% £ 3 0 , 0 9 7 
4 £451725 8% £52634 £ 2 9 , 9 4 0 * 
5 £265119 24% 8% £ 2 1 , 8 5 7 £ 1,665-* 
6 £136227 Loss 
7 £ 3 5 , 4 7 4 LOSS 
8 £300322 £318781 =t= 
9 £313255 8% £ 2 3 , 2 5 5 £100000 
1930 £491266 8% £101266 £200000 
1 £387733 £237733 
2 £299726 £ 1 4 9 , 7 2 6 
3 £209039 £ 90,413 
4 £294406 £94407 £100000 
5 £456734 £ 5 6 , 7 3 5 £300000 
6 £568988 £106488 £350000 * * 
7 £828561 74% 8% £ 1 4 1 , 4 9 9 (£125000 
I £ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 * * 
8 £1060311 10% Oof £215952 ( £ 1 5 5 0 0 0 
( . £ 2 0 0 0 0 0 * * 
9 £755131 74% 8% £186120 ( £ 1 2 5 0 0 0 
I £ 1 0 0 0 0 0 * * 
1940 £810698 74% 8% £200461 C£ 1 2 5 , 0 0 0 
( . £ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 * * 
£ 58,457 
£ 9 0 , 0 0 0 
£ 1 0 9 , 4 2 5 
£ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 
£ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 
£ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 
£ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 
£ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 
£ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 
£ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 
£ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 
£10000044 
£ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 
£ 1 1 2 , 5 0 0 
£ 6 2 , 641 
£ 6 1 , 4 1 1 
£ 61,411 
£ 59,226 
* Written off Investments. 
4- Year changed from June to June, to March to March i n 1922-23 
** Provision towards deferred Repairs, & Reserves 
+-f Nine month accounting year 
•^Writing off from Debenture Issue Expenses. 
^ Written off : Debit i n Prof i t and Loss Account by a transfer from Reserve Account 
4>+ Motion of Debenture Stock holders to reduce interest to 4% during 1933,1934 & 
1935-
Profit i s the p r o f i t on the years trading account plus the p r o f i t retained, 
and before any deductions i s made for Debenture interest. 
CONCLUSION 
The f i f t y years "between 1864-1914 delimit the span of this case 
study i n Victorian business history,and coincide with a period during 
which the British economy is held to have done relatively poorly vis a vis 
other industrial nations. Financially the Consett Iron Company performed 
unquestionably well throughout the period under review, but as has been 
pointed out financial results may mask underlying economic i l l s . 
The evidence presented^both qualitative and quantitative,suggests that 
from approximately the end of the 1890's there was a weakening i n the 
managerial drive at Consett. This manifested i t s e l f over a wide range of 
functions such as the acquisition of alternative iron supplies, the adoption 
of new manufacturing techniques and the management of labour relations. I t was 
also exhibited by the absence of any interest i n the exploitation of new 
market outlets. 
In the search for alternative ore supplies, the Company's time-honoured 
strategy of ensuring an adequate ore supply was hampered i n i t s implementation 
by the extravagant expectations deriving from the Company's great success i n 
the Orconera venture. Consett was a l i t t l e naive and ill-prepared for the 
risks inherent i n the competitive business of mineral exploration and 
exploitation i n the early twentieth century. 
the 
Much clearer is the stagnation, and i n some instances upward movement of 
real costs after 1900, i n the steelworks* Investment on this side of the 
Company's business was characterised by piece-meal projects and a habit of 
postponing thorough reconstruction. 
In the collieries also, there was a downward movement i n labour 
productivity, and also a degeneration i n labour relations. However, to 
counter-balance this the Company completed a comprehensive investment i n the 
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electrification of its mines "before 1914 • 
Probably the most serious entrepreneurial f a i l i n g after 1900 was 
the absence of any attempt to seek out new markets for iron and steel 
products, i n view of the saturation of the shipbuilding market. Consett 
was unable to throw up an entrepreneur of the quality of Charles Schwab, 
who revitalised the fortunes of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation by producing the 
'Grey' beam for the constructional engineering industry. 
The experience of Consett f i t s quite well into the hypothesis that 
the dynamism of an industry, or a company is determined by the buoyancy 
and the rate of growth of the market. Thus as the demand for shipbuilding 
materials was satisfied around the turn of the century, the incentive for 
new investment was reduced, the average age of the capital employed rose, 
and productivity began to suffer. This thesis is not invalidated by 
Consett's experience in the coal trade, for although labour productivity 
deteriorated this was in a large part due to geological conditions. The 
rapid extension of coal sales was accompanied by a thorough investment i n the 
electrification of the collieries. 
On the whole the Consett findings can be added to those in Essays on a 
Mature Economy ; Britain after 1840 ^ that there was no serious overall 
entrepreneurial failure i n late Victorian Britain. ' The Company only began 
to show signs of slackening enterprise i n the Edwardian decade. Attitudes 
concerning the iron and steel side of the business ossified, whilst on the 
coal side the Company was i n many respects exploiting its enterprising 
( l ) D.N. McCloskey, Essays on a Mature Economy ; Britain after I84O 
(London, 1971)• 
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t e r r i t o r i a l expansion of the l880's. The years between 1900-1914 were marked 
by the absence of any fundamental policy decision upon which i t could 
develop i n the future. This pattern i s diametrically opposed to 
D.H. Aldcroft's assertion that " i t seems l i k e l y that entrepreneurial lethargy 
(2) 
was more evident before 1900 than afterwards." 
The early start hypothesis also has some fresh blood driven through i t s 
veins. The heritage of old plant and limited space at Consett made the 
implementation of new and extensive investment after the mid-18901s increasingly 
problematical. In the collieries resources were suffering from half a century's 
exploitation, whilst even the new pits at Chopwell were sunk i n an area previously 
worked, and when the Whittonstall royalty was opened out old workings were 
encountered. Though the existence of old plant is not an insurmountable 
problem i t adds an extra dimension to decision-making. 
Consett was never i n any sense a family business, and was not therefore 
vulnerable to the neglect that family firms were often subject to by heirs 
more intent upon social improvement than business success. However certain 
personalities l e f t a marked imprint upon Consett*s business. They planned 
and fashioned the success of the Company, but their success bred complacency 
i n their successors. 
(2) D.H. Aldcroft, "The Entrepreneur and the Briti s h Economy, I87O-I914", 
Economic History Review, 2nd. ser. XVII (1964-65) p.134. 
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APPENDIX A.2. 
The P r i c e per ton of Steel Plates a t Middlesborough. 1887-1913 
Year P r i c e * Year P r i c e * Year P r i c e * 
1887 £6. 5s.0d 1896 £5. Os.Od 1905 £5.17s.Od 
1888 £6. 5s.0d 1897 £5. 2s.6d 1906 £7. Os.Od 
1889 £7. 5s.Od 1898 £6. Os.Od 1907 £7.10s.0d 
1890 £7. Os.Od 1899 £7.10s.0d 1908 £6. 5s.Od 
1891 £6. 5s.Od 1900 £8.10s.0d 1909 £5.15s.Od 
1892 £6. Os.Od 1901 £5.17s.6d 1910 £6.10s.0d 
1893 £4.17s.0d 1902 £5.15s.Od 1911 £6.15s.Od 
1894 £5. Os.Od 1903 £6. Os.Od 1912 £7.15s.Od 
1895 £4.17s.6d 1904 £5.12s.6d 1913 £8. 5s.Od 
Source: The Economist. 1887-1913 Vol. 45-77. 
* The Price i n June of each year. 
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APPENDIX A.3® 
The P r i c e per ton of Various Types of I r o n Ore a t Consett I868-1914 
Year ending Cleveland Spanish Cumberland Purple 
June Ironstone Hematite Hematite Ore 
1868 7s. I d £1. Is.Od £1. I s . 4d 
1869 7 s . I I d £1. I s . 4d 
1870 6s . 8d £1. Os. 9d 
1871 6s. 6d £1. I s . , 4d 
1872 7s. Od £1.. 4s.I0d 
1873 8s. Od £1. 7s. 6d £I.IOs. Od 
1874 9s. Od £I.IOs. 9d £I.I3s. Od 
1875 9s. I d £1. I s . 8d £1. 5 s . 9d I 9 s . I d 
1876 9s., Od £1. 2s. I d £1. 4 s . 8d I 4 s . 3d 
I877i 8s. 6d £1. 2s. 5d £1. I s . Od I 7 s . 3d 
1878 8 s . 8d £1. I s . 7d £1. I s . Od IOs. Od 
1879 8s. 6d I 8 s . 8d I 8 s . I I d l i s . Od 
1880 7s. 8d I d s . 9d I 3 s . 7d 
1881 7s. 3d I 9 s . I d I 5 s . 9d 
1882 7s. Od I 7 s . 7d I 6 s . 3d 
1883 8s.I0d I 8 s . 6d I 7 s . 7d 
1884 8s. 5d I6 s . I 0 d I 6 s . I I d 
1885 6 s . 8d I 4 s . 6d 9s. 2d 
1886 I 3 s . 4d 8s* 7d 
1887 I 2 s . 5d 8s. 4d 
1888 7s. 3d I 2 s . 9d 8s. 4d 
1889 6s. Od I 4 s . I d 8s. 7d 
1890 I 4 s . 9d 13s.. 5d 
1891 I 4 s . 9d I 6 s . 5d 
1892 I 3 s . I 0 d I 4 s . 8d 
1893 I 3 s . 4d 9s.. 6d 
1894 I 2 s . 9d 7 s . I I d 
1895 13s. I d IOs. I d 
1896 I 2 s . I I d 9s. 3d 
1897 I 3 s . 4d 8s. Od 
1898 I 4 s . 4d* 
1899 I 4 s . 8d 
1900 I 6 s . I d 
1901 I 7 s . 9d 
1902 I 4 s . 7d 
1903 I 4 s . 8d 
1904 I 4 s . I 0 d 
1905 I 4 s . I I d 
1906 I 5 s . I d 
1907 I 7 s . 7d 
1908 I 9 s . 7d 
1909 I 5 s . 5d 
1910 I 4 s . I I d 
I 9 I I I 7 s . 5d 
1912 I 6 s . I I d 
1913: I 8 s . 4&L 
1914 I 8 s . 0|d 
* Spanish and Purple Ore P r i c e s Quoted $s; one. 
Source: P r i v a t e float flnnfr. (DCRO t D/CO/97, 100, & I O l ) . 
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APPENDIX A.4. 
The P r i c e per ton of P i g Iron I 8 7 0 - I 9 I 3 
( I ) (2) ( I ) (2) 
Cumberland Pig I r o n Cumberland P i g I r o n : sold 
Year Hematite; s o l d by Consett Year Hematite by Consett 
P i g I r o n P i g I r o n 
1870 £3.I2s. 6d 1893 £2. 6 s . Od £2. 9s. 7d 
1871 £4.I0s. 8d 1894 £2.. 5s. 6d 
1872 £7. 2s. 6d 1895 £2. 6 s . 5d 
1873 £8. 9s. 2d £3:.I2s. 5d* 1896 £2. 9s. 3d 
1874 £5. 9s. 7d £3. 7s. 9d 1897 £2.I0s. 6d 
1875 £4. I s . 7d £2.I2s. 6d 1898 £2.I4s. 7d 
1876 £3.I4s. I d £1.18s. 2d 1899 £3.I0s. 3d 
1877 £3.I2s. 9d £I.I7s. 9d 1900 £4. 2s. IdL 
1878 £3. 0 s . Od £I.I6s. 7d 1901 £3.lis. Od 
1879 £2.I7s. 6d £I.I3s. 5d 1902 £3. 4 s . Od 
1880 £3.I0s. Od £2.I4s. 4d 1903 £2.I8s. 7d 
1881 £3). I s . I d £2.I5s. Od 1904 £2.I4s. 6d 
1882 £2.I8s. 6d £2.I3s. 2d 1905 £3.lis. Id 
1883 £2.lis. 9d £2.I0s. 7d 1906 £3. 9s * 9d 
1884 £2. 6s. l i d £2. 4 s . 5d„. 1907 £3:.I8s. 3d 
1885 £2. 4 s . 6d £2. 3 s . 7d' 1908 £3.I0s. 8d 
1886 £2. 3 s . 7d £2. I s . 7d 1909 £2.I9s. 7d 
1887 £2. 6 s . I d £2. Os. 5d 1910 £3.I7 3. I d 
1888 £2. 4 s . 8d £2. I s . Od I 9 I I £3. 4 s . I I d 
1889 £2.I2s. 3d £2. 4 s . 2d 1912 £3.I5s. 9d 
1890 £2.I9s.IId £2.I9s. 7d 1913 £3.I8s. 7d 
1891 £2.lis. 8d £2.I9s. 2d 
1892 £2. 9s. 7d £2.I3s. 7d 
* Years ending June. 
+ Between I 8 7 3 - 1 8 8 4 , the type of pig iron undefined. 
* Bessemer P i g I r o n . 
Sources! (l)D.N. M CCloskey, "Economic Maturity and Entrepreneurial 
Decline"^ pp. 1 4 4 - 1 4 5 
( 2 ) P r o f i t and Loss Accounts. 1 8 7 3 - 1 8 9 3 . ( D C R O J D / C O / 8 9 ) 
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APPENDIX B l . I . ( i i ) 
Langkey Park C o l l i e r y * Annual Average Costs per ton Coal 
Year Wages Rent Stores Royalty- Estimated Miscellaneous Total Av* 
ending and Rent Charges (coa l Cost 
June Coal f o r Engines) 
1877 2s:. 8£d. 2 i d . 8 i d . I s . l O i d . 5id„ I d. 5 s . 2 d. 
1878 3s. 3 d. 3 i d . 6 d. :i®?d. 9 i d . l i d . 5 s . 5 i d . 
1879 2s. 5 d. 2 d. 7 d. ;.;!8ivd • 6 d. i d . 4 s . 4 i d . 
1880 2s. 0 d. l i d . 6 d. 7 i d . 5 i d . i d . 3 s . 8 d. 
1881 2s. 3 d. l i d . 5 i d . 8 d. 5 i d . I d. 4 s . Oid. 
1882 2s. 2-|d. l i d . 5 d. 10 d. 5 i d . I d. 4 s . l i d . 
1883 2s. 6 i d . l i d . 6 d. 10 d. 5 d. I d. 4s . 6 d. 
1884 2s. 7£d. I ^ d . 7 d. 10 d. 5 d. l i d . 4 s . 8 i d . 
1885 2s. 7 d. 2 d. 4 d. 8 i d . 5 d. l i d . 4 s . 4 d. 
1886 2s. 5 d. • l i d . 4 d. 9 d. 4 i d . l i d . 4 s . 3 i d . 
1887 2s. 5 d. l i d . 3 i d . 7 d. 4 i d . l i d . 3 s . I I d. 
1888 2s. 4£d. 2 d. 4 i d . 7 i d . 5 d. l i d . 4 s . I d. 
1889 2s. 3£d. 2 d. 5 d. 7 d. 4 i d . l i d . 3s . H i d . 
1890 2s. 9 d. l i d . 6 i d . I I d. 4 d. l i d . 4 s . 9 i d . 
1891 3s. 2£d. l i d . 6 i d . H i d . 4 i d . 2 d. 5s. 4 i d . 
1892 3s. 6 d. 2 d. 6 i d . 9 d. 6 d. 2 i d . 5 s . 8 d. 
1893 3 s . I d. 2 d. 5 d. 9 d. 5 i d . l i d . 5 s. 0 d. 
1894 2s. 10 d. l i d . 4 i d . 9 d. 4 i d . l i d . 4 s . 7 d. 
1895 2 s . I a i d . l i d . 5 d. 8 i d . 5 d. I d. 4 s . 7 i d . 
1896 2s. 8^d. l | d . 6 i d . 8 d. 4 i d . I d. 4 s . 6 d. 
1897 2s. 7 d. 2 d. 4 i d . 9 i d . 4 i d . i d . 4 s . 4 d. 
1898 2s. 0£d. l i d . 3 i d . 10 d. 3 i d . 3 i d . 3 s . I 0 i d . 
1899 2s. 0 d. I d. 4 i d . 9 i d . 3 i d . 2 d. 3 s . 8 i d . 
1900 2s. 3 d. I d. 4 i d . I s . 2 d. 3 d. 5 i d . 4 s . 7 d. 
1901 2s. 9 d. I d. 6 d. I s . 0 d. 3 i d . 6 d. 5s . l i d . 
1902 2s. 5 d. l i d . 6 d. 5 i d . 3 i d . 5 i d . 4s. 3 d. 
1903 2s. 6 d. l i d . 7 d. 7 d. 4 d. 4 d> 4 s . 5 i d . 
1904 2s. 9£d. I ^ d . 9 d. 6 i d . 4 d. 5 i d . 5s. 0 d. 
1905 2s.10 d. l i d . 7 d. 6 i d . 4 d. 5 d. 4 s . 10) d. 
1906 2s.I0&d. l i d . 7 d. 7 d. 4 d. 4 d. 4s.10 d. 
1907 3s.. 7 d. 2 d. 6 i d . 7 d. 4 d. 6 d. 5s. 2 i d . 
1908 3 s . 8£d. 2 d. 9 i d . 7 d. 5 d. 5,!d.. 6s. I d. 
1909 3 s . I I i d j . 2 d. 10 d. 7 d. 4 i d . 4 d.. 6B. 2 i d . 
1910 4s;. 2 d . 2 i d . 8 d. 7 d. 5 i d . 6 i d . 6s • 7 i d . 
I 9 I I 4 s . 0 d. 2 i d . 7 d. 7 i d . 5 i d . 35 d. 6s. l i d * 
1912 4s. 2 d. 3 d. 7 d. 8 d.. 6 d.. 2 i d . 6 s . 4 i d . 
I 9 I 3 1 4 s . 6 d- 3 d. 7 d. 8 d. 6 d. 4 i d . 6 s . I O i d . 
1914 5s. l i d . 3 i d . 9 d. 8 di- 6 i d . I s . I O i d . 9s. 3 d. 
Source* P r i v a t e Cost Books. (DCROi D / C0/97, I00& I0 I ) 
- 362 -
APPENDIX B . I . ( i i i ) 
Chopwell C o l l i e r y : Annual Average Costs per ton Coal at- Derwenthaugh 
Year Wages Rent Stores Royalty Estimated Miscellaneous Total Av. 
ending and Rent Charges Cost 
June CSal 
1898 4s. 5 i d . 4 i d . I s . 2£d. 6 d. 3&d. 9 i d . 7 s . 7 i d . 
1899 3s.10 d. 3 i d . I I d. 6 d. 3 i d . 2^d. 6 s . Oid. 
1900 3s. 9 i d . 3 i d . 9 d. 6 d. 4 d. 9 d. 6B. 5 d. 
1901 4 s . 6 d. 4 d. 9 d. 6 d. 4&d. I Oid. 7s. 4 d. 
1902 3 s . I I d. 3 i d . 8 d. 6 d. 4 d. I0| d . 6 s . 4 d. 
1903 3s. 8 i d . 3 i d . 7£d. 6 d. 4 d. 4 i d . 5 s . 10) d . 
1904 3 s . I I d. 3 i d . 5 d. 6 d. 4£d. 5 d. 5 s . I I d. 
1905 3s. 9 d. 3£d. 6 d. 6 d. 4 d. 7 d. 6s. Oid. 
1906 4 s . 0 d. 3 d. 5 i d . 6 d. 4*d. I s . 8 d. 7s. 3 d. 
1907 4 s . 5 d. 3 i d . 6 d. 6 d. 4 i d . I s . 3 d. 7s. 4 d. 
1968 5s. 5 d. 4 d. 7 d. 6£d. 4£d. I s . 9 d. 9s. 0 d. 
1909 5s. 2 d. 4 d. 7 d. 6 d. 3 i d . I O i d . 7s. 9 d. 
19X0 5s. 0 d. 3£d. 8 d. 6 d. 3 d. I s . 2|d. 7 s . I I d. 
I 9 I I 5s. 0 d. 3£d. 7 d. 5&d. 4 i d . 8 i d . 7s« 5 d. 
1912 5s. I d . 4 d. 8 di, 5£d. 5 i d . 9-id. 7s. 9 i d . 
1913 5s. 5 d. 4 d. 7 i d . 5&d. 6 di I s . Oid. 8s. 4 i d . 
1914 5s. 8 i d . 4&d. 6 d. 6 d. 6 d . 10 d. 8s. 5 d. 
Source: P r i v a t e Cost Books. (DCROi D / C 0 / I 0 0 , & I O l ) . 
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APPENDIX B.2. ( i ) 
Average Cost per ton of Coke a t Cdnsett's Home C o l l i e r i e s , I868-I9I4 
Year Wages Coal Miscellaneous Total Y i e l d * 
ending Stores, Cost 
June Estimated 
Charges 
1868 I s . 0^d. 6s . 5 d. I s . Oid. 8s. 6 d. 65.89 
1869 H i d . 6s. 7 d. 9 i d . 8s. 4 d. 64.43 
.1870 IOid. 6 s . 4 d. 6 i d . 7s. 9 d. 64.90 
1871 IOid. 6s. 5 d. 7 i d . 7 s . I I d. 65.34 
1872 I I d. 6s. 9 d. 8 d. 8s. 4 d. 65.78 
1873 I s . 2 d. I 2 s . I I d. 10 d. I 4 s . I I d. 64.17 
1874 I s . 4 d. 8 s . I I d. I I d. l i s . 2 d. 63.00 
1875 I s . 2 i d . 7s. 9 d. 9 d. 9s. 8 i d . 62.03 
1876 I s . I d. 7s. 2 d. 8 d. 8 s . I I d. 62.97 
1877 I s . 0 d. 6s.10 d. 7 d. 8s SM d. 63.63 
1878 H i d . 6 s . 9 d. 6 d. 8s. 2 i d . 63.26 
1879 H i d . 6s . 6 d. 3 i d . 7s. 8 d. 64.96 
1880 I I d. 5s.10 d. 4 d. 7s. I d. 63.21 
1881 I I d. 6s. I d. 4 d. 7s. 4 d. 63.72 
1882 I I d. 6s. 3 i d . 3 i d . 7s. 6 d. 63.93 
1883 H i d . 6 s . 3 d. 4 i d . 7s. 7 d. 65.26 
1884 I s . 0 d. 6s. 5 i d . 4 i d . 7s.10 d. 66.72 
1885 H i d . 5 s . I I d. 4 i d . 7s. 3 d. 68.20 
1886 H i d . 6s . I d. 4 i d . 7s. 5 d. 66.97 
1887 I I d. 5 s . I I d. 4 d. 7s. 2 d. 67.45 
1888 I I d. 6s. 0 d. 5 d. 7s. 4 d. 68.51 
1889 I I d. 6s. 8 d. 5 d. 8s. 0 d. 68.19 
1890 I s . 0 d. 7s. 7 d. 6 d. 9s. I d. 67.67 
1891 I s . 2 d. 8s. 8 i d . 4 i d . 9s.10 d. 67.09 
1892 I s . 3 d. 9s. 0 d. 6 d. IOs. 9 d. 65.58 
1893 I s . Oid. 7 s . I l i d . 5 d. 9s. 5 d. 66.88 
1894 I s . 2 d. 7s. 9 d. 5 d. 9s. 4 d. 67.94 
1895 I s . I d. 7s. 8 d. 6 d. 9s. 3 d. 67.67 
1896 I s . Oid. 7s. 5 d. 4 i d . 8s.10 d. 67.23 
1897 I s . Oid. 7s. 6 i d . 4 d. 8s. I I d. 67.25 
1898 I s . l i d . 8 s. 4 d. 3 i d . 9s. 9 d. 67.32 
1899 I s . 2 d. 8s. 8 d. 5 d. IOs. 3 d. 68.32 
1900 I s . 3 d. 10s. I d. 3 d. l i s . 7 d. 68.23 
1901 I s . 5 i d . I 2 s . 2 i d . 5 d. I 4 s . I d. 67.78 
1902 I s . 4 i d . 10s. 7 d. 4 i d . I 2 s . 4 d. 67.58 
1903 I s . 3 i d . 10s. 6 d. 4 i d . I 2 s . 2 d. 66.10 
1904 I s . 3 d. 10s 4 d. 4 d. l i s . I I d. 66.76 
1905 I s . 3 d. 10s. 3 d. 5 d. l i s . I I d. 66.93 
1906 I s . 3 d. IOs. 0 d. 3 d. l i s . 6 d. 67.84 
1907 I s . 3 i d . IOs. 5 d. 5 i d . I 2 s . 2 d. 66.44 
1908 I s . 5 i d . l i s . I O i d . 6 d. I 3 s . I 0 d. 66.13 
1909 I s . 5 d. I 2 s . l i d . 4 i d . I 3 s . I I d. 66.29 
1910 I s . 4 i d . I 2 s . 8 d. 5 i d . I 4 s . 7 d. 64.38 
1911 I s . 4 d. 9s. 8 d. 5 i d . l i s . 5 i d . 67.66 
1912 I s . 8 i d . IOs. $k&- 6 d. I 2 s . 2 d. 62.90. 
1913 i s . 4 d'. l i s . 3> d. 5 d. I 3 s . 0 d. 65.62 
" Y i e l d s f o r 6 months.- ending June. 
The Y i e l d i s the % Y i e l d of coke per ton of c o a l . 
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Lgngley Park C o l l i e r y t Annual Average Costs per ton Coke. 
Year 
ending 
June 
Wages Coal Miscellaneous Total Av. 
Cost 
Y i e l d * 
1877 I s . I d. 10s. 0£d. 3 d. l i s . 4 i d . 52.07 
1878 I s . 0 d. 10s. 3 d. 5 d. l i s . 8 d. 54.56 
1879 I0£d. 7s. 7 d. l i d . 8s. 7 d. 57.40 
1880 10 d. 6s. 4&d. 3 i d . 7s. 6 d. 60.46 
1881 10 d. 6 s . H i d . 2 i d . 8s. 0 d. 58.63 
1882 10 d. 6s.10 d. 3 d. 7 s . I I d. 61.66 
1883 I0£d. 7s. 5 i d . 3 d. 8s. 4 d. 60.22 
1884 I I d. 7s. 8 d. 2 i d . 8s. 9 i d . 61.66 
1885 I s . 0 d. 6s.I0£d. 4 i d . 8s. 3 d. 63.35 
1886 I I d. 6s. 7 d. 4 d. 7s.10 d. 64.06 
1887 10 d. 6s. 0^d. 3 i d . 7s. 2 d. 64.47 
1888 10 d. 6s. 4 d. 2 d. 7s. 4 d. 64.08 
1889 10 d. 6s . 3 d. 2 i d . 7s. 3 i d . 65.29 
1890 I I d. 7s. 3 d. 3 i d . 8s., 5 i d . 66.07 
1891 I s . 0 d. 8s. 2£d. 2 i d . 9s. 5 d. 64.94 
1892 I s . I d. 8s. 9 d. I d. 9 s . I I d. 64.84 
1893 I I d. 7s. 8&d. 2i d . 8s.10 d. 65.59 
1894 I I d. 6 s . I I d. 3 d. 8s. I d. 65.82 
1895 H i d . 7s. I d. 2 d. 8s.. 2 i d . 65.17 
1896 I I d. 6 s . I I d. 2£d. 8s. Oid. 65.30 
1897 I I d. 6s. 8 d. 3 d. 7s.10 d. 64.17 
1898 H^d. 6s. l i d . 3 d. 7s. 4 d. 63,68 
1899 I s . 0 d. 5s.I0£d. 3 d. 7s. 7 i d . 63.99 
1900 I s . I d. 7s. 0 d. 3 d. 8s. 4 d. 65.61 
1901 I s . 4 d. 7s. 9 d. 3 d. 9s. 4 d. 66.31 
1902 I s . 2£d. 6s. 4£d. 3 i d . 7 s . I 0 i d . 65.47 
1903 I s . l i d . 6s.10 d. 5 d. 8s. 4 i d . 65.09 
1904 I s . 0 d. 7s. 5£d. 4 d. 8 s . I 0 i d . 66.55 
1905 I s . I d. 7s. l | d . 3 i d . 8s. 6 d. 68.69 
1906 I s . I d. 7s. 2 d. 3 d. 8s. 6 d. 67.66 
1907 I s . l i d . 7s. 9 d. 4 d. 9s. 2 i d . 66.77 
1908 I s . 3 d. 8s. H i d . 4 d. 10s. 6 i d . 67.71 
1909 I s . 3 d. 9s. 5 d. 8 d. l i s . 6 d. 64.48 
1910 I s . 2 d. 10s. I d . 6 i d . l i s . 9 i d . 65.90 
I 9 I I I s . 7 d. 9s. 3 d. 3 i d . 10s. 7 i d . 66.86 
1912 I s . I d. 9s. 6 i d . 2 d. 10s. 9 i d . 65.47 
1913 I s . I d. 10s. 6 d. 2 i d . l i s . 9 i d . 65.59 
1914 I s . 3 d. 14s. 3 d. 2 i d . I 5 s . 8 i d . 64.48 
Sources P r i v a t e Cost Books (DCR0: D/Cp/97, 100 & 101), 
* S i x months ending June. The Y i e l d i s the % Y i e l d of coke per ton of 
c o a l . 
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APPENDIX B.2. ( i i i ) 
Chopwell C o l l i e r y : Annual Average Costs per ton Coke. 
Year 
ending 
June 
Coal Wages Miscellaneous T o t a l Av. 
Cost 
Y i e l d * 
1898 
1899 8s. 2 d. I s . 4 d. I s . 2 d. IOs. 6 d. 63.24 
1900 9s. 5 d. I s . 2£d. I s . 0 d. l i s . 7£d. 367.68 
1901 IOs. 6&d* I s . 6 d. I s . l i d . 13s. 2 d* 67.57 
1902 8s. 7 d. I s . 4 d. I s . 0£d. IOs. H i d . 70.26 
1903 7 s . I l i d . I s . 2£d. 10 d. IOs. 0 d. 70.36) 
1904 8s. 0 d. I s . 2 d. I I d. IOs. I d. 70.87 
1905 8s . 2 d. I s . l£d. 8£d. IOs. 0 d. 71.55 
1906 IOs. 0 d. I s . I d. I s . 2 d. I 2 s . 3 d. 69.62 
1907 IOs. 3 d. I s . I d. I s . 0 d. I 2 s . 4 d. 68.60 
1908 I 2 s . 6 d. I s . 2 d. I I d. I 4 s . 7 d. 69.80 
1909 IOs.10 d. I s . 2 d. I I d. I 2 s . I I d. 68.57 
1910 l i s . I d. I s . 2 d. I I d. I 3 s . 2 d. 68.85 
F.I9.II IOs. 3 d. I s . lid. IO&L. I 2 s . 3 d. 68.97 
1912 IOs.10 d. I s . l i d . I s . 0 d. I2s.Il£d. 69.28 
1913 I I s . I Q d. I s . 2$d. I s . 0 d. I 4 s . 0£d. 67.83 
1914 I 2 s . 0£d* I s . 4 d. H i d . I 4 s . 4 d. 66.87 
^Source: P r i v a t e Cost Books. (DCRO: D / C O / I O O , & I O l ) . 
* Y i e l d f o r s i x months ending June. The Y i e l d i s the % y i e l d of coke 
per ton or c o a l . 
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APPENDIX B.3. ( i ) 
Consett I r o n Company, LTD. I The Cost of Producing an Average ton of Pig Iron 
Year Cost of Cost of Cost of Cost of Wages M i s c e l l - Total Av. 
ending Iron Ore Limestone Coal Coke aneous Cost 
1870 19s. 9 d. 9 d. I s . . 5 i d . 9s. 8 i d . 4 s . Oid. 3s. 2d. £I.I8s.I0d. 
1871 £1. 0 s . l£d. I Oid. I I d. 10s. I d. 3 s . I I d. 3s. l i d . £I.I9s.I0d. 
1872 £1. 0s. 6 d. iofd. 4 d. 9s. 9 d. 4 s . 4 i d . 3s. 7d. £1.19s. 5d«l 
1873 £1. 3s.10 d. I I d. 2£d. I 8 s . 5 i d . 5s. 4 d. 3s. 8d. £2.I2s. 5d. 
1874 £1. 4s. 3 d. 10 d. l | d . I 3 s . l i d . 6 s . 2 i d . 4s. 8d. £2. 9s* 0d.< 
1875 £1. 4 s . I I d. 10 d. l | d . l i s . 9 d. 5 s . 5 i d . 4s. 2d. £2., 7s. 3d. 
1876 £1. I s . 2 d. 10 d. 3|d. 10s. 9 d. 4s . I O i d . 4s. Id. £2. 2s. Od. 
1877 I 7 s . 2 d. I I d. 2^d. l i s . Oid. 4 s . 7 i d . 4s. Id. £I.I8s. Od. 
1878 I 9 s . 3£d. I0£d. 3 d. I d s . 8 d. 4 s . 4 d. 2s. 6d. £I*I7s.IId. 
1879 I 6 s . I 0 d. 8£d. 2£d. 9s. 5 i d . 3 s . I I d. 2s. 10d.. £I.I3s.IId. 
1880 I 8 s . 5£d. 8 d. i d . 8s. 7 d. 3 s . 8 d. 2s. 5d.. £I.I3s.I0d. 
1881 £1. I s . 3£d. 8 i d . l i d . 8s. 7 d. 3 s . 6 i d . I s . l i d . £I.I6s. 2d. 
1882 £1. 3 s . 2£d. 8 d. 2 d. 8s. 3 i d . 3 s . 7 i d . 2s. 2d. £1.18s. I d . 
1883 £1. 4s.10 d. 8 d. i d . 8s. 5 i d . 3 s . 6 i d . I s . 10d.. £I.I9s. 4d. 
1884 £1* I s . 8 i d . 9 d. i d . 8s. 8 d. 3 s . 6 d. 2s. 3d. £I.I6s. 5d. 
1885 I 8 s . I l i d . 9 d. i d . 8s 5 d. 3 s . 4 i d . I s . 9d; £I.I3s. 3d. 
1886 I 7 s . 6$d. 9 d. i d . 8s. 8 d. 3 s . 4 i d . I s . 9d. £I.I2s. I d . 
1887 I 7 s . l i d . 10 d. i d . 8s. 7 d. 3 s . 2|d. I s . 9d. £I.IIs. 6d. 
1888 £1. 0s. 5 d. 8£d. 
8&d. 
i d . 8s. 5 i d . 3 s . l i d . I s . 9d. £I.I4s. 6d. 
1889 £1. 2s. 3 d. i d . 9s. 2 i d . 3 s . Oid. I s . 8d. £I.I6s.IId. 
1890 £1. 2s. 10 d. 9 d. i d . 10s. 6 d. 3s . 3 i d . Is,. 7d. £I.I9s. Od. 
1891 £1. 5s. 3 d. 9 d. i d . 10s. 8 d. 3 s . 3|d. 2 s. 6d. £2. 2s. 6d. 
1892 £1. •Is.. 9 d. 10 d. 2 d. I 2 s . I d. 3 s . 7 d. l's. 5d; £I.I9s.I0d. 
1893 £1. 3s. 3 d. 9 d. 2 d. 9s. 8 d. 3s,.: 2 i d . I s . 5d. £I.I8s. 6d. 
1894 £1. 2s. 3 d. 9 d. 2 d. 9s. 5 d. 3 s . 0 d. I s . 5d. £1.17s. Od. 
1895 £1. 2s. 6£d. 9 d. l i d . 9s. 3 i d . 2s. 8 i d . r s . 5d. £I.I6s.I0d. 
1896 £1. 2s. ofd. 9 d. l i d . 8s.10 d. 2s. 9 i d . Is. 3d.- £I.I5s.I0d. 
1897 £1. 4s. 7 d. 9 d. l i d . 8s. 9 d. 2s.10 d. I s . 8d. £I.I8s. 9d. 
1898 £1. 5 s . 4 d. 8£d. 2 d. 9s.10 d. 2 s . I I d. I s . 9d.» £2., Os. 9d. 
1899 £1. 5s. 7£d. 8 d. 3 d. 10s. 7 d. 3 s . I d. 2s... Id. £2. 2 s . 3d. 
1900 £1. 8s. 5 d. 9 i d . 3 i d . I 3 s . & d. 3s . 9 d. 2s. 2d. £2. 8s. 8d. 
1901 £1. 9s. 8£d. 9£d. 3 d. I 7 s . 7 d. 4 s . 0 d. 2s'. 2d.. £2.I4s. 6d. 
1902 £1. 5s. 7 i d . 9 d. 4 i d . I 4 s . 3 d. 3s. 6 d. 2s, 2d.\ £2. 6s. 8d. 
1903 £1. 5s. 7 i d . 9 d. 2 d. I 3 s . 6 i d . 3 s . 4 d. 2s.. Id; £2. 5 s . 6d. 
1904 £1. 5s. 5 d. 9&d. I d. I 3 s . I 0 i d . , 3 s . 3 i d . 2s. I d . £2.. 5s.. 6d. 
1905 £1. 5s. 10 d. I s . 4 d. I d. I 3 s . 8 i d . 3 s . I d. I s . l i d . £2. 6s. Od. 
1906 £1. 9s. 4 i d . I s . 5 d. I d. I 4 s . 2 i d . 3 s . 5 d. 2s. Id., £2.IOs. 7d. 
1907 £I.IIs. 4 d. I s . 5 d. I d. I 3 s . I I d. 3fe. 7 d. 2s. 3d. £2.I2s., 7d. 
1908 £I.I3s. 0 d. I s . 6£d. 2 d. I 5 s . 4 d. 3s.I 0 d. 2s. 5d. £2.I6s. 4d. 
1909 £1. 5s. 4 d. I s . 2£d. 2 d. I5s . 2 d. 3 s . I 0 i d . 2s. 9d. £2. 8s. 6d» 
1910 £1. 7s. 8 d. I s . 3£d. l i d . I 4 s . 8 d. 3 s . 6 i d . 2s.. 2d. £2. 9s. 5d. 
1911 £I.I2s. 5£d. I s . 3 i d . I d. l i s . I d. 3fe. 5 d. I s . 9&, £2.IOs. I d . 
1912 £I.IOs. 8 d. I s . 3 d. I d. I 0 s . I I d. 3 s . 4 i d . 2s. 2d. £2. 8s» 5d. 
1913 £1.14s. I d. I s . 3 i d . I d. IOs. 7 d. 3 s . 7 d. 2s. 8d. £2.I2s. 3d.. 
1914 £1.. l i s . H i d . I s . 5£d. I d. 10s. 6 d. 3 s . I I d. 4s. 5d. £2.I2s. 4d., 
Source: P r i v a t e Cost Books. (DCRO: D / C0/97, 100 & I O l ) . 
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Appendix B.3. ( i i ) 
B e l l Brothers Ltd. 
Year Cost of Cost Cost of Extn. Av. P r o f i t 
Ending Ore p.t. of Labour Impr. & Total per 
September Output of Pig Coke Deprec. Cost ton 
1873 137,477 17s.lid £1.06s.5d 6s.2d+ 10£d £2.l8s.lld £1.17s.l0d 
4 134,885 18s.2d £1.07s.5d 6s2d l i d £3.00s.3d 17s.lOd 
5 164,055 17s.9d £1.00s.3d 5s.l0d Is.3d £2.lis.6d 2s7il 6 215,822 17s.5d 16s.lid 4s.l0d ls.6d £2.06s.3d 
7 203,797 
198,476 
17s.lOd 15s.6d 4 s . l i d 2s. 4d £2.13.11d Loss Is.3d L 
8 17s.lOd 14s.5d 3s.ld l.s4d £2.12.2d 11 8d L 
9 201,376 14s.lOd 12s.7d 2 s . l i d I s . I d £1.14s.l0d 4d L 188 0 278,260 15s.8d 12s.9d 2s.8d 9d £1.14s.l0d Pr. 7s.2^d 
1 281,311 163.0a 13s.3d 3s. 9d 9d £1.15s.lid 3s.3^d 
2 242,923 15s.lid 13s.3d 3s.Od lOd £1.16S. 6d 5s.5id 
3 247,260 15s.9d 13s.6d 3s.2d l i d £1.17s.3d 3s.l0d 
4 225,371 14s.5d 13s.Id 3s. 2d 12d £l.l6s4fl 5d 
5 212,072 14s.3d 12s.3d 3s,2d l i d £1.14s.4d Loss 4d. L 6 206,808 13s.9d 12s.Od 3s. I d I s . I d £1.13s.7d 2s.6a L 
7 166,475 13s.8d l l s . 6 d 3s. 5d ls.4d £1.12s.l0d ls.Od L 
8 169,003 13s.2d l l s . 8 d 3s.2d ls.6d £1.13s.5d ls.5d L 
, 9 223,045 17s.Od l l s . l O d 3s.2d 2s.7d £1.13s.4d Pr. 8d 
189 0 232,326 17s.Od I8.s7d 3s. 7d ls.5d £2.06s.5d Loss Is.3d L 
1 254,872 17s,4d 15s.8d 3s.2d* l.s7d £2.02s.2d ls.9d L 
2 189,817 17s.Id 13s.7d 3s.9d lOd £2.02.8d 3s.9d L 
3 275,366 17s.Od 12s.lid 2s. 9d ls.2d £l.l8s.5d 3s.7d L 
4 257,089 17s.Od 12s.7d 2s.l0d lOd £1.19s.3d 4s.3d L 
5 312,337 I6s.l0d 12s.8d 2s.l0d ls.Od £1.18s.Id 3s.5d L 
6 311,937 I 6 s . l l d 13s.6d 2 s . l i d I s . l i d £1.19s.3d 3s.4d L 
7 338,290 I 6 s . l l d 14s.Od 2 s . l i d 2s.3d £1.19s.l0d 2s.6a L 
8 326,791 16 s . l i d 14s.3d 2 s . l i d fil.igs 9d ls.6d L 
9** 312532 I8s.0d 18s.5d 3s. 3d £2. 6s.9d Pr. 5s.l0d 
190 0 323,876 20s.3d 24s.2d 3 s . l i d £2.17s.2d 8s.5d 
1 341,832 I8s.7d 17s.6d 3s.8d £2.17s.8d Loss I d L 
2 346,615 17s.5d 17s.4d 3s. 4d £2.05s.5d Pr. 2s. 3d 
3 352,479 I6s.l0d 17s.Id 3s. 5d £2. 6s.6d 2d 
4. 352,479 16s.lOd 15s.9d 3s. 3d £2.03s.6d Loss 2d L 5 349,479 I6s.4d 17s.Od 3s.4d £2.06s.3d 7d 
6 361,914 17s.9d 19s.4d 3s. 7d £2.10s.8d 8d 
7 357,667 19s.Id 20s.lid 3s. 5d £2.13s.ld Is.lOd 8. 383,475 19s.3d 18s.2d 3s. 7d £2.10s2d 7d 
9 371,966 18s.6d 17s.4d 3s. 3d £2.10s.2d 9d 1910 348,977 I8s.7d 18s.8d 3s. 5d £2.10s.2d IsOd 1 317,781 17s.9d 17s.3d 3 s.|id £2.08s.8d ls.Od 12 386,608 I8s.8d 21s.6d 3s. 7d £2.14s.8d Loss ls.3dL 
+• Wages and S a l a r i e s 
* Wages only 
* * Y e a r ending December Source: P r o f i t and Loss Accounts, Cost Accounts 
&c. of B e l l Brothers (Dorman, Long C o l l e c t i o n ) . 
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APPENDIX B.4. 
The Average Cost per ton of Nol Puddled Bar, I8683I899 
Year 
ending 
June 
ers P i g 
I r o n 
Puddling 
Ore 
Coal Miscellaneous 
Stores, f e t t l i n g 
&c. 
Total 
Cost 
1868 
1869 
1870 
1871 
1872 
1873 £ 
1874 
1875 
1876 
1877 
1878 
1879 
1880 
1881 
1882 
1883 
1884 
1885 
1886 
1887 
1888 
1889 
1890 
1891 
1892 
1893 
1894 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
I 5 s . I I d . 
I5&. 9d. 
I 5 s . 7d. 
I 5 s . I I d . 
I 7 s . 8d. 
21s. 4d. 
21s. 4d. 
I 8 s . 6d. 
I 5 s . I I d . 
I 5 s . Od. 
I 4 s . 7d. 
I 3 s . 5d. 
I 3 s . 9d. 
I 4 s . 2d. 
I 4 s . 9d. 
I 5 s . 8d. 
I 4 s . 6d. 
I 3 s . 4s. 
I 3 s . 2d. 
I 2 s . 2d. 
I 2 s . I d . 
I 3 s . Od. 
I 5 s . 2d. 
I 5 s . 4d. 
I 4 s . 6d. 
I 3 s . 8d. 
I 3 s . 4d. 
I 3 s . 5d. 
I 3 s . 3d. 
I 3 s . 5d. 
I 3 s . 7d. 
I 5 s . 4d. 
£2. 8 s . I I d . 
£2. 9s. 3d. 
£2. 5s. 9d. 
£2. 4s.I0d. 
£2. 6 s . 2d. 
£3. I s . I O d . 
£3. 0 s . I d . 
£2.I4s.IId. 
£2.I0s. 4d. 
£2. 7s. 6d. 
£2. 7s. Od. 
£2. 0s. 6d. 
£I.I6s. 4d. 
£I.I9s. I d . 
£1.19s. 7d. 
£2. 0 s . 2d. 
£1.18s. I d . 
£I.I3s.IId. 
£I.I2s. 8d. 
£I.I2s.I0d. 
£I.I4s. 5d. 
£I.I6s. Od. 
£I.I6s.IId. 
£I.I9s.I0d. 
£I.I6s.I0d. 
£I.I4s. 3d. 
£I.IIs. 3d. 
£I.IIs. 6d. 
£I.I3s. Od. 
£I.I5s, 3d. 
£1.15s. 3d. 
£I.IIs. 3d. 
7s. 3d. 
6 s . 2d. 
5s. 3d. 
7s. 3d. 
8s. 2d. 
8s. I d . 
8s. 8d. 
6s.I0d. 
6 s . 9d. 
5s. 3d. 
4s. 4d. 
3s. 4d. 
5s. I d . 
4s. 5d. 
4s. 2d. 
4s. 8d. 
2 s . I I d . 
I s . I O d . 
I s . 3d. 
I s . Od. 
I s . Od. 
I s . I d . 
I s . 3d. 
I s . 2d. 
I s . Od. 
I s . 2d. 
I s . 9d. 
2s. Od. 
Is . I O d . 
I s . 7d. 
I s . 7d. 
I s . I I d . 
6 s.I0d. 
6s. 5d. 
5s. Od. 
4s.I0d. 
5s. 8d. 
IOs. Od. 
7s. I d . 
6s. 6d. 
5 s . I I d . 
5s. 6d. 
5s. 3d. 
5s. 2d. 
4s. 6d. 
4s.I0d. 
5s. I d . 
5s. I d . 
5s. I d . 
4 s . 8d. 
4s.I0d. 
4 s . 7d. 
4s.I0d. 
4 s . I I d . 
5s. 8d. 
6s. 2d. 
6s. 3d. 
6s. Od. 
5s.I0d. 
6s. 3d. 
6s. I d . 
5s. 9d. 
6s. 4d. 
6s. 8d. 
3s.. 6d'-. 
4s. 3d. 
3s. 5d.: 
4s. 2d. 
4s " l i f t . 
4s. 7d. 
4s. 2d. 
4s. 2d. 
4s. 6d. 
4s.. 3d. 
2s. 2d. 
2s. 6d. 
3s. Od. 
3s. 7d. 
2 s . l i d . 
3s. 9d. 
3s. 6d. 
l i d . 
3s. 54. 
3s. 7d. 
2s;. Od; 
3s. 3d. 
3s. 2d. 
5s. 6d. 
2s. 8d. 
2s. 7d. 
2s. 4d. 
2s. 7d. 
2s. Od. 
2s. Od. 
£4. I s . I I d i * 
£4. I s . I O d . 
£3.I5s. Od. 
£3.I7s. Od. 
£4. 2s. 8d. 
£5. 6 s . 2d. 
£5. I s . 9d. 
£4.I0s.IId. 
£4. 3 s . I d . 
£3.I7s. 9d. 
£3.15s. 5d. 
£3. 4 s . 7d. 
£3. 2s. 2d. 
£3. 5s. 6d. 
£3. 7s. 2d. 
£3. 8s. 6d. 
£3. 4s. 4d. 
£2.I7s. 3d. 
£2.I5s. 9d. 
£2.I4s. Od. 
£2.I5s.IId. 
£2.I7s. Od. 
£3. 2s. 3d. 
£3. 5 s . 8d. 
£3. 4s. I d . 
£2.I7s. 9d. 
£2.I4s. 9d. 
£2.I5s. 6d. 
£2.I6s. 9d. 
£2.I8s. Od. 
£2.I8s. 9d. 
£2.I5s. 2d. 
Source: P r i v a t e Cost Books. (DCROi D / C O/97, 100, & I O l ) . 
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APPENDIX B.5. 
Iron R a i l s : Annual Average Cost per ton a t Consett . 
Year Iron Wages Stores & Coal Estimated M i s c e l l - Total Av-
Ending Materials Charges aneous Cost 
1868 £4.I8s. Sd. I 3 s . 9 d. 3s. 6 d. 3s. 6 d. 5s. 9 d. 2d. £6. 4s.I0dU 
1869 £5. Os. 6d. 13s. O d . 2s.10 d. 3s. 2£d. 3s. 4 d. 3d. £6. 3s.. l i d 
1870 £4.I6s. 5d. l i s . 1 0 d. I s . I I d. 2s. 5 d. 2s. 9 d. - £5.15s. 3d'i 
1871 £4.I9s. Od. l i s . 4£d. I s . 9£d. 2s. 4 d. 3s. 5 d. Id. £5.I8s. Od. 
1872 £5. 4 s . 9d. I 2 s . 2 d. 2s. 0 d. 2s.10 d. 2s. 8 d. 3d. £6. 4 s . 8d. 
1873 £6.I3s. Od. I 5 s . I d. 2s. I d. 5s • I d. 3s. I ^ d . Ls .2d. £7.I9s. 6d. 
1874 £6. 3 s . 9d. I 3 s . 7 d. Is.10 d. 3s. 5 d. 4s. 0 d. Ls .2d. £7. 7s. 9d. 
1875 £6. 3 s . Od. l i s . 9 d. 2s. 5 d. 3s. 0 d. 4s. 2£d. Id. £7. 4 s . 6d. 
1876 £5• 8s. 6d. IOs. 3 i d . 2s. 0 d. 2s. 9 d. 2s.10 d. Id. £6. 6s. 6d. 
Source: P r i v a t e Cost Books (DCRO: D / C0/97, 100, & I O l ) . 
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APPENDIX B.6. 
Iron Plates» Annual Average Cost per ton a t Consett. (per ton) 
Year Cost of ages Cost of Miscellaneous Total Av. 
ending Iron Coal Cost 
1868 £5. 8s. 4d. £1. 0s. Od. 5s. 2d. 1 0 s . 8 d . £7. 3s.I0d. 
1869 £5. 8s.I0d. I Q s . I I d . 5s. Od. 1 4 s . 7 d . £7. 3 s . 9d. 
1870 £4.I6s. 8d. I 9 s . 4d. 4s. I d . 6 s . 5 d . £6. 6 s . 6d. 
1871 £4.I7s. 5d. £1. 0s. 6d. 5s. Od. 8 s . 2 d . £6.lis. I d / 
1872 £5. 3 s . I I d . £1. I s . 3d. 4 s . I I d . 6 s . 5 d . £6.I6s. 6d. 
1873 £6.I2s. Od. £1. 5s. 2d. 8s. 9d. 9 s . 4 d . £8.I5s. 3d. 
1874 £6.I0s. 9d. £1. 4s. 8d. 6s. I d . 8 s . 2 d . £8. 9s. 8d. 
1875 £5.I3s. 6d. £1. Os. 2d. 4 s . I I d . 7 s . l O d . £7. 6 s . 5d. 
1876 £5* 5s• 6d. 18s. 3d. 4 s . I I d . 6 s . 5 d . £6.I5s. I d . 
1877 £4.I7s. 4d. I 7 s . 2d. 4S. 4d. I s . 9 d . £6. Os. 7d. 
1878 £4.I5s. 3d. I 6 s . 9d. 4s. 2d. 4s,. 4 d . £6. Os. 6d. 
1879 £4. 2s. 3d. I 5 s . 7d. 4s. 2d. 3s-. 3 d . £5. 5s. 3d. 
1880 £3.I8s. 6d. I 4 s . 9d. 3s. 4d. 3 s . 7 d . £5. Os. 2d. 
1881 £4. 2 s . I I d . I 4 s . 2d. 3 s . 4d. 3 s . 7 d . £5. 4s. Od. 
1882 £4. 4 s . 8d. I 4 s . I d . 3 s . 5d. 4 s . 2d. . £5. 6 s . 4d. 
1883 £4. 7s. I d . I 4 s . I 0 d . 3s. 3d. 3 s . 4 d . £5. 8s. 6d. 
1884 £4. 0 s . I d . I 4 s . I d . 3s. 5d. 5 s . I d . £5. 2s. 8d. 
1885 £3.I0s. I d . I 3 s . 2d. &s. 3d. 4 s . 3 d . £4.I0s. 9d.. 
1886 £3., 8s. 6d. I 3 s . 4d. 3s. 4d. 3 s . 4 d . £4. 8s. 6d. 
1887 £3. 6 s . 7d. I 2 s . I 0 d . $S;. 2d. 3 s . 2 d , £4. 5s. 9d. 
1888 £3. 9 s . I I d . I 2 s . I 0 d . 3s . 6d. 3 s . 6 d . £4. 9s. 9d. 
-.1889 £3.I2s. 7d. I 3 s . 8d., 3s. 4d. 3 s . 9 d . £4.I3s. 4d. 
1890 £3.I8s. 9d. I 5 s . 4d. . 3s. 9d. 2 s . l i d . £5.. Os. 9d. 
1891 £4. 3s. 5d. I 5 s . 8d* 4 s. I d . 3 s . 6 d . £5. 6 s . 8d. 
1892 £3.I7s. 5d.. I 5 s . 2d. 4s. Id.. 3 s . 9 d . £5. Os. 5d. 
1893 fi3.I2a-.IId. I 4 s . I 0 d . 3 s . I 0 d i 2 s . 7 d . £4.I4s. 2d. 
1894 £3. 9s. 5d. I 4 s . 2d. 3s. 8d. 2 s . l O d . £4.I0s. I d . 
1895 £3., 9s. 7d. I 4 s . 4d. 4s. Od. 3 s . 8 d . £4.lis. 7d. 
1896 £31.1 I s . 5d. 1485. 3d. 4s. Od. 3 s . 3 d . £4.I2s.IId.. 
1897 £3.I2s.IId. I 4 s . 4d. 3 s . I I d . 2 s . 3 d . £4.I3s. 5d. 
1898 £3.I4s. 3d. I 4 s . 4d. 4 s . 3d. 3 s . 2 d . £4..I6s. Od. 
1899 £3. 9s. 6d. I 4 s . I 0 d . 4s . 5d. 3 s . 4 d . £4.I2s. I d . 
Source: P r i v a t e Cost Books (DCROi D/CO/97, 100, & I0l)„ 
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APPENDIX B).7.(i) 
S t e e l Ingots ( E a s t & West Shop)s Annual Average Cost per ton 
Year Cost of Cost of Cost of Wages Miscellaneous Total Av. Total Av.* 
ending Pi g Iron . Iron Ore Coal Cost cost(N.Shop) 
December 
1883 £2.I7s. 6d. 4s . 7d. 4 s . I d . I 2 s . I I d . 6 s . 4d. £4. 5s. 5d. 
1884 £2. 8s. 6d. 3 s . 4d. 2s. 2d. 8s.I0d. 3 s . 6d. £3. 6 s . 5d. 
1885 £2. 5s. 4d. 3 s . I d . 2s. 3d. 7s. Od. 3 s . Od. £3. Os. 7d. 
1886 £2. 2s. 6d. 3 s . I d . 2s. I d . 5 s . 8d. I s . 8d. £2.I5s. I d . 
1887 £2. 3s. 7d. &.I0d. 2s. I d . 5s. 5d. I d . £2.I4s. 6d. 
1888 £2. 4 s . I I d . 3 s . 9d. 2s. I d . 5 s . 5d. l i d . £2.I7s. Od. 
1889 £2. 7s. 3d. 4s • 4d• 2s. 3d. 5s. 5d. £2.I8s. 9d. 
1890 £2.I0s. 2d. 3fc*IId. 2 s . 6d. 5s.I0d. IOd. £3. 2s. 8d. 
1891 £2. 6 s . 7d. 3 s . 7d. 2s.I0d. 5s • 4d •' 4 s . Od. £3. 2s. 4d. 
1892 £2. 6s. 9d. 3 s . 7d. 2s. 7d. 5s. 3d. 4s. 6d. £3. 2 s . 8d. 
1893 £2. I s . 5d. 3s . lid. 2SF. 4d. 4s.IOd. 3 s . I I d . £2.I5s. 7d. £2.I5s. Od. 
1894 £2. 0s. 7d. 3 s . Od. 2s. 4d. 4 s . 8d. 3s. 8d. £2.I4s. 4d. £2 , I 3 s . 4d. 
1895 £I.I9s. I d . 2 s . I I d . 2s. 4d. 4s . 7d. 3s. 5d. £2.I2s. 3 d. £2.I3s. 2d. 
1896 £I.I9s. 7d. 3 s . I d . 2s. I d . • :4s. 7 d. 3a. Od. £2.I2s. 5d. £2.I2s. 6d. 
1897 £2. 2s. 6d. 2s. 8d. 2s. 2d. 4 s . 8d. 3 s . 5d. £2.I5s. 6d. £2.I5s. 4d. 
1898 £2. 3 s . 5d. 2s.I0d. 2s. 26.. 4s.I0d. 3 s . 4d. £2.I6s. 6d. £2.168. 6d. 
1899 £2. 7s. 2d. 3 s . 7d. 2s. 7d. 5s . 6d. 3s. 4d. £3. 2 s . 2d. £3. O s . I I d . 
1900 £2.I7s. 3d. 3s . 4d. 3s. 5d. 6s. 4d. 3s. 7d. £3.I4s. Od. £3.I2s. 6d. 
1901 £2.I2s. I d . 3 s . 5d. 3s. 9d. 5B. 7d. 4 s . 8d. £3. 9s. 6d. £3. 8s. 2d. 
1902 £2. 7s.. 5d. 3s . Od. 3 s . 5d. 5s. 5d. 4s. 3d. £3. 3 s . 6d. £3. 2s.IOd. 
1903 £2. 7s. 2d. 2s.I0d . 3 s . 3d. 5s. 2d. 3s. 6d. £3. 2 s . Od. £3. I s . 5d. 
1904 £2. 6s. IOd. 3 s . 0d.. 3s. 7d. 5s. 0d. 3s. 8d. £3. I s . 7d. £3. Os.IOd. 
1905 £2.I0s. 2d. 3 s . I d . 3 s . Od. 5s. Od. 3 s . 8d. £3. 5 s . Od. £3. 4 s . 8d. 
1906 £2.I5s. 6d. 3 s . 4d. 3 s . 7d. 5s. 2d. 3 s . Od. £3.I0s. I d . £3.lis. Od. 
1907 £2.I9s. 2d. 3 s . 4d. 3s. 4d. 5s.I0d. 4 s . Od. £3.I5s. 7d. £3.I4s. 9d. 
1908 £2.I3s. 4d. 3 s . 2d. 3 s . I I d . 6 s . 7d. 6s. Od. £3.I3s. Od. £3. 9s. 6d. 
1909 £2. 9s. 7d. 3s . 5d. 3s. 6d. 5s . 6d. 4 s . 5d. £3 • 6s . 5d. £3. 5s. 4d. 
1910 £2. I s . 5d. 3 s . 7d. 3 s . 4d. 5s . 5d. I 4 s . Od. £3. 7s. 8d. £3. 7s. 7d. 
I 9 I I £1.I8s. 2d. 3s. 7d. 3s. 7d. 5s. 7d. I 8 s . 4d. £3. 8s.IOd. £3. 6s. 9d. 
1912 £2. 0s. 3d. 3 s . Od. 3s. 4d. 5s. 7d. I 3 s . I 0 d . £3. 6 s . Od. £3.I0s. Od., 
1913 £2. 3s. 8d. 4s. Od. 3 s . 8d. 5s .IOd. I 4 s . 2d. £3. l i s . 5d. £3.I5s. 9d. 
1914 £2. 0 s . 7d. 3s . 4d. 4s. 2d. 6s . 2d. I 9 s . 2d. £3.I3s.IId. 
* Tear ending June. 
Sources P r i v a t e Cost Books (DCRO* D/CO/97, 100*:&10l), 
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APPENDIX B . 7 ; ( i i ) 
S t e e l Ingots: Annual Average CostB per ton a t 
B r i t a n n i a Steelworks. I906-I9I3 
Year Cost of Cost of Wages Miscellaneous Total Av. 
Iron Coal Cost 
1906 £2.I0s. 2d. 3 s . I I d . 4 s . 6d. 12s. 6d. £3.lis. I d . 
1907 £2.I4s. Od. 4s . 9d. 4s.I0d. 13s. 4d. £3.I6s.IId. 
1908 £2.I0s.IId. 4 s . 8d. 5s. I d . 13s. 7d. £3'.I4s. 3d. 
1909 £2. 8s. 2d. 3 s . l i d . 4 s . l 0 d . 12s. 9d. £3. $s. 8d .i 
1910 £2.lis. 9d. 4s. 7d. 4s. 5d. lJs.lOd. £3.I4s. 74. 
I 9 I I £2.lis. 8d. 4s. I d . 4s. 6d. 14s. 4d. £3.I4s. 7d. 
1912 £2.I2s. 4dt. 4s. 8d. 4s. 9d. 14s.. 8d. £3.16 s;. 5d. 
1913 £3. 3s. 4d. 5s. 9d. 4 s . I I d . 16s. Id. £4.I0s. I d . 
Source: The Dorman Long M.SS. 
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APPENDIX B.8. 
S t e e l P l a t e s : Annual Average Costs per ton 
Year Cost of Cost of Wages: Miscellaneous Total Av. 
ending Slabs & Ingots Coal Cost 
1884 £5.I0s. I d . 3s. 5d. I 4 s . I d . 5 s . Od. £6.I2s. 7d. 
1885 £4. 7s. 5d. 2 s . I I d . I 2 s . 5d. 3 s . I d . £51. 5s.I0d.. 
1886 £3.I4s. 6d. 2s. 3d. l i s . 2d. 4 s . 2d. £4.I2s. I d . 
1887 £3. 3 s . 4d. Is . I O d . 9s. I d . 3 s . 5d. £3.I7s. 7d. 
1888 £3. 9s. Od. I s . I I d . 8s. 2d. 4s. I 0 d . £4. 3 s . I I d . 
1889 £3. 9s. 8d. Is . I O d . ' 8s. 3d.. 4 s . 2d. £4. 4 s . Od. 
1890 £3.I4s.IId. I s . I I d . 8s.I0d. 4 s . I d . £4. 9s. 8d« 
1891 £3.I6s. 2d. 2s. Od. 9s. Od. 3s.I0d. £ 4.Us. 0d» 
1892 £3.I4s. 4d. 2s. I d . ,. 8e. 7«i . 3 s . I 0 d . £4. 8s.I0d. 
1893 £3. 9s. I d . 2s. Od. 8s. 7d. 3 s . I I d . £4. 3s. 7d. 
1894 £3. 6 s . 4d. 2s. Od. 8s. 6d. 3 s . 7d. £4. Os. 5d. 
1895 £3. 3s . I 0 d . 2s. I d . 9s. Od. 3 s . 8d. £3.I8s. 7d. 
1896 £3.i:0s.IId. I s . I I d . 8 s. 7d. 2s. Id.. £3.I3s. 6d. 
1897 £3. 3 s . I d . I s . I I d . 9s. I d . 2s. 5d. £3.I6s. 6d. 
1898 £3. 4 s . 8d. 2s. I d . 9s. I d . 2s. 9d. £3;.I8s. 7d. 
1899 £3. 6 s . 6d. 2s. I d . 9s. 5d. 4 s . Od. £4. 2s. Od. 
1900 £3.I8s. 4d. 2s. 5d. IOs. 4d. 3 s . 2d. £4.I4s. 2d. 
1901 £4.lis. 7d. 2s.I0d. I O s . I I d . 3 s . 5d. £5. 8s. 8d. 
1902 £4. I s . 5d. 2s. 7d. 9 s . I I d . 3 s . 2d. £4.I7s. I d . 
1903 £3.I7s. I d . 2s. 6d. 9s. 5d. 2s. I I d . £4.IIs.IId* 
1904 £3.I7s.IId. 2s. 4d. 9s. I d . I s . 8d. £4.lis. Od., 
1905 £3.I7s. 7d. 2s. 4d. 9s. I d . 2s. 7d. £4.lis. 7d. 
1906 £4. I s . 4d. 2s. 2d. 9s. 2d. 2s. 7d. £4.I5s. 4d. 
1907 £4. 8s. 5d. 2s. 4d. 9 s . I I d . 2 s . 8d. £5. 3 s . 4d. 
1908 £4.I6s. 7d. 3s. Od. l i s . 2d. 4 s . 6d. £5.I5s. 4d. 
1909 £4. 5 s . 2d. 3s. 2d. I O s . I I d . 3 s . 2d. £5. 2s. 6d. 
1910 £4. 4s. 3d. 2s.I0d. IOs. 5d. 3&. 6d. £5. I s . Od. 
I 9 I I £4. 4 s . I I d . 2s. 6d. IOs.IOd. 3 s . I d . £5. I s . 4d. 
1912 £4. 3 s . Od. 2s. 5d. l i s . Od. 3s.I0d. £5. I s . 2d. 
1913 £4. 7s. I d . 2s.I0d. l i s . I d . 4 s . 6d. £5.. 5s. 6d. 
1914 £4. I3B. 8d. 3s. I d . I 2 s . I d . 5s. 6d. £5.I4s. 5d. 
Source: Private Cost Books (DCttOi D/CO/97, 100, & I O l ) , 
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APPENDIX B.9. 
Average Cost per ton of S t e e l Angles, I893-I9I3 
Year Slabs Wages; Coal Miscellaneous Total 
ending Scrap, Stores 
&c. 
Cost 
. 1893 £3. 9s. 6d. 9 s . I I d . 3 s . Od. £4- 6s. 9d. 
1894 £3 • 6s. Od. 7s.I0d. 2s. I d . 5 s . 5d. £3.18s. 4d. 
1895 £3. 4s. 2d. 8s. I d . 2s. 8d. 4s.I0d. £3.I5s,.I0d. 
1896 £3 • 3s• I d . 7s. 3d. 2s. 4d. 2 s . I I d . £3.I2s. Od. 
1897 £3. 4s . I 0 d . 7s. 2d. 2s. m. 3 s . 2d. £3.I3s. 6d. 
1898 £3 • 6s. 8d. 6s.I0d. 2s. 4d. 2 s . 6d. £3.I3s. 9d. 
1899 £3.I0s. 2d. 6 s . 5d. 2s. 2d. 2s. 6d» £3.I5s ., 8d. 
1900 £4. I s . 9d. 7s. 2d. 2s. 5d. 2s. 7d. £4. 5s. 9d. 
1901 £4.I2s. 2d. 7s. 9d. 2 s . I I d . 2s.IId.. £4.I8s. I d . 
1902 £4. 0s. 4d. 7s. 3d. 2s.I0d. 3 s . Od. £4. 7s. 8d» 
1903 £3.I5s.IId. 7s. 3d. 2s. 9d., 3 s . Od. £4. 3s. 6d. 
1904 £3.I6s. 4d. 7s. 6d. 2s. 9d. 2s.I0d. £4. 3 s . 6d. 
1905 £3.I6s. 9d. 7s. 3d. 2s. 8d. 2s. 6d. £4. 4 s . I d . 
1906 £4. 4s. Od. 7s. Od. 2s.. 7d. 3 s . Od. £4.I0s?. 6d. 
1907 £4.I3s. 4d. 7s. 8d. 2s. 9d. 3 s . I d . £5. Os. Od. 
1908 £4.I6s. 3d. 9s. 2d. 3 s . 4d. 3s. 4d. £5. 4 s . 9d. 
1909 £3.I9s.I0d. 9s. Od. 3 s . 7d. 3s. 4d. £4.I3s. 4d» 
1910 £4. 7s. 2d. 8s. I d . 3 s . 3d. 2s. 2d. £4.12s.IId. 
I 9 I I £4.I0s.I0d. 8s.I0d. 3 s . I d . 2 s . I I d . £4.I6s. 5d. 
1912 £4. 4 s . 4d. 8s. 3d. 2s.I0d. 3 s . 2d. £4.lis. Od. 
1913 . £4.I2s. 8d. 8s. 6d. 3 s . 3d. 4 s . 2d. £5. Os. 9d. 
Source: P r i v a t e Cost Books (DCRO: D/CO/97, 100, & I O l ) . 
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APPENDIX C . I . 
Annual Summary of Production f o r the Consett Iron Company» I865-1914 
Year Coal Coke Pig Puddled^ Iron I r o n S t e e l S t e e l S t e e l 
ending ; Raised Produced I r o n Bars P l a t e si Basils'* . Ingats; Plates; Angles 
1865 354,499 132 ,158 86,804 47,651 17,898 13,8933 
1866 394,009 144 ,294 92,068 48,595 18,318 18,901 
1867 £421,912 139 ,722 62,203 41,113 18,599 11,782 
1868 492,227 179 ,362 78,129 59,774 30,335 14,502 
1869 4496,407 189 ,415 67,690 58,832 25,367 21,179 
1870 495,843 191 ,051 87,493 74,404 27,636 30 ,.152 
1871 522,589 206 ,987 100), 122 86,910 33,669 32,027 
1872 524,664 202 ,815 106,884 90,025 40,838 24,689 
1873 620,433 200 ,661 115,445 99,413; 46,721 25,836 
1874 667,416 243 ,078 124,790 105,896 50,368 29,321 
1875 704,708 229 ,957 124,573 113,815 53,488 28,684 
1876 706,034 289 ,327 108,773 98,218 47,251 17,708 
1877 760,612 344, ,575 103,717 77,046 56,668 2,479 
1878 713,343 318, ,916 102,290 13,743 56,237 
1879 715,062 322 ,942 104,809 75,330 57,493 
1880 851,538 365, ,533 144,221 92,133 69,,576 
1881 1,061,388 481, ,355 190,568 111,381 86,020 
1882 1,056,265 492, ,237 181,906 105,744 83,209 
1883 1,054,655 489, ,071 209,827 110,384 81,933 393 
1884 958,318 458, ,078 172,349 83,364 69,175 9,454 5,544 
1885 850,462 413, ,899 163,785 71,024 58,776 21,0)88 12,914 
1886 834,318 401, ,956 162,761 48,978 42,360 43,841 26,934 
1887 834,598 412, ,810 167,466 40,427 34,442 58,214 40,184 
1888 847,351 394, ,975 160,606 32,648 26,148 103,927 66,951 
1889 900,821 408, ,256 193,455 34,740 20,707 154,273 107,161 
1890 1,033,534 472, ,224 209,033 35,481 20,515 161,410 112,136 
1891 1,100,545 470, ,234 202,856 33,628 21,412 173,690 119,515 
1892 823,002 320, 258 142,478 16,417 14,770 176,487 118:', 146 
1893 985,422 374, ,230 171,197 15,641 12,957 179,634 109,250 7,037 
1894 1,137,143 404, 536 192,119 16,152 12,366 218,864 111,583 46,391 
1895 1,147,851 438, 740 230,648 14,752 11,498 215,007 109,925 45,836 
1896 1,185,817 446, 131 212,660 16,594 11,859 238,486 119,353 55,000 
1897 1,282,247 501, ,980 261,464 21,606 16,152 266,242 122,081 67,987 
1898 1,394,486 509, ,493 254,921 21,328 15,636 253,180 122,711 75,237 
1899 1,484,991 539, ,993 258,730 4,103 3,220 277,410 123,841 83,847 
1900 1,520,114 613, ,108 241,919 268,670 121,185 76,484 
1901 1,462,752 524, ,326 236,566 258,545 117,242 69,004 
1902 1,400,662 452, ,150 206,090 248,239 113,451 59,123 
1903 1.500,506 489, 715 223,601 253,829 121,911 72,934 
1904 1,600,590 491, 837 2354,524 300,470 142,362 72,688 
1905 1,668,198 501, 042 241,456 297,511 140,583 76,833 
1906 1,819,120 540, 228 242,932 310,216 144,720 88$00I 
1907 2,053,438 570, 084 245,306 302,564; 141,374 89,106 
1908 2,052,393 536, 490 222,522 255,504 113,227 64,933 
1909 2,241,563 464, 508 177,520 223,811 99,715 55,321 
1910 2,316,145 598, .329 256,105 296,604 126,398 80,437 
1911 2,341,216 567, 871 266,326 300,839 127,466 74,002 
1912 2,118,642 464, 959 235,080 295,061 125,561 86,687 
1913 2,348,839 555, 198 271,508 314,091 138,078 91,149 
1914 2,171,505 469, ,296 231,258 1 269,112 118,053 64,098 
Source* I8 6 5 - I 8 7 I a P r o f i t & Loss Accounts. (DCROs D/C0/89) o 
1872-1939 - P r i v a t e Cost Books (DCItO* D/CO/97, 100, 101,102,103). 
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APPENDIX D.I. 
Number of Men Employedl a t Consett's C o l l i e r i e s I 896-I9I4 
Year Langley 
• Park 
G a r s f i e l d Chopwell Westwood Consett 
(6 Pits:) 
Total 
1896 519 586 541 I878;: 3524 
1897 520 540 222 549 2006 3837 
1898 553 584 219 585 2088 4029 
1899 639 549 336 598 2062 4184 
1900 650 578 405 610 2107 4350 
1901 688 593 527 169 2211 4188 
1902 783 592 674 28 2228 4305 
1903 909 617 757 33 2219 4535 
1904 1045 700 899 29 2270 4943 
1905 1104 780 1238 40 2339 5501 
1906 1084 904 1392 451 2359 6190 
1907 1056 937 1513 594 2416) .6516 
1908 1172 1070 1745 631 2498 7116 
1909 1326 1226 2075 721 2607 7955 8188 
8030 1910 1320 1199 2243 767 2659 I 9 I I 1378 1183 2344 775 2350 
1912 1400 1142 2176 809 2532 8059 
1913 1332 1013 2296 838 2435 7914 
1914 1299 964 2295 612? 2195 7370 
Sources N.C.B. S t a t i s t i c a l Returns (DCRO) 
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APPENDIX D.2. 
Wage Adjustments i n the Durham Coal Trade. 1872-1906 
Date a t which the % % Date a t which the % % Adjustment Advance Reduction Adjustment Advance Reduction 
took e f f e c t took e f f e c t 
February 1872 20 March 1893 5 
J u l y 1872 15 October 1893 5 
February 1873 15 May 1895 
A p r i l 1874 10 October 1895 24 
November 1874 9 August 1897 2i 
A p r i l 1875 5 May 1898. 2* 
February 1876 7 October 1898 2*. September1876 6 April1899 2i 
A p r i l 1877 T i J u l y 1899 2* 
May 1879 8* November 1899 34 J u l y 1879 
2* I i 
February 1900 5 
December 1880 May 1900 
A p r i l 1882 34 August 1900 10 
August 1882 I i November 1900 10 
May 1885 I i February 1901 I i 
May 1886 
1 } 
I i May 1901 n i February 1888 August I 9 0 I 
May 1888 I i November 1901 5 
August 1888 I i February 1902 I i November 1888 I * Hay 1902 2£ 
February 1889 I i August 1902 2* 
August 1889 10 February 1903 I i December 1889 10 May 1903 I i March 1890 5 August 1903 I i December 1890 5 February 1904 I i 
June 1892 10 May 1904 a* November 1904 I i 
February 1906 I i • 
August 1906 2i 
November 1906 I i 
Source t I872-1906, John Wilson, "A History of the Durham Miners" 
Assoc i a t i o n 1870-1904',' Appendix I I PP. 356-357. 
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APPENDIX F. 
Copy of a l e t t e r to S i r Edward Grey, Bart, r e: Ouenza Mines DIR.MIN. 
January 16th 1914. p.l72,D/C0/43. 
" S i r , 
Well s h a l l be much obliged i f you can see your way to give us some 
assistance i n P a r i s i n the matter of the deposits of Hematite Iron Ore 
situated at Ouenza i n Algeria. 
A statement of the history of the findings and subsequent action taken 
by us, i n conjunction with others, of these deposits i s enclosed. 
We fear that the s i t u a t i o n i s now getting beyong our control and that 
unless some pressure can be brought to bear i n the most i n f l u e n t i a l quarters 
i n P a r i s , t h i s valuable deposit w i l l be l o s t to the B r i t i s h S t e e l Trade. 
We should l i k e to point out that the Consett Iron Company i s e n t i r e l y 
dependent upon foreign ores to supply i t s steelworks. I n the year I872, 
t h i s company went into partnership with three other firms (important iron-
making firms) to form the Orconera Iron Ore Company, which has since worked 
very large deposits of iron ore, near Bilbao, i n Spain. The Orconera Company, 
anticipating the exhaustion of these deposits, acquired additional and somewhat 
extensive deposits i n the neighbourhood of Santander, but these also are 
within measurable distance of being worked out. With a view to replacing 
these resources Consett Company took a large i n t e r e s t i n the Dunderland Iron 
Ore Company formed to work deposits i n Norway, but so f a r has hot been 
successful. 
We are receiving from B r e i r a i n Algeria, and supplied a great part of 
the money required for opening up these mines. 
We mention th i s to show what effo r t s have been necessary i n the past to 
keep ourselves supplied with ore, and what a serious thing i t w i l l be to be 
deprived of our share of these deposits at Ouenza. These deposits, 
which were looked at askance by French Works a dozen years ago, are now 
recognised by them as valuable. This recognition of the value of the 
deposits would appear to have had some connection with the ef f o r t s that 
have more recently been made to deprive the foreign firms of t h e i r i n i t i a l 
i n t e r e s t , and to favour the French S t e e l makers. 
We are told by the two German firms concerned (Gewerk Schaft Deutscher 
Kaiser, Hamborn and the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks Aktiengesellschaft, 
Hochofen, Gelsenkirchen) i n the Ouenza scheme, that the German Government 
are moving i n P a r i s to protect the i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r traders, and we venture 
to hope that our Foreign Office may be able to use i t s influence on our 
behalf. 
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The plan we have always worked on i s to secure ourselves a cer t a i n 
proportion of the ore produced by any mine i n which we have an'interest at 
a figure below the market price, i n the case of the Ouenza, the 
arrangement was that we should receive 120,000 tons of ore per annum at 1 franc 
per ton f.o.b. above the cost price, and th i s i t was estimated would be 
about 5 francs per ton below the average p r i c e . Since 1901 the value of 
Hematite has been enhanced. You w i l l therefore see what a serious thing i t 
i s f o r the Consett Iron Company to be deprived of t h i s . 
We think that the French Government, i n view of the fa c t that we 
•are prepared to and i n f a c t did take up this scheme years ago before 
the value of these deposits was f u l l y recognised, should see that our 
share of the ore i s reserved for us on favourable terms. I t has not been 
our f a u l t that the Railway has not been b u i l t . The Government of Algeria 
reported very much i n our favour, and the Commission appointed by the 
French Government also reported to the small e f f e c t - the delay has been 
caused by the French Parliament i t s e l f . 
The statementenclosed has been made up i n a condensed form. Should, 
however, there be any points on which more information i s required we 
s h a l l be glad to give i t . " 
Geo. Ainsworth. 
Copy of l e t t e r from the Foreign Office 
2nd January 1914* 
Gentlemen, 
With reference to your l e t t e r of the 22nd ultimo, respecting c e r t a i n 
mines i n Algeria, I am directed by the Secretary S i r E. Grey to inform you 
that the case has been referred to His Majesty's Ambassador a t Paris for such 
action as he may consider advisable to take i n the matter. 
A. Law. 
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APPENDIX G. 1. 
An Estimation of the Change i n the Real Cost of Manufacture at Consett. 
The change i n the r e a l cost of manufacture i s the index of accounted money 
cost adjusted for the factor of i n f l a t i o n by some suitable price index. The 
precise method used for t h i s exercise i s continued i n an Appendix. 
I f the r e a l cost of manufacturing a product remained constant over time 
then there would be no addition to or substraction from t o t a l productivity. 
Since productivity changes are a function of an educational process and 
changing technology - they are an indicator of the performance of management, 
though nothing i s assumed about the constraints within which management 
operates. 
Declining r e a l costs are therefore indicative of an increasingly s k i l l e d 
labour force and / or a changing technical input. The following tables show 
the movement of r e a l costs for the Consett Iron Company i n f i v e of i t s 
iron and steelmaking departments. 
TABLE G.l. 
The Real Cost Index of Producing Pig Iron, 1870-1913. 
Year Real Cost Year Real Cost Year Real Cost 
1870 
1871 
1872 
1873 
1874 
1875 
1876 
1877 
1878 
1879 
1880 
1881 
1882 
1883 
1884 
100.0 
102.55 
97.37 
101.64 
106.36 
110.53 
104.06 
107.48 
102.78 
99.42 
94.08 
94.41 
93.17 
93.26 
92.10 
1885 
1886 
1887 
1888 
1889 
1890 
1891 
1892 
1893 
1894 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
92.02 
92.94 
93.37 
91.40 
88.65 
88.47 
91.03 
89.71 
89.08 
86.92 
85-56 
84.15 
82.81 
82.75 
82.38 
1900 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
85.37 
90.09 
87.64 
85.66 
86.86 
86.11 
88.52 
87.93 
89.20 
89.19 
86.54 
86.70 
85.65 
87.O6 
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Tablet Heal Cost Index of Producing S t e e l Ingots 
( E a s t & West shops) I883-I9I3i 
Year- Real Cost Year Real Cost Year Real C o s t 
1883 97.77 1694 80.70- 1905 76.26 
1884 90.12 1895 79.69 1906 76.87 
1885 88.64 1896 79.36 1907 76.24 
1886 88 ..99 1897 78.48 1908 76.41 
1887 90.80 1898 76.78 1909 76.14! 
1888 88.39 1899 77.38 1910 96.39 
1889 89.06 1900 76.51 I 9 I I 119.76 
1890 86.29 1901 75.09 1912 95*92 
1891 80.57 1902 75.82 1913; 93.22 
1892 81.98 I903J 74.92 
1893 81.13 1904 79.66 
Tablet Real Cost Index of Producing S t e e l Ingots 
(North shop) I893-I9I3; 
Year Real Cost Year Real Cost Year Real Cost 
1893 100.0 1900 99.47 1907. 96.28 
1894 98.51 1901 95.25. 1908 93.52 
1895 101.01 1902 96.52 1909 96.031 
1896 100.39 1903 95.93 1910 96.21 
1897 98.67 1904 95.24 I 9 I I 96.14! 
1898 98.55 1905 96.31 1912 99.89 
1899 100.II 1906 96.44 19133 99.58 
Table: Real Cost Index of Producing S t e e l Angles 
I894-I9I& 
Year Real Cost Year Real C o s t Year- Real Cost 
1894 100.0 1901 98.29 1908 101.72 
1895 101.30 1902 98.07 1909 101.46 
1896 97.91 1903 98.01 1910 99.88 
1897 98.43 1904 98.82 I 9 I I 100.30 
1898 97.59 1905 98.75 1912 98.81 
1899 97.56 1906 97.71 1913) 99.69 
1900 97.43 1907 98.54 
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Table: Real Cost Index of Producing S t e e l P l a t e s , I894-I9I3 
Year Real Cost Year Real Cost Year Real Cost 
1884 100.0 1894 89.06 1904 91.25 
1885 95.67 1895 88.40 19055 89.96 
1886 94.15 1896 84.80 1906 89.28 
1887 88.24 1897 85.58 1907 90.51 
1888 90.65 1898 85.21 1908 94.07 
1889 89.65 1899 83.63 1909 92.74 
1890 89.11 1900 83.28 1910 92.26 
1891 88.58 1901 89.36 I 9 I I 91.18 
1892 87.70 1902 91.10 1912 91.91 
1893 88.44 1903 90.12 1913 90.99 
I n addition a measures was made of the change i n t o t a l p r o d u c t i v i t y 
i n the manufacture of pig i r o n , using the method derived by D.N. 
M°Closkey(l). The measures used by M Closkey f o r s t e e l ingots and s h i p * 
p l a t e s proved unsuitable, since h i s assumption of p e r f e c t competition 
i s soundly i n v a l i d a t e d by the formation of the Plate and Angle Makers 
A s s o c i a t i o n af tear. 1904.(2). I n addition to the annual change an index 
of p r o d u c t i v i t y growth has been derived. 
Table: P r o d u c t i v i t y Change and Growth i n the Production of Pig I r o n , 
I872-I9I0 
Year Change fln d e x ^ f Year Change ^ t h 0 f Year Change dex.of rov/th 
I 8 7 I / 2 
1872/3 
1873/4 
1874/5 
1875/6 
1876/7 
1877/8 
1878/9 
1879/80 
I880/I 
I 8 8 I / 2 
1882/3 
1883/4 
0.00 
0.12 
-0.19 
-6.64 
7.64 
-1.68 
O.II 
3.47 
7.50 
-0.52 
0.75 
1.23 
M>.I4 
104.9 
105.1 
104.4 
97.9 
105.4 
103.6 
103.7 
107.3 
115.4 
114.8 
115.6 
117.1 
116.9 
1884/5 
1885/6 
1886/7 
1887/8 
1888/9 
1889/90 
I890/I 
I891/2 
1892/3 
1893/4 
1894/5 
1895/6 
1896/7 
0.62 
-0.52 
-0.36 
-0.83 
4.18 
0.06 
-0.10 
6.64 
3.87 
1.33 
1.93 
-0.34 
6.23 
I I 7 . 6 
I I 7 . 0 
116.6 
115.6 
120.4 
120.5 
120.4 
128.4 
133.3-
135.1 
137.7 
137.3 
145.8 
1897/8 
1898/9 
1899/190CJ-3 
1900/I 
I 9 0 l / 2 
1902/3 
1903/4 
1904/5 
1905/6 
1906/7 
1907/8 
1908/9 
1909/10 
-0..WM 
-4.18 
.39 
-1.61 
1.91 
2.64 
-5.63 
2.75 
-1.73 
1.23 
-0.79 
-0.55 
7.07 
145.7 
139.6 
134.8 
132.7 
135.2 
138.8 
131..0 
134.6 
132.3 
133.9 
132.8 
132.1 
141.4 
^T>.N. MtCloskey, "Productivity Change, in fcritisK Vi$ Iron, 1870. 
Quarterly Journal ef Economics, 1-50001 (#6$) . pp.2€1-2?6. 
(2) U.ti. McQoskey, "Econowc. Mafcur/fcy Entrepreneurial "Decline: The 
British Iron and Steel Industry" ( Harvard University, flK.D. IW15, 197C) 
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P a r a d o x i c a l l y the r e a l cost rose during the e a r l y 1870's a f t e r the: 
programme of re c o n s t r u c t i o n . This i s i n part due to the l i m i t a t i o n s of 
the wage index used to d e f l a t e costs and a l s o to the changes i n the types 
of pig i r o n produced. I n 1875 the make of Cleveland and Hematite pig 
i r o n rose to 70% of the t o t a l make as opposed to a nonn of between 45-55 
per cent i n previous and subsequent y e a r s . This created the n e c e s s i t y 
to use more low grade iron ore and the input of ore rose from 42-79 cwts 
i n 1873-74 to 45.53 i n 1874-5, approximately a 6 per cent i n c r e a s e ( 3 ) 
After t h i s apparent aberation i n the e a r l y and mid-seventies there 
i s a market downward trend between I877-1881 and t h i s can be accounted 
for by the decrease i n the consumption of coke. 
Table: Consumption of coke per ton of P i g i r o n i n the l a s t s i x months 
of the year, I872-1899 
Year Coke Year Coke Year Coke Year Coke 
Consumption Consumption Consumption Consumption 
1872 22.39 1879 23.18 1886 24.38 1893 19.52 
1873 23.25 1880 23.83 1887 23.62 1894 19.77 
1874 24.33 1881 22.85 1888 22.68 1895 20.02 
1875 23.52 1882 22.72 1889 22.88 1896 19.65 
1876 26.79 1883 22.51 1890 23 ..58 1897 19.90 
1877 25.76 1884 23.73 1891 22.49 1898 20.49 
1879 24.43 1885 25.38 1892 20.94 1899 22.13 
Source! P r i v a t e Cost Book, I868-1905. (DCR0: D/CO/97). 
The improvement was achieved by i n c r e a s i n g the power of the blowing 
engines i n the l a t e 1870's, thus ensuring a more e f f e c t i v e b l u s t through 
the whole of the burden i n the furnace. The f i g u r e s were^also given a 
boost by the completion of a new furnace i n 1880. 
The l e v e l of r e a l cost remained f a i r l y stable through the 1880's 
but began to f a l l again i n 1888-9, po s s i b l y as a consequence of three 
furnaces being blown i n a f t e r r e l i n n i n g and one furnace being blown out 
a f t e r ten years i n b l a s t , (see Diagram I E ) . Another f a c t o r was also.I the; 
improvement of the Whitwell s t o r e s , through t h i s was probably not 
s i g n i f i c a n t f o r i n 1891 Jenkins began s e r i o u s l y to contemplate the r e p l a c e -
ment of Whitwell stores by Cowper s t o r e s . ( 4 ) . The gradual 
( 3 ) . P r i v a t e Cost Book, 1868-1905. (DCR0: D/CO/97) 
(4-)-. See Section i l l , I886-I894S The Zenith of Consett's Enterprise, p.2l6. 
- 387 -
The c l e a r e s t feature i n a l l the s e r i e s i s the dec e l e r a t i o n or even 
re t a r d a t i o n i n the downward movements i n r e a l costs a f t e r the turn of the 
century. This i s confirmation of the trend described i n the preceding 
s e c t i o n s , and adds strengh to the suspicion t h a t it'-was; the Edwardian 
decade during which the B r i t i s h s t e e l industry r e a l l y began to lose i t s 
competitive edge. 
The succeeding sections are to be devoted to the a n a l y s i s of the? 
movements, i n an attempt to i s o l a t e the innovations which made the 
contributions to the d e c l i n i n g r e a l c o s t s , and a l s o to attempt to explain 
more p a r t i c u l a r l y why r e a l costs ceased to move downwards a f t e r 1900. 
Innovation and Pr o d u c t i v i t y i n P i g Iro n Production. 
Diagram I below shows the movements of r e a l costs of pig i r o n , the inverse 
of which would be r e f l e c t e d i n the advances i n p r o d u c t i v i t y . 
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adoption of these new stoves a f t e r 1891 l e d to an unbroken downward 
movement i n r e a l costs u n t i l 1899. Then i n 1900 there was a sharp 
r e v e r s a l and the condition of the furnaces deteriorated through the whole 
of the Edwardian decade. The p r i n c i p l e cause of t h i s was the high average 
age of the b l a s t furnaces i n 1900 when a l l were i n b l a s t a t the same time 
(see Diagram G.I ( i i ) ) • The average age was marginally above 7 years 
a t the end of 1900 and as the normal l i f e of a furnace was 8-10 years, a l l 
were a t the wrong end of the age'scale to produce t h e i r best productive 
performances. The s l i g h t improvement a f t e r 1910 was probably due to the 
blowing i n of the new l a r g e r No.85 furnace and the generally lower average 
age of the furnaces. 
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On the whole Consett compares favourably with the movements i n productivity 
nationwide, because the downward trend i n r e a l costs is. maintained through u n t i l 
1899 whereas for the nation as a whole the downward trend halted at the end of the 
1880's. (5) A more di r e c t comparison of productivity for Consett and the 
national average was the coke productivity Index used by McClosky - Consett maintained 
a lower consumption of coke per ton of pig iro n than was the national average 
throughout the whole period. (6) 
Consett's better than average performance i n pig iro n production was 
probably due to the f a c t that the Company was at a competitive disadvantage i n 
thid department of production, when compared with the Teesside Ironworks. 
Productivity and Innovation i n S t e e l Ingots 
I n the production of s t e e l ingots the two main causes of productivity 
growth were the increasing s i z e of the furnaces which resulted i n greater 
economies of f u e l and i n extending the length of 'campaign' each 
furnace could endure. 
The p r i n c i p a l economy i n melting pig iron and scrap i n a Siemens or open 
hearth furnace was gained by reducing the amounts of l o s s of heat by radiation. 
As the s i z e of the furnace was increased the consumption of f u e l decreased. 
I n good practice a.. 10 - 12 ton furnace would use 10 - 12 cwts of f u e l whilst 
a 60 ton furnace would use about 5 cwts of coal per ton of product.(7) 
Before 1894 the melting furnaces i n the West Shop were a l l raised to 20 tons 
capacity; s i x had o r i g i n a l l y been 17 tons, and two only 13 tons. Also i n 1887 
nine new furnaces were added by building the East Shop, and these had a capacity 
of 25 tons, thus having a b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t on the o v e r a l l productivity of the plant. 
(See Diagram G.I. ( i i i ) ) . 
Prom I894 improvements to the melting furnaces are not w e l l documented i n 
the records, but by 1913 the capacity of each furnace 
(5) D.N. McCloskey, "Productivity Change ," Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
LXXXII (1968) pp. 283-4. 
(6) D.N. McCloskey, Economic Maturity p.86., Chart I . 
(7) H.J. Skelton, op.cit.,p.232. 
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had been Raised to 35 tons from the estimation of the r e a l cost;of producing 
s t e e l ingots i t would appear that these extensions to capacity were c a r r i e d 
out i n the decade before 1903. The sharp r i s e i n the r e a l c o s t i n 1910, 
and then even more markedly i n I 9 I I was due to the i n c r e a s i n g use of scrap 
metal instead of pig i r o n . The reasons f o r t h i s we d i f f i c u l t to a s c e r t a i n 
but i t may have been caused by inadequate capacity a t the b l a s t furnaces, 
and thus a temporary shortage of pig i r o n . I t was therfore necessary to 
s u b s t i t u t e the more c o s t l y scrap. 
Though the capacity of the North Shop was doubled between 1894 and 1913 
without any addition to the number of melting furnaces, there was not any 
spectacular decrease i n r e a l c ost, and they were almost as high i n 1913 as 
they had been i n 1894. 
The second way of i n c r e a s i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y , was to extend the l i f e of 
the furnace before i t required r e l i n i n g . This can be a s c e r t a i n e d from the 
f a l l i n g costs a l l o c a t e d to g a n i s t e r , the s i l i c a material with which the 
furnaces were l i n e d , and cement. The s l i g h t r i s e i n cost a f t e r 1899 can be 
a t t r i b u t e d to the general p r i c e r i s e of these years, which would have 
a f f e c t e d labour costs i n mining the g a n i s t e r thus r a i s i n g i t s p r i c e . 
One i n t e r e s t i n g aspect i s the s t i c k i n e s s of the p r o d u c t i v i t y 
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Table: The Cost of Ganister and Cement per ton of s t e e l i n the l a s t s i x 
months of each year, a t the E a s t and West Shops: F i v e y e a r l y i n t e r v a l s . 
I884-1913 
Year Cost of Ganister & Cement 
per ton of s t e e l ignot. 
1884 3.00d 
1889 1.2 Id 
1894 0.50d 
1899 O.I8d 
1904 0.20d 
1909 0.32d 
1913 0,32d 
Source: P r i v a t e Cost Books. (DCROi D/CQ/97, 100 & I O l ) . 
i n the l a t e 1880'.s f o r t h i s may have been due to the r e s t r i c t i v e p r a c t i c e s 
and inexperience of the labour f o r c e . Richard Evans complained to David 
Dale i n 1887i 
"... we have a l s o i n d i c a t i o n s of trouble from the workmen i n t h i s 
"department (new E a s t Shop), more e x p e c i a l l y the young hands which were put 
" on from the Puddings and who have not y e t learned t h e i r business- "Their 
aim i s to reduce the make by r e s t r i c t i n g the charge"• (8) 
These e a r l y years;were marked by the ebb and flow of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t 
as both sides attempted to secure the stronger bargaining p o s i t i o n . 
P r o d u c t i v i t y and innovation i n the R o l l i n g Departments. 
There was a steady progress maintained i n the growth off productivity 
i n r o l l i n g s t e e l p l a t e s down to 1900, when there was a sharp r e v e r s a l . There 
are a number of f e a s i b l e explanations for t h i s ; f i r s t l y the modernisation 
of the m i l l s i n the l a t e 1880's which improved t h e i r s u i t a b i l i t y f o r r o l l i n g 
s t e e l p l a t e s . Secondly, throughout the I890*s the industry was s t r v i n g to 
meet the excess demand and so the m i l l s were running a t near f u l l c a p acity. 
However, a f t e r the boom of 1900-01 subsided i t became evident that the 
p o s i t i o n was reversed, and there e x i s t e d excess capacity* The S c o t t i s h 
makers were the f i r s t to respond to t h i s forming an A s s o c i a t i o n to r e s t r i c t 
competition, but i n 1904 they were joined by the North-east COast f i r m s . 
The e f f e c t was that p r i c e s were maintained and output was cut back, thus the 
m i l l s were run a t below capacity with consequently higher c o s t s - p r o d u c t i v i t y 
f e l l and r e a l costs rose. There i s f u r t h e r evidence given i n George Ainsworth 
report on the steelworks i n 1905 tha t the m i l l s were running below t h e i r 
optimal capacity because of inadequate capacity i n the b l a s t furnace and s t e e l 
making departments. ( 9 ) Added to t h i s was the absence of any s i g n i f i c a n t 
investment i n new m i l l machinery a f t e r 1900, the combination led to a 
s i t u a t i o n where the p r o d u c t i v i t y of the s t e e l plate m i l l s was no b e t t e r i n 
1913 than i t had been i n 1887. 
There were no s i g n i f i c a n t advances made i n the Angle M i l l s , and those 
that were made during the l a t e 1890's were probably due to^a learning process 
on the part of the labour force, since there werexino material improvements 
Footnotes C*) ftnct C?) On page 392. 
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recorded as being made to the plant u n t i l 1911 when new cogging engines 
were i n s t a l l e d . (10) 
I t can be seen from the above r e s u l t s that the postponements and 
modifications made to investment plans i n the l a t e l890's and earl y 1900's 
had c l e a r l y detrimental e f f e c t upon the e f f i c i e n c y of the Consett Iron Company' 
iron and steelworks. 
(g) R. Evans to David Dale, 4 A p r i l I887. (DCRO : D/CO/68). 
(9') Directors' Minute. 5 September, 1905. pp. 77-82. (DCRO : D/CO/40). 
(IO) Directors' Minute. 2 May, 1911. p.158. (DCRO : D/CO/42). 
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APPENDIX G.2. 
Estimation of the Real Cost of Manufacturing Pig Iron, Steel Ingots. S t e e l Angles 
and P l a t e s . 
The method has simply been to deflate the component costs i n the 
manufacture of each of the products. The cost i s deflated by price data 
given i n the Cost Books; where there was no price data, as i n the case of 
labour and the miscellaneous category, other sources have been used. 
With labour, recourse was taken to s l i d i n g scale agreements and the 
reductions and advances i n wages recorded under these agreements. For the 
miscellaneous products Rousseau's Price Index for miscellaneous i n d u s t r i a l 
products was used except i n the case of s t e e l ingots, where there was a 
heavy bias i n the miscellaneous category towards the scrap metal input, i n 
t h i s case a price index was derived from the Cost Books of the price of scrap 
and t h i s was used to deflate the costs. 
Since t h i s method required the construction of indices, the aggregation 
of the components r e a l costs, to give the t o t a l average r e a l cost index, was 
done by weighting each component index. The weighting used was the share 
of the component cost i n t o t a l average cost i n that year. 
Below i s the Real Cost Equation:-
R = Total average r e a l cost, T = Total average cost, C= Component Cost 
subscript i = product, I = Component Cost = Index, P = Price Index, 
subscript j * year 
numbers 1 - n = inputs. 
1. Mej&ad.. 
If 1 L n 
u A m * '00 
2. Inputs 
Each of the products was divided into the following inputss-
Product: 
Pi g Iron Iron ore, Coke, Coal, Limestone, Labour & Miscellaneous 
(store s , estimated charges &c.) 
Pig Iron, Coal, Labour, & Miscellaneous (Scrap, sand, 
casts, estimated charges). 
Steel Ingots, Coal, Labour & Miscellaneous (Estimated charges &c} 
Steel Ingots, Coal, Labour & Miscellaneous (Estimated charges &c) 
Inputs i 
St e e l Ingots 
St e e l Plates 
St e e l Angles 
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3.Sources. 
i ) Costs: A l l the costs were derived from the Private Cost Books of 
the Consett Iron Company (DCRO : D/CO/ 97, 100 &,10l). Since Consett had an 
accounting year from June to June, costs given are the average costs f o r the 
year ending i n June, thus a cost f o r 1866 i s the average cost over the l a s t 
s i x months of 1885 and the f i r s t s i x months of 1886. 
I n the case of S t e e l ingots i n the East and West Shops and Stee angles 
the years are i n f a c t calender years. 
i i ) P r i c e s t Most of the prices were also derived from the Private Cost 
Books, however the price index f o r labour and the miscellaneous categories 
had to be derived from elsewhere. The price for blastfurnacemen's wages had 
to be estimated from a number of sources; between 1870-78 there was no s l i d i n g 
scale agreement which could be used as an estimate, and therefore i t was. 
necessary to construct an hypothetical index. This was done by using the s i x t h 
s l i d i n g scale agreement of 8th A p r i l I89I (R.C. on Labour, P.P. 1892 
Z~c 6795 - iv_7 XXXVI' Appendix X X I I l ) to compute advances and reductions 
based upon the price of No.3 Cleveland Pig. The most serious weakness i n t h i s 
technique i s that i t probably overestimates the extent to which wages rose 
during the boom between 1872 - 74• I t also suffers i n that i t uses a scale set 
i n the 1890's, by which time there had been a secular price decline, and pig 
iron was an affected commodity. Thus the standard base was for a price of 
£l.l8s0d. whereas i t would probably i n the 1870's have been i n the area of 
£2.05s.0d to £2.10s.0d. The net r e s u l t of t h i s i s that the gains i n labour 
productivity are underestimated over the whole period. The period between 
1879-1891 was estimated on a s i m i l a r basis to that of 1870-78, but using the 
price of P i g iron quoted i n the R.C. on labour P.P. 1892 fc 6795 - i v y XXXVI, 
Appendix XXV.) The yearly average i n t h i s case was arrived a t by aggregating 
the four quotations and dividing by four. Between 1891-94 the Price of No.3 
Cleveland was used again to f i n d the wage index, and then from 1894 - 1913 
advances and reductions given on the scale were quoted i n the Directors' Minutes, 
of the Consett Iron Company. 
The Average wages of Consett's s t e e l smelters, which was used for the 
cal c u l a t i o n of both the East and West Shop was for 1883-1894 computed from material 
i n the Company Letterbooks and the Directors' Minutes. Between 1894-1905 
quotations of advances and reductions were given i n the Directors' Minutes, whilst 
between 1905-1913 the B r i t i s h S t e e l Smelters' Reports 1913 were used 
(Manchester: Co-operative P r i n t i n g Society Ltd., 1914» p.693). 
The Averages f o r the Steel Millmen were calculated from the price for 
s t e e l plate between I884-I886; from 1887-1901 advances and reductions were given 
i n the Ironworkers' Journal, w h i l s t from 1901-1913 the Consett Iron Company's 
Directors' Minutes were used. 
The Rousseaux Indices (B.R. Mitchell & P. Deane, Abstract of B r i t i s h 
H i s t o r i c a l S t a t i s t i c B ) was used as the price index i n the data f o r miscellaneous 
p r i c e s . His category of 'Principal I n d u s t r i a l Products' was taken as the index 
( i b i d . pp. 472-73.) 
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Conclusion 
The f i v e s e r i e s produced are intended to show trends i n the movement 
of the Company's r e a l costs, which are i n themselves an indicator of changes 
inproductivity. The index f or P i g Iron which i s the most defective 
because of the bias created by the price of labour, i s supplemented by the 
Productivity Index used by D.N. McCloskey (Q.J.E., 1968); the method and 
sources used i n t h i s are discussed i n the following Appendix. 
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APPENDIX G.3. 
A Measure of Productivity Change in the Manufacture of Pig Iron at Consett 
The method used i s that derived by D.N. McCloskey to measure the change 
in total productivity in the British Pig Iron Industry, ( l ) The method 
was adapted by McCloskey from R. Solow's work upon economic growth and 
technological change. (2) The equation takes the following form: 
A Q 
- {ScAjg + so . AJ^+ s i . d ^ + sk 
where A = technical change function 
Q = Output 
C = Coke 
0 = Iron ore or ironstone. 
L = Labour 
K = Capital. 
S = Share in total cost 
= Change in the function 
Sources of the data. 
Inevitably in historical research there i s a gulf between the ideal 
s t a t i s t i c a l 'series and those actually to hand. These calculations have 
not been immune to the malady, however the results produced by the data 
correspond well with those arrived at by the previously described real cost 
calculations. 
The main source was the Private Cost Books of William Jenkins and .George 
Ainsworth. (3) These contained information on the output of pig iron and the 
inputs of coke and ore, however there was no readily available measure for 
capital input. This problem has been overcome by using a measure which could 
be called 'blastfurnace weeks', that i s an aggregation of the number of weeks 
each furnace was i n blast during the year (4)• The data for the measurement 
of labour input was even more sparse, and so i t was simply assumed that there 
was proportionality between the amount of capital used and the quantity of labour 
employed. This has the serious disadvantage of taking no account of reductions 
or additions to the labour force because of changing technology - however 
Consett's blastfurnace plant was fundamentally the same over the whole period. 
The next problem was finding the proportion of the component cost in 
total cost; this was straightforward for coke, ore and labour which were accounted 
in the Private Cost Books. Capital was more awkward since there was no account 
of capital costs, thus i t was necessary to s i f t through the Directors' Minutes 
and extract as far as possible a l l references to expenditure on blastfurnace plant. 
(1) D.N. McCloskey, Economic Maturity and Entrepreneurial Decline; British Iron 
and Steel, 1870-1913 PP.83.92. 
(2) R.M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function Review of 
Economics and Statistics, XXXIX, 1957. 
(3) Private Cost Books. (DCRO : D/CO/97, 100, & 101). 
(4) Production and Stock Books. 1869-1913 (DCRO : D/CO/107-109.) 
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This was then written off over a thirty year period, by dividing the sum 
by the output over thiry years. The result was a sum of lOd per ton 
which i n fact approximates to the amount charged for capital by Bell 
Brothers. (5) 
(5) Bell Brothers, Ltd. Profit and Loss Accounts. Cost Accounts &c (North Riding County Record Office). 
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Annual Summary of Makes 
Year 
ending 
June 
Coal Coke 
Beehive 
By-Products Pig Iron Ingots Plates ^Sectional 
1913 2,348,839 280,019 
4 2,171,505 281,644 189,277 231,258 269,112 118,053 64,098 
5 1,812,974 180,901 164,496 206,223 251,535 103,490 73,152 
6 1,737,555 205,167 305,678 210,212 249,789 89,689 84,232 
7 1,700,259 231,370 341,289 258,594 263,525 119,497 82,636 
8 1,572,806 197,594 342,374 290,723 266,028 125,726 87,722 
1919 1,455,303 176,630 329,847 219,206 212,573 93,136 72,178 
1920 1,629,220 114,416 326,404 212,662 215,640 96,007 71,913 
I 1,153,986 46,332 . 247 ,360 171,469 104,064 77,090 36,424 
2 1,894,333 40,715 256,533 100,793 55,843 28,681 15,813 
9months 
3** 1,656,680 83,334 254,992 79,151 9,116 2,059 736 
4 2,258,705 54,616 363,782 132,409 
5 2,316,678 614,964 173,065 New Steel Works 
6 1,144,628* 27,817 487,524 167,842 64,887 30,549 8429 
7 709,525 13,842 287,570 153,600 98,407 44,666 23,595 
8 2,090,688 47,425 632,547 298,397 250,431 98,333 68,535 
9 2,131,053 50,205 680,841 235,134 216,857 92,743 70,707 
1930 2,314,753 52,893 1,041,076 267,676 316,272 127,137 90,885 
I 2,205,059 32,781 920,816 237,630 179,095 74,730 60,203 
2 1,955,797 34,291 628,936 98,995 147,625 44,872 53,505 
3 1,839,141 32,577 641,818 96,227 134,913 49,248 52,867 
4 1,886,084 16,024 803,653 116,484 225,673 78,344 78,399 
5 2,094,334 46,651 1,043,808 210,675 294,310 100,560 97,146 
6 2,022,368 20,378 1,043,412 202,281 326,846 119,589 113,208 
7 1,992,177 50,246 1,108,782 258,093 371,654 159,992 131,199 
8 2,029,892 47,224 1,139,037 325,419 379,503 187,274 132,687 
9 1,703,052 — 882,195 233,773 276,552 119,545 85,244 
1940 
•Accounted for by 782,161 produced at Consett C o l l i e r i e s . 
** Year ending March. 
During 1937-38 Consett purchased 91,989 tons of Ingots. 
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Chemicals produced by CONSETT IRON COMPANY. I9I4-I939 
Tar Templetown 
Sulphate 
of Ammonia 
Crude 
Benzole 
(Gall.) 
Tar 
J 
P e l l 
s of 
Unnionia 
Rectified Gas 
Prod. oin 
(Gall.)i Cu.ft. 
Tar 
Langley Park 
s of Rectified 
Ammonia Products 
(Gall.) 
1014 9026 2570 663,603 
5 7285 2105 531,956 705 238 18,128 
6 8047 2274 526,169 6714 1939 333,823 
7 8639 962 551,838 6966 2043 406,751 
8 8674 644 620,574 6696 2298 395,571 
9 8517 2076 586,097 6518 2077 431,816 
1920 8326 2389 593,699 6545 2029 456,330 
I 6201 1736 382,906 4641 1376 304,145 
2 6247 1728 360,936 5100 1723 368,510 
3 6313 1895 410,277 5374 1599 374,384 
4 8707 2499 606,345 7928 2451 49I r27T 
5 8457 2299 586,568 13055 3160 646,574 3,608,372 7755 2292 474,826 
6 7543 2082 533,131 14590 3423 637,563 3,678,845 2216 617 113,830 
7 3818 1055 225,808 7413 1907 504,407 2,151,106 2892 716 122,676 
8 8324 2229 519,600 15244 3765 1098,889 -4,138,911 9509 2302 421,635 
9 7447 2319 533,848 14583 3635 1087,213 4,346,851 9334 2337 441,376 
1930 7666 2310 500,956 15413 3852 1140,867 4,497,701 9286 2228 414,425 
I 7822 2184 503,661 12969 3250 1020,345 3,850,039 8740 2217 432,561 
2 1072 291 78,934 10348 2352 558,610 2,755,556 6632 1662 284,197 
3 ±. — — I I 9 I 8 2872 555,327 3,053,035 6504 1613 296,289 
4 3466 992 290,627 I34I9 3254 896,738 3,630,427 7209 1807 352,654 
5 9332 2610 670,347 14556 3587 1200,852 5,782,163 8506 2124 508,672 
6 10066 2713 674,695 14356 3363 1184,276 4,393,115 8604 2123 561,935 
7 I002I 2758 683,868 I440I 3402 1220,989 4,228,449 8622 2203 556,818 
8 9550 2705 696,474 14678 3542 i2sij?40> 4,379,651 8686 2230 529,944 
9 5385 1412 396,225 I2I67 3023 839,424 3,627,540 7147 2023 495,980 
